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ABSTRACT
This thesis endeavours to uncover the influence of
Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" in the theological thought of
R. Bultmann, P. Tillich and K. Barth. As background and
preparation, consideration is given to the thoughts and
conceptions of Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack and Troeltsch. The
suggestion is made that these men provide the initial starting-
point for theology's bout with the eternal truths of faith and
the accidental truths of history. As an alternative to
Liberalism, S. Kierkegaard is examined. Special interest is
given to his interpretation to Lessing's determination of
history. Further, his understanding of the Absolute Paradox
in the midst of history is considered. R. Bultmann repre¬
sents a contemporary endeavour to utilize the background set
by Liberalism and Kierkegaard in coping with Lessing's problem.
To evaluate his approach Bultmann's e:xposition of Christology
and history as eschatology is examined. A similar approach
is utilized in evaluating P. Tillich. In both cases, the
proposition is advanced that Bultmann and Tillich place heavy
emphasis upon the meaning and significance of Christ while de-
emphasizing and possibly de-valuating His facticity. And as
a consequence, both men approach the sphere of history with
the intention of interpreting it in personal, human terms.
As a result, it is suggested that both men only handle
Lessing's "ditch" from a subjective, personal perspective
without adequately considering the objective, historical. By
contrast, Barth's exposition of Jesus Christ and history is
considered. Armed with the epistemological tools of Anselm,
he views Christ in biblical, historic terms. He understands
Him to be the real revelation of God in space and time. As
a consequence, history opens to the actual presence of God
who is the beginning and the end of all time. The personal
dimension which Bultmann and Tillich considered is not
ignored. However, Barth attempts to take seriously the
actuality and supra-temporality of God. As he does this,
the gap which Lessing perceived between eternal and
accidental truths is undone. Barth no longer interprets
Lessing's problem in ontological terms. Rather, God's
creativity and grace do not recognize the artificial barrier
conceived by Lessing. The "ditch" over which Lessing could
not leap does not and cannot infringe upon the absolute freedom
of God. In the end, Lessing's problem appears to be
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A fair amount of paper and. print has been used by-
theologians in order to explicate and to present a view of
faith that is relevant and immediate to its understanding
and practice. The problems and issues seem pressing and
pertinent for its credibility and sustenance in today's
world.. Often times, these central questions loom forward
as revolutionary and unique for the time and place in which
they are formulated and discussed. It would appear that
theologians are constructing new interconnections and offer¬
ing new insights into new problems and areas of concern.
But a consideration occasionally arises which gives pause
for reflection and for taking stock of the real novelty
and uniqueness of its problems and issues. At first glance,
such a consideration may not occur. But as the pages are
turned and the content digested, one may be prompted to ask,
"How really new is this question?" On the surface, the
words and phrases theologians employ may reflect the
modernity of the times, but upon closer inspection the
vestiges of past concerns and issues may lie hidden, waiting
to be revealed and to be understood. In the light of this
consideration, theology's newness takes on a more mature
and weathered, demeanour. Understanding the present as set
in past contexts does not diminish the seriousness nor the
relevancy of the endeavour, rather it clarifies its tradition
and sharpens the scope and options within which the project
is set and pursued. The variations of particular issues
and problems are seen to have resulted in an assortment of
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conclusions and working-hypotheses which are themselves
the material for new, though seasoned, resolutions.
It is in this context that the role of Jesus Christ
in present theological enterprise shows itself as an
intricate and central theme. In the recent publication of
various systems, theologians have found it incumbent to
reflect upon and to decide the interpretation of His person
which, in turn, displays the Christian faith's relation to
history. The centrality of His person seems to be an un¬
doubted presupposition. As well, its interpretation appears
to enjoy, at least, a recent tradition which affects the
present choices and discussions. Indeed, the theological-
critical pursuits of the nineteenth century have accentuated
this point. The historical-critical approach to Jesus
Christ implicitly, if not directly, seems to assume that
faith is irrevocably bound-up with the life and work of this
man. In the course of exhaustive research and controversy,
the "Life of Jesus" scholars unrelentlessly pursued Him and
attempted to bring Him from the concealment of faith. The
approach of this movement was to portray Christ in His full
humanity. To accomplish this task, these men scrutinized
the biblical texts and sought to reconstruct the life-
situation of His times in order to explain and thus to com¬
prehend not only the constituency of His life-style but also
the fabric and weave of His faith. It would appear to be
the case that various implicit and explicit assumptions
guided and limited the work at hand. Initially, the
historical-critical scholars seem to have assumed the full
humanity of Christ. This assumption would presumably allow
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the treatment of the biblical text to be done in a thorough¬
going, objective manner. This is to say, the text would
be handled as an historical document from which certain
facts could be gleaned. The accumulation and organization
of the objective data could be utilized to build a portrait
of the Christ in a way which would reveal Him as a man of
His times. To reach the objective facts, the scholar needed
to peel away the accretions of the faith-claims. Again,
this interpretive "house cleaning" ostensibly presupposed a
climate of opinion which found it difficult, if not
impossible, to accept faith's claim to mediate the reality of
God in an empirical fashion. In a sense, the world-view of
the scholar found itself qualified by the supremacy of Reason.
This dimension of the human prowess appears to function in an
objective, material and causal manner. The rationality and
intelligibility of reality apparently becomes dependent upon
the verdict of Reason. This function of life disposes of
perceptual experiences in that it contains a system of
beliefs and values which ultimately decide the sense or non¬
sense of an issue. (For an introductory discussion to world-
views and their systems of belief and value, Stephen C.
Pepper's World Hypotheses provides a valuable survey.) No
doubt the ascendency of Reason possesses correlation to the
ascendency of a successful technical, scientific method. In
the midst of this climate of opinion, the historical-critical
scholar endeavours to be scientific in his own right by being
objective. If faith claims that Jesus Christ is very man
and very God, it would seem to follow that Reason can uncover
the possibility or probability of this claim. Unfortunately,
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Reason and its method do not seem to be able to cope with
the alleged non-empirical reality of God. The scholar finds
it difficult to comprehend the transcendent or infinite
dimension of Christ's person given the assumption of the
non-objective reality of God. "How is it possible to know
and to understand His divinity in transcendental terms within
a climate of opinion which appears unable to grasp or to
accept what cannot be scientifically investigated?" The
justification and the rationale for His interpretation in human
terms finds its well-spring in the working-hypothesis of the
world-view. As a consequence, the scholar strives to view
Jesus and His message in anthropological terms. At least
man, past or present, can be scientifically observed and
considered. If one asks, "Who is Jesus Christ?"; the
historical-critical scholar understandably portrays Him as a
religious man with a God-consciousness. The "degree" of
God-consciousness and the "type" of religious man would
ostensibly be conditioned by the relevant facts of the matter,
not to mention the interpretation given these facts by the
investigator. In this way, Jesus Christ, the man, becomes
the occasion for man's pathway to God. His divinity is
defused in transcendental terms. Therefore He cannot be a
demonstration of God's presence but only an illustration.
An outgrowth of this method was the intellectualization of
faith. It belongs to the prowess of the scholar to sift
through the empirical material. His painstaking research
and exhaustive comparisons culminating in his "Life of Jesus"
represents an intellectual investment of time and talent.
As well, the continued centrality of Jesus in His human form
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seems to suggest that His way to God and His belief-patterns
were accorded normative value. The scholar's inquiry into
His person reveals the patterns and forms of faith, and pre¬
sumably He becomes its paradigm. Consequently, the believer
initially comes to faith through an exercise of Reason. The
believer assents to Him and therefore faith becomes an
augmenting of Reason's capacity. Further, the historical-
critical approach not only affects the understanding of
Christ's person but also the content of faith. With the
credibility of the transcendent placed in doubt, faith like
Jesus undergoes a this-worldly transformation. He mediates
the way to God, but the content of God and of the way need
to be seen in finite terms. As a result, faith becomes the
ethical and moral teacher of man. Man's relation to God is
.keynoted by the ethical teachings of Jesus Christ. This seems
reasonable and intelligible in that faith cannot be seen to
be openly controverting the assumed rationality of reality.
The historical-critical way to Jesus Christ permits an assort¬
ment of interpretive forays into the facts of faith. It
was the criticism of Martin Kahler and Albert Schweitzer
which called into question the fancifulness and errancy of
the "Life of Jesus" undertaking. Kahler took issue with
the objective and intellectualizing assumptions which viewed
Christ without the ingredient of faith's claims. And
Schweitzer sought to display the purely reasonable though
highly personal inventions created by the scholar's imagination.
Nonetheless, the thrust of this method appears to have
signalled the importance of Christ's person for faith's under¬
standing of itself and of the world to which it relates. As
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well, it has accentuated, the importance of the objective
grounding of faith in order to avoid fanciful inventions of
a subjective nature.
However, the intricacy and centrality of His person has
not exhausted itself with the empirical inquiry. As a
counter-balance to the position of this theology, the nine¬
teenth century appears to have proffered a subjective and
valuational method for the interpretation of His person.
Again, this method seems to exist in the wake of Reason's
ascendency as the sole arbiter of reality. It may possibly
be viewed as an attempt to preserve the transcendental contents
of faith. But in a sense, the method may also be seen to
move "underground" into the personal and intimate experience
of the believer. Schleiermacher is one of the prominent
forebearers of this understanding of faith. In his Speeches
to the Cultured Despisers of Religion and in The Christian
Faith, he may be seen to set the tone for the subjective,
personal view. Man's e:xperience, internally valuated and
understood, permits an outlet for maintaining faith's
integrity in the face of the objective, scientific onslaught.
Man cannot pretend to demonstrate the presence of God in the
world, but he can feel and believe Him to be working there.
Though tenuous, the verification of this feeling is
individually obtained through the effects He bestows. In
this way, the person of Jesus Christ can be seen to be the
Godman in the effects of His God-consciousness upon man. In
an undemonstrable manner, He possesses the power to initiate
and to mediate the God-consciousness to His followers. Christ
makes man aware of his absolute dependence upon the Father.
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This approach appears to transpose the importance of Christ
from the factual, objective sphere to the subjective,
valuational. The material dimension is apparently super¬
ceded by His significance for the believer. However, the
material dimension is not completely abandoned. One may
possibly interpret this shift of emphasis as a reaction to the
objectivity of the former method. And again, this shift may
also represent a complementary additive to a one-sided
analysis. Faith becomes a matter of private, personal
concern. Man is called upon to dispose of faith in his own
intimate way. At this point, a certain amount of concrete-
ness and realness seems to be extracted from Him. His
ultimate disposition lies in the attitude of man and in the
decision he takes. The intellectualism of the historical-
critical method seems to give way to the relativism of the
subjective, valuational. No doubt, man retains a conscious¬
ness of the divine and the infinite, but these categories
appear to be diluted with an overdose of the finite — of man.
His finitude gives substance to the content of the infinite.
Indeed, this consequence does not seem unjustified or even
unreasonable given the climate of opinion. If man cannot
really and rationally turn to the reality of God in an
intelligible and conceptual manner, it seems to follow that
he will turn to an investigation of himself and of the effects
of faith upon him. After all, man plays an integral part in
the relevancy of faith. The problem is finding a normative
content for the God-consciousness Christ mediates. Without
faith's real and certain grounding in lived experience, man
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presumably needs to improvise this basis. The apparent
inability to organize and to normalize the improvisation
results in the entailing relativism. The centrality of
Christ's person is maintained, but the seed of subjectivism
seems to have been sown. To explain Jesus Christ, man looks
to the effects He produces within him.
Given the climate of opinion of the past century,
theology has devised at least two modi operandi for inter¬
connecting the ground and content of faith. As the ground
of faith, Jesus Christ's centrality is upheld in both
approaches. Indeed, this seems to be a most basic operating
assumption or "pre-understanding". To protect faith's
content against becoming an idea, illusion, or mere rational
assent, theology today may pick and choose from the past
traditions with modifications. But faith's grounding must
also be protected in its integrity. "Who is Jesus Christ?"
— man, God, or Godman? These appear to be some of the
alternatives which the nineteenth century has passed onto the
present. It has been the great fame (or infamy?) of
Gotthold Lessing to have drawn the distinction between the
choices so clearly. "Accidental truths of history can
never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." In
this one sentence, Lessing has made a great stride in
clarifying the present issues and problems for theology.
"How can a contingent man of history maintain 'the whole
weight of eternity' or the necessary content of faith?" It
would seem to be the case that both modi operandi work with¬
in this simple though baffling framework. Observation
shows reality to be contingent and accidental, yet Reason
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assumes the content of faith to be eternal and necessary.
Apparently, this distinction did not overly concern Lessing
in that he understood man already to be in the possession
of faith's content. For him, it is a natural phenomenon
which is obtainable through the faculty of Reason. It is
this function which manifests the power to extract the
permanent and the necessary truths for life. While Reason
may deal with the contingent and material realities, these
things are only occasions or illustrations of truths or
ideals which are more lasting and infinite. These latter
truths remain constant and necessary even though history moves
along. In this characterization, Lessing seems to have
succeeded in driving a logical or a priori wedge between the
ground and content of faith — the accidental versus the
necessary. If one asks Lessing, "Who is Jesus Christ?";
he would presumably retort that He is one of man's teachers.
Through His insights and illuminations, man has become aware
of another and more basic truth — immortality. He is the
"reliable" teacher who has made this enlightenment possible
and understandable. Jesus Christ illustrates and occasions
this truth. However, He does not demonstrate it. Indeed,
the accidental characterization of His person cannot become
the proof for the necessary truth He delivers. Lessing
would vocally proclaim that one cannot really expect him to
re-think and to re-interpret his entire understanding of the
world because faith claims this one man to be the Godman
incarnate. There is no real proof for this and to expect
him to interpolate from the contingent historical facts some
necessary truth is the "ugly, broad ditch" over which he
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cannot leap. In part, Lessing's stand, was aimed, at dis¬
arming the argument from miracles as a proof for Christ's
divinity. While he did not question that the biblical
material may be quite correct in its assertions, the fact
still remains that miracles are not part of present experience
and that the narrative is not really conclusive enough. The
force and the logic of Lessing's position seems terribly for¬
midable. While a theologian may not completely agree with
Lessing's interpretation, it has evidently become his res¬
ponsibility for proposing an alternative interpretation to his
problem. In the face of this situation, theology reiterates
the who-question in regard to Jesus Christ. The two possible
methods developed and utilized in the nineteenth century take
on a more serious demeanour because of Lessing's resounding
statement. To approach Christ's person objectively involves
the risk of finalizing the split between Him and faith — i.e.,
see the Wolfenbuttel Fragments or D.F. Strauss' The Life of
Jesus Critically Examined. Alternatively, theology may
choose to view Him subjectively and valuationally. But
again, this method runs the risk of severing Him from reality
and thus defusing the concreteness and application of faith's
content — i.e., see Schleiermacher. Taking the formulation
of the problem defined by Lessing, theology pursues its task
between these two pitfalls.
Therefore, one approach for discerning faith's inter¬
relationship with itself and with history is to begin with
the interpretation Lessing gives to the ground and content
of faith. It would seem that how one interconnects these
elements will affect faith's relation to history. That is,
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by deciding the internal connection of faith, the resulting
understanding will affect its interpretation of history.
Indeed, theology makes decisions about its understanding of
the latter as it decides about the correlation between faith's
content and Jesus Christ's historicity. For example,
Lessing's characterization of the internal dynamics of faith
in rational terms reflects his decision about the accidental
nature of history. The interpretive question becomes a bit
more clarified if his definition of the propositions establi¬
shes the initial ground rules for the discussion. On the
one hand, faith's content presumably contains value, truth
and the eternal. According to him, these things are
necessary and constant in their determination and qualifi¬
cation. In matters of faith, Reason can evidently only deal
with a sure and certain foundation which is unchangeable and
constant. On the other hand, the ground of faith consists
of the historical, empirical level and places the accent on
the historicity of Jesus Christ. Again according to Lessing,
His person partakes of the same historical probability and
possibility as do all phenomena. For the purpose of
clarifying and defining the theological issues, Lessing seems
to provide a concise and provocative beginning. However
though he presents the initial interpretation and thus sets
the framework for discussion, theology reserves the right to
improvise, interpolate and interpret his terms and categories.
Consequently, it appears to be incumbent upon theology to
deal interpretively and meaningfully with faith's historical
grounding and necessary content. In the first respect, it
will ostensibly answer the who-question — "Who is Jesus
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Christ?" — in terms which reflect a decision about faith's
ground. Thus for example if one follows Lessing and presumes
Jesus Christ to be characterized as an accidental figure,
faith's point of contact with historical life is evidently-
portrayed in probable and approximate terms. In Lessing's
understanding, Jesus Christ is one of man's teachers. His
person is important yet ancillary to the on-going nature of
His message. Following on the heels of this presumption,
one encounters the task of moving from Christ's accidental
historicity to the assumed necessity of His message. In the
second respect, theology will attempt to understand what this
lasting content really is. After a decision has been
rendered about the who-question — about the historicity of
Jesus Christ, theology will endeavour to interpret faith's
substance and relevance for historical life. Continuing
with Lessing, his decision about Jesus Christ would seem to
entail some re-interpretation and retranslation of faith's
meaning. Without benefit of a sure and certain demonstration
of Christ's person, His message requires a comprehensive re¬
formulation of its transcendental, objective content into
finite and rational terms. For Lessing, rational content
was more desirable and comprehensible than transcendental
and supernatural unknowns. Therefore, theology's problem
can be seen from the perspective of two interrelated and
interpretive questions — (l) "Who is Jesus Christ?" and
(2) "What is the message of faith?" — which leads to a third
question — (3) "How does faith's internal connection (l & 2)
affect its understanding of history?" Once again returning
to Lessing, his decision for Christ's accidental nature and
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for faith's rational content did not disturb him, in that
man as a rational creature can obtain the truth of faith
even though he lives in the contingencies of life. Man with
his rational faculty is the bridge between the accidental
and the eternal. Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" was an
artificial problem for him since his understanding of the
propositions already presuppose a solution. Armed with
Reason, man can engage the accidental truths of history and
discover there a sure and certain basis for his eternal
happiness. With Lessing's characterizations of faith's
ground and content as the embarkation point, it is possible
to review theology's attempt to modify and to reconcile his
position in order to bring Jesus Christ and His message to¬
gether in a manner which is relevant and applicable to
historical existence. But Lessing has made the exercise
quite interesting. His legacy is the dreaded obstacle of the
"ditch" which separates faith's ground and content. Theology's
success in negotiating and bridging this pitfall will
substantiate faith's connection with historical living.
As a matter of method, the approach of this paper will
be to review and to comment upon representatives of late
nineteenth century Protestant Liberalism, Kierkegaard,
Bultmann, Tillich and Barth. The review and comment will
centre around the various attempts to handle Lessing's
propositions. As well, various vestiges of other theological
systems in the work under consideration will also be suggested
in order to point out the contextualism of past and present
endeavours. In the main, the three questions posed above
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will guide and limit the inquiry. On this basis, each
chapter deals with (a) an introduction into the theological
method, (b) an interpretation of Jesus Christ and of
faith's message, (c) the effects of this understanding in
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A. PROLEGOMENA TO A BEGINNING: A CLUE FROM LESSING
But to jump with that historical truth to a quite
different class of truths, and to demand of me that
I should form all my metaphysical and moral ideas
accordingly; to expect me to alter all my funda¬
mental ideas of the nature of the Godhead because
I cannot set any credible testimony against the
resurrection of Christ: if that is not a M£Ta?f)<icrcs
6 is ye\/0S , then I do not know what
Aristotle meant by this phrase.
Accidental truths of history can never become the
proof of necessary truths of reason. 1
These words of Lessing set the stage for a discussion
of import in the theological world of nineteenth century
Liberal Protestantism. There is a clear and unmistakable
line of demarcation drawn between the truths of history and
those of reason. In terms of theological significance,
the bifurcation deals more directly with the interrelation¬
ship of faith's Jesus Christ to the structure and ground of
historical life. No doubt, certain assumptions and under¬
lying propositions frame the ground work for the distinction
made. During the course of Liberalism, prevalent con¬
ceptions of history included the characteristics of relativity,
finitude, movement and temporality. This historical nature
of life was seen to pervade the entire context of the human
world. Man's life in the nineteenth century revealed itself
to be enmeshed in the dynamics of historicality. And more,
coupled with this was the pervading quality of immanentism
which circumscribed the world in a self-contained and self-
sufficient entity. Liberal theologians worked within the
1. Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writings, pp. 53, 54.
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assumptions of this world-view and climate of opinion
where, "Reason or cognition has thus become and must remain,
as long as Western man's outlook persists, the unwitting
arbiter of reality."^ In contradistinction to the
historical, theologians embraced the contents of the Christian
faith and in particular the person of Jesus Christ. Faith
made various claims regarding this person. For instance, it
was claimed that He was the Incarnate Word, the revelation of
God. The proof of His divinity rested upon the fact of the
resurrection. Therefore in Jesus Christ, the historical
world found itself penetrated and transcended by the infinite.
Theology assumed the inviolability of God's eternity and thus
His necessity. In the face of nineteenth century's under¬
standing of the world and of faith's claims for Christ,
Liberal theologians encountered a situation which demanded
immediate attention. Lessing's dictum was assumed to
demonstrate the futility of arguing for the uniqueness of
Christ on the basis of transcendence. The theologians were
called upon to set about to explain and to interpret this
historical fact in the total context of the climate of
opinion of the time. How was one able to bind together
enough facts to demonstrate the claim of Christ's divinity?
Indeed, how are finite and accidental truths to demonstrate,
beyond doubt, the necessity and the infinity of God in time?
Lessing had made it quite explicit that for him there could
be no demand made to rethink and to re-interpret his
1. Azkoul, "Prolegomena to a Critique of Western Culture",
Greek Orthodox Theological Review, Vols.3-4, p. 151.
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metaphysical and moral conceptions of the world. Because
of their very temporal and inconclusive nature, historical
facts could not command the power or the persuasion to
effect a metamorphosis in Lessing's world-view. It is
questionable whether the Liberal theologians would disagree
with the thrust of this particular declaration. Confronted
with the advances of science and the power of Reason, these
men aligned themselves with the order of the day. It could
not be a question of demanding modern men and women to re¬
construct their assumptions of reality on the basis of an
historical claim based on a past fact. The quantitative
accumulation of facts was not viewed as possessing the
impetus to convert and to re-align modern human thinking.
No, the weight of evidence and the claim to a larger portion
of certainty lay with the modern climate of opinion. Surely
anatomy and biology and the other human sciences possessed
the ability to check, if not to refute, the claims of faith
regarding the person of Christ. Theology enlisted its
forces and checked its intellectual supplies for the coming
manoeuvres. Faith could not be allowed to perish quietly
and simply in the steady advance of Reason's progress. No
doubt, Reason arbitrated the boundaries of the intelligible
and rational world. Theology did not perceive its task to
be the unseating of such a formidable power. Indeed, it
is questionable whether Liberal theologians had harboured
such a notion. The time had thus come to re-evaluate the
thrust of faith and to bring it into line with the meta¬
physical, epistemological, and scientific views of the day.
Like physics, theology possessed the potential to be
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scientific. Of course, this was the order of the day.
Intelligibility and rationality demanded one to be somewhat
scientific. And it would seem that to be scientific not
only involved an adherence to method but also an acceptance
of basic and fundamental metaphysical and epistemological
assumptions. In an historical world the claims of faith
must be seen in their historical dimensions. This involves
the tempering of faith with various measures of finitude,
temporality, movement and immanentism. While faith's
facts may not be able to remould the order of the day, there
remained the possibility of striking a partnership. Nineteenth
Century Protestantism endeavoured to negotiate the terms of
this agreement on the acceptance of the pre-conditions and
"pre-understandings" of the day. Striking such an agreement
depended in large measure upon the role Jesus Christ could be
accorded within the limits of space and time as arbitrated by
Reason. This person moved into the forefront of concern and
discussion because faith's claims about Him provided the
stumbling-block for history's claims about relativity and
faith's pronouncement about absoluteness. This difference
of opinion established the basis upon which the theologian
could negotiate his position. What to do with Jesus Christ,
the Godman — this became a focal point of concern and an
issue demanding suitable but equitable resolution. The role
of faith in any modern conception of history would be
affected and tempered by the understanding and interpretation
of His person. Christ becomes the centre of attention. The
theologians found themselves working on the presupposition
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that "accidental truths of history" could not demonstrate
or prove the divinity and necessity of Christ. Nonetheless,
faith revolved around His person. Theology thus set out to
establish His place and to secure His abiding importance
within the context of history.
Like Lessing before them, Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack
and Troeltsch were not able to leap "the ugly, broad ditch"
separating historical uncertainty from faithful conclusiveness.
However, these men sought accommodation and assimilation with
the dominant intellectual assumptions of their day. With
this in hand, they endeavoured to re-work the content of
faith within the limits set by historical existence. The
relevance of Jesus Christ was transposed from the ontological
and metaphysical to the realm of value, significance, and
meaning. His importance was seen to lie in His conveyance of
an attitude of life which fulfils and completes this life.
Moral value and purpose become more significant and momentous
than transcendent considerations. Besides, it is a "pre-
understanding" of the day that only phenomena in their
empirical and perceptible embodiment can form the bedrock of
hard factual knowledge. In this atmosphere, it becomes more
prudent to hold speculation in abeyance in lieu of moral and
purposeful considerations, understandings and interpretations.
To speak of Jesus Christ from this perspective permits His
treatment as an historical figure contained within the mesh
of space and time reality. By avoiding speculation in
regard to His divinity, theology found it possible to maintain
His historicality as a flesh and blood man. The absoluteness
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of His divine authority evaporates and condenses into an
authority historically conditioned and qualified. In this
way Christ retains the position of importance in a limited
and temporalized manner. However, His centrality is
maintained if nonetheless qualified. By reinterpreting
the centrality of Christ in historical terms of purpose,
value and meaning, theology establishes a negotiated position
within the context of the modern order. Science and its
related disciplines are permitted to discourse in terms of
fact, data, phenomena and perception. For its own part,
theology could infuse teleological determination into the
mechanical and empirical discussions of Reason. Theology
establishes its sphere of influence upon the categories of
worth, value, meaning and purpose. But these categories are
to be taken in conjunction with the historical person of
Jesus Christ. Theology's claim to relevance and pertinence
depends upon insuring and clarifying His role in the
discernment and dispatch of the "spiritual" dimension of
immanent existence. The interpretation and implementation
of this second aspect of life affords faith a cognitive,
intelligible and rational role in a world governed by
Reason. Faith can assert itself within this area of life,
taking its lead from the person of Christ, without directly
confronting or challenging the role of Reason. Indeed,
faith's own sphere rests upon the powers of Reason and its
strictures and limitations. Reason can therefore accept
faith within the fold of reality and allow it to remain
sovereign and free in its discipline as long as faith observes
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the guidelines and groundrules governing the rational and
real from the non-rational and un-real.
The interrelationship of faith and history finds it¬
self modified and qualified "by the arbitration of Reason.
Within the limits set, Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack and
Troeltsch conceived and carried out their respective
theological enterprises. Their work was to set the stage
for those who came after them and who were theologically
nurtured and reared in the tradition of historical immanentism.
Even this tradition finds itself enmeshed within the confines
of space and time as arbitrated by Reason. The theological
tradition was to prove itself helpful to later men in that it
attempted to prepare the ground for the serious consideration
of historical questions. No doubt, this is essential for
the task of theology since the person of Jesus Christ is
lodged within the past structures of space and time. It
belongs to the influence of one particular historian who
exemplifies the preparation and explication of value, purpose
and meaning in history to open the discussion of this
chapter. Wilhelm Dilthey provides the incentive and the
structure which accepts the historicality of existence while
attempting to explicate its intelligibility systematically.
Similar to theology's project to explicate faith, Dilthey
seeks to expound the subject matter of history. And by this
attempt, Dilthey endeavours to illuminate the purposeful
and structural qualities of historical life.
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B. A BEGINNING:
AN HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE ORDER OF THE HUMAN WORLD:
WILHELM DILTHEY
In a vein similar to that of the nineteenth century
Protestant Liberals, Dilthey pursued history in order to
understand and to know it. For him, understanding becomes
an essential mode of perceiving the past. The possibility
for it rests upon the category of meaning.
Experience in its concrete reality is made coherent
by the category of meaning. This is the unity
which...joins together what had been experienced
either directly or through empathy. Its meaning
does not lie in something outside the experiences
which gives them unity but is contained in^them and
constitutes the connections between them.
Meaning performs the task of connecting and interrelating
the fibres of experience into a whole. Meaning allows one
to speak of a connectedness instead of fragmented realities.
This unity and wholeness attributes coherency and consistency
to the realm of experience. Of equal importance, Dilthey
points out that meaning does not come from outside of
experiences. This would be to allow for the imposition of
a pattern and meaning on historical life from somewhere other
than history. Metaphysical theories and speculations are
extinguished straightaway. "The significance which a fact
receives as a fixed link in the meaning of the whole is a
relation in life and not an intellectual one, not an insertion
p
of reason or thought into a part of the event." What begins
to emerge is the dependence of history upon nothing outside
1. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 74.
2. Ibid., p. 75-
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of itself. For Dilthey, it is approached as a self-
contained entity of lived experiences"'" held together in a
unity and coherence on the basis of a meaning inherent and
immanent within its own structures. Historical life does
not find it necessary to rely upon any premises or reasons
or thoughts beyond itself. Indeed, this insight into
Dilthey makes unmistakable his emphasis upon a world con¬
tained within itself. Meaning flows from the context of
life. To think historically involves one in meaningful
2
experiences "through which life becomes comprehensible."
The constituent members of the whole are connected and related
-y,
in a comprehensible manner. "Meaning is the special rela¬
tion which the parts have to the whole within life."^
Dilthey goes on to point out that life has no meaning beyond
5itself and that it means nothing other than itself. In
these terms, it is not a question of looking "behind" or
"beyond" life. Life produces significance and value in
itself. The more pressing problem for Dilthey is the
relation of meaning to understanding.^ He intends to make
it clear that "...understanding passes from something already
grasped to something new which can be understood through it.
The inner relationship lies in the possibility of reproduction
1. Gritsch, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Interpretation of
History," Lutheran Quarterly, Vol. 15, p. 6lf.
2. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 105.
3. Ibid., p. 106.
4. Ibid., p. 107.
5. Ibid.. p. 107/ (vide, Holborn, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the
Critique of Historical Reason," Journal of the History
of Ideas, Vol. 11, p. 106).
6. Ibid., p. 107.
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and empathy.""'" What Dilthey appears to be asserting is
that one can approach the historical given the fact that
2
man already stands within it as a man. He is a part of
the whole and participates in the meaning of that whole by
his constituency in time and space. The unity and coherency
of experience manifests itself because man partakes of the
meaning of life which makes this wholeness possible. "The
fact that the investigator of history is the same as the
one who makes it, is the first condition which makes scientific
history possible...." For Dilthey, history shows itself to
be a dynamic and on-going process which involves an element
of commonality. It is man who makes history and it is man
4
who investigates it. The human being stands out as the
common denominator in the historical realm. Understanding
is thus not an impossible task. It is "...the rediscovery
5
of the I in the Thou..."^ Meaning and understanding are
created by man in the process of living in interaction with
the environment, other people and things.^ Historical life
possesses a certain inscrutable and fundamental unity which
7
Reason cannot sift out. Meaning prevails in life because
man works out his intentions and purposes there. He becomes
something of a unifier, centre and principle. To think
1. Ibid., p. 107.
2. Gritsch, p. 61.
3. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 67.
4. Jenson, "Wilhelm Dilthey and a Background Problem of
Theology," Lutheran Quarterly, Vol. 15, pp« 214-215.
5. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 67.
6. Ibid., p. 78.
7. Ibid., p. 73.
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historically requires man to reflect upon himself and
mankind."1" He comes to an understanding of life as he
becomes able to think empathically and sympathically with
2
what has gone before. Human life represents the content
of experience and it is history which explores what this
life is. Dilthey is not simply dealing with another
academic discipline; rather he sees the,subject matter as
the intricacies and intimacies of human life in time.^1"
History deals with what life is because it displays its own
meaningfulness and coherency. The parts stand in relation
to the whole and the whole is in relation to the parts by
the power of intrinsic meaning. It is this category which
5
holds together life, its expressions and understandings.
Understanding depends upon the connectedness and
interrelatedness of life to its expressions and objectifi-
6
cations. The connection assumes the presence of man and
the working out of his inner state in a meaningful and
empirical manner. His interaction with the environment,
people and things creates, what Dilthey calls, the "mind-
7affected" world. The interaction that takes place results
8in the creation of values and purposes. These creations
come about since man is engaged in living which itself pre-
1. Ibid., p. 71.
2. Kluback, Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History, pp. 46-49-
3. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 74.
4. Gritsch, p. 59-
5. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 72.
6. Holborn, pp. 103-104.
7. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 128.
8. Ibid., p. 129.
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supposes the creation of meaning. Dilthey refers to this
construction as "the immanent teleological character" of
the system. "By this I mean an interaction inherent in the
structure of a dynamic system. Historical life is creative;
it constantly produces goods and values and all concepts of
these are reflections of its activity.1,1 Man leaves a trail
of empirical expressions as he comes into contact with life.
His inner motivational and intentional experiences express
2
themselves empirically. These expressions do not demonstrate
a haphazard field of connection. Rather they form themselves
into a continuum, into a system. The impetus and the
dynamics for human action and re-action results from "...
pressures and tension and the feeling of the insufficiency
of the existing state of affairs..." which "...form the basis
for action which is sustained by positive valuations, desirable
goals and ends."^1" Life provides the stimulus for human
response which endeavours to secure itself against the on¬
going pressure, tension and frustration concomitant with
living. What happens occurs through the process of
contingency; there appears to be no necessary reasons or
laws for events unfolding as they do. Man and life act and
react upon one another in a type of pleasure-pain model.
The obstacles and frustration inherent in life such as in¬
sufficiencies, pressure, tension, and death motivate man to
1. Ibid., p. 129.
2. Ibid., p. 101.
3- Ibid., p. 101.
4. Ibid., p. 145.
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react by securing his position against such uncertainties
and instabilities. The immanent teleological character
of life represents the on-going process of shoring-up his
position against finitude, transitoriness and uncertainty.
A type of struggle for survival smoulders between man and
the power of life which remains beyond his immediate
control. As this action and reaction recurs various values
2
and purposes manifest themselves. Expressions as objectifi-
cations of life resolve into systems of interaction dis¬
playing a common, general purpose and value, and these
systems express themselves in such things as law, politics,
religion, social and economic life, nations and cultural
epochs. Man's relatedness with life results in organi¬
zations and expressions and obRectifications which physically
and perceptibly manifest the inwardness of human coping and
struggling with existence.^" Understandings of the past are
possible because these features of the objective world con¬
tain a common feature expressing the relationship between
5
man and life. There remains a part of the "Thou" in the
6
objective world which the "I" can experience. In this
way what past ages and past epochs have left behind possess
ythe objectification of their copings and strugglings.
Throughout the change and movement in history, man remains
the common denominator in his intentions with life to secure
1. Dilthey, Existence, p. 24.
2. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 123*
3- Ibid., pp. 142-151.
4. Ibid., p. 120.
5. Ibid., p. 121.
6. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History, pp. 213-217.
7. Gritsch, p. 66.
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and to assure his position.
A very dynamic and on-going expression of life and
man comes into view from Dilthey's system. History reveals
man's interaction with life in his bid to stabilize it
against movement and change. "This is the point which
separates Dilthey completely from Hegel. The real is not
the rational; the real is always irrational."^ Life
moves on ambiguously. It is the human factor with the
p
creation of fact and value that imputes structure and
stability. In a sense, life imposes a constant need upon
man to come to terms with the movement and flux he finds
present everywhere. The fixed and stable points which it
lacks man creates and objectifies in the valuational and
purposeful systems of interactions with which he surrounds
himself. It appears that these systems can really be no
more than sand castles attempting to withstand the full
force of life's tides. Because of the continuousness and
the on-goingness of man and existence, adaptations and new
creations must be developed, tried and tested. Dilthey
appears to be suggesting that man imputes value, purpose,
meaning and ideals into life as a result of his attempts to
cope with it and because he is a man. He becomes a creature
of values and purposes who surrounds himself with meaning in
an endeavour to establish his life. To man's Reason,
Dilthey appears to add the category of meaning. In his
system man becomes a two-dimensional phenomenon composed of
1. Ibid., p. 65•
2. Jenson, p. 215.
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rational and valuational directives. This quality comes
to light as Dilthey explains the creation of world-views.
Of course, there comes into view a multiplicity of view¬
points, but this is to be expected given the countless
variations and permutations of life."^ However, it is a
feature of each world-view that it claims to be self-
exclusive and absolute; nonetheless the development and
continuousness of life must call into question all such
2
claims. The contradiction and exclusiveness of each view
can be brought into agreement and understanding if one
approaches the difficulty with a sense of historical aware-
ness. World-views are rooted in the fibres and contexts of
4
life. This becomes the common ground between all world-
5
views. A type of challenge-response-resolution pattern
recurs in the human encounter.^ Regular repetition and
generalized life-responses result in a traditional approach
7
adopted for the handling of the repetition. Generalized
life-responses attempt to create reality out of life and to
O
make knowledge possible. Man endeavours through the method
of world-view to integrate and establish relationships with
existence.^ This becomes necessary since life approaches
1. Dilthey, Existence, p. 17.
2. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
3- Ibid., pp. 20, 39 and (vide, Holborn, pp. 113-114).
4. Ibid., pp. 21,48,50.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 22.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Ibid., p. 22.
9. Ibid., p. 24, and (vide, Holborn, p. 102).
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man as different, strange and frightful. But in response
to this, he moves to stabilize and to secure himself against
the apparent transitoriness. World-views based on
repeated experiences and refined through the ages seek to
2
temper the "enigma of life" which constantly threatens.
Uniformities result from these views which seek to
encapsulate and to take life. These uniformities impute
4
value, meaning, and purpose to the experiences of living.
Life becomes a reality and a world which achieves value and
comprehensibility through the medium of man and the con¬
struction of his views. But it is important to be aware
of the fact that these world-views are themselves the
products of history. They are rooted in the dynamics of
life and fulfil the need of man to secure his position
5
against the relativities and uncertainties of life. They
result from man's need to cope with existence and its on-
goingness. Therefore, as long as life and man interact,
world-views will fulfil an important role in the human "will
to stability."^ They will provide the raw structures which
import intelligibility to human consciousness. Because man
and life are placed in bi-polar tension; significance, value,
purpose and ideals permeate the historical world and yield a
unitary, coherent and meaningful whole which unites the
1. Ibid., p. 24.
2. Ibid., p. 25-
3. Kluback, p. 65.
4. Dilthey, Existence, pp. 26-7.
5- Ibid., pp. 29-30.
6. Ibid., p. 30.
7. Holborn, pp. 101-102.
33
constituent members under the guidance and direction of a
common point of reference. The whole comes to
intelligibility through an understanding of the parts and
conversely, the parts come to intelligibility through an
understanding of the whole.^ This reciprocal and contextual
interrelationship permits the possibility for understanding
under the pervasive rubric of meaning. World-view, life
and man provide the integral components to the complex and
integrated dimensions and dynamics of history. It seeks to
grasp and to understand this complexity for the benefit of
2
man, the individual, who comes to know himself. This is
the vital task of history. "Man knows himself only in
■5
history...; indeed, we all seek him in history." Human
self-knowledge results as one inquires into the objectifi-
cations of life. In this way he grasps and understands
how others have coped and how he too may approach the
complexity of individual existence within the contextualism
of the whole. Man is thus the germinal cell of the
historical world.^ He figures prominently into the context
5of history because of his value-giving interaction with life.
He creates modes and means by which to harness and to
control the tides of life.^
History itself produces principles which are valid
because they make the relations contained in life
explicit. Such principles are the obligation which
1. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 106.
2. Ibid. , p. 85.
3« Ibid., p. 138.
4. Ibid., p. 140.
5. Kluback, p. 57-
6. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
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is based on a contract and the recognition of the
dignity and value of every individual simply as a
man. These truths are universally valid because
they impart order to every aspect of the historical
world. 4
These principles of connectedness and interrelatedness
assume universal validity in that they make explicit the
valuational and purposeful struggle of the individual. And
further, they are universally valid because it is man who
2
creates them. His own dignity and value underwrite and
guarantee the validity of what he creates and purposes.
Through these principles, man imposes meaning and structure
to the irrational experiences of life. He gives something
of his inner motivational and intentional structure to his
obRectifications, to his systems of interaction,and to his
all-encompassing world-view. To study these expressions
is to learn about oneself in confrontation with life. This
is where the significance and importance of history resides.
It is in the ability of man to obtain a clearer conscious¬
ness and awareness of human striving in the face of life's
4
ambiguities. Understanding remains a possibility because
man remains throughout the principle of value and purpose and
the primary actor in life's drama. Past meaning becomes
present when the "Thou" of the past is fathomed out and re-
5
produced by the "I" through a process of intuition and empathy.
1. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 74.
2. Kluback, p. 66.
3. Gritsch, p. 62f.
4. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey, pp. 11-35.
5. Gardiner (ed.), pp. 220-225y (vide, Pannenberg, "Hermeneu-
tics and Universal History," Journal for Theology and
Church, Vol. 4, pp. 122-152; Kimmerle, "Hermeneutical
Theory or Ontological Hermeneutics," Journal for Theology
and Church. Vol. 4, pp. 107-121.)
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Various latent and implicit themes emerge in
Dilthey's approach to the order of the human world. The
coping and struggling with life has already heen indicated
as describing the dynamics and the motivation perceived in
historical activity. Of significance as well, the emphasis
upon man as a creature imparting value and purpose becomes
integral in that meaningful activity provides the basis for
historical cognition and understanding. The past does not
simply become lost; rather it empirically contains the
values and purposes of a by-gone era where man was confronted
with the recurrent need to cope with the transitoriness of
life. To facilitate this matter, the creation of attitudes,
empirically expressed in laws, religion, politics, nations,
come to be developed and implemented. The world without
these creations is a hostile, frightful, strange and finite
realm. Indeed, because of these very qualities man resolves
to soften and temper life with the principles that develop
through the passage of time. By coming to an understanding
of the past one also comes to understand himself. An
historical awareness arises which opens the totality of
life. Man calls this "bad" and that "good", but such
value-judgments are themselves the products of history. By
being historically aware, one comes to the consciousness of
the relativity of life and its conceptions. World-views
and systems of interaction are all man-made phenomena
designed by the "will to stability". They are recurring
but they are not eternal. Their validity depends upon the
purposes and intentions of man. But then what is the
overall significance of historical awareness, if all that
36
one discerns is the ultimate relativity and ambiguity of
man's encounter with life? To this question, Dilthey
offers the resounding notion of liberation and freedom from
all of the dogmatic disciplines and notions which would
imprison or hinder man's total experience of life.
The historical consciousness of the finitude of
every historical phenomenon, of every human and
social condition and of the relativity of every
kind of faith, is the last step towards the
liberation of man. With it man achieves the
sovereignty to enjoy every experience to the full
and surrender himself to it unencumbered, as if
there were no system of philosophy or faith to
tie him down. Life is freed from knowledge through
concepts; the mind becomes sovereign over the cob¬
webs of dogmatic thought. Everything beautiful,
everything holy, every sacrificed relived and inter¬
preted, open perspectives which disclose some part of
reality. And equally, we accept the evil, horrible
and ugly, as filling a place in the world, as con¬
taining some reality which must be justified in the
system of things, something which cannot be conjured
away. And, in contrast to relativity, the continuity
of creative forces-, asserts itself as the central
historical fact.
This appears to be the climactic fulfilment of Dilthey's
historical approach. All of man's objectifications of
life, systems of interaction, and world-views, can only
contain a portion of life's vast diversity and totality.
To be unknowingly encumbered within the framework of any
such points of reference will result in the aberration of
life and in a lack of realistic perspective on its kaleido¬
scope which possesses countless references. Historical
consciousness and awareness open one to the relativity of
any and all views and to the vastness of experience that lies
beyond the province and dominion of any point of view. The
1. Dilthey, Patterns, pp. 167-168.
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awareness of the historicality of all life and its creations
liberates man from all dogmatic and doctrinaire obstinacy
incumbent with the feeling of absoluteness and finality."*"
All of life's obRectifications are historical phenomena
conditioned by the passage of time and founded upon the
common ground of life. As one comes to recognize and to
acknowledge the historicalness of life, the possibility
avails itself of freeing experiences from the control and
circumspection of these principles. All of life is seen to
have a place in the world and to be of such a nature that
it cannot be conjured away. Relativity of historical
phenomena assures the creative continuity of life and the
freedom of man to experience the multi-dimensional complex¬
ities of life's essence. No doubt, the systems of inter¬
action and the world-views will continue to offer logical
and comprehensible direction and guidance in the world of
change. But these value-laded institutions must be seen
in their temporality and historicality. The world's
meaning is seen to arise only in man, for he alone is open
to the possibility which life accords to this value-giving
2
creature. Man comes to know himself in history because
"man is something historical." History can be conceived
as an educational process which brings man to maturation and
fulfilment in confrontation with life. It affords the
opportunity to come to consciousness and awareness of the
1. Holborn, p. 118.
2. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 168
3- Ibid., p. 168.
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intricacies of existence from the perspective of human
meaning."1" History possesses the power to illuminate and
to illustrate the direction of value and the course of
2
purpose. In this sense, it possesses an immanent teleo-
logical character, for it directs the way to life where
human action and reaction are seen to create a temporary
equilibrium along the path.
For Dilthey, it would appear to be the case that
values and purposes represent a considerable portion of
man's nature as a man. More than Reason and rationality is
involved, for these qualities are not able to resolve and to
move behind the essential and fundamental category of life
which stimulates man to action. This aspect of the world
seems to remain a thing in itself which remains beyond the
grasp of man while nonetheless interacting with him. Life
cannot be dissolved and dissected nor can it be analyzed and
resolved. It simply is a given condition and aspect of
man's being-in-the-world. But yet he reacts to it by
creating meaning and expressing these creations empirically
through the creation of a reality. The hostility of the
world is shaded and controlled by the man-made structures
of value and purpose. He can learn about the givenness of
his situation as he comes to understand the meanings of the
past in the present. This understanding depends upon man
and upon a reconstruction of the past through empathy and
intuition. A type of subjectivism appears to enter the
1. (vide, Ratenstreich,"The Ontological Status of History,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, pp. 49-58.)
2. Kluback,pp. 26, 40-41.
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hermeneutical task. To understand and therefore to bridge
the historical distance, one intuits the inner motivational
and intentional processes on the basis of empirical
constructions. The common feature is man and his coping
with the world. While one does begin with the objective
data, one nonetheless seeks to ferret the inner and sub¬
jective values and purposes of man individually and
collectively expressed. This motivational interpretation
to understanding assumes a concentrated concern on the
phenomenon of man and his purposes and ideals. One must
wonder (l) if this motivational approach to understanding
really provides an adequate basis for coming to terms with
the full import of the past and (2) if the concentration of
the approach on man is really a broad enough spectrum upon
which to come to terms with the diversities of history.
However, the direction set by Dilthey seems to echo in the
theological constructions of Liberalism."'" The keen emphasis
on man, the category of immanent meaning, the characterization
of the world as potentially hostile, the use of intuition
and empathy to understand, the limitation of Reason to
satisfy man's quest for purpose, and finally the liberation
of man from the confines of a purely dogmatic and rational
world — these themes which Dilthey incorporates into his
historical approach to the order of the human world provide
a format for theology's attempt to accommodate the person
of Christ into the context of history. Given the historical
and the emphasis upon its value and purpose, theology
1. (vide, Gogarten, "Theology and History," Journal for
Theology and Church, Vol. 4, pp. 35-81.)
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reiterates similar themes and features which seem to imply
a perspective similar to that of Dilthey. No doubt, a
refinement and a restructuring of the themes occurs in the
religious context, but yet one must wonder if the aims and
goals are not somewhat synonymous. Jesus Christ forms the
centre of concern for theology. It becomes a question of
relating His message to the reality of the present, remembering
the pervasiveness and imminence of the historical. Dilthey
provides man, meaning, relativity, liberation and under¬
standing, as potential categories. Theology adds the person
of Christ and His message to these in order to develop and to
create an approach which considers not only man as the
germinal cell of history but also Christ as the valuational
cell of man.
C. THE MEANING OF CHRIST FOR THE HISTORICAL ORDER:
RITSCHL, HERRMANN, HARNACK.
The sense of the historical is also felt in the
world-view developed by Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack."'" It
would seem to be the case that their emphasis upon the
1. Orr, Ritschlianism, pp. 53-75; David ¥. Lotz, Ritschl and
Luther, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1974. Dr. Lotz re¬
examines the importance of Ritschl as a Luther scholar.
Dr. Lotz argues that a clearer understanding and appre¬
ciation of Ritschl is acquired as one comes to know his
great concern to re-discover Luther for his own day. Ac¬
cording to Lotz, Ritschl has over-concentrated on the early
Luther. In turn, this has lead him to aberrate Luther's
thought. Unfortunately, it may well be the case that Dr.Lotz
has not given enough space to appreciate the climate of
opinion of Ritschl's day. The desire to explain faith
historically as well as to play down the supra-temporality
of God were quite prevalent. And possibly, Lotz should
have reviewed that climate of the time in order better to
suggest Ritschl's preference for the early Luther, as well
as for his aberration of Luther's thought.
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historical leads them to consider the value-claims and
personality of Jesus Christ in contradistinction to the
finiteness and movement of history. While there remains
consensus regarding the flux of historical life and the
immanence of Reason as the arbiter of reality, a point of
reference with fixed and stationary value is offered. The
propounding of this point moves theology into the domain of
the moral and valuational dimensions. History must be
approached from within itself since there can be no appeal
to a transcendent beyond which imprints life with an
indelible standard. An immanent approach to reality must
deal with the problem of movement and change. Theology
attempts to counter the relativism and the lack of meaning
by arguing for a point of fixity and a standard of value and
worth for man gripped by the tempest of history. Life's
activities and movements demand direction and purpose.
Theology moves to satisfy this need by concentrating upon the
relevance and importance of Christ. He looms into theological
exposition as the value-giving and purposing personality in
the midst of apparent meaninglessness and change. By focusing
upon His person, theology seeks to determine ideals and
goals given by history itself.^ The task of theology is no
longer the determination and definition of the nature of
Christ. Rather it attempts to present His significance and
contribution to a life-consciousness aware of historical
O
dynamic s.
1. Mackintosh, "The Liberal Conception of Jesus in its
Strength and Weakness," American Journal of Theology,
Vol. 16, pp. 410-425.
2. Pauck, HarnacK and Troeltsch, pp. 26-27.
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It would appear that in order for theology to engage
in this task, it must embrace the historical as an integral
component for the project at hand. Jesus Christ is seen as
a concrete reality of history and as a personality having
direct bearing upon the interpretation of life."'" Harnack
asserts that the centrality of Christ calls into question the
p
bifurcation of truth suggested by Lessing. Lessing had
assumed that man possesses an innate wealth of religious
truth which made supplementation by history quite un-
necessary. But if one assumes that religious truth is not
a possession, the historical categories of personality and
development call Lessing's proposals into question.^ General
ideas of truth can no longer erase the problem of historical
5distance. Theology begins by perceiving the influence of
personalities upon historical development, discovering the
place of Christ in particular. His personal significance
offers a complementary balance to the category of existence.^
"In every religion what is sought...is a solution of the
contradiction in which man finds himself.. ..For in the former
role he is a part of nature, dependent upon her, subject to
and confined by other things; but as spirit he is moved by
the impulse to maintain his independence against them."
Apparently, man is perceived to exist in a state of
1. Deegan, "The Ritschlian School," Scottish Journal of
Theology. Vol. 16, pp. 390-407-
2. Harnack, Christianity, p. 24.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
4. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
5. Harnack, Christianity, p. 9.
6. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 23-24, 30-33-
7• Ibid., p. 199-
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contradiction in the world. On the one hand, he knows
himself to be a component part of the whole mechanical
world."'" But on the other hand, he feels an independence
from this engulfing contextualism. There exists a feeling
of liberation and freedom from the subjection of the world.
Man's existence can be seen as maturating within but not
completely subject to the confines of nature and its
immanentism. Theology seeks to explicate and to resolve
the mechanical \ teleological experience of existence. He
senses himself to be drawn between these dichotomous but
2
simultaneous notions. The paradoxical situation acquires
z
solution in the function of religion. Jesus Christ stands
out as the resolution to man's tense and paradoxical pre-
4
dicament. He functions as a mediating personality who
bridges the divided experiences of man. "For His historical
appearance denotes...the organizing centre of the world-whole
with which the spiritual self-feeling of Christians receives
its permanent and specific satisfaction.. Christ
organizes historical life. He brings about satisfaction and
resolution both to man's dependence upon and independence of
the world. Man seeks for an organizing principle by which
he can correlate and secure his position in the world void of
meaning.^ Theology looks to the solution of this problem in
the dynamic personalities of history who possess the lasting
1. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 31•
2. Ritschl, J&R, p. 502.
3. Ibid. , p. 503.
4. Mackintosh, Types, pp. 148-152.
5. Ritschl, J&R, p. 593.
6. Harnack, Christianity, p. 32.
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power and influence to affect and to determine the develop¬
ment of existence."'" Life-forces require valuational
p
direction and heuristic guidance. This analysis assumes,
"Z
in part, a feeling in man moving toward orientation and value.
On his own, he does not possess ready-made solutions as
Lessing had presupposed. Life's structures of meaning
must be given in the context of history and man comes to a
realization of his purpose and value as he focuses upon the
developmental processes influenced by men.'1 Here the person
5
of Christ is recognized as a distinct fact. This rests upon
the performance He displays as an historical personality.
What He did signifies His importance.^ "By making the aim
of His own life the aim of mankind...He is before all else
the Founder of a religion and the Redeemer of men from the
7
dominion of the world." Jesus Christ establishes a
sequence of events which elevates man above the mechanical
g
dominion of life. He authors a "spiritual religion" which
brings man into contact with God as the consummation and end
of creation.^ Material actuality finds itself complemented
by the spiritual dimension. He demonstrates the mode and
>
1. Ibid., p. 31.
2. Schwab, "A Plea for Ritschl," American Journal of Theology,
Vol. 5, pp. 27-33.
3- Ibid., pp. 35-40.
4. Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 32-33*
5. Harnack, Christianity, p. 38*
6. Mackintosh, Types, p. 161; (vide, Stuckenberg, "The Theology
of Albrecht Ritschl," American Journal of Theology, p. 28,
Vol.
7. Ritschl, J&R, p. 414.
8. Mackintosh, Types, p. 170.* (vide, Rumscheidt, Revelation
and Theology, pp. 106-109.)
9. Ritschl, J&R, p. 414.
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manner of life. Through His activity, vocation and
exertion, new possibilities arise in history.1 Jesus
correlates His activity to the aim of mankind, and He
p
accomplishes this task by calling all men to God. In this
exercise, He offers a self-understanding of His person.
Jesus Christ in His humanity shows Himself to be "the com-
plete self-revelation of God.His demonstration of the
ethico-religious way of life being synonymous with the life
4
of God represents His distinction from other men. "It
follows...that, as the historical Author of this communion of
men with God and with each other, Christ is necessarily unique
5
in His own order." It is important to point out that His
distinction does not rest "with any inborn qualities or
6
powers" but with His conduct, conviction and motives. There¬
fore, the significance of Christ can be traced to His work
and activity rather than to some undemonstrable and hidden
7
quality in His person. In this sense His extra-ordinary
personality affects the possibility of historical development.
Jesus affects history through the effects of vocation, con¬
sisting of calling men to fellowship with God and with each
8
other and of giving him dominion over the world.
1. Harnack, Christianity, pp. 33-35.
2. Ritschl, J&R, p. 446.
3. Ibid., p. 436.
4. Ibid., pp. 450-451.
5. Ibid., p. 465.
6. Ibid., p. 413.
7. Mackintosh, Types, p. l42f.
8. Schwab, pp. 21-26.
487
O'Collins, Gerald. "Karl Barth on Christ's Resurrection,"
Scottish Journal of Theology, XXVI (1973), 85-99-
Ogden, Shubert M. "Bultmann and the 'New Quest'," Journal
of Bible and Religion, XXX (1962), 209-218.
Olford, John E. "History, Theology and Faith," Theology
Today, XIV (1957-58), 15-28.
Osborn, Robert T. "Christ, Bible and Church in Karl Barth,"
Journal of Bible and Religion, XXIV (1956), 97-102.
Owen, H.P. "Existential and Ascetical Theology," Church
Quarterly Review, CLX (1959), 226-231.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Hermeneutics and Universal History,"
trans. P.J. Achtemeier; Journal for Theology and the
Church, IV, 122-152.
Panel Discussion. "Faith, History and the Resurrection,"
Christianity Today, IX (1965), 3-7.
Petras, John W. "God, Man and Society," Journal of Religious
Thought, XXIII (1966-67), 119-128.
Preuss, Peter. "Feuerbach on Man and God," Dialogue, XI
(1972), 204-223-
Ratenstreich, N. "The Ontological Status of History,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1972), 49-58.
Reardon, Bernard M.G. "Reason and Revelation: Is Barth
Consistent?," Church Quarterly Review, CXLV (1954),
144-155.
Reck, Donald W. "The Christianity of SjzSren Kierkegaard,"
Canadian Journal of Theology, XII (1966), 85-97.
Roberts, David E. "Faith and Freedom in Existentialism,"
. Theology Today, VIII (1951-52), 469-482.
Robinson, James. M. "The Recent Debate on the 'New Quest',"
Journal of Bible and Religion, XXX (1962), 198-208.
Rosenthal, Klaus. "Myth and Symbol," Scottish Journal of
Theology, XVIII (1965), 411-434.
Rumscheidt, H. Martin. "A Thank You for Karl Barth,"
Canadian Journal of Theology, XV (1969), 198-201.
Sanderson, John W., Jr. "Historical Fact or Symbol?,"
Westminster Theological Journal, XX (1958), 158-169-
Schwab, L. Henry. "A Plea for Ritschl," American Journal of
Theology, V (1901), 18-42.
h8Q
Sefler, George F. "Kierkegaard's Religious Truth: The Three
Dimensions of Subjectivity," Philosophy of Religion,
II (1971), 43-52.
Selwyn, E.G. "Image, Fact and Faith," New Testament Studies,
I (1954-55), 235-247.
Shaw, J.M. "The Christian Interpretation of History,"
Canadian Journal of Theology, III (1957), 15-22.
Shepherd, William C. "Hegel as a Theologian," Harvard
Theological Review, LXI (1968), 583-602.
Smith, J.W.D. "The Resurrection of Christ: Myth or History?,"
The Expository Times, LXXII (1960-61), 370-375-
Smolik, Josef. "Philosophy of History: K. Barth and
J.L. Hromadka," Communio Viatorum, XII (1969),
113-120.
Stuckenberg, J.H.W. "The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl,"
American Journal of Theology, II (1898), 268-292.
Sulzbach, Maria F. "Christology in Contemporary
Protestantism," Religion in Life, XXIII (1953-54),
206-215-
Sutherland, Stewart P. "History and Belief," Theology,
LXXIII (1970), 4-9.
Thomas J. Heywood. "The Relevance of Kierkegaard to the
Demythologizing Controversy," Scottish Journal of
Theology, X (1957), 239-252.
Tillich, Paul. "The Present Theological Situation in the
Light of the Continental European Development,"
Theology Today, VI (1949-50), 299-310.
"A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation,"
Church Quarterly Review, CXLVII-CXLVIII (1948-49),
133-148.
"Victory in Defeat," Interpretation, VI (1952), 17-26.
Torrance, T.F. "Karl Barth," Scottish Journal of Theology,
XXII (1969), 1-9.
Troeltsch, Ernst. "Contingency," Encyclopaedia of Religion
and Ethics, ed. by James Hastings, IV (1911), 87-89.
______ "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule',"
American Journal of Theology, XVII (1913), 1-21.
"Historiography," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,
ed. by James Hastings, VI (1913), 716-723*
489
Vahanian, Gabriel. "Karl Barth as a Theologian of Culture,"
Union Seminary Theological Review, XXVIII (1972),
37-494
Vincent, John. "New Bottles or New Wine?," The London
Quarterly and Holborn Review, CLXXXIX (1964), 299-309-
Ward, Keith. "Myth and Fact in Christianity," Scottish
Journal of Theology, XX (1967), 385-396.
Weber, Joseph C. "Karl Barth and the Historical Jesus,"
Journal of Bible and Religion, XXXII (1964), 350-354
Weldhen, Margaret. "The Existentialists and Problems of
Moral and Religious Education," Journal of Moral
Education, I (1971), 19-26.
Wells, Harold G. "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Analogy,"
Canadian Journal of Theology, XV (1969), 203-213.
Wharton, James A. "Karl Barth as Exegete and His Influence
on Biblical Interpretation," Union Seminary
Theological Review, XXVIII (1972), 5-13-
Wilburn, Ralph G. "Barth and Bultmann: An Essay in
Comparison," Encounter, XVIII (1957), 387-399-
Williams, John N. "The Christology of Paul Tillich,1"
Encounter, XXI (1950), 423-439.
Young, Norman J. "Bultmann's View of History," Church
Quarterly Review, CLXV (1964), 413-428.
46
Of course, this raises the problem of apprehending the
consequences of Christ now in what He did then. Because
theology has taken its stand with the person, it is now re¬
quired to illustrate and to point out the definite determin¬
ation of this man. "When one looks at the fact of Christ,
one is required to focus upon His personality."1" There one
discovers the "deepest humility" united with "a purity of
2
will." Contained within the depths of His personality
resides a self-evidencing proof and power which supplements




convince. The life-source and -power of thi man insures
and guarantees the facts and their certainty.
Now we Christians hold that we know only one fact in
the whole world which can overcome every doubt of the
reality of God, namely, the appearance of Jesus in
history, the story of which has been preserved for us
in the New Testament. Our certainty of God may be
kindled by many other experiences, but has ultimately
its firmest basis in the fact that within the realm of
history to which we ourselves belong, we encounter
the man Jesus as an undoubted reality. ->
Jesus Christ represents a point of reference for human contact
with the Deity. In the complex of world-historical
realities, He stands out as the one fact of undoubtable
certainty in the divine revelation. The persuasiveness of
this fact rests, in part, upon its basis in history which
provides a point of common ground between then and now. The
1. Harnack, Christianity, p. 38.
Ibid., p. 37; (vide, Ritschl, J&R, pp. 45-46.)
3- Harnack, Dogma I, pp. 59, 70.
4. Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, pp. 76-77j (vide,
Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, p. 205.)
5. Herrmann, Communion, pp. 59-60.
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historicity of His person displays an unquestionable reality
which contains relevance and significance for today."1" But
there is more to this man than His factuality. There is
something about His inner personality which speaks out beyond
the facts. The inner quality finds expression in "...the
self-evidencing picture of Jesus' inner life drawn in the
New Testament [which] is capable of gripping us with all the
2
power of a personally experienced reality." The certainty
of Christ's vocation and consequently of His person does not
z
simply rest upon reliable evidence. Coupled with the
factual data is the inner life which has the power to span
the gap of time and space and become contemporaneous. This
"self-evidencing picture" provides the basis for a personal
encounter and experience. Theology does not simply press
for a factual demonstration of His message and person. This
only establishes the initial embarkation into the inner life.
"Everything depends...on whether we really know the picture
of Jesus..., and experience in him a Power which...we know
ourselves completely subject. Each one of us must have this
Ll
personal realization...." Simple objective and empirical
demonstration will not generate the certainty and assurance
of His work and self-interpretation. One must become per-
5
sonally involved and convinced of the power of Christ. This
1. Ibid., p. 65.
2. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 50.
3. Deegan, "Wilhelm Herrmann : A Re-assessment," Scottish
Journal of Theology, Vol. 19, pp. 195-197.
4. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 52.
5- Ritschl, J&R, p. 593/ (vide, Reardon, Liberal
Protestantism, p. 36.)
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subjective and personal element must accompany any and all
facts."'" On this basis, the reality of His person becomes
2
real and actual now. In the intimacy of the individual,
Christ comes to life and guarantees that what He has done and
said through His person finds its authenticity in His power
to span the course of time. But indeed, theology does not
merely portray the personal reality of Christ per se. As
"the complete self-revelation of God", His person becomes a
transparent medium directing one to the Power behind His inner
life. As the Founder of a spiritual religion, He performs
a task of mediating God to man, since this is the aim of
4
religion. The personal experiejice of His self-evidencing
5
rests upon man's decision to opt for God against the world.
The doubts that linger regarding his place in the world and
the aim of his earthly being find resolution in the person
of Christ. "When God and everything that is sacred threatens
to disappear in darkness, or our doom is pronounced;... it is
then that the personality of Christ may save us."^ He
stands within the context of history as the sign-post pointing
the direction to God who remains while all else changes.
Christ functions as the "Way of Knowledge" for man in the
7world. "In Jesus, as His historical work shows...., we
1. Garvie, pp. 203, 212.
2. Deegan, "Wilhelm Herrmann...," pp. 197-201.
3. Herrmann, Communion, pp. 65, 176-177.
4. Harnack, Christianity, pp. 39-46.
5. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 116.
6. Harnack, Christianity, p. 47-
7. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 73*
49
have before us the inmost will of God, to which everything
is subject,and we experience it to be a power constraining
and emancipating our souls.""'" The importance of Christ's
position gains ascendency as one apprehends the historical
evidence of His person and appropriates this data by means
of a personal realization. The dynamic triangle of man and
God related through the person of Christ comes into view by
the power of man's personal decision and appropriation. In
the final analysis man performs a pivotal role in apprehending
the effects of Christ within the developmental processes of
history.
No doubt, this involves one in making a distinction
between facts and facts. Theology does not want to grant
the historian academic privilege in demonstrating and proving
the person of Christ on the accumulation of evidence. It
will grant that the complete story about Him contains
2
elements which reflect the enthusiasm of the disciples.
However, one cannot illustrate the proper estimate of Christ
by merely assuming the reliability of the scriptural
narratives.^ Indeed, theology must admit the probablistic
characterization of all such evidence.^" "Even to him [the
historian] it appears once more to be a disadvantage that
no historical judgment...ever attains anything more than
probability." In this respect the characterization of
1. Herrmann, Communion, p. 137.
2. Ibid., p. 59•
3« Ibid., p. 60.
4. Ibid., p. 58.
5. Ibid., p. 60.
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historical and eternal truths set by Lessing comes to the
fore. The accidental truths surrounding the historical
and spiritual significance of Christ do not possess the
power to prove and to demonstrate. "The actual external
details are always a matter of controversy; and in this
sense Lessing was perfectly right when he warned against...
hanging the whole weight of eternity on a spider's thread."""
Beyond the influence of external details rests the
importance of personality which transmits the spiritual
2
purport of His life. It is this category which links man
-6
to Christ. Again the point appears to be that along with
the external and objective data of historical judgments,
theology must also consider and accept the internal workings
of the observer. Christian religion has been defined as a
spiritual mode of mediation between God and man. The
"highest concern" of religion is the establishment of the
God/man communion.^ Here is the criterion of evaluation
which theology also employs to discern and select the general
features portraying the Christ. His importance arises from
5His centrality in the relationship between God and man.
But this relationship is mediated in the empirical realm
which serves as a means toward a spiritual end.^ The
theological perspective has its grounding in the empirical
1. Harnack, Christianity, p. 61.
2. Ibid., p. 61", (vide, Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, p.45).
3- Ibid., p. 62.
4. Herrmann, Communion, pp. 57-58.
5. Garvie, pp. 195-203.
6. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 279-280.
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actuality of Christ, but the content of the religious
sphere reflects the spiritual or valuational dimension.
In this respect, external details will not suffice. While
providing the bedrock of inquiry, the main thrust of the
investigation must be guided by the "highest concern" of
religion expressed in terms of meaning. In effect, man
needs to take the data at hand and decide for himself.
The value of a truly great man...consists in his
increasing the value of all mankind. It is here
that the highest significance of great men lies:
to have enhanced, that is, to have progressively
given effect to human value, to the value of that
race of men which-,has risen up out of the dull
ground of Nature.
The dimension of worth and meaning delimits the thrust of
theology's enterprise. In religion, one is concerned with
increasing man's personal value and significance. Though
man begins upon "the dull ground of Nature", a great man
inspires mankind to arise out of this dullness and to recog¬
nize and to appreciate the full worth of himself. Jesus
Christ is such a man of greatness in that He
was the first to bring the value of every human soul
to light....We may take what relation to him we will:
in the history of the past no one can refuse to
recognize that it was he who raised humanity to this
level.2
His insight and revelation of the worth of man distinguishes
Him from all others. He proclaimed man's value and esteem
in freedom from the confinement of Nature and in dependence
upon God.^ This is the internal dimension of Christ's
1. Harnack, What?, p. 67.
2. Ibid., pp. 67-68.




personality which the external data cannot hope to capture.
The peripheral facts are open to interpretation and contro¬
versy, but the essential items of the Gospel which reveal
its fundamental emphasis upon communion with God and man's
worth are "timeless"*1 "Not only are they so; but the man to
whom the Gospel addresses itself is also 'timeless', that is
to say, it is the man who, in spite of all progress and
development, never changes in his inmost constitution and
p
in his fundamental relations with the external world." The
basis of commonality between the personality of Christ and
the internal personal realization of His truth reflects a
timeless element inherent in all men. This element remains
despite the progress and development of the material,
technical world. Between the human spirit and the external
world a basic and primary continuum continues which finds
expression and resolution in Christ. He is the man among
men proclaiming the ultimate worth of all men as they stand
in communion with each other and with God. This proclamation
does not denounce the reality of the empirical world; it
merely provides a complement of value and meaning to a
context without purpose and worth. Theological reflection
upon Christ fulfils an inward and subjective need which man
experiences in his encounter with life. This need for
meaning and stability finds satisfaction in the message of
Him who delivers man from the dullness and instability of
the world to the certainty and assurance of his personal
1. Ibid., p. I49f.
2. Ibid., p. 149-
3. Rumscheidt, pp. 81-83-
worth and dominion over it as guaranteed by God. Theology
presents a personal and intimate matter of viewing which
no accumulation of historical evidence can establish. In
the true spirit of Lessing, it must be re-affirmed that no
amount of evidence can effect the qualitative change of mind
fundamental to the province of faith. What the external
cannot give; the internal and personal can intimate. Indeed,
to speak of the historical Christ actually involves one in a
query of His inner Life and of His personal existence."'" This
remains the dimension of life's continuum beyond the scrutiny
2
and surveillance of pure reason. Lessing's problem thus
remains in the facts of history though partially resolved
in the mind of man.
The ramifications of Christ's vocation influence and
affect the position of man in the world. An added deter¬
mination qualifies and interprets the human phenomenon. The
dull and unfeeling world dissipates while still threatening
the valuational construction. Christ raises the issue of
human worth and propagates the message that man has signifi¬
cance and value as he submits himself to the constraint and
emancipation of God.^1" He functions to alert man to his
need for communion with God and of his inability to effect
it on his own. He receives His uniqueness and distinctive¬
ness from other great men in the performance of this task.
1. Herrmann, Communion, p. 64.
2. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 207-208.
3. Halliday, Facts and Values, p. 144.
4. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 597-599.
5. Herrmann, Communion, p. 153; (vide, Halliday, p. 143.)
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What gains prominence is the Fatherhood of God and the
importance of morality."'" "Men are not so base that they
can find satisfaction in the gratification and the service
of their individual existence; they require convictions
2
as to the meaning of life." Christ's message seeks to
anticipate and to satisfy this human requirement. The
individual perspective requires convictions which open one
outward beyond oneself. "The Gospel teaches us that we
escape from a barren existence only when we are ready to live
for others of our own free will." Meaning and value in
human life deliver man from dependence upon the world to
fellowship with others based upon the Fatherhood of God.
Individual existence finds its complementary function in the
L
social emphasis upon fellowship. Christ proclaims communion
with God and thereby prepares man for the social dimension.
"Still, however pregnant the ideas so freely bestowed upon
us by the messengers of the Gospel, they can never do more
than stimulate the nature that we have: they cannot trans-
5
form us." The Christian message proclaims the worth of
man in communion with other men and with God. But the
vitality and the veracity of this proclamation rely upon the
personal apprehension and appropriation of Christ. The
human element in the epistemological process reveals both
the subjective and personal quality involved in coming to
1. Harnack, Protestantism, p. 55/ (vide, Rumscheidt, p. 81).
2. Harnack and Herrmann, The Social Gospel, p. 73-
3. Ibid. , p. 145.
4. Garvie, The Rltschlian Theology, pp. 16-19.
5. Harnack and Herrmann, pp. 145-146.
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faith as well as the conditionedness and limitedness of
all historical phenomena. The Gospel effects a spiritual
revelation in man "but yet it remains part and parcel of the
processes and contexts of history. Consequently, there
can be no ontological metamorphosis concomitant with the
adoption of faith's perspective. What does transpire is
the stimulating and inspiring of man to action in conjunction
with other men and God.1 The love of neighbour and of God
coupled with a recognition of what _is in comparison with
2
what ought to be provides the impetus for action. Christian
faith revealed through the person of Christ, illustrates and
portrays one possible approach for man's being-in-the-world.
The Christian understanding vies with other options for inter¬
preting existence. However, theology seeks to advance its
own cause by referring to the estimate of mar? and to the
4
personal dimension of life. "For the Christian view of
the world, disclosing as it does the all-inclusive moral
and spiritual end of the world, which is also the proper
5
end of God Himself, evidences itself as the perfect religion."
Theology opts for the personal interpretation of life as
opposed to any other view which might impair and detract
from the moral and spiritual quality of existence as
perceived by faith. The dependence of the worth of man and
the world upon the power of God expresses theology's stand
and criterion for coming to terms with the contextualism of
1. Harnack, What?, p. 300.
2. Herrmann, Faith and Morals, p. 61.
3. Ritschl, J&R, p. 211.
4. Herrmann, Faith and Morals, p. 61.
5. Ritschl, J&R, p. 211.
history, and for offering maa a feeling of independence and
freedom from the constraints of a mechanically conceived
reality.1 From this perspective, theology affirms the
personal worth and value of each man while it looks at the
personality of Christ to verify and to certify this
affirmation.
As well, there are ramifications of this stance which
apply to the interpretation of Christ Himself. Of
immediate significance is theology's position with regard
to miracle. The impact of faith's message relies upon the
vocation of Christ and upon the visible motives, convictions
and conduct which He displayed and which are recorded in the
New Testament. For one, Harnack was quite adapt at
recovering the simple and plain reality of the "fifth
2 3
Gospel" of God's Fatherhood and man's worth. Several
hundred years separate Christ from the man of today. But
this is no problem since the external details of His existence
are discernible and can alert one to the fact of His life
and since man finds in His inner, personal life the possibi¬
lity of a personal experience. Christ possesses the unique
4
quality of standing in history and of mediating the Diety.
His distinctiveness also entails the revelation of the
spiritual religion which brings to light the value and worth
of all men. This dimension of reality offers heuristic
1. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
2. Harnack, "What? and Dogma! (vide, Capps, "Harnack and
Ecumenical Discussion," journal of Ecumenical Studies,
Vol. 3, pp. 486-502.) ~
3. Harnack, What?, p. 14.
4. Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 77-80, 97fj (vide, Reardon, p.24.).
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guidance and an ultimate point of view which facts and data
are not able to support or to deny. This non-phenomenal
aspect contains a subjective slant as opposed to any that
might infringe on the significance of man. No doubt, such
a position reveals a certain anthropocentric bias, but what
is more it also reveals both the immanent grounding and the
non-empirical element of faith."1" It has been pointed out
that Christianity is a world-view portraying the worth of
man in conjunction with the self-end of God. Dilthey has
already argued that all world-views are products of history
and only present one possible way of standing in the world.
Theology's emphasis upon the historicity of Christ in
addition to the category of meaning reveals its bid to be
another alternative. The exclusiveness of this system rests
in its personal valuation and in its emancipation of man from
the limits of Nature. But it would appear that theology's
position on miracle betrays the system's ultimate grounding
2
in immanence. The past and the future seem to disappear
into the present of man's concern about himself in the
machinery of Nature.^ Theology does not want to represent
faith as depending upon the contravening of the natural laws
of empirical reality to demonstrate faith.^ Faith rather
5"sees" events in Nature as representing the work of God.
"Against the approach of others that this is logically
1. For point of non-empirical content of faith vide Ritschl,
J&R, pp. 222-223 and Harnack, What?, p. 300.
2. Orr, Ritschlianism, pp. 129-131*
3* Halliday, Facts and Values, pp. 97-98J (vide, Rumscheidt,
pp. 10,77.)
4. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 84^ (vide, Orr, pp. 243-261.)
5. Ibid. , p. 84.
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impossible, faith cannot defend itself."1 The logic of
the situation is provided by Reason which is the arbiter of
2
reality. Because faith represents another aspect of the
natural order, it cannot presume to undo the entire under¬
standing of the empirical on the basis of miracle. Rather
theology must abandon any notion of objective miracle as the
in-breaking of God into the natural order.^ While it is
discerned that the miraculous functions in the world-view of
5
Jesus' time, such as aspect today is both unnecessary and
contradictory to the laws of Nature.^ Man today no longer
7
shares the conceptions of the people of the Gospel. A new
world-view prevails in which law and order signify the
characteristics of life. But indeed, it is possible to have
a sense of the miraculous only as one is convinced by the
impression and power of Christ's personality.
Every individual miracle remains historically quite
doubtful, and a summation of things doubtful never
leads to certainty. But should the historian...be
convinced that Jesus Christ did extraordinary things,
in the strict sense miraculous things, then, from
the unique impression he has obtained of this person,
he infers the possession by him of supernatural power.
This conclusion itself belongs to the province of
religious faith....
Theology does not attempt to vault the "ugly, broad ditch"
gof Lessing by means of the miraculous. While Lessxng
1. Ibid. , p. 84.
2. Deegan, "Wilhelm Herrmann...," pp. 189-192; (vide,
Reardon, pp. 33,35,47).
3. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 195-197.
4. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 85.
5. Herrmann, Communion, p. 180.
6. Harnack, What?, pp. 26-27.
7. Harnack and Herrmann, pp. 175-179.
8. Harnack, Dogma I, p. 65, ftnt. ff 3-
9. Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, p. 20.
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himself did not deny the possibility of miracle, he none¬
theless did question the testimony of the narratives on the
basis of the non-happening of the miraculous in his time.
The lack of first-hand experience establishes something of
a stumbling-block for him. With a world-view based on law
and order, theology can now seriously question and doubt the
possibility of miracle both in Jesus' time as well as now.
Theology does not appear to be willing to defend the
miraculous on empirical grounds. Rather, one can associated
the miraculous of Christ with a personal estimation of His
person. This subjective evaluation lifts the discussion
from the grounds of simple historical argument to the
province of religious faith. On this level, facts and
figures take a secondary role to the valuational dimension.
Thus, on an empirical basis, Christ's miracles appear rather
dubious while on a religious level, their association with
Him reveal an indication of one's personal estimate of Him.
This manner of interpreting the biblical witness displays
the grounding of faith in the complexes and developments of
history. There can be no cognitive and intelligible appeal
to a factor outside of existence to demonstrate the validity
of a faith which is inside history and which attempts to
p
make life meaningful. With the disarmament of the
miraculous, a reinterpretation of Christ's death arises. Its
importance becomes associated with His person and the communion
which He endeavoured to establish between man and God. Death
1. Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writings, p. 55.
2. Halliday, pp. 73-77.
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signifies the accomplishment of this communion.1 It is
now difficult to see this event as an expiation or sacrifice
2
compelled by God. What one can perceive is a turning-point
in history effected by His death; it is an act which
affects the moral sensitivities of mankind.^ Death marks
the beginning of man's partnership with God. The resurrection
must not now be seen as a proof for His accomplishment or
as a necessary element of faith.'1 Faith began at the grave;
to go further than this would take one out of the realm of
5fact and into the sphere of speculation. Christ dealt with
man and with his present condition. What concerned Him must
also determine theology's task now. Faith's appeal is to
the subjective element of life — to man in his inner
struggling with the external world — where the empirical
and objective loose their cogency and power to convince.
Faith's sphere appeals to life's emotive and meaning category
which seeks to regulate and to understand reality not only on
the basis of fact but also in conjunction with ideals and
6
goals. The understanding represents "another class" of
7
judgments distinct from but equal to the empirical cognit-
g
ions. Faith based upon Christ, who is the key to the
1. Ritschl, pp. 542-fl?: (vide, Herrmann, Systematic,
pp. 121-124.)
2. Harnack, What?, pp. 156-158.
3. Ibid., pp. 158-160.
4. Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 125-127/ (vide, Orr, pp.46-108.)
5. Harnack, What?, pp. 160-164.
6. Ritschl, J&R, sec.28, p.203f.
7. Ibid., p. 205.
8. Ibid., pp. 207-208/ (vide, Orr, pp. 265-279; Orr, The
Ritschlian Theology, Chapter 3; Brightman, "Ritschl's
Criterion of Religious Truth," American Journal of
Theology. Vol. 21, pp. 212-224; Keirstead, "Metaphysical
Presuppositions of Ritschl," American Journal of Theology,
Vol. 9, pp. 677-718.)
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Christian world-view,"'" assumes its position in the context
of history while presenting itself as the organizer of
experience. Like faith, Christ also enjoys participation
in this complex of experience. His distinctiveness does
not depend upon what He was in Himself but what He did and
2
effected for all men. Indeed, while miracles cannot be
presumed to disrupt the causal order of reality, this same
causal order provides another criteria for discerning and
understanding Him. Ontological speculation must cease and
desist while the observation of His work provides the data
to be interpreted and understood. "The theological solution
of the problem of Christ's Divinity must therefore be based
upon an analysis of what He has done for the salvation of
mankind in the form of His community."-^ From theology's
understanding of miracle; faith, Christ and His message
emerge as historical phenomena founded upon the immanence of
life, affecting the human attitude toward existence, making
no appeal to extra-historical phenomena, and relying upon
personal conviction and realization for their certainty
and affirmation.
Similar to Dilthey's approach to the order of the
human world, the late nineteenth century Liberal Protestantism
of Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack reveals its presentiment
for man and his place in the world. Value, meaning and
purpose occupy central roles in the presentation of this
1. Ibid., p. 202.
2. Rumscheidt, p. 180.
3. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 416-417.
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theology. For it is on this basis that these men erect
the foundation of faith. Their meaning-approach to
existence entails the propounding of a Christian view of
the world. Faith endeavours to explicate man's position
in reality not from the categories of empirical reality but
from the perspective of meaning.1 This is the dimension
of life which concerns man and demonstrates his distinction
from the mechanical world. The assumption appears to be
that man alone is capable of apprehending the significance
of life. Within the limits of humanity, meaning arises
and organizes the world. Here the historicity of Christ
gains importance. Through the influence of His personality
in and upon history, the true worth and value of every man
has come to light. This effect is ever significant
because no matter how the empirical and outside world
changes and develops man within himself fundamentally requires
adjustment to the reality of the external world. Like
Dilthey, there is a constant dynamism between man's estimate
of himself as a creature of worth and the active and neutral
medium of the world where he lives. This relationship
illustrates the need and the importance of Christ aid His
work. He attempts to regulate and to organize the happenings
in life by relating them to man as a means for his ultimate
fulfilment in communion with other men and God. Faith offers
a point of view to the activities of life. The power and
the persuasiveness of this entire framework rest, upon the
inner and personal life of Christ which is capable of
1. Ibid., p. 20.
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becoming a present and personal experience. This capacity
appears to permit the Christ of a bye-gone era to maintain
the concreteness of faith's system. On the bedrock of
history, faith's position began and through the person and
effects of Christ it will remain there. But another pivotal
point is the reality of man and his deciding to view life
from the perspective of faith. Faith's relevance and
significance depends upon man and the values for which he opts.
Further, faith's framework underlines the limitation of
empirical Reason to establish or dis-establish it. The
veracity of faith begins with fact but ultimately concludes
with a personal and intuitive experience and insight
effected through the consequences of Christ. Empirical Reason
understands the causal connections of the world. However,
the religious grasp of reality builds upon this connectedness
to correlate it with the unity of the world perceived by
Christ. In this way the teleological dimension of the
Christian world-view expresses the inclusiveness of man and
world. Man utilizes Nature as a means to the realization of
his partnership with God. Inclusiveness, connectedness
and interrelatedness become the hallmarks of faith's position.
And through these determinations man comes to an awareness
and consciousness of his freedom from because of his utiliza¬
tion of the world as a means to his self-end. The contra¬
dictions of life dissipate through the power of the Christian
view. Man stabilizes his position bjr means of the message
of faith. The relativities and ambiguities of existence
become encompassed by the values and purposes shared by man
and God. Ultimately the universality of the Christian view
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emerges. But unlike Dilthey, theology adheres to the
absoluteness of its position. It would seem that theology
admits the historicity of its system without the limitations
which this entails. Instead, theology apparently places the
weight of its claim upon the personality of Christ and the
Power which He reveals. The fundamental constitution of man
in his relations with the external world appears to insure the
relevance of Christ, God and the Christian world-view for the
duration of human life. But Dilthey has already argued that
each and every worid-view reflects the concerns, logic and
values of that system alone and not those of the entire
spectrum of life. The function of life resists absolute and
universal domestication by any and all historical systems.
Indeed, man and his need to secure his life are fundamental to
all world-views. But while man devises and submits to them,
life remains active and non-committal to the operations of the
human mind. For in the end of the day, faith does present
another set of judgments which reflect the operation of his
rational copings with the life-situation. Faith represents
another rational way of being-in-the-world. And ultimately
faith must be regarded as another rational product of the
"mind-affected" world. It must be seen as a product of
history circumscribed by the indefiniteness but constancy of
life. Man is a part of this and as a part he can generate
meaning for the whole. And the whole can be understood in
terms of its parts, but man does not represent the sum total
of life. From Dilthey's perspective, faith would be seen
as a selective approach to life-experiences and as a systema¬
tizing and encumbering of life with a particular set of values
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and purposes. Dilthey can, no doubt, empathize with
theology's endeavour to liberate man from a dull and un¬
feeling world. But he would undoubtedly proceed to un¬
shackle life-experiences from the hold of faith. For
Dilthey, all dimensions and experiences are real and cannot
be conjured away. In his terms, liberation results not
from adherence to a world-view but from the realization of
the relativity of history. Therefore, theology can be seen
to have both a friend and a foe in Dilthey. He provides
vistas and insights into historical life, but he also
maintains the relativity of all. But theology and its
claim persists due to the importance of Christ's personality
and His power to unite both fact and value under the auspices
of His person. This is the view of theology. In the face
of Dilthey's "relativity clause", it argues for the
absoluteness and definitiveness of faith's position in the
order of the historical world.
D. THE ABSOLUTENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AND CHRIST FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN HISTORY: ERNST TROELTSCH
When one comes to the theological work of Troeltsch,
a somewhat similar variety of thought emerges as that of
Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack. A concern to establish
and to preserve the freedom and personality manifest in
history displays itself. Troeltsch recognizes and
appreciates the historicity of life and the change and
development which this entails."^" But he is also interested
1. Little, "Ernst Troeltsch and the Scope of Historicism,"
Journal of Religion, Vol. 46, pp. 343-364.
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in discovering and explicating a point in history from which
to perceive the values and intricacies that are affected by
and affect man. Because of the seriousness with which he
accepts the historical, Troeltsch is willing to admit that
such a point will necessarily be an historical one. To be
faithful to history does not allow one to impose or seem to
impose some reality or principle from beyond as absolute."'"
What transpires in space and time reflects the limitedness
and contingency of this realm. However, this ought not to
dissuade one from attempting to find a sure foothold within
the set limits. Indeed, Troeltsch has certain lines of
thought by which he perceives the historical to yield the
required protection for freedom and personality. He takes
his stand in the theological circle, and from this initial
point, he attempts to explicate the importance of Christ for
2
man. But he appears to distinguish himself from his pre-
decessors in that he recognizes and admits, like Dilthey,
the futility of claiming absoluteness and universality for
any historical product — even faith. Thus Troeltsch sets
about to present a Christian view of the world relying upon
the person of Christ and displaying a pervading sense of
relativity.
To begin, it is essential to be perfectly clear on one
important issue. When one speaks of Christianity's absolute¬
ness and its place in history, it is imperative to dispose
1. Van Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, pp. 29-30.
2. Pauck, p. 67.
3. Ibid., p. 60.
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of all appeals and reliances upon the supernatural."'" "From
the scientific point of view one's attitude toward the
religious life of men can no longer be that of a supernatural
2
...defense of one's own religion...." Christianity has
attempted to subordinate history to a universal principle
"5
which is working itself out. However, scientific theology
is aware of the fact that all historical phenomena have
existence for their common denominator and that any and
all claims for absoluteness and universality arise from this
4
basis. "Nowhere is Christianity the absolute religion, an
utterly unique species free of the historical conditions
that comprise its environment at any given time." It is
of no use to make appeal to some miraculous and supermundane
dimension. Whatever Christianity claims in the way of
uniqueness and absoluteness can be discerned from the
environment of history. This must be the initial premise
for any and all understandings which one can hope to attain.^
This does not abrogate the possibility of speaking about the
distinctiveness of faith. One must simply admit that this
quality can no longer be sustained and nourished from an
extra-historical sphere. The inquiry, of necessity, leads
to a re-interpretation of faith's uniqueness in terms of
the environment of history. Here the claim to absoluteness
1. Ibid., p. 62.
2. Troeltsch "Dogmatics...." p. 2.
3. Troeltsch, Absoluteness, p. 66.
4. Ibid., pp. 64-65-
5. Ibid., p. 71.
6. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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finds itself in conflict with the presumed historicity of
life."'" Historicity involves relativity which is supposedly
antithetical to absoluteness. But the recognition of faith
to be an historical phenomenon forms the beginning-point of
2
inquiry. It requires a shift in conception from an either
absoluteness/or relativism choice to a discernment of
tendencies and lines of development. To discover these
lines and tendencies requires the assumption of similarity
4
through time. In approaching the investigation in this
manner, one is not confronted with an inordinate plurality
of choices, rather there becomes visible only a few
possibilities in the religious realm. What one discerns
is the importance of personality in the context of religious
ideas.^ Of course, this feature is present in all of the
major religions and the evaluation of its strongest expression
and development will ultimately be based on personal and
7
subjective grounds. But to discover this common feature is
to identify a form that expresses itself "in every form of
life" without coming to complete realization though directing
8
this process. In recognizing such an historical feature,
1. Ibid., p. 83.
2. Ibid. , p. 85.
3. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
4. Ibid., p. 92j (Troeltsch, "Historiography," Encyclopaedia
of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 6, p. 718.)
5- Ibid., p. 92.
6. Ibid., p. 96.
7. Ibid., p. 96J (vide, Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 719).
8. Ibid., p. 98.
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"...it may well "be that we will have reached the principle
of normativeness and universal validity which is both
common to all religions and at the same time absolute."""
However, one must keep in mind the contingency of historical
formulations and thus refrain from drawing unwarranted
conclusions. The feature of personality represents a
direction of movement perceived in human life and thus is
2
coupled with a notion of growth and evolution in existence.
Personality points the direction from a heuristic assumption
based on fact. This religious expression of a spiritual
evolution presents an upward movement in life which refutes
the apparent confusion and disarray of history; the same
tendencies in the religious realm should issue in the
"purest and most profound idea of God."^" This idea "...is
to be sought... among the positive, historical, religious
5
orientations and revelations." The inquiry after the
absoluteness of faith works within its foundation and
expression. It is not a question of imposing values and
direction upon history; rather one looks to religion to
try to understand what is developing spiritually in one's
midst. Therefore, history shows faith to be associated
with historical reality.^ The present investigation only














hand."'" The movement which Troeltsch perceives as a
personalistic direction to the development and growth of
life finds expression in Christianity. "Among the great
religions, Christianity is in actuality the strongest and
most concentrated revelation of personalistic religious
2
apprehension." This is the affirmation towards which
Troeltsch has "been moving. In a modern world governed by
the arbitration of Reason, it is completely out of hand to
affirm Christianity's relevance on the basis of a supposed
supernatural grounding. This would fail to come to terms
with the climate of opinion of the modern world. No, it is
possible in this way to argue for faith's absoluteness. It
requires the recognition of the historical basis and
tendencies discernible and observable in life. The criterion
of personality, no doubt, represents a personal valuation on
the part of the observer, but even this has some basis in
fact. The perspective one takes is a religious conviction
which affirms the more profound dimensions and qualities of
life to be personally experienced. The supernatural falls
into disrepute but it is replaced by an evolutionary conception
moving towards personal realization.
5
Troeltsch conceives history as a sphere of movement.
To understand this ground of life, one needs to perceive the
connectedness and interrelatedness of life which expresses a
1. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
2. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
3- Ibid. , p. 112.
4. Ibid., p. 157.
5. Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 718a.
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similarity and continuity throughout."'" In history one
has to do with a qualitative and valuational dimension which
2
empirical Reason cannot grasp. In coming to terms with
history, one encounters the phenomenon of man and the effects
which he produces.
In the historical sphere nearly everything passes
through the medium of consciousness, and in the last
resort all turns upon the constant interaction of
conscious efforts, into which even the unconscious
elements tend to resolve themselves.. .Here, therefore,
it is not permissible to reduce events to non-
qualitative forces, or to explain effects by causal
equivalence.
Historical systems represent "mind-affected" realities which
bear the stamp of human consciousness. Troeltsch sees this
aspect of the obRectification of man's psychical existence,
for it is there that the motives and values are conceived
which are later resolved into actions and phenomena. There¬
fore, empirical observations utilizing mechanical laws of
causation miss the mark in historical explanation. The
historian must seek after the human reality and come to terms
with him empathetically.
The physical world invites us to understand it by the
deduction of general laws; the psychical world by a
sympathetic reconstruction of the causal connexions
in which the actual facts of history have taken shape
...Historical knowledge selects its materials as it
may require...and seeks...to make it as intelligible
as if it were part of our own experience. 5
Grasping the distinction between historical phenomena and
mechanical and natural realities brings one to the position
1. Mackintosh, Types, p. 199f.
2. Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 719b.
3. Reist, Towards a Theology of Involvement, pp. 69-89.
4. Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 719b.
5. Ibid., p. 720a.
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of a sympathetic reconstruction. This process appears to
involve the assumption that man throughout the course of
time remains a common factor. When one seeks to under¬
stand what happened then, it is possible to reconstruct the
action or reality assuming that given the same factors it
would occur now. Indeed, this whole process of reconstruction,
understanding and explanation requires man to make the past
alive in the present as a part of his own experience.
Historical facts and realities result because of man, and
when one understands the factors that stimulated and
motivated him to act then one comes to an understanding of
the past. Another feature of significance here is the
discussion by Troeltsch on the importance of values and
ethics in history.^ For him, a system of this sort allows
for the interpretation and evaluation of history from a
2
fixed standard. But Troeltsch remains aware of the
z
relativity and development^ of history when he points out
4
that all values are ultimately the products of history.
"The circle is not to be evaded, and the difficulty can be
solved only by the thinker's own conviction and certainty
that amid the facts of history he has really recognized
the tendencies that make for ethical ideals, and that he
has truly discerned the dynamic movement and progressive
tendency of the historical process." While one cannot
1. Ibid., p. 722a.
2. Ibid., p. 722a.
3. Ibid. , p. 720b.
4. Ibid. , p. 722a," (vide, Mackintosh, Types, pp. 196-197.)
5. Ibid., p. 722a.
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evade this recognition, a solution, in part, is available.
The historian must exert his own power of choice and
decision. Through this personal activity, he will work
as if there are recognized tendencies and discernible move¬
ments which characterize life. Troeltsch describes the
"as if" quality as insight and imagination."*" However, he
does recognize that this quality, though intuitional, is
2
nonetheless a "postulate of faith". On this admission,
the intuited standard by which life is interpreted and
evaluated will only be seen in approximation. While
progress and regression may be seen to result, the relative
Ll
position of all fixed standards must be assumed. No doubt,
such a system relates and connects life and is also a product
5
of psychical powers, yet the on-goingness and movement of
life remain the ultimate and absolute determination. Only
by sheer will of personal conviction and certainty can the
phenomenon of man harness and control the tide of life which
is also the basis of existence.^
The line of attack for Troeltsch begins to emerge.
The dynamic and on-going ground of life is the basis upon
which man finds himself. As he lives, historical life
develops and takes shape while always propelled and affected.
Man acts and reacts and in the process he creates "mind-
1. Ibid., p. 722a.
2. Ibid., p. 722b.
3« Ibid., p. 722b.
4. Ibid., p. 722a.
5. Mackintosh, p. 198.
6. (vide, Obayashi, "Pannenberg and Troeltsch," Journal of
American Academy of Religion, Vol. 38, pp. 401-419.)
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affected" realities which enable him to cope with life's
power. Christianity is such a reality. It is a system
of ethics historically conditioned and determined. In
contradistinction to the confusion of life, Christianity
offers a point of view for understanding these evolutionary
and developmental processes."'" It is a system of values
which heralds the importance of man while accepting the
dynamics of life. From the"mind-affected" bulwark of
Christianity one can survey the realm of life and perceive
2
a unity and sense value and purpose. Faith represents an
ideal which never realizes anything more than approximation
but which nonetheless signifies a teleological dimension
to the process of history established upon the life-foun-
dation. The position places faith within the historical
realm. Here, man discerns the tendencies of religious life
and decides that Christianity is the most profound expression
of the personal — a feature manifest in all. Man sees and
discovers this by observing and comparing and finally by
making a choice. Like Dilthey, Troeltsch perceives the
conditioned and determined historicity of human relations
and obRectifications. His existence grows out of and
develops within the relativizing and encompassing category of
life. This is the source and bedrock of creativity and man.
Amid apparent relativity and confusion, Troeltsch still
insists that the psychical powers provide the key to
1. Reist, pp. 174-197.
2. Pauck, pp. 75-85.
3. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 9.
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establishing the grounds of faith as well as its uniqueness.
The historical represents the product of consciousness - of
man. This is the point of commonality amidst change to
which Troeltsch points. And by man, Christianity was
conceived and nurtured. Its expression of the personalistic
has issued from "positive, historical, religious orientations
and revelations." Conceived by man, they can be understood
by him since all faith is the product of history. The
"religious orientation and revelations" depend upon the
person of Jesus Christ. His importance rests upon His
insights and valuational choices as well as upon His person.
Christianity's personalistic feature issues in a pro¬
found and pure expression of God. The religious man will
stand within this faith because he "knows" that here the
God of his inner experience comes into view."^" And Jesus
Christ is the man who represents "the most forceful and
profound God-centered life" in which the religious man can
participate. Through the energy of His person, faith in
God radiates into the world and animates and unites the
people who follow Him. Troeltsch views Christ in the un¬
certainties of history and conceives of Him as the
"historical mediator and revealer" of God.^" The historical
approach removes the trappings of metaphysical speculation
and focuses upon present day religious experience. Today's
experi ence
1. Troeltsch, Absoluteness, p. 121.
2. Ibid. , p. 122.
3- Ibid., p. 123.
4. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 14.
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receives its powers, its vitality and its definite-
ness, and especially its capacity to take social
organization, from the events of history leading us
to God; and particularly from the prophets and Jesus.
Without these sources of power and centers of concen¬
tration, personal piety could be impoverished and
crippled, and the religious community would possess
no center.
Religious experience represents another dimension of man's
historical existence. The events and particularly the
prophets and Christ function in a special capacity by
becoming centres for religious constellations. The
originality and power of these sources occupy a central
position in the continuance and stimulation of their original
insights and conceptions. Present religious experience
depends upon the radiant power of these centres for the life-
source of its piety. Without these centres, piety would
suffer. The essential thing for religious experience is
not dogma and idea but community and cultus through which
2
both communion with others and faith in God result.
Religion is a living and vital phenomenon which cannot depend
upon a senseless and lifeless foundation. Communion and
fellowship require a personal, motivational source which
inspires and stimulates men to unite in faith. Religious
life becomes chaotic and issolvent when " [t] here is no
dominant rallying-point from which it can nurture its
self...." It must be based on a real person for myth, no
matter how appealing, will not suffice as the organizing
point. Just as God is conceived to be a "heilige RealitSt",
1. Ibid., pp. 14-15-
2. Troeltsch, Die, p. 25*
3- Ibid., p. 25.
4. Ibid., p. 32.
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it is essential that His "Symbol Gottes also has a
grounding in life."^
It is for him of real significance, that an actual
human being lived, fought, believed and conquered,
and that from this real life a stream of power and
certainty flows that reaches even him. His symbol
is a real symbol for him only because there stands
behind it the majesty of a transcendent real religious
prophet, wherein he not only finds God illustrated,
but is able to overcome his ownpuncertainty and
acquire spiritual strength
The symbol of God must be a real man who lived and fought and
praised. What is more, a stream of power and certainty
must flow from his life to the man of faith. The symbol
is real because behind it stands an actual religious prophet
in whom man not only finds God presented but also in whom he
overcomes his own uncertainty. Troeltsch perceives the
importance of a living and breathing person behind the
community. In the historical realgi, personalities predominate
over ideas and values because these are only by-products of
men. Christianity is also a product of the times and life
of Christ. He illustrates faith in God by being an actual
religious prophet whose life sends a current of power and
certainty into the present. If man today could not re¬
cognize the person of Christ or if His historicity is
decided negatively, this would mark the beginning of the
end for the Christ-symbol.^ But the greatness of
Christianity rests not in its dogma or moral law but in the
centrality of a living and powerful personality whose inner
motivations provide the principles for meeting religious
1. Ibid., p. 32.
2. Ibid., p. 32.
3« Mackintosh, p. 207.
4. Troeltsch, Die, p. 34.
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tasks."'" The power of Christ's personality has stimulated
other strong persons to create new and old things just as
He was generated by the spirit of the prophets of Israel to
2
produce the new. A continuum of personal spirit and
stimulation connects the religious man of today with the
God-centred faith of Christ who was inspired by the context
of His own time. Believers can. participate in the
centrality of His person and in the benefits which He creates.
Therefore as long as Christianity continues, the central place
will belong to Him. The power of Christ's person and the
ability of man to make this a present personal experience
alleviates the problem of historical distance. Man can
become certain of the authenticity of faith's claims not
through empirical investigation alone but also through personal
conviction based on insight and intuition into this personal
system of values. A living and feeling relationship deve¬
lops between Christ and the believer. Indeed, Christian
faith presents a view of the world which seeks to fulfil
4
man's need for harmony and stability. Troeltsch character¬
izes his conception of Christianity as "...faith in the
divine regeneration of man who is alienated from God — a
5
regeneration effected through a knowledge of God in Christ."
This is the task which he perceives Christ to be fulfilling.
Through the mediation of His person, He illustrates a know¬
ledge of God which regenerates man's communion with God.
1-. Ibid., p. 43.
2. Ibid., p. 44.
3- Ibid., p. 29-
4. Troeltsch, Absoluteness, p. 137.
5. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 13-
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Christ represents the central rallying-point which historical,
religious life may utilize to form a constellation. In this
way, the centrality of His person conceives and sustains
faith through the course of time. However, one must be wary
not to attempt to reduce Christianity to one historical
factor or dimension. The content derived from and dependent
upon Jesus reveals the particulars of faith. "£t] he essence
of Christianity can be understood only as the productive
power of the historical Christian religion to create new
interpretations and new adaptations — a power which lies
deeper than any historical formulations which it may have
produced.""'" Jesus Christ stands undoubtedly as the
rallying-point and central personality for faith's conception
and continuance. His essentiality in this respect is a
2
"sozial-psychologisches Gesetz". But hidden beneath the
historical adaptations, a deeper power, something beyond
demonstration but resulting in obRectification, remains
active. The "determinative influences of historical
conditions" and the "common influences of modern spiritual
conditions" affect the manner in which faith formulates it-
self at any given time. Further, it is important to point
out that the context of faith represents one influence. The
connectedness of history involves it in a set relation which
has affected its growth and which it in turn has reacted upon.
But just as the ideals and ethics of a system of values only
1. Ibid., p. 12.
2. Troeltsch, Die, p. 27j (vide, MacKintosh, p. 208.)
3- Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 13«
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reach approximation in life; so too the productive power
of Christianity is only approximated in time. The power to
create new interpretations and adaptations remains deeper
than any form so far formulated. However, this power is
always mediated through the person of Christ, who represents
an essential part of faith based upon the lawful workings of
man in society."^
Troeltsch appears to succeed in subjecting faith to
the rigours of history in a more radical manner than does
2
Ritschl, Herrmann or Harnack. He begins with the premise
that Christian faith mediated through Christ is of signifi¬
cance to the life-situation. Faith's position is developed
upon historical grounds where one looks for tendencies and
values. Like his predecessors, he implies the importance
of man because he is the dimension which makes history
possible. To deal with it brings one into immediate en¬
counter with man and with the world he produces. Undoubtedly
there are overtones of Dilthey's position here, especially
in regards to man. However, Troeltsch presents Christ and
faith as historical phenomena which reflect a connectedness
with the past and present in that they mediate and illustrate
a perspective which apparently satisfies a recurrent human
need. Christ illustrates faith in God, and His person
provides the focal point for participation. His place is
assured since man demands that his symbol of God be a living
1. Diem, Dogmatics, pp. 6-8.
2. Ibid., p. 9j (vide, Macintosh, "Troeltsch's Theory of
Religious Knowledge," American Journal of Theology,
Vol. 23, pp. 274-289.)
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and breathing person. This personal and subjective
element guarantees the certainty of His own convictions and
insights."'" It should be noted that this certainty does not
come from historical inquiry but from personal conviction
as a postulate of faith. Christianity functions as a
shelter to gather into communion men with God. It would
seem that like Ritschl et al, Troeltsch conceives faith as
a manner of being in the world and as a position which is
ultimately beyond empirical proof though relying upon the
judgments of value. Further, Troeltsch places stronger
emphasis on the historicity of faith and Christ by observing
that on the one hand faith as a system of values attempts to
circumscribe the whole of reality but on the other hand this
same system must be observed as originating in and forming
a part of this reality. The tension between absoluteness
and historical individualization can never be resolved on
the basis of historical evidence and fact. Indeed, the
observation of contingency demonstrates the power of life
2
to resist universal positions and principles. The tension
remains real but the individual through choice and decision
can effect a temporary truce through knowledge of God in
Christ. This peace comes about through the mediation of
the factors of historical development and the requirements
of the spiritual life. What appears to result is the
attempt to portray Christianity and Christ as a means of
rationally coming to grips with historical life. Ethical
1. Reist, pp. 197-201.
2. Troeltsch, "Contingency," Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, Vol. 4, pp. 87-89.
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and valuational means are required for taming and
harnessing the flux of life. Historical observation merely
points out the tendency of the spiritual in the direction
of a personalistic interpretation. Christianity shows
tendencies in the same direction. Here one can possibly
find a basis for making value-judgments about life given the
correlation between man's spiritual growth and faith's
historical development."'" Yet the bare facts of the
p
matter reveal man's struggle with life.
Nowhere does there exist an absolute Christian
ethic...There is no absolute ethical transformation
of material nature or of human nature....This is the
cause of that ceaseless tension which drives man
onward yet gives him the sense that he can never
realize his ethical ideal.... Faith is the source of
energy in the struggle of life, but life still remains
a battle^which is continually renewed upon ever new
fronts.
The reality of life presents the continuous tension and
grasping for ethical valuation. Troeltsch portrays
historical existence to be an on-going process where man
receives impetus from his faith to do battle with the
vagaries of life. In the end, no final outcome is possible
for no ethical transformation results.^ Absolute values
only manifest themselves in historical approximations.
Like Dilthey, he perceives the continuousness of the life-
process and the ultimate relativity of all systems of
interaction and value which would attempt to contain this
1. Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Church,
p. 1012.
2. Ibid., p. 1013.
3. Ibid., p. 1013.
4. Lubbe, "The Theory of Secularized Society," Lutheran
World, Vol. 13, pp. 366-376.
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power. In a manner again reminiscent of Dilthey, Troeltsch
would affirm that history cannot be transcended from
within."'" There are only momentary respites in the struggle
2
for ethical supremacy. The struggle depends upon man
and upon the source of energy available to him.
The task of the damming and controlling of the stream
of historical life is thus on all sides complicated.
It involves a combination of various fundamental
tendencies of the ethical consciousness, and the
only evidence which can ever be deduced for the
decisive combinations is but a conviction of faith
based on conscience and conditioned by individuality.
This is the point at which the historical inquiry ends for
Troeltsch. A conviction of faith decides the distinctiveness
of the ethical tendencies of religion. The burden falls
upon man and the courage which he can summon now from his
own conscience. The process of value-judgments rests upon
his person and his choice. The stream of historical life
continues but Christ and the faith remain a possible course
of attack for the task now at hand. To control and to
damm present life requires the absoluteness of faith which
4
only personal conviction can guarantee. In this view,
Troeltsch takes up the position of Ritschl et al., in
5
ascribing to life the conscious need to subjugate it. Life
appears as dull and unfeeling and as forcing man into a
1. Troeltsch, Christian Thought, p. 128.
2. Ibid., p. 129.
3. Ibid., p. 127.
4. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 16; and Absoluteness,
pp. 121-123-
5- Little, "Ernst Troeltsch on History, Decision and
Responsibility," Journal of Religion, Vol. 48, pp. 205-234.
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struggle. This negative qualification aids in stimulating
them to propose a more positive and acceptable view of the
world. Here it would seem, they differ with Dilthey in a
matter of attitude. His investigation moves man on to an
historical consciousness and awareness that will ultimately
liberate him from all dogmatic thought and systems. Liberal
theology desires to free man from the mechanical and non-
personal machinations of the natural order. To do this
they distinguish between man and Nature. The former concerns
them while the latter is seen to confine. Man's struggle
is "to see" himself independent of Nature. Dilthey takes a
similar view. But for him, life-experiences include the
good and bad, the ugly and beautiful, and the evil and
horrible. Historical life is creative, and only when one
takes a definite attitude does it become necessary to con¬
jure away or to "fear" some happenings. For Dilthey,
every historical experience must be open to man. In this
sense, relativity is not the great evil of history, nor is
the mechanical-natural view of the world. All reflect the
life^experiences of man. Dilthey sees this as the basis
for historical freedom and creativity. He envisions a
contextualism of life while theology concentrates solely
upon a contextualism of man.
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E. CONCLUSION: FAITH AND THE SPIDERS THREAD
OF HISTORY
The actual external details are always a matter of
controversy; and in this sense Lessing was
perfectly right when he warned us against coupling
matters of the highest moment with "accidental
truths of history," and hanging the whole weight of
eternity on a spider's thread. But the spiritual
purport of a whole life,-^of a personality, is also
an historical fact
The dictum of Lessing casts a long shadow. Liberal
Protestantism followed his lead and admitted the
impossibility of finally deciding for or against the
actuality of faith's content on the basis of external fact.
Attempting to reconstruct the facts of faith's beginning
and development will only lead to quibbling and controversy.
The probablistic and accidental truths of history cannot be
presumed to establish the "timeless" essentials of faith.
Theology portrays the theme of faith to be a recurrent and
constant content in the life of man. The world with its
natural nexus of cause and effect encapsulates the human
phenomenon. Reason tells him that he is a part of the
world-machine, but yet he feels and senses himself to be
independent of natural processes. Empirical data and
observations do not lend credence to this religious view.
On an impartial and objective level, man is unquestionably
a product of nature and life. But the matter will not rest.
Beside the objective evidence is to be found and considered
the ability to make value-judgments based on personal con¬
viction. Man "knows" himself to be of worth and value.
1. Harnack, Christianity, p. 61.
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These are the qualities which remain beyond the province
of impartial observation. Quantitative analysis does not
permit qualitative change. However, man does feel meaning
to be a real dimension of living. For faith, Jesus Christ
announces the worth of all by being the first man to bring
this feeling to consciousness and cognition. The greatness
of Christ rests upon the conscious explication and living
of this insight. Christ's conduct, motives, convictions,
all represent visible verification of meaning's power. As
a man, He stands in history and makes His mark by the
benefits He bestows and by the Power He reveals. He
associates the worth of man with the self-end of God. God
and man are intended for communion. It is from this
association that man "knows" his own value and independence
from the world. The natural order becomes the means to
express his significance and importance. Christ dies and
thereby seals the divine intention of communion with man.
The meaning of Christ's message lingers in the context of
living and is open for apprehension and appropriation.
One begins to appreciate His work on the basis of knowing Him
as a factor in history. The empirical evidence supports the
veracity of faith. But added to this must be the personal
realization and conviction of Christ's inner, personal life.
This dimension must be made a personal experience by the
believer. As one knows Christ personally, he becomes
certain and convinced of the truthfulness of His message and
the Power which He illustrates. Knowledge of God in Christ
provides the bulwark of the Christian world-view. The
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problem of historical distance becomes non-existent in the
depths of personal involvement. Christ does not deliver an
idea to man which is unrelated to the reality of his life.
It would seem to be the case that He verbalizes and
materializes an inner, inexplicable feeling in man. The
power of His personality and insight transcends the limits
of time; because in Him, man recognizes and comes to aware¬
ness of something that all men "know". Personality reveals
the truth of faith because man can identify and associate
himself with what is common to and experienced by him. The
facts of history only provide the bedrock upon which the
great personalities affect the course of human affairs. Man's
continual concern about himself in relation to the external
world finds resolution and satisfaction in His personality.
The whole weight of eternity is no longer suspended on the
spider's thread of external, historical detail. The power
of His personality supplements all such facts. In the end,
man and his personal realization of His inner life stand as
the pivotal point in deciding the truth or falsity of the
matter. Faith gives man the perspective of reality which
he feels to be true. The knowledge of God in Christ helps
to bring to cognition this inner feeling. Man asks and
faith answers. But questions and answers are framed
anthropocentrically and immanently. Faith satisfies man's
needs now, in the present. Dilthey developed an understanding
of history which depends upon the continual presence of man.
In a similar fashion, theology presents an understanding of
faith. The historical world and the religious manifestations
represent products of human psychical affectations. The
88
"mind-affected" world satisfies and creates the needs,
directions, values, products and meanings in history. At
the end of the day, the final disposition of faith's truth
comes before the judgment seat of human volition and
value-judging. Dilthey, no less than Ritschl and company,
declares the sovereignty of man over the confinement and
conditions of life.
The "ugly, broad ditch" over which Lessing could not
jump remains. But theology has substituted another means
of dealing with Lessing's warning. The "timeless"
essentials of faith depend upon the "timeless" constitution
of man. Faith answers the "timeless" questions of his
relation to life. It accomplishes this by means of the
personality of Christ. By identifying with Him and
accepting His answer, man realizes and affirms the continuity
between Christ's answer and his need. Personality, personal
involvement and realization make contemporaneous and real
what no amount of facts and figures may hope to secure.
Man's present problem finds solution in the knowledge of
God in Christ. On theology's behalf, Troeltsch recognizes
the limitedness of this solution based upon its adoption by
man and its creation in the context of history. The
personality-solution must be seen as temporary. Theology
may choose to ignore this fact; however, the reality of life
persists in creating new obstacles and new tensions for any
and all views of the world which claim absoluteness and
universality. The uniting of fact and value in the person
of Christ must ultimately be seen as (l) resting upon personal
conviction and (2) offering only tentative and approximate
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evidence in history. The relativity of all such views is
the insight of Dilthey. Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack may
desire to postpone the problem, but Troeltsch remains un-
waivering in his commitment to the historicity of life.
Change, relativity and movement are the historical phenomena
to which man must adjust. Faith assists in this task but
also develops because of it. The task is the constant
problem for man, and to date one can only say that faith has
been the answer so far.^"
Jj: >j? * % % $ %
Liberal Protestant theology attempted to circumvent Lessing's
problem. It was in agreement with him when it contended
that external, historical facts cannot hope to support the
weight of eternity. In essence, theology conceived faith
to be a "timeless" content answering man's interrogation of
the external world. The valuational dimension of this
answer placed it beyond the perview of objectification. For
theology Jesus Christ represents the personal and real
culmination and fulfilment of fact and value in history. The
"accidental truths of history" cannot establish the "time¬
less" truths of faith. Empirical and objective facts do not
have a direct bearing upon the value-judgments made in faith.
Lessing and Liberal Protestantism appear to agree on the
matter regarding "accidental truths". Personality may
provide an alternative route around Lessing's "ugly, broad
ditch", but it does not provide a /iGTo- fio.O'iS
1. Reist, Chapter 5, and Troeltsch, Protestantism and
Progress.
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The "ditch" remains as well as the inherent problem of
relativity and change. Personality fortified with fact is
given the task of upholding the weight of eternity. This
emphasis raises the question from a purely historical
problem of the truth or falsity of the divinity of Christ
to one of His value and meaning for man now in his present
struggle with the world. But this solution is conditioned
and generated by man. Man and his history are the measures
of faith's content. Though personality seems to offer a
basis for certainty and veracity, it must be seen as
momentary and temporary. The need of man: remains while the
satisfaction he receives comes from historical products. The
psychological slant on faith appears to result from theology's
emphasis upon man and upon history's intimate connectedness to
his psychical powers. But faith is an historical product
also and as such it is qualified by the categories of space
and time. The "accidental truths of history" also qualify
as "accidental" the characterization of all historical facts
and creations. The illusion of faith's absoluteness
continues so long as man affirms its universality through
personal conviction. Absoluteness attributed to faith
derives from man and not from the category of history. The
dictum of Lessing remains in force though temporarily
aberrated by the introduction of personality.
Theology again finds itself struggling with the problem
of Lessing — how does one come to the certainty of faith's
truth? Liberal theology proposed the route of Christ's
person. But at the end of this road, it was required to
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make a detour. Person of a factual nature came to mean
person or personality of a value nature. Facts merely
provided the stepping-stone to talk about meaning. But at
the end of the road, it was required to see that even this
solution rested upon a relative factor — man and his
personal conviction. Historical movement and relativity
even blocked the completion of man's journey to establish
faith's certainty. Theology may travel an alternative
route but it must be wary of further gaps and detours, and
it must also allow for the possibility that what Lessing
perceived as a "ditch" may really have the dimensions of
a chasm. With the threat of this portentous obstacle,
the pathfinders of faith continue to risk the dangers of
the abyss for the treasures of eternity. As the momentary
success of Liberalism dissipates before Lessing's discovery,
other theologians with their formulas for fortune brave the
dangers of historical relativism and attempt to possess what
Liberalism only perceived.
LESSING TO KIERKEGAARD:
A HOP, SKIP, AND A
JUMP
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ABBREVIATIONS OF SK'S WORKS IN
FOOTNOTES
CUP = CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT
FT = FEAR AND TREMBLING
PA - THE PRESENT AGE
PF - PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS
TC - TRAINING IN CHRISTIANITY
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Nineteenth century Protestant thought had encountered
a perplexing situation. It had attempted to grasp firmly
the contingencies and temporalities of history in such a way
as to contain them within the rational structure of faith and
therefore to mould and to control these relativising forces.
However, as it became quite clear in the thought of Ernst
Troeltsch, the privileged position of Christianity as the faith
was to be brought under the influence and power of the same
forces which faith had sought to control. The accidental and
contingent character of all historical occurrence was
eventually applied to the very structure of Christianity itself.
Faith claimed to be rooted in the historical happening. But
the very nature and consistency of history was marked by the
accidental and contingent. Faith's claim to be absolute could
be no more than a claim, for history appeared to contain only
movement and approximation. Dilthey was quite explicit on
this point. History was not to be transcended. All exper¬
ience was to be founded upon the individual experiences of
human beings. There could be no appeal to any transcendent
or metaphysical realms. This could just simply not be known,
for it was outside man's experiences. The effect of this
thinking seemed to undercut the proclamation of faith which
ultimately was seen to rest upon the historicality of the
Godman, Jesus Christ. Faith could not intelligibly appeal
to any realm of reality that might possibly lay outside of
experience. Jesus Christ had to be re-interpreted in the
light of this "pre-understanding". Much emphasis was put on
His humanity and work as an example for man. His divinity
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was lost in the non-cognitive sphere of the metaphysical
and transcendent. Jesus Christ was unique not in who He
was but in what He did. Faith responded to a human need
when it pointed to an accidental and contingent occurrence in
history. This need itself was viewed as essential and time¬
less because of its relation to man and as such it did not
require doctrinal metaphysics for its proof. The conse¬
quence of Christ's personality was the revelation of the
worth of every man. This was His insight which gave humanity
value and significance in addition to its facticity. This in¬
sight assured man that his feeling of independence from the
world was indeed real and human and possessing content. The
human connection established Christ's importance.
It is at this juncture that the thought of S^ren
Kierkegaard becomes important both as a point of reaction and
attack to the theological development of the late nineteenth
century. SK takes up the problem of the eternal and
necessary truths of faith as opposed to the accidental and
contingent truths of history. His thought appears to present
an avenue of hope for the statements of faith made within an
historical process of relativity and change. SK moves to
re-affirm the positive value and the meaningful qualities of
the finitude and temporality of history, as opposed to their
negative valuation. It is in the instant and in the moment
with all of its change and movement that meaning and signifi¬
cance are contained. The accidental and temporal nature of
history is not to be avoided and negativised, but it is to
be affirmed and appropriated as the sphere of existence.
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Time and history gain their significance and importance
because of the descent of God into the realm of existence.
God's choosing to reveal Himself in the Godman, Jesus Christ,
in the category of time re-makes history and adds a new
dimension to it through His in-breaking. Christianity
claims to stand upon this divine self-revelation which SK
terms the Absolute Paradox. Faith and history are then not
essentially disconnected but rather they conjoin and open-up
in the revelation of the eternal Deity. They are components
of man's existence which, of its very nature, does not permit
a logical interconnection or separation between these two.
Existence is the realm of man's becoming and acting and is
not to be systematized and categorized. Existence does not
deal with abstraction but with the particular and the actual
as it is individually encountered and experienced. Therefore
the historical takes on a positive revelatory and existence-
affirming quality. It is not to be avoided, for it is the
very place where life is lived.
In this manner SK moves positively in drawing out the
implications of the encounter between faith and history. He
is able to maintain the historical claims of faith and the
self-revelation of God in the particularity and finitude of
time without devaluing faith and relegating Jesus Christ to
the simple yet complex problem of an historical phenomenon.
Christianity does not sink into the mire of relativities and
temporalities to be forever speechless and without authority.
Rather it achieves its strength and power from the conditions
of the moment, which is itself affirmed by the claims of faith.
This is precisely the case because the eternal God has revealed
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Himself in space and time and has brought the eternal into
the present. SK discovers the whole weight of eternity to
be found in time — the place where Lessing also searched
but only to leave empty-handed.
A. ETERNAL VERSUS ACCIDENTAL TRUTHS
"Accidental truths of history can never become the
proof of necessary truths of reason.In this statement by
Lessing, one confronts a major problem with which SK attempts
2
to deal. It is from this basic proposal that the distinction
is cast between the "truths of history" and the "truths of
reason". Lessing argues that no matter how well an histori¬
cal truth is substantiated, one is still dealing in the realm
of the probable and the approximate. Historical argumen¬
tation cannot prove or demonstrate the essential truth con¬
tained in Christian faith. History represents the sphere of
contingency and temporality while religion contains rational
truths of a timeless and necessary nature.
[F]rom what Lessing has already said...it follows
that there is a difference between historical proof
and what can be demonstrated, where demonstration
means logically deduced from self-evident premises.
So then, Lessing is making another logical distinction,
this time between the a posteriori 'proof' which can
be adduced in support of an historical assertion,^and
the a priori 'demonstration' of 'eternal truths'.
Lessing draws a line of demarcation between these two realms —
5that which is historical and that which is eternal. The
1. Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writing's, p. 53*
2. SK, CUP, p. 86f,*(vide, Campbell, "Lessing's Problem aid
Kierkegaard's Answer," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 19, p. 35)•
3. Ibid., p. 88; (vide, Lessing, pp. 30-31.).
4. Campbell, p. 43-
5. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Vol. II, pp.310-311.
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distinction is the "ugly, broad ditch" over which he is unable
to jump, for in essence these two classes of truth stand in
different qualitative categories - the a posteriori and the
a priori.^ No amount of quantitative proof is able to
establish a necessary, eternal truth. Quantitative abundance
does not produce qualitative change. This appears to be the
point which Lessing endeavours to make. To attempt to argue
for the substantiation of the eternal by means of the
historical represents the y{X. fyen.O'lS yis/oS*
But it is to be noted straightaway that this distinction
marks an assumption on his part — namely, that theological
p
truths are eternal and timeless. As long as this assumption
remains, an inseparable gulf stands between the historical
embodiment of faith and the truth which it transmits.
Reason provides the means by which one is able to
demonstrate the necessary truths of the eternal. Such a
position implicitly contends that man already possesses a
3
capacity for truth and that he must simply utilize it.
Through the faculty of consciousness and rationality man
holds the available means of progressing along the pathway of
truth.^ Lessing viewed the road as a continuous and arduous
5
journey not to be dreaded. The eternal truth categorized
1. Lessing, pp. 53-541 (vide, Sime, Lessing, Vol. II,
pp. 210-212.).
2. Lessing, pp. 82 and 83, sec. 2,4.
3. Ibid., p. 101, sec. 22-26.
4. Ibid., p. 94, sec. 70-72.
5. Ibid., p. 43, (vide, Demoor, "The Problem of Revelation in
Eighteenth-Century Germany: With Particular Reference to
Lessing," Evang. Q., Vol. 39, p- 74/and vide, Dorner,
p. 308j and vide, Sime, p. 226.)',
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as a priori and demonstrable has no need for the occasion or
the moment of its transmission. It would appear that history-
only represents an illustration or an instance of what is
necessary and timeless."'" Man, the thinking creature, con-
o
tains within himself the possibility for knowing the truth.
In this way the contingent and accidental characteristics of
history are merely ancillary and illustrative to the immediate
moment of the eternal and rational. Of itself, time is not
a fundamental nor essential component in bringing to remembrance
what is already implicitly possessed. Truth cast in eternal
garb becomes a-historical. Man, the possessor of truth, is
turned inward onto himself and away from the perception of the
temporal. Lessing's dictum consequently draws the "ugly,
broad ditch" between the historical as becoming and the
eternal as being.^ Any point of contact is sent into an
infinite digression never to be secured.
Lessing's setting of the problem may be accepted.
Then the factuality of the revelatory facts is quite
incidental, the real issue being concerned with the
reality of the believer. In this case the Moment has
ceased to be decisive, we have returned to the Socratic
situation, and the fact of revelation is simply part
of the mythology postulated by the believer as the mere
occasion for the learning of certain eternals-truths
which really are known implicitly all along.
Lessing does appear to begin his investigation into the truths
of theology from the Socratic standpoint. SK presents this
1. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 7-
2. DeMoor, pp. 147-150.
3. Ibid., pp. 140-141.
4. Lessing, p. 31.
5. Campbell, pp. 53-54.
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position and an alternative one in Ms PMlosophical Fragments.
Lessing presupposes their a priori, demonstrable quality and
2
their implicit being within the individual believer. Reve¬
lation is reduced to an anticipatory process which brings
from concealment a timeless possession. Truth does not come
from outside of man but is forever inherent in his individual
and collective reasoning.-^ Time slips into unimportance and
God is physically escorted from and taken out of His self-
4
revelation in time.
Beginning from this stance, the revelatory particulars
constituting faith's truth are posited as accidental and un¬
necessary for its propagation. It is in this manner that the
Christ of faith is irrevocably separated aid wrenched from the
Jesus of history — truth takes precedence over event. The
bearer of truth stands as a mere occasion for its being
brought to light. Lessing appears to be arguing that the
essentials of faith are a human possession which Christ merely
more quickly facilitates in His work. "A better instructor
must come and tear the exhausted primer from the child's hands
— Christ came." His act of "revelation" involves the
bringing to consciousness of a truth that remains latent and
implicit for man in the infancy of rational capability.
Christ, the "better instructor," helps man along the path to
rationaLmaturity. Indeed, "the development of revealed
1. SK, PF, chapter 1.
2. Lessing, p. 83, sec. 4 and pp. 104-105.
3. Ibid., p. 36.
4. Ibid., p. 32.
5. Ibid., p. 91, sec. 53-
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truths of reason, is absolutely necessary.... When they were
revealed they were certainly not truths of reason, but they
were revealed in order to become such.What may have
originally been described as a mystery and as beyond compre¬
hension acquires a very rational and intelligible demeanor
in the process of time. Lessing points out that this tran¬
sition from revelation to reason is "absolutely necessary".
He might even say that it is inevitable given his belief in the
2
development and maturation of man's intellectual capacity.
What seems to follow from the function of Christ is not a
belief in His person but a communion with the truth He
"reveals". The "religion of Christ" contradicts the Christian
religion. Lessing portrays the former as "that religion which
as a man he [Christ] himself recognized and practiced; which
every man has in common with him...." Christ recognized and
practiced a natural religion which acknowledges one God and
4
which seeks to think and to act ideas in accordance with Him.
This is the faith which all men have in common. But the
Christian religion "is that religion which accepts it as true
that he was more than a man, and makes Christ himself, as such,
the object of its worship." It is this type of belief that
holds Christ to be "more than a man" which Lessing wants to
see as "so uncertain and ambiguous".^ He wants to stress the
1. Ibid., p. 95, sec. 76.
2. Sime, pp. 275-276j (vide, DeMoor, p. 143).
3- Lessing, p. 106.
4. Ibid., pp. 99-100, 104-105,' (vide, Bernard, Cambridge
Free Thoughts, Letter III, "Axiomata", pp. 18-58.),
5. Lessing, p. 106.
6. Ibid., p. 106.
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commonality between Christ and all other men. His preference
for the "religion of Christ" suggests his leaning away from
the supernatural and transcendent."'" Lessing's reason
rebels against the notion that Christ is of the same essence
2
as God. Natural religion is so much more natural if it
z
remains on an immanent and rational footing. Christ teaches
man ideas worthy of God and illustrates the importance of
4
love. His revelation must become the truth of reason. The
consequences of what He says and does predominate over who He
is. This situation overshadows and annihilates the bearer
and draws exclusive attention onto the truth itself. Jesus
as the Godman is driven into the far country of obscurity
because of the contingency and temporality which encompass
His existence and which qualifies it as unnecessary and
accidental.^ The person of Christ is lost in the remembrance
of His work. The historicality of revelation becomes trans¬
formed into the rational conceptualization of the believer.
With the logical distinction drawn between history and the
eternal, the moment of revelation, in all of its particularity
and historicality, is relegated before the brilliant certainty
of the timeless. Existence with its activity and individuality
becomes secondary and tangential to the essentially real and
universally demonstrable.
1. Ibid., p. 34.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
3. Bernard, Letter I, "The Parable," pp. 2-5-
4. Lessing, pp. 57-61, p. 28) (vide, Lessing, Nathan The Wise,
Parable of the Ring, pp. 99-105.
5. SK, PF, p. lii.
6. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, pp. 32-36.
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SK was not content with the regimentation and the de-
historization of individual and collective existence under
the auspices of the a priori and of being. He was in agree¬
ment with Lessing on the inability of offering proof for the
claims of Christianity. Discovering faith's whatness pre¬
sumably entails offering its historical, contextual relations
in an endeavour to expose its inner essentiality to the light
of day. "Supposing that we continue in this manner to prove
and seek proof of the truth of Christianity, the remarkable
phenomenon would finally emerge, that just when the proof for
its truth had become completely realized, it would have
ceased to exist as a present fact."~^ To seek and to
inquire after the essence of faith places one in the role of
an objective observer, where it becomes impossible to decide
2
for or against its claims. Further SK can also agree with
Lessing that the historical, contextual data can never be
more than an approximation.
[I]t is more important to have it understood and
remembered that even with the most stupendous learning
and persistence in research, and even if all the brains
of all the critics were concentrated in one, it would
still be impossible to obtain anything more than an
approximation...P
This being the case', the objective observer who seeks after
faith's essence but who can only discover approximations is
embarked upon the quest of the impossible dream. He is
seeking in objectivity what is foreign to the very nature of
faith and contrary to its actuality. He is seeking to prove
1. SK, CUP, p. 32.
2. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 12.
3. SK, CUP, pp. 25-26.
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it objectively. In the objective search, the campaign and
struggle after its proof tends to obliterate the real and
actual existence of faith in its lived and experienced single¬
ness and particularity. The proof also beclouds the
existence of the believer in his inner relation to it.
Objectivity searches dispassionately without commitment which
alone is able to grasp that which is sought."'" Indeed,
objective dispassionateness and approximation can continue
indefinitely without final resolution.
It is not without reason that you have been praised,
0 wonderful objectivity, for you can do all things....
Unless this objective and accommodating temper should
perhaps be in the wrong place, so that it is possibly
unchristian; in that case it would naturally be a little
dubious to have arrived at the truth of Christianity in
this manner. Christianity is spirit, spirit is inward¬
ness, inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is
essentially passion, and in its maximum an infinite,
personal passionate interest in one's eternal
happiness.
Christianity does not stand over and against man as merely
and simply an objective phenomenon which possesses no personal,
passionate and intimate interest for the observer. Rather
faith maintains itself within the historical relativities as
inwardness, spirit and subjectivity. As well, it is funda¬
mentally and existentially crucial and necessary for one's
eternal happiness. Faith is a matter of the utmost impor¬
tance for man; it is a matter not only of objective but also
of subjective, personal concern. It permeates the human
life-structure and -reality not merely of the thinking but,
1. SK, TC, pp. 37-39.
2. SK, CUP, p. 33.
3- Johnson and Thulstrup (ed.), A Kierkegaard Critique,
pp. 217-222.
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more importantly, of the existing individual. Christianity
is also of subjective interest to man who is not only an
observer but also a participator in the truth. "All
decisiveness,all essential decisiveness, is rooted in sub¬
jectivity.""'" This is the point of departure for SK from
Lessing. Christianity is not simply qualified as uncertain
and unimportant because of its historical embodiment and
claims. Rather precisely because of this, faith is positively
affirmed and presented as the decisive factor and commitment
2
in man's existence and for his eternal happiness. SK's
concern is not with proving Christianity but with establishing
its relevance for man's life.
By placing the emphasis upon the contingent, historical
and becoming rather than upon the eternal, necessary and being,
SK features the truth of faith more in the light of an a_
posteriori inquiry.^ In this way the historical embodiment
of Christianity matters for something as integral and compo¬
nent to faith's nature. Man cannot demonstrate its truth
a priori, rather he must discover and grasp it within the
context of the "accidental truths of history." Therefore,
one is able to speak again of the Godman, Jesus Christ, as
the self-revelation of God in the context of space and time.
But it is precisely at this point that SK draws the limits
of Reason and its objective appropriation. Reason's approach
1. SK, CUP, p. 33-
2. Johnson and Thulstrup, pp. 214-215-
3. SK, CUP, p. 18.
4. Campbell, p. 46.
5- Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 59-
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to God is frustrated and stymied by its attempt to comprehend
and to demonstrate the presence and existence of the Deity.^
"But what is this unknown something with which the Reason
collides (when inspired by its paradoxical passion, with the
result of unsettling even man's knowledge of himself?). It
2
is the Unknown....Let us call this unknown something: the God."
God is unknown to Reason because He stands in an absolute un-
likeness to what Reason is die to conceive. Reason thinks in
terms of objectivities: empirical data, facts and necessary
connections. It attempts to discern the demonstrable truth
of the matter.
When the question of truth is raised in an objective
manner, reflection is directed objectively to the
truth, as an object to which the knower is related.
Reflection is not focused upon the relationship,...
but upon the question of whether it is the truth to
which the knower is related.3
SK here makes the point that in this mode of thinking one is
more concerned with the question of truth than with the
relationship to it. In this way, truth becomes an object
to be analyzed and subjected to demonstration irrespective
of its relationship to the observer. Indeed, this is what
4
occurs when God is perceived as the true object of faith.
By merely observing the historical remembrances of Jesus and
even by arranging them into some coherent system, one is still
no nearer to the proof of His Godmanhood.
1. Eller, "Faith, Fact, and Foolishness: Kierkegaard and the
New Quest," J. Rel., Vol. 48, pp. 56-57.
2. SK, PF, p. 49-
3. SK, CUP, p. 178.
4. Ibid., p. 178f.
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As long as I keep my hold on the proof, i.e., continue
to demonstrate, the existence does not come out, if
for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving
it; but when I let go, the existence is there.... This
act of letting go...is...a contribution of mine. Must
not this also be taken into account, this little moment,
brief^as it may be — it need not be long, for it is a
leap.
The objective attempt to demonstrate the Godman-hood of Jesus
is the very act which annihilates and dissolves His existence
into a proof which must always remain only approximation. In
the "act of letting go," existence is allowed to emerge and
to express itself. This is possible because it is not
demonstrable but rather it is a given; it is not logically
2
deducible rather it is simply there. Therefore, SK chooses
to approach the matter of God's self-revelation in the mode
of an inwardness which is passionately concerned not with
rational universality and necessity but with the particular¬
ity and individuality of Jesus. In making this approach, SK
appeals to the passionate inwardness of human subjectivity —
Christianity communicates life. On this basis, one no longer
approaches Jesus as an object, rather the relationship to Him
takes precedence.
When the question of truth is raised subjectively,
reflection is directed subjectively to the nature
of the individuals relationship; if only the mode
of this relationship is in truth, the individual
is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus
related to what is not true. 3
Subjectivity is regarded as another mode of reflection. SK
informs us that this reflection clarifies the significance
of the essential truth for existence.^ Subjectivity reflects
1. SK, PF, p. 53-
2. Ibid., p. 50.
3. SK, CUP, p. 178.
4. Ibid. . p. 178 (ftnt.).
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upon the truth which affects the contents of living."1' The
O
What of objectivity is replaced by the How of subjectivity.
To come to life objectively is to attempt to discover its
thought-form, to annul its differences and to remain in
infinite indecisiveness. Subjectivity, on the other hand,
seeks to appropriate inwardness, to retain the life-distinctions
4
and to engage in infinite decisiveness. To be in object-
5
ivity is to be in error. Indeed, it is to decide for the
object of truth as opposed to a relationship to it. But the
reality of faith is a truth which demands relationship and
subjectivity. Jesus Christ represents this truth.
The object of faith is hence the reality of the God-man
in the sense of his existence. But existence involves
first and foremost particularity, and this is why
thought must abstract from existence, because the
particular cannot be thought, but only the universal.
The object of faith is thus God's reality in existence
as a particular individual, the fact gfchat God has
existed as an individual human being.
In the process of "letting go", man dispenses with his attempt
to probe and to dissect the historical reality of Jesus, an
empirical object. History entails particularity and con¬
tingency. This is the place where He is to be found. The
object of faith is the existence of the Godman in time, in
the depths of history. And more, the objective Reason which
can only think the universal can never attain the reality of
7God who is subject and particular. There can be no direct
1. Crites, pp. 24-28.
2. SK, CUP, p. 181.
3- Ibid., p. 181.
4. Ibid., p. 181.
5. Ibid., p. 181.
6. Ibid., p. 290.
7. Ibid., p. 178.
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relationship between man and God.1 He is not contained
within the totality of the created, objective order. Rather
man's subjectivity represents his inner means to a relation-
ship with Him. The non-objectivity and the subjectivity of
the Deity demonstrates the futility of all attempts to
appropriate Him through Reason. Man must "let go" of his
objective attempts. He receives Him only in the person of
Christ who has particular existence in the context of history.
Here again the emphasis of SK's thought dwells upon existence
and becoming in the contextual atomization of its reality. He
is interested in the particular life of Jesus Christ as He
dwells in the historical-ness of the real world.
Lessing's admiration for the powers of Reason to demon¬
strate the a priori necessities of eternal truth is played down
by SK who turns his attention to the affirmation of the
historical and accidental. By asserting the self-revelation
of God in time and space, he provides Reason with an insur¬
mountable stumbling-block which prohibits Reason's compre¬
hension and apprehension.^ "The Reason has brought the God
5
as near as possible, and yet he is as far away as ever."
In opposition to and yet in correspondence with Reason, SK
posits the faculty of faith which subjectively appropriates
the sense and meaning of God's self-revelation at the limit
and in fulfilment of Reason's power.^ Faith is not another
1. Ibid., p. 221.
2. Ibid., p. 220.
3. Ibid., pp. 220-221.
4. SK, TC, pp. 122-123.
5. SK, PF, p. 57.
6. Ibid., p. 76.
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avenue to knowledge, rather it is a qualitative leap in time
which passionately grasps the Unknown, God, in the Godman,
Jesus Christ — the Absolute Paradox for Reason."'" The
Paradox arises in the fact that God, who is eternal, has
broken into time to exist as an individual man in the context
2
of history. He has come to teach man and this He does by
3
way of a self-giving descent. Faith is thus man's approach
4
to the appropriation of the Paradox. This is necessary
because Reason is not able to conceive what is absolute un-
5
likeness to itself. But yet man is nonetheless confronted
with a reality in time that hinders and collides with his own
reasoning capabilities.^ In the Godman, man is faced with
the Paradox of the in-breaking of God. To speak of Him is to
7
speak of Christ in His being-in-the-world. SK brings to
the centre of discussion the centrality of Christ and the
individual believer in faith's witness and proclamation. Jesus
Christ as the coalescence of the eternal and the temporal, of
God and man, of truth and error, stands in the middle of the
discussion of Christianity. He is the Paradox which Reason
approaches and yet is unable to grasp.
But can such a paradox be conceived? Let us not be
overhasty in replying.... The Reason will doubtless
find it impossible to conceive it, could not of itself
1. Ibid., pp. 58-59-
2. McKinnon, "Believing the Paradoks," Harv. Theo. Re.,
Vol. 61, p. 633; See Appendix A on Reason and Paradox, p.452ff.
3. SK, PF, p. 39.
4. Crites, p. 64.
5. SK, TC, pp. 28-29.
6. Crites, p. 62.
7. Cruickshank, "Theology and Kierkegaard's 'Postscript'",
Church Q., Vol. I, p. 208.
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have discovered it, and when it hears it announced will
not be able to understand it, sensing merely that its
downfall is threatened. In so far the Reason will have
much to urge against it; and yet we have on the other
hand seen that Reason, in its paradoxical passion,
precisely desires its own downfall. But this is what
the Paradox also desires, and thus they are at bottom
linked in understanding; but this understanding is
present only in the moment of passion. 1
The elusiveness of Christ is due to the inability of Reason to
2
conceive Him and thus to abstract Him out of existence.
Reason is powerless to extract the truth from its encounter
with the Paradox. It finds itself helpless and impotent
and thus must await communication — the communication of the
truth which is appropriated through faith. The evidence of
God's approach to man is empirically inconclusive to justify
Reason's verdict and judgment of faith's claim. Lessing saw
as well that there is no analogy in one's present experience
which could count as supporting testimony to the question at
4
hand. God's coming-into-history is a unique and objectively
uncertain occurrence which is a rational ambiguity. Yet a
channel of intercommunication exists between these two
elements. Reason and the Paradox both desire the downfall
of Reason in order to allow for the apprehending of the truth
of faith. But it Is important to be precise in pointing out
that the Paradox in and of itself is not a logical contra¬
diction which confounds and obliterates all coherence and
intelligibility. Rather the Paradox collides with the Reason
1. SK, PF, p. 59-
2. SK, TC, pp. 124-127.
3. Johnson and Thulstrup, p. 167.
4. Campbell, p. 42^ (vide, Lessing, pp. 51-56.).
5. McKinnon, "Believing...," pp. 633-636.
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as an "essential paradox" which cannot be resolved and
decided by an appeal to empirical, observable, objective
data."1" Given the information at hand, Reason is not capable
of reaching a definitive resolution of faith's claim. The
lack of resolution results from the very nature of history
which is strewn which approximations. For SK, the reality
and the actuality of the Godman is not a priori and is not
demonstrable by the powers of Reason alone. SK restricts
himself to the position that
Lessing has concealed everything in the adjective:
accidental, but said only a part, so that "accidental"
is here not a relatively-distinguishing predicate, but
a genus-predicate: historical truths, which as such
are accidental....Everything that becomes historical
is accidental or contingent; it is precisely through
coming into being, and thus becoming historical, that
it has its moment of contingency, for contingency is
precisely one factor in all becoming. Here again we
have the root of the incommensurability that subsistsp
between an historical truth and an eternal decision.
Historical truths are accidental. History is not the realm
of the necessary. Rather "zufallige" characterizes the
nature of the historical, and it is within this nature that
God comes to man in Christ. In the category of becoming,
history is affirmed as contingent. For SK, it is the realm
•5of the coming-into-being. Eternal truths as necessary
already exist: they have no becoming.^ To discuss and
reflect upon the eternal's coming into time requires further
ado than simple intellectual assent or dissent. The category
1. Eller, p. 56.
2. SK, CUP, p. 90.
3. SK, PF, p. 93-
A 4. Ibid.. "Interlude", p. 91f>
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of becoming points to the same incommensurability which the
Reason has in confrontation with the Paradox. There can be
no fixed and final historical proof for eternal happiness.
History as the sphere of existence cannot be systematized or
made logical. The process of becoming is antithetical to
2
the necessity which Reason seeks to discover.
It is to faith that SK points in his explication of the
Paradox. Reason stands dumbfounded and stymied, but yet the
Paradox allows dialogue and communication. Man comes to it
with his Reason which discovers the perplexity of the confron¬
tation and uncovers the absurdity of the claim that God is in
z
Christ. But the Paradox is not a logical contradiction,
4
rather it marks the limits of Reason's ability to apprehend.
The Paradox in communication with Reason demands under-
5
standing. And it is in faith, the qualitative leap, that
the Paradox is brought into subjective, inward and particular
relation to the participant, who seeks the essential truth
which provides the basis for his eternal happiness.^ Indeed,
"the transition by which something historical and the relation¬
ship to it becomes decisive for an eternal happiness, is
AlgT*. fyoiCTtS &l$ y&\/o$ , a leap, both for a contem-
7
porary and for a member of some later generation." This
is what eternal happiness and the How of subjectivity require.
1. SK, CUP,pp. 99fj 107f; (vide, SK, Journals, p. 175, sec.610.),
2. Ibid., pp. 99-113-
3. SK, TC, p. 139.
4. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further
Light," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 13, p. 33-
5. Ibid., p. 34.
6. SK, Journals, p. 386f., sec. 1084.
7. SK, CUP, p. 90.
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There are no easy, short-cut and objective proofs and ways
to this decision. No one is in any better situation to
understand the truth than anyone else. The decision is just
as difficult for all. The way over Lessing's "ditch"
requires a leap in confrontation with the Absolute Paradox —
a leap which Lessing could not make. While Reason has
functioned in the deciphering of the empirical data and claims,
it came to realize its inability to grasp that which it has
pursued — namely, the Godman."'" The faculty of faith helps
to resolve the problem of historical distance. For SK, what
is known by the historian is not immediately known simply as
an effect or consequence. Rather by an act of inference, an
act of resolution characterized as faith, historical appre¬
hension may occur and connection may be made and coherences
2
realized. Also for SK, faith functions to condition the
understanding for the reception of eternal truth. It is
also historical and as such demands an act of the will for it
is subjective appropriation. This appropriation has the
existential ramifications of deciding and establishing man's
eternal happiness. The eternal as historical is uncertain —
4
it is the objective uncertainty of the Paradox. As an act
of existential resolution, faith leaps to grasp and to make
contemporary the essential truth of this objective uncertainty
5
with passionate commitment and subjective inwardness. As an
1. Eller, pp. 57-64.
2. Campbell, p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 51 •
4. Crites, p. 90.
5. SK, CUP, p. 182.
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act of will, faith involves a leap which is also a risk,
for Reason can never of itself determine the certainty of
God's self-revelation in Christ and establish contemporaneity
with Him. This is the consequence of SK's insistence upon
the accidental and contingent nature of history which cannot
be systematized. It is always in the process of becoming.
[T]he factuality of the revelatory facts may be
insisted upon for SK. In this case ordinary historical
questions can be raised about them, and faith in the
pre-eminent sense is sundered from the rationalist
ideal of eternal truths. It must now be seen as some¬
what dependent upon faith in the ordinary sense, which
in turn is guided by matters of weight of evidence. ^
Thus faith cannot be sealed off from 'natural inquiry'.
SK insists upon the historicality of faith's claims and upon
the objectivity of God's presence in Christ. But the unique¬
ness and the absolute incommensurability of God's act demands
more than mere intellectual assent and inquiry, for this is
not able to grasp the existing truth present in the Godman.
Reason must will its own re-alignment in order that the
Paradox of God's historical presence might communicate its
truth to man. Reason thus brings man to the recognition of
the Paradox as paradox and in so doing it is re-organized by
the content of the truth.^ "[F]aith is not a form of know¬
ledge....No knowledge can have for its object the absurdity
that the eternal is historical."^ Reason possesses no real
possibility of systematizing faith into an object of truth.
1. Campbell, p. 53*
2. Johnson and Thulstrup, pp. 179-184.
3. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation....," p. 34.
4. SK, PF, p. 76.
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Life and its essential truth possess the marks of becoming
and striving which resist confinement. "The principle that
the existing subjective thinker is constantly occupied in
striving [means]...he strives infinitely, is constantly in
process of becoming.""'" This movement, dynamism and process
remain beyond the grasp of objectivity. However Reason can
deal quite seriously with the factual, historical questions,
for Christianity does point to the eternal in time where time
2
is taken with the utmost seriousness and gravity. The
eternal no longer stands over and against history but is now
ever-breaking into the historical process, and thus in decision
it can create the moment as an egression of itself. Time
in its contingency, temporality and finiteness stands out to
confront man as essential and significant for his very becoming.
It is through an act of the eternal God that history is inter¬
sected.^1" God's coming into existence — this is the fact
which SK seeks to maintain and to protect from the notions of
necessity and being, which are a priori and demonstrable.
History is the realm of God's self-revelation, and it is
positively affirmed as the arena of His creative purpose.
Therefore, it witnesses to His presence and opens itself to
Reason's scrutiny and faith's subjective appropriation. In
this way, SK conditions the eternal with the historical and
the historical with the eternal. The appropriation process
1. SK, CUP, p. 84.
2. Bedell,"Kierkegaard's Conception of Time," J. Amer. Aca.
Rel.. Vol. 137, pp. 266-269.
3. Crites, p. 74.
4. SK, PF, pp. 108-109.
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is effected both through Jesus Christ who brings the truth
and through man who adopts the truth in subjective inward¬
ness and passionate apprehension.
B. CHRIST AS PATTERN AND TEACHER
SK has positively affirmed the individual moment and
instant to be infused with the presence and the power of the
eternal. Time becomes essential because it is here that man
encounters the truth, the eternal truth, which is the basis of
self-under s tanding. God has come to encounter His people in
the person of Jesus Christ. It is He who provides the
occasion for the discussion of the eternal in time. He is
God's own self-revelation. By asserting the historicality
of His presence in time, the position emerges that man is not
in the possession of the truth but is rather in the need of
its reception. SK parts company with Lessing at this point,
for he views the truth to be a God-given commodity which can
2
only be appropriated by faith.
If a human being is originally in possession of the
condition for understanding the Truth, he thinks that
God exists in and with his own existence. But if he
is in Error he must comprehend this fact in his
thinking, and Recollection will not be able to help
him further than to think just this. Whether he is to
advance beyond this point the moment must decide
(although it was already active in giving him an in¬
sight into his Error). 3
Truth remains something distinct from man. His condition is
one of error which entails his inability to grasp the eternal.
Rather it is in the moment that man comes to move beyond error
1. SK, CUP, pp. 505-506.
2. Geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Sg$ren
Kierkegaard, p. 55•
3. SK, PF, p. 25.
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to the hope of appropriating the truth. The decisive
moment gives him new life and he is born again."'" The reve¬
lation, possession and maintenance of the truth are functions
of God, who is the initiator of the truth-giving process.
God comes as the Teacher. Since man as the learner has
not the truth but is in error, it is for the Teacher to bring
what man lacks as well as for the condition for its reception.
What the Teacher can give him occasion to remember is,
that he is in Error. But in this consciousness the
learner is excluded from the Truth even more
decisively than before, when he lived in ignorance of
his Error....Now if the learner is to acquire the Truth,
the Teacher must bring it to him; and not only so, but
he must also givephim the condition necessary for
understanding it.
Truth and error stand in counter-balanced opposition to each
other. They are dialectical poles which help to mark-off the
existence of man. These two poles are essential facets of
the learner's historical becoming and as well time becomes a
decisively significant factor for the revelation of error and
the reception of truth. It is in time that the learner
experiences the qualitative transition from the one to the
other. The moment of transition becomes a matter of utmost
significance and existential importance. But it is always
the truth of the Teacher which confronts the learner. The
moment is always filled with His presence and with His ever-
recurring encounter. "[T]he Moment in time must have a
decisive significance, so that I will never be able to for¬
get it either in time or eternity; because the Eternal,
1. Ibid., p. 26.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
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which hitherto did not exist, came into existence in this
moment.""1" The Teacher shines forth in brilliance at the
decisive moment when the learner moves from error to truth.
But the moment of decision is only partially determined by
the learner; it is always the Teacher who extends both the
truth and the condition for its reception. Therefore, such
a Teacher is more than a teacher. Man who is in error is
not able to transform himself into the truth. All is dependent
upon the necessary condition which is occasioned by Him. In
this He accomplishes more than man is able to do.
All instruction depends upon the presence...of the
requisite condition....It is necessary not only to
transform the learner, but to recreate him before
beginning to teach him. But this is something that
no human being can-do; if it is to be done, it must
be done by God..."
The teacher who delivers the truth is thus more than man.
The qualitative transition from error to truth requires an
act of God. Such a qualitative change produces a new
creature.^ Therefore the Teacher must be God Himself who
alone possesses the power so to act. But God gives utter
and decisive significance to the moment, for in the moment
God makes possible the recreation and the reformation of
the learner into a qualitatively new becoming. It is a
transformation and a metamorphosis that man as the learner
will never be able to forget either in time or eternity.
"Such a moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and
1. Ibid., p. 16.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. SK, TC, pp. 198-205.
4. SK, PF, p. 23.
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temporal...; it is transient as all moments are; it is
past....And yet it is decisive, and filled with the Eternal...
It is the Fullness of Time.""*" God is affirmed to act in
time and there to reveal Himself in the brief and temporal
instant. It is in the act of self-revelation that time
becomes meaningful because it is filled with the eternal;
it is filled with God Himself.
God reveals Himself in Christ by an act of divine love.
This love is His motive for action. God, the Teacher,
instructs man in its meaning. The instruction is a further
condition for man's own essential development and eternal
happiness.
Moved by love, the God is thus eternally resolved to
reveal himself. But as love is the motive so love
must also be the end....His love is a love of the
learner, and his aim is to win him. f"or it is only
in love that the unequal can be made equal, and it is
only in equality...that an understanding can be
effected, and without apperfect understanding the
Teacher is not God....
In being moved by love, God also wills to have love returned
to Him. He acts in this manner to secure the learner from
error for truth. By love God descends to man in order to
make him equal and to have communion with him. Equality is
a condition which God establishes as a necessary requisite
for the transmission and appropriation of the truth. And
this moment of equality is in the Godman, Jesus Christ.
1. Ibid., p. 22.
2. Ibid. , pp. 30-31.
3. Reck, "The Christianity of S^ren Kierkegaard," Can. J.
Theo., Vol. 12, pp. 86-87.
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Attention is again drawn to Him as the point of reference
for man and for the in-breaking of God."'" The centrality of
love is also expressed in His person. Jesus Christ meets
the learner as the Teacher of the truth and imparts God's
love through His person and not through the consequences of
2
His work. He is the moment and the occasion in history
for man's faithful striving after God.
SK affirms the actuality of Christ. He was a real
"3:
and actual man who shared in the vicissitudes of existence.
He is also the real and actual God who shares in the
strivings of living.
In some of Kierkegaard's remarks concerning the Christ
as Paradox one senses that his thought has reached a
kind of plateau from which movement to new ground can
be generated only with great exertion...Kierkegaard
does at times seem not only intent to assert that God
and man meet in,the Christ, but content to leave the
matter at that.
SK does not move in the direction of developing an intellectual
R
system which rationalizes the meeting of God and man. Rather
he points out the encounter and meeting without elaborate and
systematic presentation of a doctrine or dogma on the union
of the two natures. Such a presentation would attempt to
capture objectively what only the faith leap appropriates
with subjective inwardness. God is subject and must be known
subjectively.^ The encounter in Christ, who is the truth,
1. Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, pp. 353-354.
2. SK, TC, pp. 30-37.
3. Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Coherence, p. 174.
4. Ibid. , p. 176.
5. Geismar, p. 43-
6. SK, Journals, p. 186, sec. 620.
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delivers to the learner the capacity for love when in the
presence of the truth.^ As a particular, historical person,
Jesus reveals to man the ideal which God has for him. In
looking at and holding onto Him, the learner comes to know
2
who he is in his own existence. The truth which Jesus
imparts is the truth for man's existence as he is existen-
tially and fundamentally when removed from the bondage of
error. He is the pattern for human living and the one who
demands imitation, if the learner is to be transformed into
the truth. Jesus' work coalesces in His existence; He is
the Pattern of life by which man is transformed and made
4
qualitatively new. "This understanding places the work of
Christ in continuity with the work God summons man to
perform....And while the Christ's death may alter 'everything
infinitely', it does not abolish the fact 'that he is at the
5
same time the pattern....'"-^ Jesus brings to man the truth
of God which summons him to a new relationship. The
imitatio Christi reveals to the learner the demand which God
makes but also the way which He has opened for him to follow.
Jesus lives the truth and He approaches man personally and
historically. The existence of Christ is indivisible from
His work. Reason's attempt to abstract His consequences
from His person is in opposition to what it means to be
historical — to be ever in the process of becoming. And
1. Sponheim, p. 177.
2. Ibid., pp. 183-185.
3- Johnson and Thulstrup, p. 168.
4. Geismar, pp. 63-65.
5. Sponheim, p. 196.
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in this life-process, He presents the possibility of
obedience to the truth of God, for He has already accomplished
in Himself what He holds out to man.
Now we see that it is fully as mistaken to divide the
Christ's person by reference to the performance of
certain function. Kierkegaard suggests that in com¬
menting upon the significance of the Christ as pattern
for the Christian: "He believes, that this pattern, if
he constantly struggles to resemble it, brings him into
kinship with God, a second time and into an ever closer
kinship, that he does not merely have God for a creator,
as all creatures have, but he has God for a brother."
But quite apart from such explicit textual support one
faces the fact that for Kierkegaard the Christ is
precisely the God-man-,— that in this one God and man
do meet personally.
God approaches in Jesus Christ. In His person the learner is
personally brought into relation with God. By means of
Christ's existence, man is given the necessary directions for
having a God-relationship. Jesus teaches the meaning of
life — He communicates a mode of living which unites
2
historical man with the eternal God. In the Fullness of
time He transforms man into truth and presents him with the
condition for faith whereby he holds fast to the transitions
by inward appropriation. Confronted with the divine
initiative, man is called to choose either for or against the
truth.^ By means of faith, he subjectively takes onto
himself the eternal truth and passionately chooses and
decides to follow His pattern.
( INTERLUDE)
In contrast to Dilthey's insistence that "History within itself
1. Ibid., pp. 197-198.
2. SK, CUP, p. 219.
3- Croxall, "Facets of Kierkegaard's Christology," Theo. Today,
Vol. 8, pp. 331-332.
4. Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, pp. 60-62.
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cannot be transcended," one comes to the thought of SK who
transforms the meaning of the present into an expression of
the eternal."'" The question of a firmly established meaning
and value, which so perplexed Troeltsch, is now re-examined
in a positive sense with affirmative possibilities. The
apparent hopelessness of the "endless movement of the stream
of history" is no longer negatively depicted. Troeltsch's
search for a unifier in the historical process appears to
achieve final completion. "The task of the controlling and
damming of the system of historical life" is no longer a
task which requires a rational though undemonstrable article
of faith. History as the realm of existence and becoming
has no room for purely objective controls and damms. It is
positive precisely because God has brought it into inter¬
connection with Himself. By this divine act, man does not
exist and become without personal relation to the eternal.
Dilthey argued that, "History...must be understood from with¬
in. All meaning, all value, all purpose in the historical
world, is rooted in the experience of individual human beings
who lived at a particular time and in particular circumstances."
SK can appreciate this dynamic and human interrelatedness
within the context of history. Human existence consubstantially
shares in its becoming. This quality depicts history's and
man's interconnectedness and interrelation. History relates
to individual human beings in all time and circumstances at
the point of Christ. As with Dilthey, SK could see that man
appropriates and apprehends the essential truth necessary for
1. Bedell, p. 267.
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life in this realm. But for SK, the exercise of human
subjectivity and passionate inwardness in grasping the
object of faith — an historical existence — provides the
foundation for eternal happiness. In man's act of inward¬
ness, life takes on meaning. Added to the rational content
acquired by Reason, human life leaps over the objective un¬
certainties to essential truth. This basic and existential
project requires more than facts and empathy. Therefore, by
God's divine and historical act essential truth penetrates
history. Meaning, value and purpose remain concomitant
with the historical process, but it is always a process which
is opened by God's presence. Meaning, value and purpose are
commodities which present themselves as conditioned and
mediated by the Teacher who is also man's Pattern. History
becomes the transitional category and medium where man is
brought face to face with essential truth necessary for
existence in the decisive moment when choice, decision and
commitment become the order of life. It is in this instance
that life appropriates meaning in the presence of the eternal.
God's descent into history gives each moment a special value,
for to live in the moment is to be related to the eternal.
The past and the present intersect and open up into the
2
future because of the Fullness of Time. Time, in a sense,
becomes eschatological through the penetration of the divine,
for by means of His descent history opens outward and upward
to the possibilities He has realized in the temporal process
1. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, pp. 117-9.
2. Bedell, pp. 267-268.
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through Christ. In the light of SK's beginning point,
Troeltsch's rational project dissipates before the historical
becoming of God. As the place of living-before-God, history
requires no damms or controls to block and to impede its
spontaneous and free movement. It always develops and
happens in relation to Him who gives the truth. "[Historical
coming into existence occurs by the operation of a relatively
freely effecting cause, which in turn points ultimately to an
absolutely freely effecting cause.God, as the "absolutely
freely effecting cause," governs the historical through the
imputation of meaning realized through the person and pattern
of Christ the Teacher. SK's postulation of the "freely
effecting cause" is intended to maintain the elusiveness of
the coming-into-existence of man. History is the realm of
contingency which remains precisely because living happens
freely and effectively.
This coming into existence kind of change...is not a
change in essence but in being and is a transition
from not existing to existing....Everything which
comes into existence proves precisely by coming into
existence thatpit is not necessary, for only the
necessary is.
The "coming into existence kind of change" is the hallmark
of the historical. Troeltsch was correct in arguing for
contingency as that which cannot neatly be fitted into a
logical system based on cause and effect and abstracted by
the power of Reason. But Troeltsch erred in deducing from
this contingent nature that one is thrown into the context
1. SK, PF, p. 94.
2. Ibid., p. 91.
3. Swenson, pp. 148-151.
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of the negative forces of relativity. Quite to the
contrary, the contingent is the positive sign of becoming
which testifies to the "freely effecting cause" in the
historical, for contingency allows room for freedom. And
further, the contingent is always conditioned by the
"absolutely freely effecting cause" which is God. The negative
forces which Troeltsch feared are qualified by means of the
penetration of the absolute and infinite into the process of
becoming. A dialectical tension is set-up between temporal
and eternal, the finite and the infinite, error and truth.
History is affirmed as positive not simply because it is
history but because it is the place of the divine self-
revelation and the place of human appropriation and striving.
Time receives the eternal and every moment stands out as a
point of absolute encounter with God. SK reveals no a priori
ban or "pre-understanding" against the transcendent. The
immanent world of man stands face to face with the eternity
of God. It is this latter world which is affirmed because
it is here that God personally meets man. Thus in contrast
to Dilthey and Troeltsch, SK perceives and expounds the
values of history from the presence of God in it. And in
agreement with them, SK rests this valuation upon the
subjectivity of man and the use he makes of the moment. The
whole weight of eternity is balanced upon the spider's thread
of man and his passionate concern. For Dilthey and Troeltsch
as for SK, man ultimately forms the bedrock of eternal
happiness, and this is so whether through the process of
objectivity or subjectivity.
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C. INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIALITY
At the divine initiative, Jesus Christ becomes the
occasion for human incorporation into the truth which makes
possible his qualitative re-making and transformation."'" Jesus
Christ sets the pattern as Teacher for the imitation and
appropriation of what it is to be a man before God. It is
in God-relationship that man qua man develops and maturates.
But it is only in this relation that he also inherits the
temporal and eternal. Human living and becoming achieves
complementarity in the God-relationship. As well human
Reason achieves re-alignment and re-organization in comple¬
mentary relation with faith. Life becomes meaningful and
qualitative through its augmentation from the eternal. Human
becoming can be seen to strive along the finite-infinite
continuum. But without the eternal, man exists as something
unreal and unrelated in a world of ceaseless reflection and
immobility. "When the human dimension of subjectivity falls
into limbo, one no longer deliberately acts but now actively
deliberates. It is when objectivity and Reason attempt to
be the sole arbiters of reality that man relinquishes his
inwardness and passion. Reason loses sight of the contingent
p
which is the real. And in losing sight, Reason also fails
to heed the transitional nature of existence which represents
the becoming of life.^ To transform the actual as transitional
into the actual as necessary belongs to the power of reflection.
1. Geismar, pp. 51-52.
2. Crites, p. 63.
3. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, pp. 72-85.
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But for SK, such a power is not the rebirth of man but his
passionless eulogy.
Our age is essentially one of understanding and
reflection, without passion, momentarily bursting
into enthusiasm, and shrewdly relapsing into repose....
Nowadays not even a suicide kills himself in
desperation. Before taking the step he deliberates
so long and so carefully that he literally chokes with
thought. It is even questionable whether he ought to
be called a suicide, since it is really thought which
takes his life. He does not die with deliberation
but from deliberation. 1
Reason and objective reflection choke and exhaust the creative
enthusiasm of man. He is conditioned into a reflective
repose which removes the vitality and livelihood. But man
is not only effected particularly, the reflective repose
infects the entire fabric of the social order. Passion and
enthusiasm give way and are replaced by Reason and deliberation.
The tensions and dynamics of life which characterize the
personal and interpersonal relations and interactions are
substituted for a reflective repose which obliterates the
p
qualitative differences. Qualitative tensions and distances
disappear and it is the loss of the subjective and the
passionate which places man in untruth and error.
The established order of things continues to exist but
it is its ambiguity which satisfies our reflective and
passionless age. No one, for example, wishes to do
away with the power of the king, but if little by little
it could be transformed into something purely fictitious
every one would be quite prepared to cheer him....
People are quite prepared to leave Christian terminology
untouched, but are surreptitiously aware that it
involves no decisive thought. And so they remain un-^
repentant, for after all they have destroyed nothing.
1. SK, PA, p. 3-
2. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
3. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
4. Ibid., pp. 20, 21.
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The atrophy of the inward and the subjective brings about
the reinterpretation of the established order while still
maintaining it. The relations continue but not undisturbed
and unaffected by man's loss of himself. Ambiguity and
fictitiousness mark-off the interrelations, and these elements
stand out because the reflective repose thrives on deliberation
and not upon decision. Reason reigns but in its reign a
paralysis sets in, and man succumbs to immobility and
indecisiveness. "Thus our own age is essentially one of
understanding, and on the average...more knowledgeable than
any former generation, but it is without passion. Everyone
knows a great deal, we all know which way we ought to go and
all the different ways we can go, but nobody is willing to
move.""'" Here is precisely the stigmatism of the reflective
repose — man is not willing to move or to decide. The
static and the stationary stance of Reason has replaced the
dynamic and the transitional one of real living. Existence
as movement and becoming has been lost in the necessary
connections and mechanics of objectivity. History as the
medium of transition has been rendered impotent and immobile
by the a priori and the demonstrable. The spring of life
has been sapped of its dynamics — not by any lack or in¬
sufficiency on the part of history but by man's forgetfulness
of his own subjectivity in the face of the objective. But
SK perceives the hope for a revival and renewal of inwardness
and passion. Again, it is in the personal encounter with
1. Ibid., p. 60.
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Jesus Christ that man regains his apperception of the
eternal in time and of truth in opposition to error.^
To speak of man is also to speak of Christ as He is
revealed in history. His historical objectivity conditions
2
the terms of man's personal encounter with Him. Encounter
occurs in history which is characterized by change. It is
the place of the actual and is specified as transitional.
Because of its movement and change, the historical remains
uncertain and confronts man with only the possibility for
truth. Life transpires in uncertainty and all human attempts
to establish it on a sure and certain basis require more than
historical, objective uncertainty. The firm foundation
demands a break in the continuity of this approximateness.
"This is the essential nature of existence;... all actual
transition involves a breach of continuity, a leap♦To
appropriate the historical truth is decisively to engage
oneself in the process of an inference-leap which seeks to
5
hold fast to the objective uncertainty of Christ. For SK,
this inference-leap is an act of faith with infinite inward
passion.^ It involves the risk of existence. Man becomes
personally and passionately involved in what meets him face
to face — the power of the eternal. But this meeting is
not immediately certain or recognizable.
1. Crites, p. 62.
2. Sefler, "Kierkegaard's Religious Thought: The Three
Dimensions of Subjectivity," Philosophy of Rel., Vol. 2,
No. 1, pp. 47-48.
3. Swenson, p. 146.
4. Ibid., p. 146.
5. Diem, p. 16.
6. SK, CUP, pp. 209-210.
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[i]t now becomes easy to see that belief is not a form
of knowledge, but a free act, an expression of will.
It believes the fact of coming into existence, and has
thus succeeded in overcoming within itself the uncer¬
tainty that corresponds to the nothingness of the ante¬
cedent non-being; it believes the "thus" of what has
come into existence, and has consequently succeeded in
annulling within itself the possible "how". Without
denying the possibility of another "thus", this present
"thus" is for belief most certain.
In so far as that which through its relation
to belief becomes historical and as historical becomes
the object of belief...[it] has an immediate existence,
and is^immediately apprehended, it is not subject to
error.
Faith as belief is a wilful and active expression of decision
by man to leap over the inherent uncertainties of historical
objectivity and to take in subjective certainty the reality
of the actual not in its "how" but in its having come into
2
existence. Existence does not emerge out of the necessary
but rather it happens. Belief is man's way of apprehending
that which happens in such a manner that the occurrence has
immediate presence. It is not a means to pure historical
knowledge, rather it is a resolution which seeks to grasp
firmly the meaning for man in his personal and existential
situation. "The thing is to understand myself, to see what
God really wishes me to do; the thing is to find a truth which
is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die."
This truth comes out of the historical in the person of Christ.
He is the truth of God and the one in whom the eternal and the
1. SK, PF, p. 103.
2. Geismar, pp. 46f, 57-
3. SK, Journals, p. 15^
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temporal intersect. As the Absolute Paradox with which
Reason collides, Jesus Christ can nonetheless be apprehended
by the historical learner."*" Reason possesses the capacity
to ascertain the facts about Him, but it is never able to
2
resolve His meaning into an understanding. Rather it is
for belief to transcend and to complement Reason and to take
"5
hold of His actuality and to see Him as true for me. As
Teacher and Pattern, He becomes contemporaneous with the
learner through passionate inwardness in the face of His
4
objective uncertainty. Christ delivers the truth and in
delivering it He lives the truth which is God's gift and man's
fulfilment. Therefore, Christ reveals its existential
function and relevance as opposed to its reflective consider¬
ation and indecisiveness. The lived and experienced truth
of Christ informs man's life and conditions his becoming.^
Although man thinks and is rational, his existing ought not
7to be simply adjuged in terms of thought and deliberation.
Hence the point is not to think truth but to live in
the truth. This means that truth is no longer to be
conceived as an objective statement about certain
relations of being, but as a form of existence in
which such relations are actualized. Hence the
truth..."is something related to the knower, who is
essentially an existing individual, and that all real
insight is essentially related to that which exists
and to experience itself." Before the truth...implies
a process which is never complete. Man always remains
in the position of one who strives.... 8
1. SK, CUP, pp. 512-513-
2. Ibid., p. 206.
3. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 20.
4. Crites, pp. 90-91.
5. Malantschuk, pp. 94-98.
6. SK, Journals, p. I6f.
7. SK, CUP, pp. 312-322.
8. Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, p. 38.
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Truth for SK stands out not only as objectivity but also as
subjectivity. It is personal and existential and actualizes
itself in man's very becoming in the process of time. Truth
as a mode of becoming before God is man's relation to himself
and to all who are involved in the coming-into-existence-kind-
of-change. As something lived, it is on-going and ever-
striving in time intersected by the eternal. Jesus Christ
approaches man as his Pattern for existence and for being in
the truth; He is man's way to life."'"
Man's becoming involves him in the free and dynamic
acceptance and maintenance of existence in essential inward-
2
ness and subjectivity. Objective uncertainty becomes an
element in life which calls into question all finality and
absoluteness. Existence emerges in all of its elusiveness
and precariousness, while conditioned by the temporal and
4
limited by death. Contingency permits and necessitates the
emergence of the particular and of the individual with the
breakdown and collapse of all completion. As an individual,
man comes out of concealment and is seen to be an actual and
real constituent of reality. He becomes meaningful and
significant when confronted with the truth and when brought
5
into intercourse with it. In living it, God and man inter¬
act in the moment and man comes forth as a qualitative creature
1. SK, TC, p. 160.
2.' Crites, pp. 69-70.
3. SK, CUP, pp. 508-511.
4. Swenson, pp. 129-133•
5. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 20.
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who has undergone a transition from error to truth."'" By-
faith, man becomes positioned in an ultimate relationship
with the eternal God. He is brought into authentic existence
when and where he perceives the direction and the goal of his
own becoming. In the moment of divine encounter, he is
given the potential and the possibility to be what he is
intended to become. The God/man encounter and relationship
allow him to embrace the freedom to be himself and in being
himself to be for God. Man comes into his own by being
permitted to accept himself by the power of God. By means
of the leap of faith, he takes hold of the eternal and
4
becomes free to accept existence.
Further, man is not a solitary figure. His individuality
is not isolated and secluded from the responsibility and
decision to deal and to live with others. Ritschl and
company also accentuated the importance of fellowship in
relation to the apprehension of Jesus Christ as Pattern. For
these men, the remembrance and the appropriation of Him is
mediated in the community of believers. Individual men in
communion with others are presented the possibility of
experiencing God's presence. In fellowship, argued Herrmann,
moral knowledge will develop and enhance the thought of duty
5
whereby man becomes conscious of who he is. Jesus Christ
represents the model of moral responsibility and He awakens
1. Price, The Narrow Pass, pp. 122-133-
2. Hartt, "Christian Freedom Reconsidered," Harv. Theo. Rev.
Vol. 60, pp. 137-140. ~ " '
3- Roberts, "Faith, and Freedom in Existentialism," Theo. Today,
Vol. 8, pp. 473-474.
4. Ibid., p. 475-
5. Herrmann, Communion With God, p. 83-
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man to his own moral duty through the consequences of His
work. For SK, man comes to "be himself in relation to God's
presence.
SK sees the transcendence of God...as the eternal
point of reference without which there is no love of
neighbour, no genuine involvement, but only hatred,
bloodshed, and chaos. Unless man reckons with the
Absolute,... it has become possible to muddle up the
whole of temporal existence. 1
Christ is more than a moral model for SK; He stands at the
point of penetration and transcendence of the eternal in time.
God's motive for this interaction is the love which He gives
and demands. It is only in this relationship that man is
completely and passionately capable of handling the demands
of existence. Reason must be seen as only one aspect and
dimension of man's being-in-the-world. By the power of God,
man lives"and interacts1. His power is His love which descends
and makes man an equal and embraces his life in the temporal.
2
Jesus Christ sets the pattern of human relationships. Man's
reckoning with the Absolute initiates him into the demand of
love which is an expression of the divine,
"What is the God-relationship of the individuals
involved?" On this basis SK interpreted Jesus'
requirement that his disciples must be capable of
"hating father and mother" to mean that the
disciples must love God with such passion, and indeed
to love them (which means to help them to stand before
God) also with such passion, that to the mother and the
father to whom love means exclusive devotion to them on
their terms, such passion will appear to be hatred.
The ethical task of love is to conform not to the
beloved's idea of love, but (precisely for love's sake)
to God's. 3
1. Moore, "Religion as the True Humanism," J. Amer. Aca. Rel.,
Vol. 37, p. 20.
2. SK, TC, pp. 231-232.
3. Moore, p. 21.
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God's demands for love condition human relationships. To
love the other is to love God with such passionate concern
that He ultimately and absolutely informs and mediates the
outcome of all interactions. For SK, the interrelation with
other men is more than doing one's duty to another in
conformity with the consequences of Christ's work. SK opens
man's relationships upward and outward to the eternal God
who is man's creator and brother. To love as God loves is
to become contemporaneous with Him through the person of the
Godman.^" Man loves the other by passionately embracing
2
God. In this way the relationship is more than between
God and man; it also contains the third party — the neighbour.
In observing Reason to arbitrate and to determine the
contents of the real, SK was well aware that the reflective .
repose though intricate to man's existence also tended toward
the dissolution of the connatural abiding of Reason and
Revelation. By influencing the diminution of the subjective,
thought was seen to call into question God's self-revelation
as well as history's positive value as the place where man
meets, man. The eternal as present and individual is
4
discerned by Reason as something ordinary and common. Surely
the eternal and the temporal do not really coalesce in this
person. But yet faith makes this claim: that God has
actually broken into the conditions of time not only to be
in history but also to reveal Himself historically. However,
1. Johnson and Thulstrup, p. 66.
2. Ibid., p. 57-
3. SK, Journals, pp. 367-368, sec. 1044.
4. SK, TC, pp. 69-70.
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Reason, in isolation from the subjective, turns outward
away from itself and thus becomes unconscious of its own
participation in the process of becoming. Therefore, God
becomes mythological and beyond experience. Reason is un¬
able to understand Him to be historically contingent and
accidental. But in removing His presence, Reason also effects
all human relations. According to SK, it can succeed in
making life ambiguous and muddled."*" Man's interactions
remain, yet they are hollow and empty because inwardness — a
truly human ingredient — has ceased, removing passion, and
reflection has taken over, leaving only deliberation. Man's
existential responsibility has been suspended in the search
for conclusions, while in the meantime existence continues
ambiguously without decision and without resolution.
Morality is character, character is that which is
engraved...,but the sand and the sea have no character
and neither has abstract intelligence, for character
is really inwardness. Immorality as energy, is also
character; but to be neither moral nor immoral is
merely ambiguous, and enters into life when the
qualitative distinctions are weakened by gnawing
reflection...The distinction between good and evil is
enervated by a superficial, superior and theoretical
knowledge of evil, and by a supercilious cleverness
which is aware that goodness is neither appreciated
nor worth while in this world, that it almost becomes
stupidity. 2
For SK as for Ritschl and company, faith emits morality which
conditions and influences human behaviour. SK views morality
as a function of man's inwardness whereby he is opened-up
to the reception of the eternal presence. Inwardness coupled
with Reason is man's source for a moral energy which builds
1. SK, CUP, pp. 248-249.
2. SK, PA, pp. 15-16.
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and invigorates character. It is inwardness and not just
Reason which allows goodness to come forth. Reason suspends
judgment on Christ who is the Teacher and Pattern, and in so
doing Reason suspends the passionate and human qualities.
To cut man off from God is to remove him from the possibility
of significant existence and co-existence. Jesus Christ as
the foundation of life and the way to its truth must be seen
as more than an objective uncertainty."'" The quality of
meaning is a need in life for which history turns out from
2
itself to a God-relationship. God demands from each man
that he should be what he is intended to become — a learner
of the truth. In becoming this, he gives up his error of
self-sufficiency and turns to the eternal presence by means
of subjectivity. In this way, he also readies himself for
the encounter with the neighbour. It is in faith and in its
subjective appropriation that he truly apprehends the Paradox
and is set free to be both for God and man.^1" Jesus Christ
thus plays the pivotal role as mediator. As a pivotal
factor in all relationships, He sets out for man the need for
contemporaneous decision and action based upon the imitatio
5
Christi. Man is called again and again to decide and to
act for God in concrete and living ways.^ Faithful existence
like historical happening involves a coming-into-existence-kind-
of-change which is always conditioned in turn by the
1. SK, TC, pp. 66-67-
2. Moore, pp. 24-25.
3. Crites, p. 71.
4. Hamilton, "Created Soul — Eternal Spirit," Scot. J. Theo.,
Vol. 19, pp. 24-29.
5. Reck, p. 97.
6. Ibid., p. 93-
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"absolutely freely effecting cause". The Christian's life
can never be a static entity, rather it is an active becoming
which moves toward self-realization and toward the neighbour
and all of this always in the ultimate grounding of the
eternal."'"
The outcome of this finite-infinite encounter is the
securing of life in its finitude, contingency and temporality.
Man encounters God and his neighbour within the limits of
space and time. Because God has entered time, temporality
has taken on a new dimension of significance and fullness.
The task for man must not be to escape from history but to
exist and to decide within its context for eternal happiness.
[T]he aim must not be that man should seek to escape
from his temporality and finitude, but that he should
seek to regain these in their plenitude of meaning.
Finitude must not be left aside, but rather saved and
redeemed, for "it is finitude and temporality which
are essentially at stake." 2
The historical stands out positively as man's home and as his
inheritance. To escape and to run away is to abandon what
God has infused with the bountifulness of His presence and
the gift of His love. Temporality is the mark of existence
and the source of both its uncertainty and meaningfulness
before God. The Christian infinitely renounces everything
to gain all. It is in the moment that he is given a new
qualitative existence to be for God and man.^ But always
he is called upon to choose and to decide in the face of the
Paradox either for faith or for Reason. Christianity is
1. Michalson (ed. ), Christianity and the Existentialists,
pp. 36-41.
2. Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, pp. 74-75-
3- SK, FT, pp. 65-69.
4. SK, PF, pp. lxx-lxxii.
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lived and acted out and not deliberated upon or thought about
without final resolution and faith. This is not to stress
2
any anti-intellectualism, but it is to point out that faith is
more than a matter for the head: one must also deal with the
heart. In a sense then, this typifies something of the
flavour of SK's divergence from the rational and natural
approach to religion found in Lessing.
D. CONCLUSION
SK's position affirms the positive and valuational
dimension of history for man. It is a place of becoming and
striving. All of life produces the coming-into-existence-
kind-of-change. Everything depends upon the simple adjective
"zufallige" which characterizes the historical as accidental.
There are no timeless and eternal truths which man simply
needs to become conscious of. Lessing assumed that this
approach was the correct one and consequently dispensed the
supernatural and transcendent as quite superfluous and
redundant trappings for what is essentially immanent and
natural. Historical truths therefore only illustrate and
point out what man's rationality can demonstrate and prove.
Lessing effectively draws a wedge between events and truth by
viewing the former as becoming and the latter as being. The
result of this bifurcation leads to the downgrading of the
historical embodiment of faith and the ascendency of its
essential truth. This final element Lessing holds to be a
1. SK, CUP, p. 523.
2. Fitzpatrick, "Current Kierkegaard Study," J. Rel., Vol. 50,
pp. 88-90.
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common possession of all men. It involves the idea of God
and human action which is worthy of Him — love. This is
the truth which Christ delivers but which Reason can demonstrate.
The importance of Christ thus results from His illustration of
a truth which Reason possesses the power to obtain. SK
reacts against this formulation. Indeed, Christianity is
not a form of knowledge at all. Human rationality can only
see as incommensurable any and all claims of the Eternal in
time. Objectivity seeks to abstract and to demonstrate the
thought-content of life. In its endeavour, objectivity
engages in ceaseless indecision and approximation. Reason,
no doubt, permeates the entire context of human existence but
yet it is not alone capable of providing a firm basis for life.
SK emphasizes the accidental and contingent qualification of
life in order to point out the insufficiency of Reason. The
becoming and striving of man knows no final and rational deter¬
mination upon which to rest. The accidental characterization
of living permeates the entire fabric of history and faith
as well as does Reason. To counter the contingency and
movement of life, SK proposes a subjective additive to the
apprehension of faith's claims. Reason views Jesus Christ
as a Paradox beyond comprehension. Objectivity cannot
establish enough facts about Him to decide the issue. But SK
seeks a point which will be determinative for his life and
will provide it with direction and certainty. Subjectivity
makes the leap of faith which overcomes and silences the
objective uncertainties surrounding Christ, the Paradox.
Subjectivity grasps the moment and decides the matter of
its eternal happiness. It resolves the issue which objectivity
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can only becloud and pursue without final conclusion. The
Paradox provides a new paradigm for life which complements
objectivity with the certainty of passionate inwardness.
Reason remains a dimension of human living but subjectivity
augments its indecisiveness and approximation with infinite
decision and certainty. Faith is not irrational or non-
rational. It is a component of life in history which Reason
cannot ultimately affirm or deny. Indeed, subjectivity and
inwardness become the cornerstones of Christian faith and life.
SK attempts to resolve Lessing's problem through the
medium of man and his subjectivity. Without this latter in¬
gredient, the claims of faith seem absurd and contrary to
Reason. But through the exercise of decision, the leap of
faith overcomes the apparent absurdity and transforms it into
a coherent world-view. Again, the production of this result
rests within the capacity and decisiveness of man. In this
respect, SK appears to offer another alternative to the
solution proffered by Ritschl and company. The unfeeling
and dull world requires valuation and worth. Jesus Christ
provides the insight in the quest for Liberal Protestantism.
He is the first man to bring to consciousness the worth of
all men. The significance of His personality reflects this
momentous determination. Man comes to approximate Christ's
significance as he personally realizes the authenticity of
His person. Harnack had warned against hanging the whole
weight of eternity upon the spider's thread of historical
details and facts. But in theology's endeavour to avoid this
peril, the weight of eternity was shifted to the spider's
thread of Christ's personality personally experienced and
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realized in the life of man. Man comes to the centre of
the stage and appropriates for himself the determining
position on the disposition of faith. It would appear that
SK and Liberal Protestantism both engage in an anthropo-
centrism which undergirds the truth-claims of faith.
But for this considerable point of agreement, SK differs
from Liberal Protestantism as well. For him, faith is not
a form of knowledge to be dissected from the rubble of
historical facts and impression. It is an all-encompassing
and -determining way of life, which resists objective final-
izations. The "timeless" elements which Ritschl and company
sought to discern appear as a chimera to SK. His radical
emphasis upon becoming and striving leaves no room for the
"timeless" which they sought to gather into the basket of
faith. All of life is permeated by change and absolutely
resists the assaults of Reason to encompass it into a universal
and necessary system. Life will not be systematized.
Troeltsch saw this point almost as clearly as did Dilthey.
But yet he sought to find some place amid the relativities
where man could stake his claim to certainty and value. But
his rational approach could discern no historical points but
only social-psychological tendencies and laws. In the end
Troeltsch can really find no final absolutes. SK remedies
this situation by removing the discernment of eternal happiness
from the exclusive province of objectivity to the complement¬
ation of the subjective. The essential truths of existence
must be grasped existentially — subjectively through
passionate inwardness. The leap of faith leaves behind all
of the objective doubts and uncertainties of Reason and
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embraces Jesus Christ as the eternal in time. Subjectivity
produces a re-organization of existence which objective forms
of knowledge cannot effect. And more, SK's position also
warrants the re-introduction of the transcendent and eternal
in the immanent. Liberal Protestantism laboured under the
auspices of Reason which left no room for metaphysical
speculation or appeals to the beyond. While subjectivity
does not seem to rely explicitly upon metaphysical assumptions,
it would appear to be the case that SK's position implicitly
depends upon the penetrating and transcending of the finite
by the infinite. For this SK presents Christ as the self-
revelation of God.
One other point of departure for SK from Liberal
Protestantism represents more of an attitude and frame of
mind than an outright empirical divergence. The emphasis
which Ritschl and company placed on personality placed Christ
in the forefront of theological concern and exposition. These
men sought to historicize Him and to remove the transcendental
wrappings which they assumed to surround His person.
Personality became the password for theology. This quality of
Christ allowed theologians to speak of Him in a factual and
empirical manner without taking leave to the metaphysical.
But yet something mysterious and undemonstrable remained about
Him. Even after His historicization, Christ retained a
dimension of uniqueness and distinction which appeared to out¬
strip historical discernment. The emphasis fell upon His
ability to become personally realized in the experiences of
man. His life displayed an inexplicable relation to God
which possessed a self-evidencing character. This mysterious
146
life-source and -power was almost an undemonstrable article
of faith which was treated as a given. But it appears that
Troeltsch sought to eradicate this last vestige of latent
transcendentalism. His unwaivering adherence to the process
character of faith moved him to affirm the absolute histori¬
city of Christ. He stands in a line of historical and human
spiritual factors which develop and process through the in¬
sights of individual men. Christ's personality is important
because it satisfies a social-psychological need in man to
have a living, breathing personality for his symbol of God.
Christ's uniqueness no longer rests in a mysterious life-source
but rather in the social-psychological framework of the human
mind. In this respect, Christ truly becomes historicized
without any explicit or implicit appeal to the mysterious or
transcendent. However, the line of succession from Ritschl
to Troeltsch never failed to maintain the centrality of His
person. Even in Troeltsch's final deathblow to the mysterious
trappings, the intent remained to establish Him as a fortifi¬
cation against the gnawing dullness and uncertainty of
historical life. From Ritschl to Troeltsch, the theological
project becomes the presentation of a world-view which
counteracts the erosion aid corrosion of the contingency and
relativity. Indeed, Troeltsch felt this problem most because
of his complete historicization of faith. The climate of
opinion appears to be a dread and fear leading to an anxious-
ness about life. Dilthey had given an explanation of history
which preserved its relativity without the anxiousness and
fear. He perceived life to be creative and active, and he
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saw man as possessing a share in this treasure. Fear and
anxiousness are not really adequate expressions of historical
consciousness for Dilthey. Rather he appears to view it
with its relativity and contingency as positive and creative.
Historical awareness liberates man from all of the dogmas and
systems which seek to select and to filter experiences as
"good" and "bad". Man can be truly free from systematization.
But theology seems to have a latent and hidden anxiety about
this liberation and freedom which Dilthey makes so complete
and final. Jesus Christ provides the instruction and lesson
for man's coming to grips with the task of living. From
Ritschl to Troeltsch, the aim is to discover the "timeless"
elements in Christ which give resolution and relief to man's
"timeless" bout with the external world. Indeed, the goal is
to find something necessary and self-sufficient among so much
contingency and temporality. SK seems to return to the
attitude of Dilthey. His radical emphasis upon "zufallige"
as the genus-predicate describing history as accidental
strikes a heavy blow against all pretenses of necessity and
timelessness. The coming-into-existence-kind-of-change is
the hallmark of history and of becoming. Life is historical
in the most complete and radical manner. Therefore it
appears incongruous to him that man should seek to establish
his eternal happiness by means of Reason and objectivity. The
possession of essential truth can never be a completed act.
Movement and change which characterize life also characterize
the truth concerning it. This possession must likewise be
seen in the dynamics and processes of existence. For SK,
subjectivity represents the only possible and existential
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prerogative available. It alone allows the means of leaping
over the objective uncertainties to be found everywhere.
Faith and its leap become man's organs for living in a truly
historical manner. There is no need to be anxious or to
fear the failure of Reason to reach nothing more than
approximations. Life possesses no static and necessary
points. But armed with subjectivity, man may gain a new
perspective on the situation. From Ritschl to Troeltsch,
the attempt was made to approach faith objectively and
reasonably. And in the process, anxiousness about history
resulted because of the temporary and inconclusive results
which were obtained. But SK approaches history subjectively
and inwardly and as a result he complements the findings of
Reason and grasps certainty and stability in life through
Christ. Again, history is seen as what it is — a realm of
becoming and striving. Man has the means at his disposal
for a resolution of the ultimate problem relating to his
eternal happiness. By a leap of faith, life assumes a
different configuration. SK had no need to be anxious or
fearful. In contrast to Liberal Protestantism, SK repre¬
sents a change of view on the question of life. For him,
history without faith is blind and faith without history is
empty.
But for all of the positive affirmations regarding the
person of Christ, the importance of the moment, the signifi¬
cance of life, and the worth of history, SK's position rests
upon the spider's thread of subjectivity."^" This is the
1. Barth, "A Thank You and A Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille,"
Can. J. Theo., Vol. 11. pp. 3-7.
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possession of man which he has sole authority to exercise
at his discretion. For SK, man still remains the pivotal
point in the balance of life. His decision and leap decide
the issue of faith's content and relevance.1 In the end, SK
provides a variation on Lessing and Liberal Protestantism.
Subjectivity augments Reason. Man's passionate inwardness
completes the journey which Reason can only begin. Inwardly
and heuristically life receives sustenance from the eternal
in time. Objectively and empirically, the "accidental truths
of history" can never become the cornerstones of eternal
happiness. The final disposition lies within the province
of human inwardness. This concludes SK's solution to the
problem raised by Lessing and partially answered by Liberal
Protestantism.
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INTRODUCTION
The work of S^ren Kierkegaard on the correlation of
history and faith has posed a variant position to that
offered by the late nineteenth century Liberals. It appears
to be the insight of SK to develop and to elaborate an under¬
standing of history which seeks to maintain the positive
thrust of its contingency and relativity as the marks of
freedom which provide the basis for transition or becoming.
History represents the realm of becoming, of moving-on-the-
way, of transition. But yet in this medium, faith finds its
reference and grounding. History is most assuredly stamped
with temporality and change but yet God has made Himself known
in His mysterious and special way in the Godman, Jesus Christ.
Because of its transitional nature, the intellectual prowess
and capacity of man, with his Reason, is not able to establish
the truth of the relation between Jesus and the Christ. The
best that it appears to offer is approximation of this past
fact. But nonetheless, in this very indeterminate sphere SK
seems to maintain and to explicate the interpenetration of
God into the creation. For him, Jesus Christ personally
represents His point of contact and reference in the historical.
SK did not completely follow in the footsteps of Lessing.
Rather he upheld the integrity of the accidental truths by
viewing history as the place of God's personal action of self-
revelation. God does not simply reveal Himself through
rational processes but rather involves Himself in the very
stuff of history. Through this action, SK argues for the
significance and the meaningfulness of this contingent continuum.
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It would appear that from this perspective SK is initially
basing his position upon the uniqueness and the once-for-all-
ness of God's self-disclosure in Christ. With this initial
groundwork laid, SK moves to affirm history's relativities
while upholding a fixed point of reference amid them. In this
way, history and faith seem to coalesce in His person. He
qualifies the temporal with the eternal presence and condes¬
cends to become a function in the sphere of approximation.
It is at this particular point that consideration of
Rudolf Bultmann may commence. For it appears to be Bultmann's
intention and endeavour to sustain the correlation between
faith and history, though as he says, paradoxically."'" The
thrust of his work appears to be an attempt to present the
Christian faith as an address to man from God which maintains
the sovereignty and integrity of faith while opening its
meaning and challenge to the light of the modern day.
Bultmann confronts the ancient text of the Bible and seeks to
enter into a personal dialogue or "life-relation" which permits
it to speak out concerning man's existence as a man. The "I"
of the investigator and the "Thou" of the text appear to
coalesce through the context of understanding. The process
of demythologizing is an attempt to open-up the "strange new
world of the Bible" in such a way that its thoughts and under¬
standings become contemporaneous and alive. The result of
this process is a re-interpretation of man's ontic attitude
to the world and to history. History is no longer a concern
about the past and about what has happened; rather man is
1. EF, p. 19.
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presented with a new self-understanding which frees him from
all of this and opens him to the experience of the future
with its manifold possibilities. It seems to dissolve
into eschatology where every moment is personally experienced
as a first and last Now. Bultmann finds the basis for this
interpretation from the teachings of Jesus Christ who en¬
counters man as a concrete historical figure in the word of
preaching which touches him in the contemporary situation.
Jesus Christ is the end of the past and the beginning of the
eschaton precisely in the call to decision found in the Word.
In His teaching, man meets a challenge-response crisis which
demands decision and commitment. One can choose either to
fasten hopes to the contingency of the world or to be open to
the gift of the future which derives from reliance upon God.
Bultmann appears to incorporate within his programme a
comprehensive meaning-view of man as a Christian who lives in
an alien world. But in this view, Bultmann attempts to
maintain the historicity of Christ as an act of God in a world
which is something of a closed system of cause-and-effect.
The unique combination of cause-and-effect system with the
action of God requires Bultmann to effect some type of peace¬
ful co-existence which conserves the uniqueness of the con¬
stituent terms. For to affirm one element over the other
would appear either to negate any possibility of God's inter¬
action or to deny the cause-and-effect structure of the natural
order. These seem to be the two dichotomous forces which
Bultmann apparently seeks to preserve in the semblance of a
homogeneous relationship of assumed exclusive terms. In his
effort to effect this unity, he turns his attention to the
Word of God as it comes to man in the scripture.
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A. DEMYTHOLOGIZING: INTERPRETATION AS PRIMARY
In every age all forms of theology — exegesis,
dogmatics, preaching — must certainly undertake this
kind of translation. It is an important task...I wish...
1 knew how to introduce within the framework of
Bultmann's concern, something else which seems to me
to be even more important....Must we not try to come
to grips with him who confronts us there...?...The task
of translation is a secondary concern...I am quite sure
he (RB) would agree with me about what I have called
the primary task. But there he is, still hammering
away with unparalleled persistence, at the various
historical forms in which the gospel is enshrined.
Apparently he already knows what is in the New Testament.
(As found in Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, II, and written
by Karl Barth, pp. 87 and 88.)
One port of entry into the thought of Bultmann appears to be
found in the interpretive procedure which he utilizes to un¬
cover the meaning of the biblical text. He is keen to point
out the need for such procedure. He views the New Testament
material as embedded in mythological conceptuality which
impedes the contemporary reader of scripture."'" Today, man
does not live within a world bordered by God above and Satan
2
below. He lives in a world made comprehensible by general
laws of science which presuppose a closed world system of
cause-and-effect. He no longer appears capable of compre¬
hending and finding intelligible religious language which
presents the world of God in objectified terms.^ God does
1. ¥. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf
Bultmann, pp. 252-255- For a comprehensive history of New
Testament interpretation and analysis, see Werner Georg
Kummel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation
of its Problems (trans"! S. McLean Gilmour and Howard C. Kee).
SCM Press, London (1973).
2. EF, p. 93-
3. EF, p. 292.
4. Essays, pp. 102-105.
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not approach man in any overt, demonstrable and public manner.
Rather he remains hidden and mysterious in the ebb and flow of
historical life."'" But yet the New Testament presents a
picture of Him and His saving activity in such a way as to
objectify Him within the processes of the world system. New
Testament myth is a "mode of thought and speech which
2
objectivizes the unworldly so as to make it worldly." In
this way, the real encounter with Him is lost, for He no longe
approaches man in His hiddenness and mystery but in empirical
terms. But it is precisely this ancient garb which must be
/1
stripped away since it is no longer acceptable. "Man's
knowledge and mastery of the world have advanced to such an
extent through science and technology that it is no longer
possible for anyone seriously to hold the New Testament view
5of the world — in fact, there is hardly anyone who does."
Nonetheless, beneath the cosmological paraphenalia of the
primitive world-view, there lies an encounter with the living
God who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ.^ It is to the
exposition and elaboration of this encounter to which theology
task must turn. Bultmann maintains that "faith only became
possible at a definite point in history in consequence of an
event — viz., the event of Christ. Faith...is only possible
ywhen it is faith in Jesus Christ." He seems to be the only
1. EF, pp. 26-29.
2. Bartsch, KMI, p. 187.
3. Schmithals, pp. 257-258.
4. EF, p. 94.
5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 4.
6. Essays, p. 118.
7. Bartsch, KMI, p. 22.
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mediator of man's encounter with God, and if the theologian
is to come to grips with this, it will be his responsibility
to sift out of the churchly tradition this actual mediating
experience. Theology needs to examine the myth of the New
Testament in the effort to release the God/man encounter from
concealment. "[l]t is a characteristic of original myth
that in it empirical reality and existential reality are
not distinguished.... This is precisely what makes demytholo-
gizing necessary.Mythological thought confuses the
2
empirical and the existential realities. The theologian
must seek to separate the two and in so doing to allow man
to experience the challenge of God. Therefore, Bultmann
■5
elevates the faith-experience over the object of faith. As
4
a corollary, existential reality supercedes the empirical.
Demythologizing is the name that Bultmann appoints to
this task. Demythologizing moves to dissolve the confusion
inherent in mythological thinking by accentuating the
5
anthropological over the cosmological element. Myth is
man's way of objectively understanding himself in the world.
But it pursues this explanation in visible analogies which
substantiate the powers and forces that are encountered and
elevates them to cosmic proportions. "[Man] may account for
the present state and order...by speaking of a primeval war
1. Bartsch, KMII, p. 185, ftnt.#l.
2. Bartsch, KMI, pp. 10-11.
3. TNT, Epilogue, p. 239-
4. Schmithals, pp. 235-7•
5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 10.
158
"between the gods. He speaks of the other in terms of this
world, and of gods in terms derived from human life.""'" Thus
man inquires after his position in the cosmos by expressing
his present experiences in terms of cosmic happenings. In
other words, man apparently sees his position as qualified by
the powers and forces beyond perceptible control and experience.
"Myth is also an expression of man's awareness that he is not
lord of his own being. It expresses his sense of dependence...
on those forces which hold sway beyond the confines of the
2
known." It expresses his conviction that life here and now
is infused with the influences of powers and forces that he
cannot dominate. He is aware that things do not always occur
as they were planned and that events seem often to evolve with-
3
out direct human action. Thus myth appears to contain with¬
in itself a conceptual system of belief and understanding
which endeavours to make sense out of existence. And this
is the point at which biblical mythology apparently achieves
its importance and significance for theology. One must
wonder if Bultmann is not a priori deciding that myth does
refer to man as opposed to the realities which it purportedly
objectifies. The thought forms of scripture present to the
reader an understanding of experience. Bultmann contends
that "the real question is whether this understanding...is
true. Faith claims that it is, and faith ought not to be
1. Bartsch, KMI, p. 10.
2. Bartsch,KMI, p. 11."
3- HE, p. 2.
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tied down to the imagery of...mythology." It is here, then,
that the theologian takes his stand in regard to the task at
2
hand. He must bring to light this understanding of
existence which has been garbled in the imagery of an ancient
world-view. The problem of interpretation comes to the fore
as primary and real and as something to be attacked and
apprehended. The Christian message must be released from
the imagery of the past. The biblical writings are seen as
documents of affirmation and proclamation which do require
translation in order that they may be understood historically.
It is the function of demythologizing to effect this release
and to permit the understanding to come forth unencumbered
Ll
with cosmological speculation. The bye-product will be to
discover "whether the New Testament offers man an under¬
standing of himself which will challenge him to a genuine
5
existential decision."^
But demythologizing involves certain presuppositions
which guide and direct the translation process. The investi¬
gator does not approach the text without implicit and/or
explicit self-understandings or questions.^ He sees the world
as a closed unit. This is to say that it is viewed as a
closed nexus of cause-and—effect which apparently precludes
1. Bartsch, KMI, p. 11.
2. EF, pp. 95-96.
3. Bartsch, KMII, p. 184.
4. For an assessment of RB's cosmological presupposition see
T.F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, p. 48ff.
5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 16.
6. Schmithals, p. 237f«
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any outside intervention from the "supernatural"."'" Man's
attention is directed to the life-possibilities set within
2
existence. He cannot appeal to powers beyond this realm,
for this would presumably be undemonstrable within the modern
framework of cause and effect conceptuality. However, the
text is met with the subjectivity of the investigator. The
present situation becomes a constituent element within the
process of interpretation, for the text is approached with
life-questions which take root and mature out of the
existential emotion of the investigator. He is conditioned
by his own individuality which colours and qualifies the
initial pre-disposition.^ There is a personal involvement
on his part and he assumes responsibility for existence by
5
hearing the claim of history within the text. In this way,
a "life-relation" evolves between the text and the investi¬
gator which mediates the appropriation and understanding.
[A] specific understanding of the subject matter...,
on the basis of a "life-relation" to it, is always
presupposed by exegesis....The "life-relation" is a
genuine one...only when it is vital, i.e., when the
subjectgmatter...also concerns us and is a problem
for us.
The text seems to become a part of the investigator's life.
It is integral in that it seems to concern him and to present
itself as a question (and answer ?) to be contended with. It
is this relationship which Bultmann labels as a "pre-
1. EF, p. 291f.
2. FU, pp. 151, 155-7.
3. HE, p. 2.
4. EF, p. 290.
5. C. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, pp. 133-4.
6. EF, p. 294.
161
understanding.""'" This is to say that the investigator
apparently exists in a specific situation which qualifies
2
and conditions his prior position in relation to the text.
The "pre-understanding" is man's concern about himself. He
possesses various thought forms, cultural attitudes and
values, and moral beliefs, culminating in a climate of opinion
which etches out his place in the world. The "life-relation"
with the text appears to obtain from the commonality of past
Ll
and present experience of this climate of opinion. The "I"
of the investigator seems to understand the "Thou" in the text.
In this relation you have a certain understanding of
the matter in question, and from this...grow the
conceptions of exegesis....[Y]ou will learn and your
understanding will be enriched and corrected. Without
such a relation and such previous understanding
(Vorverstandnis) it is impossible to understand....
This is...the basic presupposition for every form
of exegesis; that your own relation to the subject-
matter prompts the question you bring to the [text and
elicits the answers you obtain from the text.
The investigator and the text participate in a shared
experience. Such a participative sharing creates an
atmosphere for enriching and correcting one's approach to
life. Thus the purpose and the task of interpretation in
general, and of demythologizing in particular, seems to be
the elucidation and clarification of man's understanding of
himself in the world.
This understanding of existence seems to be re-enforced
1. EF, p. 294.
2. Schmithals, pp. 231-2.
3- HE, pp. 108-111.
4. Essays, pp. 240-243-
5. JCM, pp. 50-1.
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by another important "pre-understanding". This comple¬
mentary dimension of Bultmann's project appears to impute
added impetus to the task he engages in. Bultmann is quite
specific that one function is the unveiling from mythological
concealment the awareness of life."'" But this consciousness
which he has in mind reflects the present climate of opinion.
In a word, he takes his stand with the modern scientific
attitude which he claims perceives the world as a closed
2
continuum. The world-view of science seeks to comprehend
the occurrences which confront man in a general system of
laws which does not appeal to mysterious or supernatural
powers. "[F]aith acknowledges that the world-view given
by science is a necessary means for doing our work within the
r
world." Thus faith does not compete with science in
4
explaining historical, natural happenings. Rather, Bultmann
seems quite explicit that the text must be approached by the
investigator with a definite commitment to discover some-
R
thing enriching and corrective. The scripture does not
confront man as an historical document demanding verification
and objectification.^ Quite to the contrary, the scriptural
material converses with the very life-forces of the investi¬
gator in order to challenge his present existential commitments
1. Schmithals, p. 259f*
2. A. Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, p. Il4f.
3. JCM, p. 65.
4. Bartsch, KMI, pp. 3-5•
5. EF, pp. 101-102.
6. FU, pp. 159-170.
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and decisions."'" The text speaks to existence and to being-
2
in-the-world. The empirical, natural, explanable view of
the world which he holds appears to make the personal and
existential dimension of the text acquire ascendency and
stature. In today's world, the text challenges anew his
understanding and acceptance of who and what he is in the
face of existence. "[o]nly those who are stirred by the
question of their own existence can hear the claim which the
text makes." The claim of history — of becoming — touches
and calls .into question man's being, but this claim can only
be heard by one who is open to the question. Hearing appears
to be the medium through which understanding develops between
4
the text of scripture and the investigator. The commonality
of concern for living generates and excites a vital "life-
relation" which facilitates communication and dialogue. To
assume that scripture really intended to convey natural and
metaphysical information would apparently only confuse and
becloud the more fundamental and basic issue of living and
finding direction for it. The transmission of understanding
concentrates its affective power within this relation.
[l]t is clear that real understanding does not arise
from the satisfying contemplation of an alien
individuality as such, but basically from the possibili¬
ties of human being which are revealed in it, which
are also those of the person who understands, who makes
himself conscious of them in the very act of compre¬
hension. Real understanding would...be paying heed to
1. Malet, pp. 20-21.
2. EF, p. 296.
3. Essays, p. 256.
4. FU, pp. 280-3.
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the question posed in the work which is to "be inter¬
preted, to the claim which confronts one in the work,
and the 'fulfilment' of one's own individuality-
would consist in the richer-^and deeper opening up of
one's own possibilities....
The understanding and comprehension effected through the
"life-relation" permits the examination of the investigator's
own living in the light of what is contained in the text.
Man and his personal knowledge become the prime interests of
2
the demythologizing process. The investigator searches
and interrogates the text for the meaning of what is .involved
in being a man. And he looks to scripture because it
appears to be the claim of faith that one can find an
authentic expression of life there.^ Thus he acknowledges
the claim of faith and sets about the task of discovering the
adequacy or inadequacy of the expression. But demytholog-
izing does not seek after the past references but rather
5after its present meaning which is pertinent for today.
What is utmost and primary becomes the existential encounter
with history, for the real subject of history is man and his
action.^ Demythologizing brings this past into the present
and illuminates the understanding of existence in the text
7in such a way as to make it a present possibility. As a
possible comparison of method, Bultmann's tendency to
1. Essays, pp. 250-1.
2. Bartsch, KMI, pp. 10-11.
3. I. Henderson, Myth in the New Testament, p. 14.
4. Malet, p. 72.
5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 196.
6. HE, p. 139-
7. HE, pp. 143-6.
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accentuate the existential perspective of the task over the
possible cosmological or metaphysical additives resembles
the "pre-understanding" of Ritschl and company. These men
seem to have had an aversion for anything that smacks of
speculation about the non-empirical dimensions of existence.
Hence, they recorded strong reactions against the mystical
and the metaphysical as levels of reality which cannot
really be perceived by man in his world. One must, of
course, wonder about the extent of the Liberal aversion in
respect to Bultmann. Is it at all possible that the "pre-
understandings" of his teachers have, in turn, become part
and parcel of Bultmann's "pre-understandings" as he approaches
the scriptural text? Indeed, does the man who occupies the
church pew really share in the theologian's "pre-under¬
standings" regarding the make-up of the world?
Bultmann seems to utilize demythologizing as a means
to secure life-possibilities for man."'" It serves apparently
the functional purpose for uncovering and elucidating the
possibilities contained in scripture. Interpretation
operates as a means of leaping across the span of time and
wresting for the present the insights of the past. In this
manner, man becomes the focal point of interest and deter¬
mination. He becomes the measure by which the past must be
understood, for it is man with his present concerns who
interrogates the past sources. This appears to be the
1. Malet, pp. 151-2.
2. Schmithals, p. 264f.
3. HE, pp. 115, 117-122.
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emphasis of Bultmann's "pre-understandings" which guide
and direct the task of interpretation. Man is concerned to
know about and to understand himself as he is in the present.
In looking into the scriptures, the investigator encounters
the teaching and preaching of Jesus of Nazareth. Faith
makes its claim to possess the means to authentic existence,
and it finds its reference in the words of Jesus.^ Demytholo-
gizing directs its attention to the work of this man whose
name is attached to this decisive disclosure of understanding
contained within the historical limits. Demythologizing
operates to extricate from the past the present meaning of
the Word of Jesus. It is from this man within history that
faith claims to attain its decisive grasp upon an authentic
understanding of human existence.
B. JESUS CHRIST AS THE WORD OF GOD
[w]hat God has done in Jesus Christ is not an
historical fact which is capable of historical proof.
The objectifying historian as such cannot see that an
historical person (Jesus of Nazareth) is the eternal
Logos, the Word. It is precisely the mythological
description of Jesus Christ...which makes it clear that
the figure and the work...must be understood in a
manner which is beyond the categories by which the
objective historian understands world-history, if the
figure and the work...are to he understood as the
divine work of redemption. That is the real paradox.
Jesus is a human, historical person....His work and
destiny happened within world-history and as such come
under the scrutiny of the historian....Nevertheless,
such detached historical inquiry cannot become aware
of what God has wrought in Christ, that is, of the
eschatological event. 2
1. Schmithals, p. 267f.
2. JCM, p. 80.
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Jesus Christ functions as the historical point of reference
for the claim of faith to possess an authentic understanding
of living. Bultmann appears insistent to present Christian
faith as a viable and legitimate avenue of expression for
historical possibility. He wants to uncover just that
possibility which qualifies and conditions in order to aid
man in the realization of his manhood. Historical phenomena
reveal him and his actions as the subject matter of research.""
And it is this research which endeavours to discover the
various options open. Bultmann contends that the real
2
essence of man is to be found in his activity. Genuine life
is always before him as a function both of his own existence
and of his willing. Consequently, it would seem that he is
L
an entity which is constantly being-on-the-way. His essence
5
is achieved in the grasping of possibilities and in deciding.
And any historical knowledge of past possibilities and
decisions relevant for today assist in shaping his present
self-knowledge.^ Jesus Christ is a past historical figure.
His life and His work are covered in the indeterminateness of
history and the full recovery of His figure must always remain
a project which is like life itself — perpetually on the way
7
though never complete and final. This seems to permit
1. HE, pp. 138-9-
2. HE, p. 139.
3. HE, p. 140.
4. HE, p. 46.
5- HE, p. 44.
6. HE, p. 144.
7. Essays, p. 105.
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Bultmann to suggest that man can now know little of the
life and personality of Him."'" Yet the investigator has
an adequate source of His words which encounter him with
2
the question of how he is to interpret his own existence.
It would seem that this affords a beginning point for an
inquiry into Jesus Christ as the Word of God; for while
the investigator cannot finally know His person, he can deal
intelligibly with His Word and with its present application.
The investigator is permitted this point of entry apparently
because he is able to enter into dialogue with Jesus' Word
and to uncover its meaning .in so far as it speaks to the
4
problem of human existence. The question of understanding
life appears to be the point of commonality between Jesus of
a bye-gone day and the present investigator. Jesus' Word is
5
questioned to reveal how He understood being-on-the-way.
Indeed, the distinction between the historical phenomenon of
Jesus as opposed to the self-understanding He occasions seems
to be the direction in which Bultmann's thought is moving.
For him, there seems to be two approaches to the text:
Either the writings...can be interrogated as the
"sources" which the historian interprets in order
to reconstruct a picture of primitive Christianity
as a phenomenon of the historical past, or the
reconstruction stands in the service of the inter¬
pretation of the... writings under the presupposition
that they have something to say to the present. 6
1. JW, p. 12.
2. JW, p. 11.
3. JW, pp. 8-10.
4. JW, pp. 4-6.
5. "PCKHJ", pp. 27-31-
6. TNT, Epilogue, p. 251.
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The pursuit of the former alternative guides one in the
direction of asserting the process of reflection and object¬
ivity. The investigator endeavours to discern and to re¬
construct, with historical concreteness and accuracy, a
replica of the past. Apparently, the emphasis upon the
facticity of the text and the objective truth it purportedly
conveys disturbs the proper relationship which Bultmann
desires to maintain. He is not primarily concerned with
presenting the facts of the matter per se. There is a
definite part in the interpretation of the text that recon¬
struction does play, but it is not the prime area of concern.
What is apparently "most important" and "basic" is "one's new
self-understanding"."1" Bultmann seems to mean "an existential
understanding of myself which is at one with and inseparable
2
from my understanding of God and the world." Faith itself
and not the object of faith^ stands at the heart of an investi¬
gation into the person of Jesus Christ. Presumably the pursuit
of the latter alternative (interpretation) affords the right
l_L
perspective of the task. As an amplification and corrective
to the "pure" act of reflection, Bultmann wants to add the act
of living. Indeed, in the task set before the investigator
the act of living must also take precedence. "For they [the
texts] can claim to have meaning for the present not as
theoretical teachings...but only as the expression of an under-
1. Ibid., p. 239-
2. Ibid., p. 239.
3. Ibid., p. 239.
4. Ibid., p. 251.
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standing of human existence which...is a possibility for
his [the man of today] understanding of himself....""'" The
thrust of this connection between living and reflecting seems
to have ostensible ramifications in regard to Jesus. From
the gist of Bultmarm's comments, it would appear to be the
case that the brute facts of His person are not in themselves
overly significant. The "believing self-understanding"
lifts faith itself above its object. This would seem to
suggest that the message of Jesus (faith, value) takes
p
precedence over His person (the object or fact). Another
way of stating it might be to say that the historical Jesus
occasions or illustrates the "believing self-understanding"
of the Word. He does not really demonstrate its application
or truth though He does appear to function as the vehicle for
its transmission.
The Christian faith claims that Jesus Christ is God's
point of contact with the historical realm. He is viewed
as the objective manifestation of a God who confronts man
in the world. He delivers the Word of God which both
challenges and demands decision as to how he shall live.
Faith claims that Christ is the revelation of God and as such
He is also God Incarnate. Bultmann is sympathetic to these
claims, but he cannot allow its message to be obscured in
the mythological language of the first century Christians
who attempted to objectify God. For Bultmann, it seems to
1. Ibid., p. 251.
2. Ibid., p. 250.
3. C. Braaten and R. Harrisville (eds.), Kerygma and History,
pp. 27-29.
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remain a standing proposition that He is both hidden and
mysterious even when He is present."'" In conjunction with
this, Bultmann also maintains the closed world which does
not avail itself to an observable and objective penetration
2
by God. However, faith's claims can be approached on the
personal level. This encounter would mediate between the
claims of faith made about Jesus and the investigator's
present existential situation. "What would be sought in
faith's claims is not the metaphysical possibility of God's
in-breaking into history or the ontological description of
Jesus as the Godman, for this would be speculation defying
the laws of science which seem to know nothing of supernatural
intervention. Rather the investigator seeks to illuminate
the kernel of existential understanding which is open to
him to grasp, to understand and to appropriate. In this way,
the person of Christ dissipates into His Word, for the modern
man can neither seriously accept nor find palatable any talk
which literally expresses God's presence objectively.
It is impossible to use electric lights and the wireless
and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical
discoveries and at the same time to believe in the
New Testament world of daemons and spirits. We may
think we can manage it in our own lives, but to expect
others to do so is to make the Christian faith
unintelligible to the modern world. 3
Thus the Word of Jesus is to be laid open in order to glean
from it the understanding for human existence contained
therein.^ This is the stuff of history which modern man
1. EF, p. 16.
2. M. Hoffmann, "Kerygma and History," J. of Bible and Rel.,
Vol. 33, pp. 26, 27f.
3. Bartsch, KMI, p. 5.
4. EF, pp. 294-6.
172
can grasp and which is relevant to him in the face of the
change and contingency^" of life. For Bultmann, this
represents the proper mode of explicating the faith for today.
Demythologizing moves "behind the mythically presented picture
2
of Jesus to His message. In Him, man experiences an
encounter with a specific message and it is in confrontation
with this reality that one is ultimately placed in making a
choice about its truth.
Bultmann's project discloses itself as a search into
Jesus' words to recover His intention and purpose. Bultmann
seems to view the result as an expression of an existentially
viable concept of human living. Through the process of de¬
mythologizing and reconstruction of the past, Jesus Christ
is released from the encumbering metaphysical titles and
doctrines which have been thrust upon Him by the passage of
time and by the wisdom of men. After investigation and inter-
4
pretation, He meets man as the Revealer of the Word of God.
Christ steps across the span of time as the decisive moment
in time when man and God meet in the message proclaimed by
5the man from Nazareth. "The event which as a fact in time
transforms the world...is the sending of Jesus.He is
the bearer of God's Word which places man in a position
requiring a choice to be made — a position of existential
1. "QMH", p. 329a.
2. EF, p. 292.
3. J.D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology, pp. 157-
158. """^
4. EF, pp. 252-254.
5. "PCKHJ", p. 40.
6. FU, p. 174.
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crisis. "The crisis is linked...strictly to one particular
event, that is, the coming of Jesus....[T]he eternal God is
not within the circle of perceivable possibilities; within
that circle stands only the incarnate one, whose word is
heard.. .now. By inaugurating the demand for decision,
Christ implants within the message an eschatological proclama¬
tion which challenges the very core and foundation of man's
becoming. Jesus bears God's Word which questions man's life
before the Creator. "The now of being addressed at a
specific time, this moment, is the eschatological now because
2
in it is the decision between life and death." The Word of
Jesus Christ as the Word of God is a repeatable event which
occurs in the moment of proclamation and which transforms
that specific moment into the urgency of decisive existential
significance. Man is placed before the two choices of life
and death when he hears the message. He stands before the
Word and it is his responsibility to choose, to make a decision.
1. FU, p. 174.
2. FU, p. 175- The investigation of the apocalyptic and the
eschatological has been renewed by some of Bultmann's
followers. Many seem to differ with him about the proper
interpretation of these terms. It would seem that RB's
search for the meaning and significance of these terms
has been augmented, to some degree, by an attempt to
understand the apocalyptic and the eschatological in
literal terms. For a discussion of this, see Journal for
Theology and the Church, Volume 6 (1969), edited by
Robert W. Funk. Of further interest in the area of
apocalyptic, D.S. Russell has done an interesting study in
the area of Jewish apocalypticism (The Method and Message
of Jewish Apocalyptic, Westminster Press, Philadelphia,
1964). Russell also appears to disagree with Bultmann's
interpretation of this category. He suggests that for the
Jews and the early Christians: "The promises made to Israel
by his servants the prophets must have meaning and reality
and would ultimately be fulfilled" (18).
3. TNT, Volii, p. 62f.
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Man's essence manifests itself in action, in his being-on-
the-way, which always seeks to place him before new
possibilities and alternatives."'" But in Jesus Christ, he is
p
met with a life-and-death message which must be considered
in all seriousness and responsibility, for it questions the
life-core of his essence and being. "Human existence has
z
regained its authenticity in its potentiality to be." This
is where the decisiveness of Jesus's Word rests — upon its
ability to shake the very foundations of self-understanding
and to present a new and real potentiality for becoming.
Human essence reveals itself in actualization of possibility.
"Man is never satisfied with his present. His desires, his
expectations...stretch into the future. That means that the
real, the genuine life of man is always before him. Khn is
Ll
always on the way...." This would seem to be precisely the
point where man comes into contact with the Word of Jesus —
at the place of his becoming. The possibility consists of
eschatological existence which is lived in the presence of
God. "This self-understanding...grows out of the Word....
The believer has passed from death to life...." Man's old
self is replaced by the new which is lived out of the Word.
The Word seems to receive ultimate importance in man's
encounter with the faith. It is the Word which mediates
1. TNT, Voli, p. 246; Volii, p. 26.
2. TNT, Volii, p. 62.
3. FU, p. 176.
4. "QMH," p. 329b.
5. JCM, p. 81.
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the transition from death to life, from the old self to the
new, from the world to God."'" And it is the Word which
Bultmann appears to view as the once-for-all-ness of God's
revelation in Jesus Christ.
His Word appears to function as a transitional category
in Bultmann's theology. Christ delivers it, but it belongs
2
to the Word to effect the shift from death to life. It
appears to be its authorized preaching which transposes
life and the world. "God's saving act occurs only as Word
and is recognized as saving act only in answer to the Word....
The saving event does not lie behind the Word, but takes
place in the Word." It remains the prerogative of God to
4
encounter man in this form of address. Jesus Christ who
speaks this Word addresses the man who will listen to God's
call. In this way, revelation, as it occurs in and through
5
the message, is a hearing event. Man is called upon to
hear. This proclamation has the function of directly
placing him in confrontation with God.^ Proclamation demands
a faith-response as an answer to the word of challenge.
"Faith is directed to the Word and to the authorized proclama¬
tion of the Word. Therefore, no other validation can be
demanded for the Word and no other basis created for it than
7
the Word itself." The response to it can be none other than
1. TNT, Volii, pp. 67-8.
2. "R in NT", p. 43-
3. Schmithals, p. 212.
4. EF, p. 166.
5. EF, p. 100.
6. "R in NT", p. 42.
7. FU, p. 138.
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faith or unbelief."'" Its authorized proclamation comes
2 _
through the transmission of churchly tradition. To look
for validation behind the Word would be to seek after an
objective proof which would only invalidate it by making
it empirical. Man's meeting it apparently requires only
a simple "Yes" or "No". The ultimate decision rests within
the will of the hearer, but the power of life that brings
man out of death resides in the possibility possessed by
the Word. It is to the position of faith that the Word of
Jesus speaks and endeavours to move man, for it is in faith,
which attaches to the Word, that the life of the hearer is
L±
opened to the historic possibility of grasping himself.
"Faith has only become a possibility for man because God has
sent his Son.When the Word is proclaimed, man comes
face to face with the call of God. The Word possesses the
efficacy of creating an eschatological situation which can
transform man's life by altering his self-understanding.
This efficacy cannot be a possession which can be manipulated
and controlled.^ Rather it confronts man anew in each
experience of preaching and it is here and nowhere else that
7
one finds this encounter. In the Word's preaching and
1. TNT, Volii, p. 75-
2. JCM, p. 82.
3. FU, p. 122. For further elucidation of Bultmann's use of
Jesus Christ as the root fact of faith, see Appendix B
(page 460ff) on his similarity to Martin Kahler's "historic,
biblical Christ".
4. FU, pp. 139-142.
5. FU, p. 173.
6. EF, p. 169.
7. Bartsch, KMi, p. 41.
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proclamation, the contemporary becomes contemporaneous with
the eschatological situation found in Christ."'" Man is
given the possibility for authentic existence when he is
delivered from himself and this is precisely what Jesus
2
Christ has accomplished. Man's new self-understanding
involves freedom by which C-od removes man from himself to
others. It remains the power of the Word to transform man
in this manner and thus to make the present moment eschatolo¬
gical. "The eschatological event, which Christ is, is
consequently realized...in concreto here and now, where the
Word is proclaimed.... This proclamation addresses me
personally...in the sense that God's having acted is present
4
as an eschatological NOW." God's personal address requires
response. The Word seems to function in such a manner as
to present the hearer with the possibility for faith which
is itself the potentiality to be a new man. Here resides
the power of Jesus' Word: it gives new life by means of a
new self-understanding. "The proclamation does not effect
a magical change in our life....It brings nothing into our
life as a new entity. It only opens our eyes to ourselves
...."^ It is this "opening our eyes to ourselves" which
marks off the special province of the Word. It does not
seem to initiate any metaphysical or ontological metamorphosis
1. "R in NT", p. 45-
2. Bartsch, KMi, p. 31*
3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 32.
4. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 208-9.
5. Smart, pp. 158-9.
6. FU, p. 140.
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since such a transformation could, quite possibly be
construed as requiring supernatural intervention."'" Rather,
the change involves an ontic re-evaluation of life-style
and -structure which appears to re-order and re-arrange
present historic priorities. This apparently being the
case, Bultmann announces that the event of preaching constit¬
utes the Now of salvation in which man is brought from himself
2
and the world to others. Again Bultmann does not appear to
be completely novel in the suggestion regarding the ontic
change. Herrmann and Harnack have already pointed out that
the ideas of the Gospel do not involve a transformation or
ontological change in a physical sense. Rather, one is
motivated and stimulated to act differently, to act in harmony
with the Gospel. Man is thus only ontically affected.
The importance of Jesus Christ rests in His delivering
the Word, and in that moment He apparently becomes the
7
revelation of God. Christology confronts man as a direct
l±
summons of proclamation. In this way, Jesus Christ becomes
5the Word which is preached as the word of salvation. The
Now of the Revealer's coming corresponds with the Now of the
proclaimed Word.^ It would seem that Christ appears to come
7
very close to being identified with the preaching itself.
1. Braaten and Harrisville, Kerygma and History, pp. 217-8.
2. FU, p. 276.
3- "PCKHJ", pp. 41-2.
4. FU, p. 280.
5. "PCKHJ", p. 42.
6. FU, p. 175.
7. Essays, p. 289-
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Bultmann has contended that authentic existence is obtained
in the acknowledgement and realization of possibility. It
is in this that man's essence finds expression, for man is
man in deliberate action and not in mere active deliberation."'"
Bultmann approaches the biblical text with this underlying
anthropological consideration. And this vastly influences
the interpretation of what he finds there. Man himself
appears to be a primary focal point for Bultmann's interpre-
p
tation. "Since the exegete exists historically and must
hear the word of Scripture as spoken..., he will always under¬
stand the old word anew. Always anew it will tell him who
z
he, man, is and who God is...." Bultmann's concern seems
to concentrate on an explication of the phenomenon of man as
4
he exists before God. In his historical position, man
approaches the text. He attempts to sift out who he is in
the light of what Jesus Christ has spoken. The investigator
cannot anticipate discovering any facts about God who is
believed to have spoken since he apparently assumes a priori
that any such talk reflects mythological conceptions. There¬
fore, his attention moves away from an inquiry into what man
can grasp regarding the experience of God as faith claims
Him to be in the person of Christ. But within the framework
outlined above, the investigator, in order to be comprehensible
and intelligible to the modern scientific mind, directs his
1. LD, pp. 60-3-
2. "R in NT", p. 42; and TNT, Voli, pp. 326-7*
3- EF, p. 296.
4. Smart, pp. l6l-3«
5. Ibid., p. 135.
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inquiry into the ontic possibilities for man which faith
alleges to be present there. As a result, the facts seem
to dissipate into the indeterminateness and obscurity of
historical phenomena in general. It may be the case the
Bultmann could have some sympathies with Harnack's distinction
between facts of external details and the facts of personality.
It appears that the person of Jesus is an external detail
which no amount of research and scholarship can retrieve from
the ambiguities of history. There will always be controversy
about the facts of the matter. However, the fact of His
reality seen from the sphere of faith allays all doubts and
suspicions about the authenticity of His person and His
reality as the Christ. With this distinction made, it is
possible to see why Jesus becomes ambivalent and ambiguous
when investigated as an objective constellation of data."'" In
the opening pages of History and Eschatology as well as in
the introduction of Jesus and the Word, Bultmann expresses his
concern about finding any sure and certain information. In
this way, the person of Jesus, as an objective, historical
individual, apparently becomes maintained and established in
2
the transmission of faith.
We cannot be certain...whether...the earliest layer of
tradition disclosed...comes directly from Jesus or
whether the oldest community preserved a true picture
of him and his message....But actually this need make
no difference to us....Whether [our encounter]
originated with^Jesus or with his church is a secondary
consideration.
1. "PCKHJ", p. 25-
2. Ibid., p. 18.
5. Smart, p. 157.
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The infinite qualitative difference which exists between
God and man appears central and decisive."'" It would seem
that on the basis of this working hypothesis coupled with the
corollary regarding the world-view, Bultmann finds himeelf
restricted in giving any serious consideration to the ontolo-
gical claims of faith that in Jesus Christ, God is personally
present. Bui tularin's attention thus draws away from the
bearer of the Word and from consideration of who He is.
Rather, it would seem to be the case that the Word itself
becomes the power which replaces His person who must remain
2
irrevocably caught in the grasp of contingency. "Therefore,
the inner relation between Word and bearer of the Word is
irrelevant to the claim of the Word." It becomes the province
of the Word to mediate the God/man experience which is itself
confined to the structures and categories of existence and to
the natural laws which govern it. To come to God is not to
come to Jesus, the man, but rather to hear in mindful antici¬
pation that which has come down to the present time and which
4
claims to mediate between divine and human. The Christian
5
faith, is a present experience in which the hearer participates.
The eschatological Now rests upon proclamation which comes
ever anew in each specific encounter with preaching. In this
manner, Jesus Christ is secondarily rescued from the grips of
1. Ibid., p. 154.
2. "PCKHJ", p. 20.
3. FU, p. 131.
4. "PCKHJ", pp. 40-1.
5. J.C. Futrell, "Myth and Message," Cath. Bibl. Q., Vol. 21,
pp. 307-9-
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obscurity and criticism, for He approaches not in His
person but in the historical act of the spoken word."'" It
may be that Bultmann takes his stand with the "Immune-from-
Historical-Research School" which contends that the knowledge
of events is superceded by the encounter that they mediate
and which thus establishes faith on the decision with the
2
encounter rather than with facts.
Jesus Christ comes in the proclamation which is itself
rooted in the historical happening of the cross of the
z
Crucified. The content of the Word expresses the meaning
that the one who preached God's Word and who demands decision
4
is Jesus of Nazareth crucified. On this basis, Bultmann
can maintain that faith is an historic event which happened
5
in space and time. The aspect of death, even if on the
cross, can apparently be understood within the world-view of
Bultmann. The cross which crucified Jesus is also the
cross which each man must bear who hears and believes in the
spoken word.^ In faith, one also participates in the
crucifixion in that the believer is both judged and delivered
7
by his act of belief. In this manner of vicarious suffering
and death, the believer accepts the challenge presented in the
1. "PCKHJ", pp. 37-8.
2. H.K. McArthur, "From the Historical Jesus to Christology,"
Interpretation, Vol. 23, p. 196.
3. LD, p. 93f.
4. FU, p. 114.
5. "PCKHJ", p. 18.
6. Bartsch, KMi, p. 36.
7. Bartsch, KMi, p. 37.
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preaching of the Word."'" It thus initiates a "new and
permanent" situation in history because the cross is an
2
historical fact. Jesus' Word delivers a new possibility
while the cross indelibly engraves it into the very fibre
and fabric of history itself. God has wrought this event
which is also eschatological, precisely in that it transmits
a new and radical self-understanding. "The Word of God is...
a concrete word addressed to men here and now....Its origin is
an historical event by which the speaking of this word...is
rendered authoritative and legitimate. This event is Jesus
Christ."^ So the Word of new life is an historically rooted
word in the event of Jesus the man as He is preached. But
the foundation appears to give way to the precedence of its
existential message — that man is now a new creation.^ The
Word of the cross addresses the present. "It gives him free¬
dom from the world and from the sorrow and anxiety which over-
7
whelms him when he forgets the beyond." The hearer is
released from his own self-imposed captivity which has held
Q
him in bondage. His new self-understanding involves a new
Q
and dynamic attitude toward the world and meni "To believe...
means to abandon all merely human security and thus to overcome
1. TNT, Voli, p. 292f.
2. Bartsch, KMi, p. 37-
3. D. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, p. 97f.
4. JCM, pp. 79 and 80.
5. LD, pp. 68-70.
6. TNT, Voli, p. 329f.
7. JCM, p. 40.
8. Smart, p. 180.
9. WB, pp. 145-154.
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the despair which arises from the attempt to find security
The Word of Jeuus challenges man to relinquish his
idolatrous graps upon the world and upon his own future.
As does Kierkegaard and Tillich, Bultmann appears to be
indirectly criticizing any attempts on the part of man to
2
stand aloof from God. The notion of human self-sufficiency
and -assertiveness moves away from the infinite dimension of
reality. The finite world and man are not the real possibili¬
ties for life. Man's security rests upon the same basis as
does the Word — the presence of God. The cross exemplifies
all of the folly and foolishness inherent in all attempts to
find security within the world. Jesus announces that human
existence is from God and that He is the possibility upon
which true and genuine life is to be founded. "In contrast
to world and death, life is always...a being-in-the-future....
Man...is always being given himself back as his possibility...;
he is free...."^ This freedom is God's gift and as such it
can never be grasped by man of his own accord. Rather, it
is the significance of the Word which creates meaning in
every moment of preaching. Jesus' Word occurs as an historic
happening and it is in understanding history that one comes to
' 5
achieve the possibility of better understanding himself.
But it remains the claim of faith as announced in the Word that
1. JCM, p. 40.
2. Compare references in Kierkegaard Chapter,
and Tillich Chapter, ff,
3. EF, pp. 174-7.
4. FU, p. 179.
5. JCM, p. 53-
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freedom is granted by God's act."'" The urgency of the Word
as well as its finality is impressed upon historic conscious¬
ness by the cross which is the road that all men must travel
2
in dying to the security of the world.
But the Word is also the resurrecting of hope for the
future, which arises out of man's past. The cross and
resurrection of Christ signify man's vicarious dying to all
•5
and rising again upon the basis of God. "In accepting the
word of preaching as the word of God and the death and
resurrection of Christ as the eschatological event, we are
4
given an opportunity of understanding ourselves." This is
where the true future resides — in understanding and in
grasping possibilities. As Bultmann points out, "the
salvation-occurrence" is effected in and through the word of
preaching which has as its existential content the death and
resurrection of Christ.^ As with any speculation about the
ontological make-up of Jesus as the Godman, so it must also
be in respect to any consideration of the resurrection as a
7literal event. "An historical fact which involves a
Q
resurrection from the dead is utterly inconceivable!" It
appears that Bultmann's anti-metaphysical presuppositions
and his distinction between God and man preclude any serious
1. JCM, p. 53-
2. TNT, Voli, p. 303.
3. Braaten and Harrisville (eds.) Kerygma and History,
pp. 35 and 36.
4. Bartsch, KMi, p. 41.
5. J. MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 159.
6. TNT, Yoli, pp. 300-2.
7. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, p. 98.
8. Bartsch, KMi, p. 39.
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contemplation of the New Testament's claim being taken in
an objective sense."'" What is required is an understanding
of what the New Testament is saying to man about himself.
The resurrection-event like the Christ-event is geschichtlich
2
unique. The objective reference gives way to its historic
z
and existential meaning for the believer. As with Christ
and His cross, so with the resurrection — they become
4
meaning-events in the fact of preaching. "I would not call
dying and rising again with Christ a subjective experience,
for it can occur only through an objective encounter with
5
the proclamation and the act of God which it mediates."
Certainly Bultmann does not want to maintain "subjective" in
the sense of a completely illusory experience which takes
place only in the sphere of meaning.^ Rather, he appears
to becloud his meaning in this reference by coupling it with
the word "objective". It is entirely possible and conceivable
that Bultmann is permitted no other alternative than to demyth-
7
ologize the resurrection given its objective impossibility.
Even if there had been a resurrection it would presumably be
incumbent upon faith to view it as nothing other than an
explanable phenomenon according to the laws which explain the
world. For on BuLtmann's pre-suppositions, even a resurrection
1. R. Cushman, "Is the Incarnation a Symbol?", Theology Today,
Vol. 15, p. 174.
2. Ibid., p. 178.
3. TNT, Voli, pp. 305-6.
4. Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 156.
5. Bartsch, KMi, p. 112.
6. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, pp. 66-7.
7. Hoffmann, "Kerygma and History," J. Bibl. and Rel.,
Vol. 33, p. 27.
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could hardly find its way into faith's understanding as
evidence of God's intervention into the course of human
affairs. Rather, Bultmann demythologizes the event to mean
the rise of the Easter faith in the first disciples."'" In
this way, faith's claims become intelligible to the modern,
scientific man, and the confusion which could possibly be
seen as occurring in his use of "subjective" and "objective"
together subsides in the encounter with preaching and its
personal certainty. Indeed, these are the factual dimensions
of faith.
From this discussion involving the role of Christ as
the Word of God, it appears to emerge that one is not dealing
here with merely an historical figure. It seems that
Bultmann's understanding of Jesus Christ is somewhat coloured
by his basic presuppositions which guide as well as condition
the range of his thought on this subject. His metaphysical
assumptions considerably contribute to the limitations placed
upon finding any sense in the New Testament's talk of God
2
objectively acting in history. An investigator cannot
really attach much credence to the possibility that He has
literally revealed Himself. As it relates to Jesus Christ,
revelation must be demythologized into categories of compre¬
hensible meaning which make sense to the modern climate cf
z
opinion. To accomplish this, Bultmann endeavours to ask,
"What is the New Testament trying to tell me about my historic
1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 42.
2. MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp.166-170.
3- "R in NT", p. 43f-
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existence?""'" No doubt, in this question the point of
emphasis shifts from God to man who is still related to God
but who appears, nonetheless, to be the reference of primary
concern. In this way, Bultmann seems to be perpetuating
something of the old dichotomy in reality between the objective
2
and the subjective. God's acts are not capable of objective,
rational conceptuality in this setting, since they remain
extra-sensible and thus beyond the realm of perceptual
apprehension and experience. What is required of the in¬
vestigator is to speak of man, for he is definitely part of
the sensible, perceptual world. Bultmann contends that to
speak anthropologically requires reference to the Word of God.
But he can only talk about God's Word as he refers to Jesus.
This manner of speaking seemingly moves in the direction of
playing down the historical data pertinent to Him while
emphasizing His importance for the conveyance of present
meaning.
First,...the event of Jesus...has its primary signifi¬
cance in the dimension of personal history. Second,
Jesus Christ can never be objectively identified as
the eschatological event by investigation.... Third,
Jesus Christ as eschatological event is such only in
the present, only as he confronts men in their own .
situation with the possibility of new self-understanding.
Clearly the emphasis comes to light regarding Bultmann's
concern to view Him as a geschichtlich-event while retaining,
at a distance, the objective, historical reference upon which
1. JCM, p. 53-
2. Cushman, pp. 178-9.
3. EF, pp. 25-30.
4. N.J. Young, "Bultmann's View of History," Church QR,
Vol. 165, p. 424.
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this event is founded."'" In this connection, it appears that
2
he may do some equivocating here. For he seems to hesitate
in his demythologizing project at the point of Jesus Christ.
On the one hand, he retains Him as the bearer of God's Word.
On the other hand, he appears to maintain that there is no
objective, material relation between the Word and its bearer.^
As a possible comparison, it may be justified to suggest a
resemblance between Bultmann's position and that of the
Liberals in regard to the personality of Jesus. Bultmann
apparently maintains the "Dass" of Jesus in order to ground
the Word in the concreteness of history. One can say that
Jesus lived and died, but His real importance comes to the
fore in the proclamation. In this moment Jesus is the
Christ. The believer apparently becomes contemporaneous with
Him in the moment of hearing and deciding. While
historical-critical research does not seem to be able to
demonstrate the material connection between Jesus and the
Christ, in "believing self-understanding" the relationship
is evidently sealed and made certain in the experience of the
5
believer. Similarly, the Liberals could speak of "only one
fact" which remains beyond question. It is "the appearance
of Jesus in history." He "can overcome every doubt of the
reality of God." Objective investigation into the reliability
1. H. Diem, Dogmatics, pp. 64 and 65.
2. G.E. Ladd, "The Role of Jesus in Bultmann's Theology,"
Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 18, pp. 57-68.
3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 41.
4. "PCKHJ", p. 25f.
5. EF, p. 16.
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of "biblical testimony can only provide controversy and
quibbling about the external details of this man. One
obviously cannot demonstrate the connection between Jesus,
the man, and Jesus, the Christ. However, the New Testament
account provides the basis for a personal encounter and
experience. For the Liberals, the fact that He lived and
died seems to function as an embarkation point into the
weightier matter of the Power He communicates. The personal
and intimate experience of the believer realizes His "self-
evidencing" power. In other words, it seems that the
Liberals see Jesus as the Christ in the faithful eventuation
of the believer. The fact of His person stands beyond
question and doubt in the context of belief. But Troeltsch
took opposition to the "self-evidencing" power in that he
viewed it as a symptom of latent transcendentalism. Why
should this one person possess the ability to prove the
authenticity of His person? Indeed, one must wonder if this
same question applies to Bultmann. Does his conjoining of
the acts of living and thinking provide a more certain basis
for relating Jesus to the Christ than the Liberals' "self-
evidencing" power? It may not be out of place to suggest
that Bultmann is possibly presenting a variation of his pre¬
decessors' method, for the experienced reality of Jesus as
the Christ takes place in the personal encounter of the
believer, both for him and the Liberals. But to return,
Bultmann's thought seems a bit confusing in that he appears
both to take his stand in the faith and to maintain his
allegiance to the modern world."'" From appearances, he
1. Diem, pp. 76-8.
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interconnects Jesus of Nazareth with the Word at the point
of proclamation."^" This would seem to suggest that the
historicity of Jesus gives way to His meaning at the moment
of proclamation. His subjective and personal importance
takes precedence over His objective and empirical grounding.
Given the facticity of proclamation and the "Dass" of Jesus,
one might possibly inquire, "How does it happen that one part
of historical reality eludes objective observation and the
2
other not?" An alleged disjunction between the objective,
empirical and subjective, personal appears to be prompted here.
It seems that Bultmann has so construed reality as to make it
an either/or proposition, and quite possibly he is one of the
first casualties of these apparently mutually exclusive terms.
One commentator has criticized him on this tendency:
we must protest at the tendency here to exclude the
objective-historical element altogether. True/ Bultmann
is right in refusing to make theology... dependent on
historical research. But there is a sense in which
the existential-historical implies the objective -
historical. To preach the cross as saving event is
to propagate an illusion unless the origin of that
saving event was an actual happening.... 4
For another perspective of this issue, one can survey the
5
writings of the "Bultmannians" of the New Quest School. It
is a contention of these people that Bultmann has certain
"undercurrents" which move in the direction of identifying
Jesus with the Word, while Bultmann maintains that the Word
1. Braaten and Harrisville (eds.), The Historical Jesus and
the Kerygmatic Christ, pp. 142-171.
2. Ibid., p. 146.
3. C.W. Kegley, The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, pp. 76-7.
4. MacQuarrie, p. 178.
5. See James Robinson's A New Quest of the Historical Jesus.
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arises not out of faith in the historical Jesus but from
the early Christian community."'" But all in all, the
tendency which appears to manifest itself is that Bultmann
tends to maintain the that about Jesus over the how of His
2
relation to the Word. The answer to the how question would
seem to direct attention to the material actuality of the
person called the Christ. Paradoxically, it might seem that
Jesus Christ both is and is not related to the Word which
He speaks. And maybe it is incumbent upon Bultmann to
4
decide unequivocably how he will stand on this issue.
C. HISTORY AS ESCHATOLOGY
The Word of Jesus Christ brings an historic possibility
which creates a "new and permanent" situation in which man's
life-style is ontically re-ordered in relation to the message
5
heard and received. According to Bultmann the hearer who
grasps the Word experiences the reality of history from the
6
perspective of faith. "Christ is...the end of history...."
As a believer, man perceives the historical reality in a new
and radical manner which results from the new understanding
of existence obtained in faith. As with his understanding
of Christ so also with his view of history, Bultmann seems to
approach the subject with various "pre-understandings" which
condition and qualify his approach. Part cf this working
hypothesis presumes that an event is historical if it includes
1. J.B. Cobb, "The Post-Bultmannian Trend," J. Bibl. Rel., Vol.
30, pp.3-11. S. Ogden, "Bultmann and the New Quest," J.Bibl.
Rel. Vol. 30, pp. 209-218. J. Robinson, "The Recent Debate
on the New Quest," J. Bibl.Rel., Vol. 30, pp. 198-208.
2. Ladd, pp. 60,61,63,66.
3. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, pp. 63-7-
4. Cushman, p. 177.
5. TNT, Volii, pp. 70-3.
6. EF, p. 237.
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meaning."'" But meaning is always related to the investi¬
gator who comes to history "excited" by his subject matter
and asking questions which relate to his own existential
situation. In this way, man encounters history and
engages it in dialogue. "We do not stand outside historical
forces as neutral observers; we are ourselves moved by them;
and only when we are ready to listen to the demand which
history makes upon us do we understand at all what history
2
is about." The dialogue is a necessary part of one's
involvement in the questioning, for he is himself a part of
3
the very process which finds itself under scrutiny. One
views himself as part of the process. This encounter aids
man in viewing the demand or claim which calls into question
his own subjectivity. "This dialogue is...a real interro¬
gating of history...[in] which the historian puts...[his]
subjectivity...in question, and is ready to listen to history
as an authority."^ Man converses in the anticipation of
learning something about himself. History comprises the
realm of human existence. "But what we call history is the
course of those events which are brought about by human
action....Human actions are always caused by purposes and
5
intentions, by the will to attain something."^ This
characterization appears to tie it very intimately to the
actions and reactions of man. Not only does he appear to
be the subject, but also he appears to be the primary deter-
1. HE, pp. 118-122.
2. JW, p. 4.
3. "QMH", p. 329b.
4. JW, p. 4.
5. "QMH", p. 329b.
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mination of its constitution. What man purposes and
intends is the material substance of history. His psychical
interaction with Nature seems to provide the dynamism for
movements and meaning. One may possibly eee strong traces
of Dilthey and Troeltsch at this point. No doubt, both of
these men approach the subject of history with an anthropo¬
logical "pre-understanding". Dilthey, Troeltsch and Bultmann
do not look at history to discover what0 but who man is — it
is to search for personal meaning. As well Bultmann also
apparently views history as man's teacher about himself."*"
Therefore he interrogates it and listens to its "demand" as an
authority which is to be contended with. "The character of
every... situation lies in the fact that within it the problems
and the meaning of past and future are enclosed and waiting...
2
to become unveiled by human decision." But as a Christian
theologian, he has special interests for this particular inter¬
pretation. He too possesses the interest to engage in
dialogue with it, but his interest is attached to a specific
event which he views as decisive for interrogating human
subjectivity. His attention is directed to the event of
Jesus whom faith claims to be the Christ. But we have already
seen that no empirical credence can be given these affirmations.
Rather the theologian's interest is in demythologizing His
person and in placing Him within the instructive sphere of
man's realm.
The ideas [of Jesus] are understood in the light of the
concrete situation of a man living in time; as his
1. O'Meara and Weisser (eds.), Rudolf Bultmann in Catholic
Thought, p. 172.
2. "QMH", p. 329b.
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interpretation of his own existence in the midst of
change, uncertainty, decision; as the expression of
a possibility of comprehending this life. . . ."When we
encounter the words of Jesus...we do not judge them....;
they meet us with the question of how we are to inter¬
pret our own existence. 1
Ostensibly, Jesus steps out of the historical past in the form
of His Word which encounters man today as in every day with
2
an interpretation of existence. His Word confronts man as
the question posed to his own being of how he will live in
-a
the world. But man's being is not just simply questioned,
it is also presented with a "possibility of comprehending
this life" and with an attitude of life and mind which sees
into the contingencies and necessities of being in the world.
Thus the Word confronts the investigator on two levels.
First, it removes any sense of security about his own sub¬
jectivity. Man encounters a challenge which interrogates
him at the very core of life — his own being. Second, it
offers an interpretation that comprehends the situation of
man. The Word presents a positive dynamic to man's under¬
standing of himself. His being is both called into question
and given new and positive supports. This encounter is an
historical one which also presents historic, personal possi¬
bilities. Not only does he live and exist in history, but
also he can find in it a teacher whose Word can instruct him.
But for Bultmann, the event of Jesus' Word is not
1. JW, p. 11.
2. TNT, Volii, p. 75f.
3. TNT, Volii, p. 75f.
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another happening among so many others. Surely, He is just
another man who lived and died, but the meaning He delivered
comprises something final which prompts him to call Jesus
Christ the "end" of history."'" Something final and once-for-
2
all occurs in the Word. It is not a final and once-for-all-
ness that radically shifts the ontological structures and
abruptly institutes a complete metamorphosis from one age to
another. There does not appear to be anything of this kind
involved; and hardly could there be given the preliminaries
to approaching the whole discussion. But while history and
the world remain unchangeable, man does change and is affected
4
by what he receives in faith. No "magical change" takes
place. Rather, he is granted a new self-understanding which
changes his whole life-style in relation to the world and other
men. This new life-outlook can never be at his disposal; it
5
is never his complete possession. It is the claim of faith
that he receives this as a gift from God.^ And this gift is
effected through the Word which confronts and encounters man.
"Christ meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else....
7
Jesus represents the intervention of God in history...."
In the event of preaching, Jesus' interpretation of life
becomes a real possibility for man. The Word received in
preaching seems to validate itself in the message which it
1. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 166.
2. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf
Bultmann, p. 184.
3- Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 167.
4. HE, p. 153.
5. "R in NT", pp. 45-6.
6. TNT, Voli, p. 289f.
7. Futrell, "Myth and Message," Cath. Bibl. Q., Vol. 24, p.309.
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presents. Bultmann appears to make it perfectly clear
that one cannot inquire behind the Word, for this would
seemingly jeopardize its authenticity and message. To seek
behind it would be to seek the objective relationship between
God and Jesus, and for Bultmann this can never be verified or
established."'" The Word stands or falls by its own power to
convince that in encountering it one encounters an act of
God. But to speak this way, one must not look out onto the
objective material of history; rather one looks into himself
at his own existence. "God as acting does not refer to an
event which can be perceived by me without myself being drawn
into the event as into God's action....In other words, to
speak of God as acting involves the events of personal
2
existence." To all appearances, the Word acts internally
in the man who hears and believes. God cannot be objectively
seen nor can His Word find objective moorings in the vicissit¬
udes of history. Consequently, He is seen to act through His
Word where only the eye of faith seeks Him. It is to the
province of faith to perceive the hidden and mysterious
activity of God.
Christian faith can only say, "I trust that God is
working here and there, but His action is hidden, for
it is not directly identical with the visible event.
What it is that He is doing I do not yet know, and
perhaps I never shall know it, but faithfully I trust
that it is important for my personal existence, and I
must ask what it is that God says to me." 3
Surely then, God does act for man even though he cannot
perceive this action in the visible events of the every day.
1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 207.
2. JCM, p. 68.
3. JCM, p. 64.
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But the effect of the Word creates its own assurance that
indeed He is present here in this speaking and that indeed
it is God who influences and moulds personal existence.
More than this cannot be asserted, for it would endanger
the hiddenness and mysteriousness of God by attempting to
make Him a possession. Apparently the most that faith can
expect and do in Bui tularin's world-view is to trust that He
is acting here and there through the preaching of His Word.
This position occasions another glimpse back to the work of
the Liberals. It has been suggested that for them man's
Reason overlords Nature as the arbiter of reality. As a
consequence, the world appears a self-contained nexus of
cause and effect."'" Yet faith can operate within this
context without apparent harrassment and contradiction. The
Liberals did not appear to suggest a view of faith that
contradicts the experiences of perceptible reality. Rather,
it transacts its affairs within the limits set by Reason.
As one consequence of this, these theologians put forth the
proposition that man of faith can only "see" God in the world
for himself. Faith cannot defend itself against the reproach
of others that such a "seeing" is illogical. The literal
in-breaking and operation of God remains doubtful, if not
impossible. In a similar fashion, Bultmann appears to share
some sympathies with the Liberals. He points out that one
can only "trust that God is working here and there."
Ultimately, His activity remains hidden and beyond perception
1. For a discussion of cosmological presupposition in theology,
see Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, pp. 22-51-
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of the objective eye. The man of faith believes inwardly
and personally that He is active and present. But again,
it is only from the stance of faith that such belief seems
possible, for the Liberals as well as for Bultmann.
Man is history and this involves his becoming which
occurs through decision."'" The essence of man does not
appear to lie in any immutable quality but rather in his
response to the challenge which confronts him. He lives by
being-on-the-way. But this is a controlled, guided, and
qualified activity which takes its direction from his under¬
standing of existence. Being-on-the-way receives its decisive
significance from man's life-style. Presumably it is at this
point that the nature of man finds a point of contact with the
Word. He lives in possibility which he actualizes in
2
decisions, and Jesus' Word offers a possibility for life which
faith claims to be authentic. In this way, the Word and its
hearer seem to occupy a common ground which touches the very
core of the hearer's subjectivity. It is a common ground
which challenges the hearer's life-style while offering the
gift of being a new man.
It is just this that is achieved in Christ and given to
man as a gift....He brings history to an end in the
sense of ending man's past history, his past under¬
standing of himself, and grants...the possibility for
free decision and thus new and authentic existence....
This dimension...Bui'tmannrefers to as eschatological
existence, or new life.... 3
1. Young, "Bultmann's View of History," Church Q.Re., Vol.165,
pp. 419-420.
2. G. Wingren, Theology in Conflict, p. 49', and O'Meara and
Weisser, p. 171.
3. Young, p. 420.
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Man is permitted a new life through the ending of his past.
Jesus' Word ends the past self-history and opens man to the
reception of a "new and permanent" situation which allows for
a "new and authentic existence." Bultmann is dealing in the
realm of personal and intimate existence where it is a
possibility to feel the presence of God acting by trusting
in Him. In this way, Jesus Christ is the "end" of history
by being the end as well as the beginning of a new and
personal becoming."'" Man's volition becomes the target of
proclamation, for in preaching he becomes aware of his own
2
pride and this is what faith in God crushes. It delivers
the opportunity of authentic freedom which can only be his
as a gift. New life finds the source and well-spring of its
4
power in His power. The new and personal history finds its
basis in a new self-understanding which is grounded in God.
As a believer, he lives out of His power confronting man
historically in proclamation. His new understanding is the
relinquishing of all confidence in human and worldly achieve¬
ments. It is a turning to God in absolute surrender and
trust which sees Him as active and present. "The man who
desires to believe in God must know that he has nothing at
his own disposal on which to build this faith, that he is, so
to speak, in a vacuum....He who gives up, he who loses every
5
security shall find security." This new awareness awakens
1. Ibid., p. 420.
2. Prim. XT., p. 183.
3- Kegley, The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 53*
4. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 43-4.
5. JCM, p. 84.
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the impossibility of establishing anything lasting upon the
foundation of this world. It is the realm of the contingent,
and man is not master here."'" Rather his authentic hope and
possibility is to live out of the power of God. It is He
who frees from the entangling alliances with the worldly
phenomena and grants true freedom which can only be radical
openness for the future. In this way, man moves toward the
real grasping of himself. He lives out of divine power and
2
not out of the powers which seem to constitute the world.
The Word of Jesus as the Word of God presents and opens man
to the gift of a radical shift in life-style. He lives in
3
the world as though he were not. His new consciousness of
living views the presence of God as the only security which
4
is real. Existence becomes conditioned by the presence of
the "end" which is inaugurated in the Word and finalized by
the power of God. "Jesus Christ is the eschatological event,
which means that he is the action of God by which he has
sent an end to the old world." He makes the new beginning;
it is new since it is eschatological in that it ends man's
past life-style and makes him a new "creation".^
[T]he eschatological event has happened within history
and happens everywhere in preaching...[e]schatology...
is not the future end of history, but history is
swallowed up by eschatology....[Hjistory must...be
understood...as profane....But the dialectic of human
1. WB, pp. 59-64.
2. HE, p. 116.
3. "Prophecy and Fulfilment", p. 74, (see page 202, Ftnt #5).
4. LD, pp. 58 and 59-
5. "QMH", p. 330a.
6. "Prophecy and Fulfilment", p. 73-
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life as historical...is brought to light, and...the
history of-^man as person...is set beyond world-
history.
In the light of what has been said, it appears that faith is
2
the answer to any inquiry regarding meaning for life.
Eschatology no longer deals with a future, objective com¬
pletion of history but strictly with the believer's personal
existence. It ends the old life-style and re-creates him
as a believer of the Word. This is accomplished through
preaching which mediates the transition. Man's place
comes into view as a history in and of itself and no longer
L.
simply a component of history on a grand or universal scale.
He is now important individually. The emphasis switches
from the overall span of history in general to the specific
5
instance of personal history in particular. Both history
and eschatology appear to be removed from cosmic and objective
1. "HE in NT", p. 16.
2. Cushman, "Is the Incarnation a Symbol?", Theology Today,
Vol. 15, p. 169.
3. "QMH", p. 330a.
4. Young, p. 420.
5. Ibid., p. 415; Indeed, Bultmann is quite clear in his own
mind that the emphasis of the biblical message is directed
to the individual. To understand and to interpret this
message in any other way moves one in the direction of
viewing faith empirically and thus looking for the
salvation of a people or community and for an observable
end to history. However, Bultmann's conception of the
task will only permit an existential or personal interpre¬
tation. For this preference in Bultmann, see for instance
his articles:
"Prophecy and Fulfilment", in Essays on Old Testament Inter¬
pretation, edited by Claus Westermann (trans. James Luther
Mays), SCM Press, London, 1963; and
"The Old Testament and Christian Faith", in The Old Testament
and Christian Faith, edited by Bernhard W. Anderson,
SCM Press, London, 1964.
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proportions and translated into personal terms. Eschatology
is thus possible here and now in man who is created anew
through decision."'" "[l]he meaning in history lies always
in the present, and when the present is seen by...faith as
the eschatological present, the moment of decision, the
2
meaning in history is realized." History is swallowed up
by eschatology, for it too is translated into personal terms
affected by the Word. God's act becomes personalized in
the believer and for this reason history gives way to
eschatology since the Word makes life a present possibility.^
The need for new life arises from the conditions of
5
being in the world of space and time. Without God, man
stands as nothing without meaning. He participates only in
death. But it can only be through the Word that he comes to
an awareness of this situation. "[l]n...preaching...the
word addresses you, it shows you your nothingness."^ Man
comes to see that he is at the mercy of the world, for the
powers of the cosmos seek to enslave him. "The powers under
which man is enslaved are...cosmic powers. They are the
element of the world..., the 'dominions, principalities,
7
powers'." The objective world reveals itself to be an alien
counter-point. It cannot be made into a home where security
1. Cushman, p. 176.
2. "QMH", p. 330b.
3. "HE in NT", pp. 13-13
4. Essays, p. 286.
5. TNT, Voli, p. 246.
6. EF, p. 169.
7. Prim. XT, p. 190.
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and confidence are to be found. It does not apparently-
present itself as a life-giving possibility. To look to
the world of empirical happening is to look into the face of
death itself.1 "In this conception,... he is deprived of
authentic life, true existence. Nor can he ever achieve that
2
existence by his own strength." In this manner, history
reveals itself as a hostile force. But the power to overcome
it does not rest within his grasp. History appears dominated
by cosmic and hostile forces. The appearance of Jesus of
Nazareth and His Word does not overtly change and rectify the
ontological structure of history. However, He infuses the
life-process with a "new and permanent" situation which stands
out as a voice in the wilderness of unfriendly powers. The
Word is an oasis in the vast sphere of insecurity and
inauthenticity.^ Man confronts the immensity of this realm as
a weakling. As well he approaches the Word as a weakling,
for in its presence he can only be remoulded and given new
life as a recipient. "Only in human weakness is the power
of God made known. Once again, this means that the grace of
God is never an assured possession. It is always ahead of
5
man, always a future possibility." His grace touches man
in the present through proclamation. It re-directs his
attention from the world to the present option of God's
futurity which can also become his own. God's grace re-works
1. TNT, Voli, pp. 254-9.
2. Prim. XT, p. 191.
3. TNT, Volii, pp. 76,78.
4. LD, pp. 68-70.
5. Prim. XT, p. 195-
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man's awareness of himself by turning him from living solely
in the world to living out of the power of God.^ "Like
everything that is created, we are from him....We are encom¬
passed by hiiji, we have our ebbing from him, and we have it
2
for him, we belong to him." Faith in creation shifts to
faith in God. The world and man are no longer seen as
self-contained and independent realities in polar relationship.
They are viewed in their complete dependence upon the presence
of God. Therefore, history does not coalesce into a unified
and whollistically meaningful pattern because of any inherent
potentiality within itself. It is always seen as a medium in
4
relation to man. World-history is replaced by personal and
individual history. The question of meaning in history as
a whole falls into unimportance, and now one must inquire
after the meaning of personal history as it lies in the present
— in man's present confrontation with God. The natural
order of space and time cannot be grasped as offering any
real or authentic options for life. The empirical world,
just like man, participates in the nothingness of all created
reality. To look to the world for meaning is to look at
nothing at all.^ Man's only real hope lies in his reliance
upon God who creates meaning only in personal, historical
7
existence.
1. TNT, Voli, pp. 288-92.
2. EF, p. 176; and compare Tillich, Chapter, pp.2k S~0ST1/.
3. EF, p. 176.
4. HE, pp. 138-9.
5. HE, p. 155-
6. LD, pp. 89 and 90.
7. LD, p. 63f.
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In his discussion on the part which history plays in
man's search for life, Bultmann seems to follow the tendency
hegun in his demythologizing project. To interpret a text
is to ask after its relationship to the investigator.
Authentic interpretation always presupposes man's seeking to
enrich and to correct his self-understanding. The investigator
approaches the text with this same working hypothesis. He
desires to know what this text can tell him about himself.
As preliminary groundwork, all mythological conceptions are
scrutinized to separate the cosmological from the existential
presentations. Therefore, the investigator interrogates the
text strictly from the perspective of what he can learn
about man. But to grasp the full implication of this anthropo¬
logical concern, he must endeavour to re-enact the Word of
Jesus in his own life in order to inquire into its authen¬
ticity."'" The New Testament does speak about man and his
situation because these are the "pre-understandings" with which
the text is approached and expected to speak. For Bultmann,
cosmological speculations must be interpreted to explicate
p
real,, existential options. Man guides and controls the
■5
project. He is the subject of research and as such he
is the medium through which the interpretation must filter.
The New Testament relates to man and because of this relation¬
ship any talk of the New Testament's understanding of history
must also be related to him.^ Bultmann sees the Word of Jesus
1. TNT, Voli, p. 307.
2. Young, p. 418.
3. Ibid., p. 419-
4. Bartsch, KMi, p. 16.
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as addressed to man in intimate and personal terms. The Word
informs me of how I may better understand myself in the world
before God. The manifestation of this new life-style and
pattern also finds expression in the same personal and individ¬
ualistic terms as does the Word. Meaning is not to be found
in the empirical world as a whole, for this can only be seen
in the same manner that man's life is seen before his relation
to God — as nothing. History and man are both creatures and
are thus both encompassed by non-possibility."^ Therefore,
Bultmann seems to transform it from the encompassing material
realm into personal and human conceptualization. "What...is
the meaning in history? The meaning...lies always in the
present as far as the present demands decision...and thereby
2
offers possibility to become a self, a personality."
Eschatology is now a real possibility because it too is
realized in man's personal life and not in cosmic and universal
terms. Eschatology and history coalesce in the human encounter
with God — they are the medium for the realization of his
new creatureliness. Demythologizing thus seems to humanize
and individualize the New Testament and history. Anthropolo¬
gical considerations govern and mediate the interpretative
process by which man is re-evaluated as the first principle of
concern.^ Bultmann's attention is with man and with the
meaning for his life that is to be found in Scripture.
1. EF, pp. 176-7-
2. "QMH", p. 330a.
3. HE, p. 152.
4. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 67.
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D. CHALLENGE/RESPONSE; MAN'S EITHER/OR
Man's existence as it acquires authentic possibility"^"
represents the point of concern for Bui tularin's demytholo-
gizing project. Man's life comes to be the focal point
2
at which the Christian message is concentrated; for Jesus
of Nazareth has come to deliver a new awareness of his options
for living. The Word creates the situation of authentic
freedom. The new life is lived in freedom which can be the
only condition for the true and authentic actualization of
personality. "It is the idea that freedom is irrevocably
bound up with being an individual and being one's self —
indeed, that 'being free' and 'being one's self' are identical.
The realization of personality manifests itself in the
dimension of freedom. As man lives for God with an open¬
ness for the future, he apparently displays the historicity
of his being which permits a freedom from the past as well
as a freedom for the present and future. "Freedom belongs
to the genuine historicity of man, whose self stands always
4
before him and is to be gained." However, this category
or medium of self-development can never be at man's
5
disposal. It remains the power of the Word to engender it
as a real and living potential. Through His Word, God's
grace touches man as the necessary condition for the realiz¬
ation and appropriation of the gift. "Human freedom and
1. O'Meara and Weisser, pp. 179-80.
2. Essays, pp. 83-4.
3. Ibid., p. 306.
4. "QMH", p. 330a.
5. MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 196.
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divine grace are...not mutually, exclusive.... Indeed we
must say that it is only divine grace that is responsible for
man's real freedom.""^ Human freedom is always a gift which
finds its ground in God. On this basis, His Word becomes
the controlling and deciding factor from the divine side
2
which readies man for freedom. But freedom possesses a
definite characteristic which qualifies new relationships
and which lies beyond man's power to effect.
For real freedom does not... consist in freedom from
the determination of the will by the outward con¬
ditions of life...; rather it is in freedom from
ourselves — from ourselves as we are in every "now",
as people who come^out of their past and are
determined by it.
God's Word works to create a new consciousness of self which
has as its content the releasement from past determinations.
Freedom qualifies the new self-concept by allowing man to
4
live without bondage to himself. This type of freedom
characterizes itself by being unburdened by past determin-
5
ations. Man is extricated from the entangling alliances
of his past decisions that were based upon his past reliance
upon the world.^ His encounter with God's Word delivers
the opportunity for a freedom which takes man from himself
7
and brings him to others. "Freedom...is therefore always
g
essentially 'freedom for' as well...." God's gift elevates
1. Essays, p. 180.
2. EF, pp. 241-2.
3- Essays, p. 180.
4. Ibid.,pp. 180-1.
5. TNT, Voli, p. 330ff.
6. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 19-20.
7. TNT, Volii, p. 78f.
8. Essays, p. 307.
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man from simple concern with and about himself and permits him
to be responsible for others.^ The freedom that He brings
still challenges man to decision and demands the response of
2
responsibility.
For here is the point of decision...;he...becomes aware
that every safeguard is shattered for him, and...that
he must be himself — that the truth we are inquiring
about for our existence is the truth of our existence
itself,...which we constitute as our truth only in
actually existing. 3
Man's encounter with God delivers him from enslavement to the
hostile cosmic powers that seek to incarcerate him in his
past history and in their powers and forces. Through freedom,
he becomes aware of the truth of his own existence. This truth
4
is not a static and general quality of definition. In living
from God, man moves in the direction of authenticity and true
5
manhood — precisely in his acting and in his doing. In being
free, he acts and lives for the future because his past is now
past and the future is now God's future.^ From this vantage
point, he is permitted the privilege of surveying the un¬
certainty of all knowledge and wisdom which constitutes his
past. "The way to freedom leads him in the recognition of
the relativity and insignificance of all human activity and
y
all human wisdom. There can be no real hope of establishing
authentic life on these contingent foundations. In
1. TNT, Voli, p. 308f; Volii, p. 218f.
2. EF, pp. 230-1, 239.
3. Essays, pp. 322-3*
4. FU, pp. 64-5, 172.
5. Bartsch, KMi, p. 205.
6. MacQuarrie, pp. 204, 206.
7. Essays, p. 324.
211
confrontation with the world, man must choose either to
stand with God or to remain with the world. With God, he
is given the gift of himself free from past determination."1"
Living from the world, he must contend with the realm of
2
relativity and contingency. Here there can he no absolute
or final resting point which offers a fixed and once-for-all
reference. Man's decision appears to be limited to two
exclusive possibilities. "For everything that we do in the
worldly realm can be done in two senses: either as a tribute
to the worldly powers or, in faith in God the Creator, as a
4
service of love." In essence, man is obliged to choose
which god he will ultimately serve and call his own.
Bultmann's attitude toward the natural world seems to possess
strands of similarity with the Liberal forefathers. From the
above position, it would appear that Bultmann views the
created realm as a hostile and alien medium. In this guise,
it represents a threat as well as a challenge to the life-
processes of man. Taken in and of itself, the world appears
as a foreboding wilderness where man may temporarily establish
a clearing. But the apparent fickleness and latent hostility
of the situation poses an impending threat on creativity
which seeks to tame the surroundings. There seems to be
the occasion for momentary successes but yet man on his own
really does not possess the power to settle himself securely.
This is the point where the Word of God stands as a citadel
1. TNT, Voli, p. 319f.
2. Ibid., pp. 227-69.
3. FU, p. 170.
4. EF, p. 182.
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of eternal civilization and learning. Through the onslaught
of setbacks and gains, this one point remains unharrassed
amid the relativity of life. In his own way, it would appear
that Bultmann is affirming without much reservation that man
cannot really exist upon finite possibilities. The hori¬
zontal dimension of creation must be tempered and qualified
by the vertical additive. The infinite dimension, God, His
Word, need to contribute and to interact with the medium of
the world. In an implicit way, Bultmann seems to agree with
Tillich that fulfilment of earthly life requires the dimension
of the ultimate. This theme does not seem to be entirely
novel or original. Indeed, Ritschl and company also
perceived the world as "dull" and "unfeeling". Man knows
himself to be a part of the system of Nature and yet he feels
an independence from and dominance over this mechanical
reality. Ritschl and company seem to depict the theological
enterprise not as the great mechanical "gangbuster" which
would release man from the confines of the system. The
Liberals apparently accepted the scientific climate of opinion
of their day and thus allowed Reason to remain the arbiter of
reality. As a possible compromise with this "pre-under-
standing", they sought to free man, at least in spirit, to
liberate his feeling, from the mechanism which was assumed
to be threatening on all sides. God gifted man with an
"organizing centre" "with which the spiritual self-feeling"
"receives its permanent and specific satisfaction". In a
sense, man becomes personally and inwardly free to experience
the elements of the infinite in his life. It may not be un¬
founded to suggest that with his own "pre-understandings"
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about reality, God and freedom, Bultmann re-plays an old
tune on a new piano.
In accepting freedom, man accepts responsibility for
the decisions which he makes. "Responsibility and freedom
belong to historicity."^" It releases and detaches him from
his past and opens him to the present possibilities that
remain always ahead. "To be historical means to live for
2
the future." But this freedom is only possible on one
basis. This basis is the "vouos" in which he:
actually must be and wishes to be as himself, in,the
unity and constancy of his real being — by a "vouos",
therefore, by which he is brought to himself and
becomes himself. 3
Man's freedom obeys a law that remains a constant factor,
though emanating in various actions. This unity of motive
in a plurarity of behaviour comprehends and upholds itself
as a centre for the self. As such it succeeds in the
positive and affirmative realization of what man must and
ought to be. This centre, this law of being, exerts itself
in unity and in concert with his real being. This centre
motivates him to become himself. The law apparently expresses
itself as a self-actualization principle. This principle
seems to release and to condition the inherent possibilities
contained in the self. But the activating power behind the
self-developmental process appear always to remain in the
4
power of the Word. It is the Word that must always come to
1. "QMH", p. 330a.
2. Ibid., p. 330a.
3. Essays, p. 307.
4. "M in NT", p. 372.
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man as a gift and never as a possession. As a self-
actualizing initiative, freedom must be grasped and approp¬
riated on an individual and personal level. Jesus' Word
approaches man in a one-to-one encounter, and it is a personal
response on a one-to-one level which meets the Word. In this
encounter, the dimension of freedom is apparently released."'"
Therefore, man's "way to freedom cannot be made by organiz-
2
ation — it must be found by each man for himself." The
medium of decision is ostensibly the manner and means for
the acquisition of freedom. "For in the decision of faith,
I...make a decision for...a new understanding of myself as
4
made free from myself by the grace of God...." The Word
announces itself in the present moment, in the Now, and thus
it requires a "Yes" or "No" as a decisive response. It is
in the faith-response that man grasps hold of true life.
Again it seems warranted at this point to re-visit the
position of Dilthey and to inquire after any possible simi¬
larities in Bultmann. It has previously been suggested that
Dilthey endeavoured to re-work the historical consciousness.
He viewed the arena of history as an on-going flux where man
seeks to secure himself against the relativities of life.
As a bulwark in his defense, he constructs metaphysical
systems which attempt to maintain absolutes while contingencies
and insecurities prevail all around. But in this attempt,
1. Essays, p. 180.
2. Ibid., p. 321.
3. Ladd, "The Role of Jesus in Bultmann's Theology,"
Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 18, pp. 61, 63-
4. "QMH", p. 330a.
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man seems to limit his options, depending on which system
of interaction in which he lives. That is to say, the
various systems limit experiences in that each system
contains its own concept of what is intelligible and per¬
ceptible and what is "good" and "bad". On the one hand,
Dilthey perceives this defensive posture as a concomitant
dimension of being-in-the-world. He apparently sees that
man contains the will-to-stability. On the other hand,
Dilthey seeks to present a view of history which, in part,
displays the relativity of all life and systems. In this
latter pursuit, Dilthey speaks of the liberation of man from
the assumptions which all systems make. He seems to impress
upon historical consciousness the finitude of all historical
creations. Man's true liberation opens him to all experiences
whether "good" or "bad". Bultmann seems to be pressing for
a similar type of consciousness which liberates. Again, man
apparently strives to secure himself but yet his absolutes
are as nothing before the contingency and hostility of the
world. Bultmann sees liberation from this situation in the
conscious and decisive decision for God as opposed to the
world. As man becomes aware of the infinite dimension, he
relinquishes his attempts to find security only in finite
terms. It is possible to suggest that Bultmann implicitly
engages in a value-judgment by conceiving the contingency of
reality in negative terms that threaten well-being. No doubt,
Dilthey also engaged in judgments. However, the Word of God
seems to free man from finite and futile strivings after
security in the world. Dilthey does not appear to be as
sceptical about life in the world. Of course, it may be
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justified to ask, "How does the methodology employed by
each man affect the judgment which he makes regarding the
possibilities found in history?" Bultmann and Dilthey part
company about the possibility for absolutes in history. The
former seems quite content to maintain the Word as the one
authentic choice to be made. In contrast, the latter would
even call this position in question given the finitude of all
phenomena. However, both men seem to liberate man — one
from the dullness and hostility of the world and the other
from false assumptions which fail to recognize the inherent
limitations of life. And as a possible corollary from the
perspective of the Word, if one views this as an absolute
it could seem to suggest that this position may implicitly
rest upon latent transcendentalism. While Bultmann maintains
the movement and change in the world, there may be some
recourse to the transcendent as eternal and unchanging in
order to establish the Word as absolute.
Nonetheless, man's positive response to proclamation
manifests itself in total surrender to God."'" Preaching
p
reveals his nature as related to Him. He hears His call
and it is this that challenges him either to faith or to un¬
belief. In faith, man obtains a new self that freely
realizes itself on the basis of one principle — to be a
personality. Through the attitude of faith, he decides
both for God and himself.^ He acknowledges the insecurity
1. EF, p. 169.
2. TNT, Voli, pp. 288-306.
3. Ibid., p. 324.
4. "QMH", p. 330a.
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of earthly and historical life. He is able to affirm his
creaturehood and thus his being in finitude."^" "Faith is
the answer to the message of preaching. Faith is the
acknowledgement of man's own security and readiness to find
o
security only in the unseen beyond, in God." He relinquishes
all hope of basing existence upon self-sufficiency. There
can be no sure basis for authentic life in created reality.
Rather, he no longer approaches the world as a closed system.
Due to the ontic and internal transformation, the world is
now seen to open upward and outward to God. "Hence it is
clear that for my existential life,...the world is no longer
a closed weft of cause and effect. In faith the closed
weft...is transcended." Faith allows man to look beyond
space and time for the explanation of his new self. He knows
that reality is not able to engender real life, for it is
only a creature like man. But yet faith acknowledges the
working of God where He is apparently not to be seen. "But
this is just the paradox of faith, it understands an
ascertainable event in its context in nature and history as
the act of God."^" Therefore, faith seems to abide in para¬
doxical tension between the acceptance of the scientific
5
world-view and the belief that God acts in history. It
remains to the eye of faith to behold His presence. As a
personal commitment and response, it can only claim to "know"
1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 198.
2. JCM, pp. 40-1.
3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 198.
4. Ibid., p. 199.
5. "QMH", p. 330a.
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God as He acts pro nobis, and for this reason "it follows that
faith is a new understanding of existence, and that the
activity of God vouchsafes to us a new understanding of
self...." To speak of God requires man always to speak
from the context of his own existence. God can only he
p
"known" in what He accomplishes for man. Man's experience
of Him is always mediated in the realm of the personal and
not in the objective. He never really meets Him in an
empirical context but always within the existential, personal
4
and historical; the changeable can never provide the stage
5
for His authentic self-revelation.
Man can also approach God's Word with the response of
unbelief and thus choose to serve the world.^ For Bultmann,
man denies his real self in this way. The world of space
and time reflects the same created nature as does man. In
themselves, they are ultimately nothing. "Man's efforts to
rely upon himself and to cling to the tangible reality which
he can control is doomed from the start, precisely because he
7
is incapable of controlling it." The desire to control
Q
seems to arise out of man's desire to be self-sufficient.
He seeks for somewhere to call his home, but to live out of
the world is to live out of the past. Being-on-the-way is
1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 202.
2. WB, pp. 159-163; also, O'Meara and Weisser, p. 169-
3- Essays, pp. 109-118.
4. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, pp. 99-100.
5. Essays, pp. 98-108.
6. WB, pp. 123-128.
7. Futrell, p. 303*
8. Schmithals, p. 93*
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man's essence and it can only express itself in action. But
man in the world becomes enslaved by its powers."'" In this
state, he is not able to realize himself as he is actually
intended to be. The space and time reality poses as the
2
place of security, but in consequence to man's belief in its
claims, he loses himself to the past. Liberation is not
attained in any other place than in an affirmative and faith¬
ful response to the Word of God. Living in unbelief expresses
itself as the non-actualization of human nature. Bultmann
appears to have bifurcated the options in such a manner as to
present them as an either/or proposition — either faith or
unbelief, either life or death, either God or the world.
These are the ostensible choices, and it is in choosing for
one or the other that one decides either for or against one's
self.^
E. RECAPITULATION AND RESPONSE
The apparent challenge-response motif in Bultmann's
theology accentuates the paradoxical situation of the believer.
The man of Reason who is conditioned by the present climate
of opinion accepts the closed unity of the world as the place
where he must endeavour to live. But in contrast, the man
of faith, who may also be the man of Reason, acknowledges his
indebtedness to God for working a life-giving experience for
him. In this act, he receives a new feeling for life which
1. Prim. XT, p. 193-
2. TNT, Voli, p. 239-
3- TNT, Volii, p. 27.
4. EF, p. 182.
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re-organizes and re-aligns the self. By God's power, the
believer receives the gift of freedom for the realization
and actualization of the self. A new and unitary centre of
motivation stimulates action — it is his acceptance and
reliance upon God. In faith, he comes to a new awareness
of the real possibilities. The resultant effect seems to
be withdrawal from self-sufficiency and -assertiveness based
on the world. The gift of freedom prepares the future in a
never-ending openness."'" On this basis, the believer is
permitted to find himself by being himself. But here the
apparent paradoxical relationship seems to arise at two points.
In the first place, man's adherence to the scientific
attitude does not allow him to speak or to think in objective
terms about God. Man's objective, empirical situation is
a priori eliminated from direct contact with Him. This is
due to the "pre-understandings" about His infinite qualitative
difference with man and about the closed unity of the world.
Existence remains self-contained. However, the man of faith
believes that God does act and is present. And this belief
2
must always be prefaced by a "nevertheless". The world is
a closed system, "nevertheless" to faith, God is active and
present. From this perspective, the self-exclusive propo¬
sitions seem to be dialectically correlated by the use of a
conjunction. In man, the objective and subjective differences
seem to form a unity. The conjunction of the acts of
thinking and believing may provide the personal resolution to
1. Prim. XT, p. 208.
2. JCM, p. 65.
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this paradoxical situation. But in the process of con-
/ joining, the application of faith seems to supercede or to
replace any need or demonstration of faith's object. In
the second place, the new self-understanding permits man to
exist as though he were not part of the world. Man seems
to live between the "already" and the "not yet"."'" Signifi¬
cance and importance are to be found only in the historical
realm as it is qualified by God's Word. Through His power,
the believer's horizon is expanded beyond the empirical
limits. He is opened to the recurring encounter with God
who remains outside quantitative observation. Man finds
Him in the effects that He brings. Again, a paradoxical
relationship results in that God and man interact in a
personal mode which transpires in a closed system. How is
this possible? Bultmann attempts to circumvent the apparent
problem by diminishing the empirical and augmenting the
existential dimensions of the encounter. God is God for me.
Consequently, any exposition of Bultmann's position must
always interpret Christ, Jesus, resurrection, cross, history,
eschatology, etc., in terms of man and the effects which
these concepts have on his existence. Nonetheless, the
apparent circumvention ultimately becomes more of a delaying
tactic than a solution, since Bultmann must still find it
incumbent to explicate the "how" of this encounter. Is it
a viable possibility to argue that it belongs to the Word of
God to mediate this encounter by granting existential
sustenance gleaned from a "Dass"? Or does the Word function
1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 21.
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as an undemonstrable article of faith which is to be
believed though not firmly grounded?
Bultmann most certainly emphasizes the immense impor¬
tance of proclamation and preaching and their power to
transform the self. But again he must tell his reader "how"
God is able to affect a regeneration in the believer. What
actually is the point of contact between Him and His Word?
Bui tularin's energetic and enthusiastic endeavour to maintain
and to guard the qualitative difference between God and man
appears to lead him along the primrose path of mutual
exclusion. That is to say, the objective, historical and
the existential, historical appear to become bifurcated. His
predilection for meaning and significance coupled with his
negative-to-neutral results in speaking of Jesus objectively
permits him to see as presumably secondary and inconsequential
the interrelationship between the bearer of the Word and the
Word itself. It would seem that he strives both to relate
Jesus to the Word and to play down this relationship.
Possibly such a paradoxical tension must exist if Bultmann
desires to maintain the Word as an historical reality and as
an eternal truth. "Because the reality of history and the
historicity of human existence may not be wrenched apart,...
we cannot separate historical scholarship and faith as
strictly as does Bultmann.""'" To maintain such a dichotomous
position is to endanger faith's message. To identify the
message of faith and its object is possibly to erect a false
stumbling-block by allowing its claims to be misconstrued as
1. H. Zahnrt, The Historical Jesus, p. 94.
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illusory based on a priori assumptions."'" This is not to
say that Bultmann accomplishes this identification, but
rather that the possibility looms implicit in his thought.
As one commentator points out, "We cannot be content with
having this...identity between the earthly Jesus and the
risen Lord, only in preaching and therefore only in faith. We
2
also wish to discover it." While it may remain the case
that no definitive equation between these two parts can be
demonstrated, the need to fasten the Word to something
objectively real appears to be required. A danger that must
be averted in this search is one exposed by Kierkegaard in
his solution to Lessing's dictum. The theologian needs to
avoid approaching faith's claim as eternal truth which can
find no necessary connections with the accidental surroundings
of history. To propound faith in this manner is to confound
the interrelationship between faith and history. And this
may be a tendency in Bultmann's theology which requires,
further clarification. How does the correlation between
faith and history really stand? Bultmann confronts man with
the either/or choice he finds in the New Testament — either
God/or the world. In creating the radical disjunction, he
seems to accentuate a position which obscures and relativizes
history as well as heralds its negativity. In relying upon
the objective world, man in effect surrenders to an alien
and hostile power. In contrast, God is expounded as a
constancy principle which remains while all else changes. He
1. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 207-211.
2. Zahnrt, p. 94.
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can be man's only future for He releases him from the burden
of the past. Freedom becomes the category for the achieve¬
ment of personality. In this way, Bultmann seems to be
moving toward the actualization of divine movement in life.
Initially, God's Word is taken as absolute and certain,but
in the state of existing, the power of this Word partakes of
the actualism of human life. In an indirect and circuitous
manner, the constancy of God's Word enters the sphere of human
movement and history. But again, this entrance must be
reserved for the internal dimension of the human factor. God's
actualism appears to be directly related to man. Nonetheless,
Bultmann seems to affirm, at least implicitly, the disjunction
between necessary, eternal truths and accidental, historical
ones elaborated by Lessing. Man must turn to God and not to
"the world if he is to find life and to be free. The "ugly,
broad ditch" in its objective proportions appears to have
been re-discovered. As with Lessing so with Bultmann, it
is a logical distinction which almost defies reconciliation.
And further, Bultmann seems to have repeated a preference SK
had shown. In uniting the ground of faith (Jesus) with its
content (Christ) in the confines of personal existence,
Bultmann seems to have subjectified faith by basing it upon
man and his decisions. It appears to be the case that
faith unfolds according to the presumptuousness of man. His
"pre-understandings" look for meaning. And after reviewing
Bultmann's theology, man apparently finds that for which he
is searching. Man decides and he resolves. Like Dilthey,
Ritschl and company and SK, Bultmann also seems implicitly to
allow man to decide the content and the disposition of faith.
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Subjectively, no gap appears between the facticity of faith
and its significance. Objectively, the gap retains its
infinite dimensions since the factual demonstration (Jesus'
"Dass") can be no more than an illustration of its personal
value and intimate meaning. But what valuation of history
is involved in this position?
SK went to great pains to elaborate the positive and the
affirmative in history. It was his contention that God's
self-revelation does in fact take place in the very midst of
it. But history is not to be seen as the realm of the
eternal and timeless, rather it encompasses the contingent
and the becoming. As such, any knowledge of its events and
happenings must always be viewed as approximate since they
involve a coming-into-existence-kind-of-change. The con¬
tingent becomes; the necessary is. Thus to seek the facts
and data of objective phenomena is to deal with the approximate.
History does not result from necessary causes but from freely
effecting causes. They include the potentiality both to be
and not to be. Consequently, history is contingent and
temporal. In this way, SK seems to have radicalized Lessing's
problem by denying the possibility of necessary, eternal truths
in historical garb. All truth — historical or religious —
is contingent. But yet it is in history that God has acted
in Jesus Christ. He has affirmed this same temporal realm.
From this perspective, history can be open to God and to man
because it is the place where both have made their home. In
contrast to SK, Bultmann seems to uphold the negative qualities
of history which were positive for SK. The contingent and the
temporal — these are all marks of its insecurity and hostility.
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At this point, it seems that Bultmann has taken his lead
from Ritschl and company rather than from SK. For man to
succeed in winning empirical reality would be only a hollow
victory, for he would be gaining nothing.^ God does not
objectively and in-and-of Himself penetrate this sphere.
This is an absolute impossibility. Rather, God and man meet
in the twilight zone of the Word where man comes "to know" of
Him through the effects He has upon the believer. Again,
Bultmann seems to echo the Liberal forefathers who also place
priority on His personal benefits rather than His objective
workings. There can be no outside-of-faith point of
reference in speaking about Him since the empirical world
knows nothing and comprehends nothing of supernatural inter¬
vention. History and the world appear to become a never-never
land where God and man never meet save in the paradoxically
tenuous medium of proclamation. From this perspective, it
may be seen why God remains hidden and mysterious. Man is
not really offered a way of knowing Him. Man can only act
as if He is present. As a consequence, it seems that Bultmann
rightly turns his attention to man and to his inner life.
While God does not seem to be reasonably and intelligibly
present for man, there remains man. By an act of decision
he can become a believer and respond in faith to the Word.
His decision is decisive because it grasps hold of what he
cannot know through the medium of the material world. In
essence, Bultmann perpetuates the presumptuous "pre-under-
standing" canonized by Ritschl and company: Reason is
1. R. Niebuhr, "Faith as the Sense of Meaning in Human
Existence," Chr. and Crisis, Vol. 26, p. 130.
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separated from its connatural abode with Revelation and it
becomes the unwitting arbiter of reality. God is expelled
from history, save in the "Dass" of Jesus; any talk about
Him interacting with history is nonsense. But Bultmann
looks to man's inner sanctum as the bridge for overcoming the
alleged bifurcation. Here he can exist both scientifically
in a world arbitrated by the powers of Reason and faithfully
in a personal encounter with God whom he "knows" through His
effects. But again this does not really appear to solve the
problem of relating God to history and the world; it only
appears to move the discussion to a new level of consideration.
In the early eighteenth century English logic textbooks
used to give as an example of a universally true
proposition: all swans are white. Then someone with
little concern for logical propositions discovered
Australia, and, in Australia, birds that were like
swans in every respect except that they were black.
What could be done? These black swans might have
been disregarded as essentially unswanlike because
they did not fit the classification, whereas in fact
it is recognized-^that it was the classification that
was inadequate.
Today in the twentieth century, the logical proposition that
the world in a closed cause-and-effect system is regarded as
universally true, so Bultmann. But someone with "little
concern for logical propositions" has affirmed God's inter¬
vention in history. What can be done? Bultmann answers this
question by maintaining Reason's role as the sole arbiter of
reality while seeking to demythologize rather than to dis¬
regard the biblical report as simply un-God-like. Bultmann
does not assume it proper to question the classification.
Thus he talks about a new self-understanding and about making
1. Young, p. 423.
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man new. But does man really become new?
In personal and individual decision, he takes hold of
the Word and responds in faith to it. In so doing, he
acquires a new law of motivation. Man's new centre
stimulates him to be himself by freeing him from himself.
It is important to point out that no "magical change" trans¬
pires and that no ontological metamorphosis results. Man
changes inwardly and ontically.On this basis he must
already contain within himself his essential nature which is
only released by the encounter with the Word. And if this
is the case, Bultmann is not far removed from Lessing, who did
not fear the bifurcation of eternal and historical truth since
he was convinced that man already possesses the former truth
which makes him free. The new self may possibly be a constant
embryonic possession in the state of unbelief, for even in the
faith-response no "magical change" or rebirth occurs. This
would seem to suggest that man latently possesses the truth
while nonetheless ignorant of it. It belongs to the Word
to free him for authentic development. It would seem that
he really has no need of history or the world, for these only
encumber his truth and enslave his possibility. The function
of the New Testament in its demythologized form is to present
man with the either/or alternatives which Bultmann contends
to be the genuine existential choices. If this is the case,
then surely the New Testament and even the Word do not create
1. Braaten and Harrisville, Kerygma and History, pp. 217-228.
2. Bartsch, KMi, p. l6f.
229
anything ontologically new. They merely occasion a "new
and permanent" situation in the life of the believer. After
all, Bultmann does seem to look to man as the bridge which
somehow relates God to the world. But as a bridge, man
cannot be objectively transformed. Therefore, the potential
to be a man must already be an inherent possibility within
man qua man, or else a "magical change" does in fact really
occur. But nonetheless even though the Word does not seem
to effect any transformation, it does appear to facilitate
the maturation process toward self-realization.
SK does not exactly appear to share a synonymous
opinion on this matter. Man's Reason collides with God as
the unknown something, and as a result the knowledge of him¬
self is unsettled. The unsettling effect is not simply due
to the re-awakening of his true self. More to the point,
Reason comes up against an absolute unlikeness which it is
not able to dissolve. Reason halts in confrontation with
God's self-disclosure in the Absolute Paradox of Jesus Christ.
While man's attitude toward existence does indeed change, the
effecting factor seems to be something other than man. It
embraces him within the historical process and makes Christ
contemporaneous. This something identifies itself as the
Teacher who is Himself the Truth and not merely its bearer
or occasion. The Teacher is not only the Truth but also
the condition for its acquisition. In this way, SK can
affirm that God can transform and recreate the learner and
only as He is a man can this understanding be effected.
Bultmann appears to have modified the Kierkegaardian position
by curtailing the historicity of the Teacher and amending it
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to a mere "Dass". On this basis, the Teacher and the Truth
only seem to coalesce at the moment of proclamation. Again,
this disassociation is very possibly the result of Bultmann's
anti-metaphysical "pre-understanding" which cannot comprehend
or attempt to comprehend how a divine Truth can be literally
related and conjoined to an historical person. The closed
world limits the data to be experienced as well as the inter¬
pretation to be given it. It would appear that "[t]he only
data within the range of anyone's knowledge are historical
data which...have their mode of existence as past in the
present of the interpretive act.""'" Man cannot look anywhere
else except to the present reality of personal, existential
encounter. This appears to limit his knowledge, and any
exploration of the past meaning which is intended to be made
present can only come by way of the interpretive act. For
Dilthey has already made it fairly clear that one must be
"open to the possibility that meaning and significance arise
only in man and his history." There can be no reliance upon
or appeal to supernatural powers and metaphysical speculation.
"All meaning, all value, all purpose, in the historical world,
is rooted in the experience of individual human beings...";
this is Dilthey's dictum. And in fact Bultmann must share
something of a similar view given his own predilections.
Therefore, Jesus as the Teacher can, at least, only be related
to the Word He delivers in a very nebulous and ethereal manner.
Divine words and historical persons do not seem easily to
intermix. Rather, "if the question of Jesus' historicity...
1. C. Michalson, "Fifty Years of Theology in Retrospect,"
J. Bibl. Rel., Vol. 28, p. 221.
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is anywhere raised in separation from the question as to
what Jesus really means, a truncated historical figure will
emerge.""'" As a past mode of existence, Jesus can only
become present through the interpretive act which inquires
into His present meaning. This act is directed and con¬
trolled by the cultural milieu. In this context, it may be
possible to suggest that:
for this reason it must once again be emphasized that
the objectivity of a particular historical investigation
is in no way threatened by the fact that a cultural
value serves as the guiding principle in the selection
of the data,...for the general acknowledgement of the
values that endow the objects under investigation
with significance is a fact that the historian can
point to. He thereby achieves d:he highest possible
degree of empirical objectivity.
Where man stands seems to colour his approach to how he will
understand Jesus. He is never a merely naked fact but
always a meaning which is relevant today because of the con¬
temporary cultural value that accompanies any understanding
of Him. His significance acquires this qualification through
the thought-forms and life-patterns which reflect the
particular set of present values. It is this set which
guides selection and endows the object "under investigation
with significance". The cultural value is a fact that enables
any inquiry to attain "the highest possible degree of empirical
objectivity." Thus a look into the past historical Jesus
and His relation to faith would seem to involve consideration
of the present valuational system. The object under scrutiny
1. Ibid., p. 220.
2. H. Rickert, Science and History, p.140.
3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 5; also, HE, pp. 1-2.
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is researched precisely because it is "interesting" and
"important" to man.^" A present concern or interest quali¬
fies the event, happening and person of Jesus and His
relation to faith as significant for the here and now. But
here is precisely where a problem appears to emerge when
the consideration of Jesus, such as the one suggested by
Bultmann, is strictly confined to a closed world system. As
Rickert points out, "there are...as many different historical
truths as there are different spheres of culture; and each of
2
these truths...is valid or invalid in the same way." What
appears to develop in an approach like Bultmann's project is
the problem of historical relativism which Bultmann appears
to have sought to quelch in the Word of Jesus. It seems
to be the case that his demythologizing appropriates a
cultural value and holds it up as the solution to understanding
the New Testament.^" But surely this solution is limited
5
and qualified by the grounds upon which it has maturated.
6
Thus history will also be the realm of valuational changes.
Therefore, Bultmann's "only solution" will, in reality, be
only one possible reading, given his concern and interest.
In a synonymous'way, Dilthey would apparently agree with
Rickert, since he also suggests the relativity of all systems
and faiths in the historical spectrum. The reflections of
1. Rickert, p. 129.
2. Ibid., p. 137.
3. HE, pp. 1-11.
4. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 15-16.
5- See first chapter section on Dilthey, pf>
6. "QMH", p. 329a.
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Troeltsch may be seen to cast a long shadow, for the task
of "controlling and damming... the system of historical life"
may be with us once again. Bultmann's demythologizing
project appears to reflect a particular valuational system
of culture at a certain point in time. As such, Bultmann's
project partakes of the same relativity and temporality as
does all historical happening. As Troeltsch has already
pointed out, "A radical and absolute solution [to historical
relativism] does not exist....History within itself cannot
be transcended...." And as SK has argued, "Everything which
comes into existence [including Bultmann's solution to the
question of meaning] proves precisely by coming into existence
that it is not necessary, because the necessary is." What
can be done? SK had confronted this problem of historical
relativism head-on by affirming history's transitional nature
and by seeing it as positive because God has chosen to reveal
Himself in its midst. SK had also sought to correlate it
with faith by protecting its relativity and by attempting to
make God's truth partake of the same actualism as history.
Unfortunately, God's actualism became over dependent on man's
subjectivity. Nonetheless, SK sought to speak of God's
activity without resort to the anti-metaphysical tradition
of the Liberals. But Bultmann has himself sought to resurrect
the ghost of theology past with his "pre-understandings" which
appear to re-lead theology back to where history and faith
stand in polar tensions. On the one hand, the tension seems
alleviated in the personal experiences of the believer who
inwardly unites fact and value. But this implies the pre¬
sumption that man's subjectivity can support the whole weight
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of eternity. But can the spider's threat of subjectivity
really secure the weight? And on the other hand, fact and
value seem as objectively distant as ever. It appears that
Bultmann only presents half of a solution to the problem of
history's (the contingent Jesus') relation to faith (the
necessary Christ).
In conclusion, we are drawn again to the proposition
of "all swans are white" and to the discovery of something
that looks like a swan but is black. What can be done?
Instead of questioning the logical proposition, Bultmann has
apparently accepted the classification a priori and endeavours
to fit the biblical reports into it. "I am simply making the
comment that when Bultmann's approach is followed, that is
when certain trends...are selected, emphasized and then made
normative... then a (certain) kind of exegesis seems to be
inevitable.""'" Bultmann approaches the New Testament with
various implicit and explicit "pre-understandings" which
question and interrogate it. What may also be required is
the questioning and interrogating of the "pre-understandings".
In this way, Bultmann may possibly be given genuine freedom
from the confines of methodological assumptions. And maybe
as a result of this freedom, the claims of faith and the
material of history can also find objective correlation on
peaceful terms without presuppositions that seem to have re¬
discovered Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch".
1. Young, p. 423; compare
(1) Cushman, p. 181;
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INTRODUCTION
The contingency of history and the absolute certainty
of faith remain in abeyance in the thought of Rudolf Bultmann.
Meaning and new self-understanding provide the malleable
material necessary for interconnecting God, the Creator, and
man, the creature. This interconnection is affected by the
Word of God which eventuates in the historicity of Jesus of
Nazareth. As He speaks this Word, meaning and new self-
understanding are imputed into the historical process.
History, which of itself is alien and hostile to man, provides
the opportunity for the fulfilment of man's possibilities. By
speaking the Word of God, the historical event of Jesus Christ
addresses man here and now. His event unfolds the central
focal point of faith's personal interconnection with history.
By means of the Word, man is offered the potential for over¬
coming the world and its incumbent sorrow and anxiety. He is
given the freedom by the power of God's Word. Man is awakened
to a real possibility — to the possibility of his-being-in-
the-world. The Word spoken by Christ motivates and activates
man's seizure of his authentic possibility for freedom. In
hearing and believing, man is given to understand himself and
his interrelation to the world. Jesus Christ as the bearer
of the Word is also the initiator of freedom. From the
perspective of meaning, history becomes eschatological in that
the Word opens man to the future. History and eschatology
coalesce in this Word which delivers man from the bondage of
the here and now and renovates his self-awareness to face the
real situation. History as eschatology happens in the Now
of preaching and hearing God's Word, and thus it is a personal
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and. intimate transition which affects man ontically. He
becomes inwardly and personally renewed in the self-awareness
he receives from Christ. In this way the Word becomes a
meaning-event in the life of man. The substantial question
of Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word remains unanswered in
Bultmann's demythologizing project. Jesus and His relation
to the Word also remains tenuous. This is due in part, no
doubt, to the abyss which he creates between God and man. God
thus touches His world only through the Word. But how Jesus
acquires this Word cannot be adequately handled because of the
apparent ontological gap between the finite and the infinite.
In the end, Bultmann's attempt to synthesize faith and
history through the process of demythologizing retains an
outward, objective bifurcation which is inwardly and subject¬
ively mended and bound in the faith experience of man. Man
and his predicament in the world remain the pivotal factors
in the equation. However, the question remains: "How does
God communicate with man?" "What is the point of contact
between the content of faith and the material of history?"
It is in the endeavour to relate faith and history that
Paul Tillich offers his brand of theology. Tillich surveys
the condition of man, the finite creature, within a finite
world. He analyzes his awareness of the existential
condition in relation to the question of being. This latter
question is interconnected with man's understanding of him¬
self. Man's analysis of the finite, the temporal and the
contingent propels him to seek after the root and ground of
all finite being. He asks questions which, according to
Tillich, are answered by the Christian faith. Tillich
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examines existence by means of existentialism which is used
to interrogate finiteness. By means of this method, Tillich'
discovers that man is estranged from his essential nature.
The predicament of estrangement moves Tillich into offering
the message of the Christian faith as the answer to man's
quest for essentiality. Tillich discovers in Christianity's
picture of Jesus as the Christ the New Being who symbolizes
the fulfilment of man's existential quest for what he is
essentially. The biblical picture of the Christ is the
paradigm of essential unity. In this manner, Christology
points to man's coming to know himself and to the realization
of the truth of his essential being within the confines of
history. Christology reveals itself to be both a dynamic
interpretation of history and a symbol for man's essential
nature. Man, for his part, achieves the courage to affirm
himself even in the face of fragmentariness, temporality,
and transitoriness. The symbol of the New Being found in
the biblical picture opens man to the acceptance of even
himself who is unacceptable. For Paul Tillich, then, the
Christian faith answers the questionings regarding the nature
of existence in general and of human life in particular. The
symbols of faith operate and function to bridge the gap which
exists between man's existential and essential natures. From
this perspective, faith interacts with history by providing
the motivational stimulus which prompts man to move actively
in the direction symbolized by the Christ and the Kingdom of
God. Through an existential analysis, man "sees" the
dilemma of his present predicament, and through the symbols
of faith he gains an insight into the direction he must go.
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EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF MAN
He is the most courageous of all beings because he
has to conquer the deepest anxiety. It is hardest
for him to affirm the present because he is able to
imagine a future which is not yet his own and to
remember a past which is no longer his own. He must
defend his present against the vision of an infinite
past and of an infinite future; he is excluded from
both. Man cannot escape the question of the
ultimate foundation of his ontological courage.
Paul Tillich seeks to investigate the nature of man
with the intention of opening him to the symbols of the New
2
Reality expressed by the Christian faith. But Tillich
admits that these symbols are themselves only meaningful to
the extent that one has already raised the question "concern-
ing the whole of our existence."^ Christian symbols can
only be meaningful to one who has "experienced the shock of
transitoriness, the anxiety in which they are aware of their
finitude, the threat of nonbeing."^ Man's analysis of his
5
situation today is done in existential terms. It is on
this basis that he explicates his awareness of himself as
separated from that to which he really belongs. On this
analysis man in existence is separated from his essential
unity. "A symptom of both the essential unity and the
existential separation of finite man from his infinity is
his ability to ask about the infinite to which he belongs:
the fact that he must ask about it indicates that he is
separated from it."^ Man thus contains within the existential
1. STi, p. 194.
2. STi, p. 62.
3. STi, p. 61.
4. STi, pp. 61-2.
5. STi, p. 62.
6. STi, p. 61.
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realm a notion of belonging-ness to that which is essent¬
ially his hut is denied him existentially. Existential
analysis seeks to explicate this state of affairs.
For Paul Tillich, "man must rise above existence"; he
must see himself as separated in his actual state of existing
from something which is essentially and potentially a part of
him. Man's existence requires him to rise above this state
to attempt to regain and to recapture what is really his.
"True being is essential being....""'" In existing, man has
lost a part of himself. "In this way man's existence, his
standing out of potentiality, is judged as a fall from what
2
he essentially is." But existence as a falling away is not
complete, "for man still stands in his potential or essential
being." Further, Tillich also affirms that man is neither
completely ignorant nor removed from this essential unity
because he asks after that to which he really belongs. He
remembers and participates in that which is his true unity.^
Man lives and moves in a realm of separation where a split
manifests itself between existential and essential humanity.
For Tillich, existence is a falling away from essential human¬
ity. "Existence is estrangement and not reconciliation; it
is dehumanization and not the expression of essential humanity.
It is the process in which man becomes a thing and ceases to
be a person." Separation is estrangement from essentiality;
1. STii, p. 22.
2. STii, p. 22.
3. STii, p. 22.
4. STii, p. 22.
5. STii, p. 25.
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and further, man's existing qualifies his essentiality and
even contains within it the process of dehumanization where
he ceases to be a person. Tillich's attitude here is in
contradistinction to the great essentialist system worked
out by Hegel. According to him, Hegel's system interprets
the created realm as the expression of unity between that
which is essential and what is existential. As such, Hegel's
system overcomes the "separation of existence from essence
in finite beings: for him, the finite is infinite both in
essence and in its existence.""'" On the basis of this inter¬
pretation, man's being-in-the-worid expresses his essential
nature and this being the case, there is no gap between what
man is and that he is. "[Essence] transforms itself into
existence. Existence is the being of essence, and there¬
fore existence can be called 'essential being'. Essence is
2
existence...." Under the guise of this philosophical
explanation, the tension between these two realms is assuaged.
The state of separation and split are non-existent since
"essence is existence". These two are thus reconciled with
each other and reality is now a whole. And in the face of
this reconciliation, estrangement appears to be overcome and
man's split with essential being appears to be no more.
Hegel's system thus mends the individual and society into a
whole where existence is not a separation. According to
Tillich:
1. TC, p. 82.
2. TC, p. 82.
3- TC, pp. 82-3*
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Non-being has been conquered in the totality of the
system; history has come to its end; freedom has
become actual; and the paradox of the Christ has
lost its paradoxical character. Existence is the
logically necessary actuality of essence. There is no
gap, no leap, between them....The gap is overcome not
only eternally in God but also historically in man. 1
The realization of essence within existence assures man of
the possession of his true self. In existence, man is what
he is in essence. There is no need for risk or doubt about
the incertitude of oneself or of one's relation to God; the
gap is overcome. Freedom is actual. There is no need to
risk decisions or to question the range of possibilities open.
Incertitude and paradox dissipate as essence actualizes it¬
self in existence. "There is no gap, no ultimate incertitude,
no risk, and no danger of self-loss when essence actualizes
2
itself in existence." Striving to be more is no longer
necessary, since this same striving is already actualized
and already is. However, Tillich opposes this essentialist
view of reality, and with it the accompanying development of
man's attitude toward himself and his world. As such,
existentialism is, for Tillich, a protest against "the self-
4
interpretation of man in modern industrial society." Tillich's
analysis is not one of reconciliation but of estrangement.
"Reconciliation is...not of reality. The world is not recon-
5
ciled." For Tillich, freedom has not become actual and
1. STii, p. 24.
2. STii, p. 24.
3. STii, p. 24.
4. STii, p. 24.
5. STii, p. 25-
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history has not come to its end and the paradoxical nature
of the Christ has not lost its paradoxical quality. Further,
man does experience a gap between that he is and what he is.
"The existence of the individual is filled with anxiety and
threatened by meaninglessness.Man not only is separated
from essence but he is aware of it. Therefore Tillich moves
on to explain the transition from essence to existence by
means of the symbols of creation and fall.
Tillich has already argued that standing out of potent¬
iality is a falling away from essence (see Ftnt. 2, page 241).
Existentialism has given something of an analysis of what it
means to be, and in conjunction with this Tillich moves in
the direction of answering what and how the transition is in
2
religious, symbolic terms. Biblical symbols are not to be
taken literally, for to do so would lead to absurdity. For
Tillich, the fall represents a symbol which expresses the human
situation universally.^ The symbol of the fall, which attempts
to explain man's position in the world, expresses his aware-
5
ness of his existential estrangement. In so doing, it
represents the universal and tragic quality of transition from
essence to existence.^ The fall points to and participates
in the cosmic and universal "transition from essential good-
7
ness to existential estrangement." The Christian symbol
captures both the tragic element and the moral impediment
Q
accompanying participation in this transition. As Tillich
1. STii, p. 25-
2. STii, p. 25.
3. TC, p. 63.
4. STii, p. 29.
5. STii, p. 31.
6. STii, p. 38.
7. STii, p. 39.
8. STii, p. 39-
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maintains, it is man who is held responsible for the fall."'"
Thus for Tillich, it is only through man that the transition
2
is seen to occur. Since the fall is not to be taken
literally, it is also pointed out that it did not just happen
once upon a time. Consequently there was no time when created
4
goodness actually occurred. This being the case, the fall
as well as creation are viewed as co-temporally co-inciding
"in so far as there is no point in time and space in which
created goodness was actualized and had existence." From
this it would seem to follow that all reality, in so far as
it is actual and has existence, remains in a state of estrange¬
ment which marks its separation from essential goodness. The
coming-into-existence-kind-of-change includes both elements
of fall and creation as Tillich symbolically expresses them.
Such a change has the quality of a leap and as such "existence
cannot be derived from essence."^ Man as he exists partici¬
pates fully within the tragic universality of an estranged
state. "Man as he exists is not what he essentially is and
7
ought to be. He is estranged from his true being." By not
being what he essentially is and ought to be, he shoulders the
Q
responsibility for the estranged state. The essential good¬
ness to which he really belongs acquires a distorted quality
1. STii, p. 39.
2. STii, p. 39.
3. A.J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich,
p. 149.
4. STii, p. 44.
5. STii, p. 44.
6. STii, p. 44.
7. STii, p. 45.
8. McKelway, p. 150.
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in the state of existence. The essential goodness remains
at a distance from man's existential condition even though
he is not completely separated."'" His standing out estranges
him "from the ground of his being, from other beings, and
2
from himself." Subsequently, man's part in the transition
separates him not only from essence but also from the ground
of life where he encounters other lives. Tillich portrays
man as both responsible for and suffering from this transition.
Man's entire existence finds itself tattered and fragmented
as a result of his standing out. But for him to be ultimately
responsible, Tillich predisposes the quality of freedom to
man. Man's existence is his standing out of and upon the
ground to which he really belongs. To exist is to move to
actualize what one really is.
But man's being is not only hidden in the creative
ground of the divine life; it also is manifest to
itself and to other life within the whole of reality.
Man does exist and his existence is different from
his essence. Man and the rest of reality are not
only "inside" the process of the divine life but also
"outside" it. Man is grounded in it, but he is not
kept within the ground. Man has left the ground in
order to "stand upon" himself, to actualize what he
essentially is, in order to be finite freedom. 4
For him to stand out of the potential is for him to stand
upon "the creative ground of the divine life." What he
essentially is lies hidden within this life. But nonethe¬
less man has the freedom to actualize this potential in
existence and to participate in this actualization requires
1. STii, p. 45.
2. STii, p. 44.
3. McKelway, pp. 147-148.
4. STi, p. 255-
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him to be both "inside" and "outside" of it. In leaving
the state of potentiality, he does not stand upon himself.
Rather he rests upon the ground to which he belongs. Indeed
while existence is different from essence and while the former
cannot be derived from the latter but can only be viewed as a
leap,"*" man nonetheless finds his basis of living in possibility.
This is the point at which the doctrine of creation and
the doctrine of the fall join....Fully developed
creaturellness is fallen creatureliness. The creature
has actualized its freedom in so far as it is outside
the creative ground of the divine life....To be out¬
side the divine life means to stand in actualized
freedom in an existence which is no longer united
with essence. 2
The overlapping and coinciding of fall and creation are
expressed by Tillich. To be created and to exist are already
to participate in the fall, for Tillich has already pointed
out that there is no point in time and space where essential
goodness has had existence. To be a developed creature is
to participate in fallen creatureliness. As a creature, man
stands outside of the divine ground and so he is "no longer
united with essence." He is separated from it while none-
theless founded upon it. As he lives in this actualized
state, there is a gap between that man is and what man really
is. He is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He
remains light years away from the "ought"; this is expressed
by the symbol of creation.^" But even in this state where he
1. D.J. Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul
Tillich, pp. 297, 315-
2. STi, p. 255-
3. Keefe, p. 217.
4. BRSUR, p. 35.
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experiences the gap, he still retains an awareness of and a
participation in this ground upon which he stands. Indeed,
Tillich affirms that man's very questioning indicates his
consciousness that he is separated from essentiality. In
the present predicament, man experiences finitude and the
threat of non-being and becomes pointedly aware that essence
and existence are not reconciled. However, he does possess
the quality of finite freedom as a result of the transition.
This allows him a limited capacity to work out his real
nature. Such freedom provides the basis for the "ought" and
the "must" which Tillich posits. Man is responsible for the
tragic and universal predicament of the human condition. In
the possession of freedom he accepts responsibility for
reality. Creation gives this potential which is always
tempered with the strains of destiny. Destiny is that part
of man formed by previous decisions, human nature, the world,
history."'" Therefore freedom and destiny form, for Tillich,
a polar relationship which makes self-realization a possibility
on a limited scale. "Creation is fulfilled in the creaturely
2
self-realization which simultaneously is freedom and destiny."
Man who is responsible for creation is qualified by freedom
which is, in turn, tempered by destiny. Creation "is ful¬
filled through separation from the creative ground through a
break between existence and essence....God creates man; he
z
gives man the power of transforming himself and his world.
1. STi, p. 185.
2. STi, p. 256.
3- STi, p. 256.
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By means of the creative act man is given the power in
freedom to accept responsibility for creation. Though free¬
dom is conditioned by the given-ness of existence,"^" man none¬
theless retains a propensity to transform himself and his
world. The bestowing of such power makes it incumbent upon
him to maintain and to fulfil existence, for Tillich affirms
p
"that man is the telos of creation." In the created and
estranged state he possesses "the possibility and necessity of
actualizing himself and of becoming independent by his self-
actualization...."^ Man becomes the dynamic element which
provides the given-ness and the conditioned-ness for self-
realization as a finite creature determined by the polar
dynamics of freedom and destiny. As the telos he fulfils
both creation as well as himself when he actualizes freedom
within existence. He occupies the focal and central
position because of his analogous relationship to God. As
the image of God,man's logos is similar to that of the divine
ground.^" This being the case, the divine logos manifests it-
self in the fallen creatureliness of humanity. "While man
stands out of and upon the divine, he participates in it and
is dependent upon it. In the actual and created state, he
lives by the power of God, for the infinite remains present
in all that stands upon it.^ Man is the telos by sharing
1. Keefe, pp. 302-304.
2. STi, p. 258.
3. STi, p. 259.
4. Keefe, p. 216.
5. STi, p. 259•
6. STi, pp. 261-263.
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analogously in the divine logos and as such he purposes and
fulfils creation to the extent that he actualizes and
realizes his own potentialities."'"
From the Christian symbols of creation and fall, Tillich
achieves quite a bit of explicative mileage in analyzing the
existential situation. Tillich utilizes these terms in a
co-incidental fashion which allows him to present a state of
creative falling where man both stands upon that to which he
really belongs and also remains in intimate co-relation to it.
Even though existence involves transitoriness, finitude and
estrangement, man remains in freedom in order to live within
the possibilities and potentialities given to him. A con¬
comitant aspect is the quality of this freedom which dialect-
ically holds man in dependence upon and independence of the
divine ground. Tillich tells us that man is both "inside"
and "outside" the divine life. And what is more, his freedom
makes him responsible since he contains "the possibility and
the necessity" of self-actualization. As a creature, he en¬
compasses this "possibility and necessity" by the intimate
and participative relation and interconnection analogously
remaining between the divine and human logos. Therefore,
man's existential separation from God in no way precludes his
ultimate responsibility to Him. In the created state, man
still participates and shares in an awareness of essential
oneness and unity in the divine. He retains the potential
within himself to recognize that he is not what he really is
1. STi, p. 263.
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and what he "ought" to be. Existence becomes a matter of
decision and responsibility because he must choose either
for or against God. It provides the medium for possible
and potential fulfilment but it is man, with his freedom, who
has the power to make the potential actual. And further, it
is man who inherently shares in the logos of being and there¬
fore shares in an awareness of the telos of creation which is
2
his responsibility. From this perspective, it becomes some¬
what more perceptible to grasp Tillich's alignment with the
existentialists in opposition to Hegel. Existence and
essence cannot be reconciled within the created realm, for
such a stance would relieve man of the impetus to strive and
to become. History would end in that man would no longer
be required to choose and to make decisions, and there would
be no possibility for him to experience a self-loss. Further,
the appearance of the Christ would not be a paradox since the
essential would have already manifest itself in all things.
Tillich, however, is not willing to move in synonymous
thoughts with Hegel, as he understands him. Rather man's
existing reveals itself to be a process of creative falling
which separates him from his essence, which allows him
participation in the divine life, and which grants him the
potential capacity for freedom. By means of the Christian
symbols of creation and fall, Tillich symbolically expresses
the actualization of freedom which rests upon participation
1. BRSUR, pp. 44-46.
2. STi, p. 264.
3. TC, Chapter 7.
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in the divine ground."'" Man in and of himself is not a
2
self-sufficient creature. His awareness of the transition
shows him to be more than a merely self-contained life. In
freedom, he is given the option to act, to decide, to change,
and to respond, to his real being which is contained within
the divine life. Man, the creature, moves forward by
actualizing what he is in essence. Man qua man experiences a
call to move beyond himself to what he "ought" to be.
He experiences a demand which frees him from being
simply bound to that which he finds existing and
forces him to add to the question, "Whence?" the
question, "Wherefore?" With this question the circle
is broken in principle and man is raised above the
sphere of the merely living thing, for the demand asks
something that is not yet here, that should be, that
should come to fulfilment. 4
The "ought" is a demand to move beyond the simple given-ness
of creation and to transform the already given into the new.
A quotation from George Bernard Shaw hints at Tillich's
possible meaning here: "Some people see things as they are
and ask why. I dream dreams that never were and ask why not."
Man's purposing and transforming are determining factors
5
which produce and promote something qualitatively new. Man
does more than manipulate the given; he possesses the power
in freedom to change, to decide, to act and to respond, to
the demand of the "ought" which propels him in the direction
of transcending himself and the given.^ He possesses the
1. DF, p. 52.
2. DF, p. 76.
3- STi, p. 254.
4. IH, p. 207.
5. STiii, pp. 302-303-
6. STii, pp. 31-32.
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power to open himself to the call of the unconditioned which
is the ground from which he comes and upon which he stands.
He can direct his power to a creative use when he responds
to the "Wherefore?" of existence. In so doing man transcends
simple concern about origin and now seeks to inquire after
and to share in the real purpose and intent of the created
realm."'" This demand stimulates him to devise and to create
something that has not been before but that should be. The
"ought" thus returns to lead man beyond himself to the qualita-
2
tively new." The "demand seeks the fulfilment of the true
origin."-^ Man moves, changes, acts, decides and responds
in relation to his receiving and heeding the demand, the
"ought", of his real nature.^1" To the extent that he partici-
5
pates in this way, he remains within his existential finitude.
In the existential state, he participates in the creative
falling of being actual, of being created. He is cognizant
and aware of the split between essence and existence. But in
the anxiety and threat of meaninglessness and non-being, man
experiences freedom which allows him to decide either for or
against his real state and therefore either for or against
6
God, Existence is the realm of decision and response to
the demand and to the "ought" which calls man to his real and
true nature. While participating in this divine life as well
1. IH, pp. 206-207.
2. STi, pp. 181-182.
3. STi, p. 209.
4. MB, p. 20.
5. STii, p. 67.
6. STi, p. 235-
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as in creation, he is also responsible for the latter and for
himself. Since man analogously shares in and communes with
the divine logos, he becomes the telos in that existence serves
the purpose of providing the environment for self-actualization.
Tillich perceives man to be striving and struggling — to be
a man who is not self-sufficient and -contained but who must
look beyond himself to the source of being-itself. The fall
is, for Tillich, a break between being and becoming. History
does not contain the possibility to fulfil itself as Hegel
maintained."'" Man and the world must open themselves to that
which transcends but yet penetrates life with its source of
being. Man needs to face the question of his ontological
source while relinquishing self-sufficiency in the presence
of the eternal. He does this because he is aware that the
past, present and future are not permanent possessions but
are conditioned by finitude and temporality. Thus Tillich
appears to create something of a gap between what man is and
that he is. And yet even though this gap remains, man is
conscious of and participates in what he really is. On this
basis Tillich appears to have created a conceptual dialectic
which depicts the creative fallen-ness of man who senses what
he "ought" to be but yet possesses the power to contradict
himself. And further, Tillich appears to follow Kierkegaard
in accepting an infinite qualitative distinction between man
and God. This arises in Tillich's distinction between
existence and essence.
1. STii, pp. 29-30.
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As a striving creature who experiences the "ought" of
the really real,"'" man requires definite direction and
motivation in the accomplishment and fulfilment in this
2
drive. After all, Tillich believes that existentialism
can only provide an explication of man's situation and that
answers to these questions of being can only be answered
religiously. Tillich develops his theology as an answer
to the questions raised by man who on his own cannot answer
4
them. For Tillich, Christian theology provides the
5
symbolic resolution to the human questions. He tells us
that "man has asked and is asking in his very existence and
in every one of his spiritual creations questions which
Christianity answers."^ As he did with the fall and
creation, Tillich also draws upon other Christian symbols to
explicate and to ameliorate the existential position. He
directs answers to the questions asked and also provides
content and guidance for fallen creaturliness. Tillich's
aim appears to be the creation of a sacred-secular synthesis
which is able to open man and his society to the reality of
7
God and to the foolishness of self-sufficiency. For him,
existence stands upon more than man. For man to cut himself
1. Keefe, pp. 301, 314, 315-310.
2. G.H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message,
pp. 140-162.
3. STi, pp. 59-66.
4. K. Hamilton, "Tillich's 'Method of Correlation'," Can. J.
Theo., Vol. 5, pp. 87-91.
5. Ibid., pp. 91-94.
6. STi, p. 65; (vide, STii, pp. 27-28).
7. "PTS", pp. 305-309.
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off from the eternal is to remain within the limits of finitude.
True being moves him in the direction of actualizing, to a
temporary degree, essential humanity, but this is only
possible when he remains open to and shares in the power of
the divine. Tillich stands within the Christian heritage and
therefore draws upon this tradition to answer the existential
questionings. In so doing, Tillich focuses attention upon
the biblical picture of the Christ who represents the New Being.
This picture provides the clue to true existence. But Tillich
does not accept the picture without some re-interpretation.
The Christ functions as a symbol for man and as such He helps
to bridge the infinite gap between existence and essence. The
symbol of the Christ attempts to concretize and to motivate
the human quest for essential being. It is this symbol which
gives content to the demand and the "ought", and it is by the
power of this symbol that life becomes historically correlated
to the being of the divine.
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLICS
Christianity relates man to the ground of being by the
use of Christian symbols."'" It is in the power of religion
to bridge the gap which man experiences in the core of living,
and thus religion grows and matures as man becomes aware of
p
his predicament. Religion's power to overcome the gap
created by the transition rests in the power of the symbol.
1. DF, p. 45.
2. TC, pp. 40-41.
3. Keefe, p. 225f.
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This gap requires Tillich to develop and to expound his
theory of symbols, for it is on this basis that the communi¬
cation between the finite and infinite transpires."*" Tillich's
symbolics function as a dialectical language between man and
God. In this communication, man receives content and
direction for his self-realization and for the actualization
of creation.
Tillich begins his discussion by stating that (l) symbols
and signs reflect a similarity in use in that they both
2
"point beyond themselves to something else." But only
symbols (2) alone participate in that to which they point.^
For instance, the sign "flag" can be replaced by the flag of
a particular nation, such as Chile or Canada. As well, the
sign "book" can be replaced by specific titles such as
Uncle Tom's Cabin or The New Being. But symbols appear to
operate quite differently. Like man they appear to stand
both "inside" and "outside" of that to which they point and
in which they participate. Tillich suggests that symbols
functioning religiously have both a transcendent and an
A
immanent level of meaning. As such, a symbol has a repre¬
sentative function. "The symbol represents something which
is not itself, for which it stands and in the power and meaning
of which it participates." Symbols stand in the place for
something which one does not have. In this respect it shares
1. DF, p. 45-
2. TC, p. 54.
3. TC, p. 54.
4. TC, p. 61.
5. TC, p. 56.
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in the "power and meaning" of that to which it points. On
this basis (5) symbols possess the "power and meaning"
necessary for bringing from concealment "levels of reality
which otherwise are hidden and cannot be grasped in any other
way.""'" This function appears to reveal and to transmit the
"power and meaning" of the reality to which it points.
Symbols appear to function both cognitively by communicating
2
"meaning" and emotively by transmitting "power". In
grasping this "reality which is otherwise hidden" man comes to
"know" something about the reality. Further, this "knowing"
of the otherwise hidden may provide a stimulus to move and to
act differently. In addition, Tillich goes on to state that
(4) symbols are "two-edged. It opens up reality and it opens
up the soul." In order for the reality revealed by the
symbol to be grasped, man himself must also be receptive in
order that he may appreciate and apprehend what is conveyed.
The "two-edged" function seems to mediate between the unlocked
dimensions of reality and the soul by creating a mood or an
avenue of communication where man has the ability to participate
4in what is beyond him and within him simultaneously. Thus a
symbol appears to be able to bridge the gap between essence
and existence. But symbols (5) cannot be produced intent-
5 6
ionally. They are born and they die. They grow and are
1. TC, P- 56.
2. SF, PP . 52-63-
3. TC, P- 57.
4. DF, PP . 42-43-
5. DF, P- 43-
6. TC, P- 58.
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not made."'" As such they arise out of a situation which it-
self reveals that which it participates in and expresses.
For instance, Tillich relates the symbol of the Holy Virgin
who no longer has symbolic power for Protestants because of
the changed situation in relation to God brought about by the
Reformation. A symbol thus reflects a social aspect which
connects it with the community who responds to it.^ It is the
situation of the group which maintains the vitality of the
symbol. And finally (6) a symbol can function either to
5
integrate or to disintegrate both groups and individuals.
This aspect refers to the "power and meaning" of a symbol to
function cognitively and emotively in human existence as a
rallying-point which spurs man to action. As a rallying-point,
it contains both the possibility of creation and destruction
in man's life. On the basis of Tillich's remarks, it seems
to be the case that a religious symbol functions transparently
in the realm of existence. For the reader is told that
"everything can become a bearer of the holy. Nothing is
prevented from becoming a sacred thing. Only historical con¬
tingencies prevent it."^ A symbol grows out of situations in
which the divine manifests itself in the finite. It does not
refer one to the finite reality but acts as a vehicle in the
expression of the infinite. The former notion would require
1. IH, p. 239.
2. STi, p. 129, see fnt. #6.
3. TO, p. 65.
4. "JRS", p. 4.
5- "JRS", p. 5-
6. "JRS", p. 8.
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one to position the symbol in the place of that to which it
points and this would lead one into idolatry."'" Symbols
2
which are taken literally become an absurdity. For Tillich,
reality is more than the given. To elevate the symbol to the
position of the ultimate is to shield oneself from the divine
and therefore to remain isolated within the confines of the
finite. Man lives in the finite realm but only by the power
contained within the infinite ground.^" Religious symbols
perform the task of drawing man's attention away from himself
5
to the infinite. God is apprehended in the language of
symbolics.^ He represents man's infinite ground, and symbols
are always present as a means of conversing about the finite/
7
infinite relation.
The "power and meaning" of the symbol arises out of that
which the symbols points to and participates in. It remains
transparent and expressive of something beyond itself and as
such it reveals its grasping, shaking and transforming
capacity. To participate in the "power and meaning" of the
symbol, man must be grasped by the infinite and must be aware
Q
of his own potential infinity. He experiences the symbols
by sharing in them and by living them. "Man is able to under-
1. DF, p. 52.
2. TC, p. 63.
3- DF, p. 14.
4. STi, pp. 261-3.
5. DF, p. 45.
6. DF, pp. 45-6.
7. DF, pp. 49-50.
8. DF, p. 76.
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stand in an immediate personal and central act the meaning
of the ultimate, the unconditional, the absolute, the
infinite.""1" Symbols relate him to the ground of being and
expose him to the influence of it and to the awareness of his
part in it. Such exposure and consciousness involve man in
the act of participation which is itself a category of relation
2
between man, his world and the infinite. It is through the
symbol that man's horizons are broadened. They function as
picture windows to the ultimate. They open man to dimensions
of reality which he otherwise would not have the tools to
experience, and further they open him in order that he may
also participate in these hidden dimensions brought from
concealment. By existing in the "power and meaning" of the
symbol, he achieves a cognitive and emotive insight into the
essential ground of being. Through sharing, man involves
himself in symbolic communication with the divine. He opens
himself to the experience of the ultimate and to the recog-
4
nition of what it is he "ought" to be. Tillich does, of
course, hold a variant view on the relation of symbol and myth
to Christianity than that of Bultmann. The latter is very
anxious to demythologize the symbols in such a manner that
they reveal a new self-understanding within the world.
Bultmann views the Christian symbols as inundated in the
cosmology of the primitive Christian community and therefore as
foreign to the present time and situation. Given the advent
1. DF, p. 9.
2. STi, pp.176-7.
3. J.Y. Fenton, "Being-Itself and Religious Symbolism,"
J. of Rel., Vol. 45, p. 73-
4. R.F. Aldwinckle, "Tillich's Theory of Religious Symbolism,"
Can. J. Theo., Vol. 10, p. 11.
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of existentialism, he enlists the services of these categories
in order to move behind the Christian symbols to their appli¬
cation for today. In exegeting a text, one employs the
tools accepted by the modern climate of opinion to release
the meaning of the symbol from the symbol itself. Tillich
views this approach as an attempt to disrupt the myth and thus
to substitute one meaning for another."'" The attempt to
recover the meaning from the symbol saps it of its power and
thus deprives it of its truth. For as Tillich maintains,
they are born and die and cannot be created intentionally.
Thus he preserves their function against the assaults of de-
mythologizing. He accomplishes this by understanding
Christian symbolics within his own frame of thought which it-
2
self expresses his own intentions. These intentions begin
to manifest themselves as one follows him in the use he makes
of the Christ who directs attention to the presence and
reality of the New Being.
THE BIBLICAL PICTURE OF JESUS AS THE CHRIST
We are to speak of the situation of this period in its
relation to eternity. Therein we shall see the real
religious situation of the present....The total move¬
ment with which we are concerned is the slowly develop¬
ing defeat of the spiritual temper of the nineteenth
century. The self-sufficient this-worldliness of
capitalist culture and religion is being disturbed.
Questions and doubts are arising on all sides; they
point toward something beyond time and threaten the
security of a present which has cut itself loose from
the eternal. Doubt is cast on the complete rational¬
ity of the three great powers, science, technique, and
TT DF, pp. 50-1.
2. T.A. O'Meara and C.D. Weisser, Paul Tillich in Catholic
Thought, p. 131•
3. Keefe, p. 185f.
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capitalist economy; abysses are opening on all sides
and everywhere the souls of men are struggling for
fulfilment which must arise out of the deeper strata
of life. 1
In the above several sentences Paul Tillich sets out his
introductory analysis of the present cultural predicament
2
of the human situation. Tillich appears to be casting an
unequivocal "NO" to man's endeavour to remain in an attitude
of self-sufficiency and this worldliness. Man's true being
rests within the essential humanity from which he is estranged.^
The existential situation is one of separation and split
establishing an infinite gap between him and true reality.
Essence and existence are not reconciled and man in his
present condition is not what he should be. Self-sufficiency
and this-worldliness imprison him within the confines of
5
finitude. But the present situation is also one of
questioning and doubting of the supposed sanctity of these
institutions and assumptions. Questions and doubts are
driving beyond the present, and in so doing they threaten the
very structure of the here and now which has cut itself off
from the eternal. Man's interrogation and incertitude are
moving and searching for a fulfilment which involves a more
primary and fundamental level than man and his own abilities
and creations. "The decisive event which underlies the
1. RS, pp. 51-2.
2. Compare: M. Azkoul, "Prolegomena to a Critique of Western
Culture," Gr. Orth. Theo. Rev., Vol. 4, pp. 151-160.
3. Compare: Chapter on Kierkegaard, p. IHff.
4. SF, pp. 1-11.
5. RS, p. 137.
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search for meaning and the despair of it in the 20th century-
is the loss of God in the 19th century.""'" In his effort to
be self-assertive, man eliminates the experience of the
ultimate. His place in creation becomes tenuous and
ambivalent since he is conditioned only by the qualities of
2
existence which also include his own non-being. No act in
the historical is itself capable of overcoming the conditions
of estrangement which are the experiences of man. With this
as background, Tillich reviews "the present theological
situation in the light of the continental European develop-
4
ment." Here he relates the theological systems of the
Liberal school of Ritschl, Harnack and Troeltsch, and pronounces
5
this movement as dead. Tillich contends that the Liberal
school moved in the direction of avoiding metaphysics and
speculation and in its stead spoke of the religious-ethical
man.^ Theology shifted its emphasis from the ontological to
7
the moral. It endeavoured to retrieve the Jesus of Nazareth
8
from the Hellenizing dogma of Christianity. And it attempted
to relate the- faith to the racial and economic institutions
and assumptions of European civilization, and in so doing to
g
establish the absoluteness and certainty of the faith. The
1. CTB, p. 142.
2. STi, p. 210.
3. STii, p. 79.
4. "PTSLCED", p. 299.
5. "PTSLCED", p. 299.
6. "PTSLCED", p. 300.
7. CPT, p. 218.
8. CPT, pp. 219-223.
9. "PTSLCED", p. 301.
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questions and doubts of the once self-sufficient man have
shaken the theology of Liberalism and are now seeking for
something more than the religious-ethical man, the historical
Jesus, or the establishment of faith upon immanent world-
1
views.
[T]he symbols of the Church have become strengthless.
The 'word' no longer sounds through its speech.
Society no longer understands it. And vice versa the
work of society has become empty, and into its vacuum
powers of the anti-divine, of the untrue and unjust,
have forcedptheir way, the very powers which it wanted
to escape.
The attempts to locate and to position man as self-contained
and -assertive have failed. For the attempt of Protestant
theology to capture and to extinguish the questions and doubts
have failed. The search for meaning is a result of the loss
of God. And with this loss, man and his community are
suffering from an invasion "of the anti-divine, of the untrue
and unjust." The cultural life of today is one of breakdown
in harmony and as such reflects the personal, existential
condition.^ Culture today experiences "fear", "uncertainty",
5
"loneliness" and "meaninglessness". Disintegration becomes
the bye-product and result of this self-assertiveness. "We
come out of a time which no longer possessed any symbols by
which it could point beyond itself."^ Thus a present crisis
arises which demands a new approach and a re-awakening of our
7
concern for the ultimate. Tillich is certain that "people
1. BRSUR, p. 57.
2. IH, pp. 258-9.
5. RS, pp. 57-9.
4. PE, p. 244.
5. PE, pp. 245-6.
6. RS, p. 50.
7. PE, p. 224f.
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want to have a principle which transcends their whole dis¬
integrated existence in individual and social life.""'" Man
searches for a way out of the present predicament which has
begun with the loss of God and has continued in the disin¬
tegration of culture and the breakdown of the religious
2
situation.
At this point it appears that the interests and concerns
of Tillich reach a step beyond those of Bultmann. Indeed,
Tillich is expressing a concern not only for the individual
man but also for the culture and the society in which he lives.
Tillich is not only involved in attempting to recover the
meaning of man individually, but also he endeavours to see man
collectively as a correlative to the dynamics of society.
Tillich appears to direct his attention to the present
historical setting. "In this situation in which most of the
traditional values and forms of life are disintegrating, he
[the man of today] often is driven to the abyss of complete
meaninglessness...." He views the present age as one of
cultural disintegration and re-organization where the self-
assertive and -sufficient tendencies are being shaken to the
foundation. Man and society have lost the ultimate and now
the time requires a new attempt to synthesize the finite and
4
infinite in order to reverse the dehumanizing process involved
in the loss of God. "We are convinced that today a kairos,
5
an epochal moment of history, is visible." Tillich looks
1. PE, p. 227f.
2. CPT, chapter 4.
3. PE, p. 202.
4. E. Cell, Language, Existence and God, pp. 361, 363-
5. PE, p. 48.
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to the symbols of the faith to move man out of the abyss
of meaninglessness and into the symbolic relationship with
the ultimately significant."^" In this symbolic relationship
faith and society stand in dialectical tension which neither
fuses nor confuses the two identities but which recognizes
2
the interplay of content and form. "And that means nothing
other than that the whole life of society in every direction
is destined to be strongly symbolic of God. Church and society
are destined to become one." The movement towards unity,
towards the infinite, is expressed in the symbolics of the
Christian faith which opens man to the ultimate dimension by
means of finite realities.^ Thus Tillich looks to them to
provide a new perspective on man, society and his relation to
5
God. This is, of course, a more comprehensive view of the
Christian faith than the one developed by Bultmann which seeks
to incorporate into man a new self-understanding. Bultmann's
emphasis falls upon the individual and his freedom from
bondage to the present. It is an emphasis which man experiences
internally in opposition to the apparent absurdity of existing.
However, Tillich moves beyond the circle of individual
concerns to the society and to the history in which he lives.
And in so moving, Tillich seeks to create a new understanding
of self and world which takes into consideration the presence
of the ultimate.^
1. PE, p. 43f.
2. J. Dillenberger, "Paul Tillich: Theologian of Culture"
Rel. in Life, Vol. 35, p. 692.
3. IH, p. 238.
4. RS, pp. 11-16.
5. C.W. Kegley and R.W. Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich,
p. 65.
6. RS, pp. 21-2.
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Tillich has made it clear that existence ultimately
stands out of and upon true heing which is also the source
of true humanity. Man remains aware of his relation to
this ultimate source as he has a sense of participation and
belonging-ness to that which gives life. Indeed, Tillich
wonders how it is at all possible for one to come to under¬
stand Christianity or any religion "without finding a point in
the structure of man as man in which the finite and the
infinite meet or are within each other.""'" Tillich seems to
assume a point of identity between man and God which allows
man to move in the direction of finding the ultimate. His
creative falling assures that he "is never cut off from the
2
ground of being...." Even in the existential condition,
man remains fundamentally in relation to the infinite, to the
eternal. His essence remains separated from existence, but
he nonetheless possesses an intimation of what it is he
"ought" to be. The search for himself and for the meaning
of life in contrast to the questions, doubts and abyss about
him can be answered only from a religious basis. "Man cannot
solve any of his great problems if he does not see them in the
light of his own being and of being-itself." He is permitted
to quest after the source of the really real and of meaning-
itself as he becomes conscious of the threat of non-being
and the anxiety of meaninglessness. The search can begin
with his own life, but he is required to move beyond existence
1. CPT, p. 231.
2. STii, p. 78.
3. LPJ, p. 125.
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to the source of all becoming. This brings him face to face
with God. "Fulfilment is bound to eternity.In
himself and in the confines of history, man possesses no hope
p
of transcending the boundaries of finitude. The search for
fulfilment leads along the road to an encounter with the un¬
conditioned, the absolute, the infinite — with God. The self-
actualization of man, the creature, rests upon the power of
God who creates, sustains and directs all along the path to
accomplishment and fulfilment. But man experiences a gap in
his relation to the infinite. Between man and God, there
remains an unbreechable chasm which cannot be transcended by
z
mere finite capacities. Rather God manifests Himself within
4
the confines of the created order and thus "reveals" Himself.
But His revelation must not be seen as a literal transportation
into the structures of reality. The language of the faith is
the language of symbols. The divine reality becomes trans¬
parent in the symbol which illuminates man's awareness of his
participation in the absolute. A symbol opens up new
dimensions both within man and his world. That which a symbol
points to and participates in comes out of concealment and
becomes an immediate experience. He appropriates its truth
by participating in it. Participation becomes a mode and
means of relation between finite and infinite reality. Being
involved in the power of the symbol, man receives its
cognitive and emotive content. The symbol begins to function
1. LPJ, p. 124.
2. McKelway, p. 222.
3. McKelway, p. 155 f-
4. STi, pp. 132-7.
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as a sign-post pointing to the really real and thus directing
him "to see" possible ways of realizing his potential.
Fulfilment is possible only as it is related to the infinite
and it is through sharing in the symbol that man moves along
the path to self-actualization. Indeed, he is the telos of
creation. By means of the symbol he "sees" where essence
resides and he begins "to know" the direction in which he
must move. The symbol expresses its content in personal
terms. "Man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything
that is less than personal....""1" The "power and meaning" of
2
a symbol becomes expressed in a personal life. Christianity
symbolically directs attention to the presence of the ultimate
in the person of Jesus as the Christ. "The term 'the Christ'
points by marked contrast to man's existential situation. For
the Christ, the Messiah, is he who is supposed to bring the
'new eon', the universal regeneration, the new reality."^ He
comes symbolically as a person directing attention beyond the
present to a confrontation with the ultimate, which guides
his fulfilment in creation.^ Jesus as the Christ, as the
new reality, responds to the question of being which arises
in living. Tillich's existential analysis of the predicament
5
of estrangement reveals man's "old eon". As the "new eon",
Jesus points out the way to fulfilment and to the really real.
1. STi, p. 244.
2. STi, p. 229.
3. STii, p. 27.
4. STii, p. 120.
5. STii, p. 27-
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Faith is the sphere of life where man receives the victor
over the powers of estrangement."'" Jesus as the Christ
comes from the concealment of history to answer the question
of being. "The quest of the New Being presupposes the
2
presence of the New Being...." And the quest is itself a
universal quest because of the universal character of
estrangement. All men by nature of becoming remain separated
from the really real. Faith directs man, who seeks after the
really real, to the biblical picture of the Christ.
It is interesting to note that at least two features of
Tillich's position are not completely new. Tillich maintains
that the theological position of Liberalism is no longer
viable. This is the case since man seeks answers to life
which require him to look beyond himself and this world.
Symbolically speaking, man needs to think ontologically in
terms of the finite and infinite. This will not involve
direct metaphysical speculation and discussion. Rather one
will be required to discourse symbolically. It will be
remembered that Herrmann and Harnack prefigured, in part,
this approach. Liberalism's anti-metaphysical "pre-under-
standing" directed theology's concern to the here and now,
as Tillich has already indicated. Man's present situation
demands amelioration and guidance. However, with the removal
of the transcendent from direct perception, Christian cate¬
gories could be utilized as paradigms and models for present
1. STii, p. 80.
2. STii, p. 80o
STii, p. 86.
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action and. behaviour. To become a believer did not involve
an ontological metamorphosis; instead man received new
stimulation and motivation for his being-in-the-world.
Herrmann and Harnack perceived the pregnant ideas of the
Gospel as the means to this end. In a sense, the idea or
the symbol of the Christ contained the power and meaning to
stimulate man though not to transform him. As long as the
finite and the infinite remain at bay, Liberalism could conceive
the notion of a re-birth or transformation of the believer in
time as highly unlikely. After all, in point of fact for
them, Reason has objectively and empirically determined man
to be a part of the natural-mechanical world. Faith thus
becomes a personal and rational process of value-judging.
On a second front, Martin Kahler also prefigured Tillich's
position."'" Tillich apparently takes great pains to speak
of Jesus as the Christ. The amplification of His person is
communicated in the biblical narrative. It is here that
Jesus comes forward as the Christ and it is here that the
present believer must receive information and testimony about
Him.. The life of Jesus drawn in the New Testament provided
Kahler's point of attention. This is the fact with which one
must deal. The biblical picture is the root-fact of Jesus'
existence and the community's acceptance of Him. Tillich
also begins here, though he re-interprets and fortifies the
content of this picture. Nonetheless, Kahler had apparently
set the stage for the later concentration on Jesus in the New
Testament as compared with the Jesus behind it — the latter
1. (See Appendix B, p.
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position followed by Liberalism. Therefore, in what
follows, Tillich attempts to deal with the picture of Jesus
as the Christ as the determinative affirmation for faith.
Tillich has affirmed that fulfilment for man and
creation is only possible as it is related to the eternal, to
the infinite. Tillich also affirms that the faith possesses
the symbol for man's fulfilment in the biblical picture of
Jesus as the Christ.^ Man's quest for direction and meaning
comes to an end in the encounter with Him. Here one
symbolically meets a personal life which has overcome the
2
power of estrangement in life. Tillich's analysis of
existence has demonstrated the transitory, fragmentary and
temporal character of existing. What is more, Tillich has
reviewed the present cultural and religious dearth as
symptomatic of the need to look beyond man to the eternal,
where some direction toward fulfilment may be found. At this
juncture, he positions the biblical picture of the Christ as
the answer to man's individual and collective quest for
meaning in the present period. Tillich is somewhat emphatic
when he presents the Christ as a fact which has happened.
"Only if existence is conquered in one point — a personal
life, representing as a whole — is it conquered in principle
...."^ To be the Christ, there must be a concrete person who
fulfils the actual fact of what it means to be Him. Man's
estrangement occurs within the confines of finitude and it is
1. B. Martin, Tillich's Doctrine of Man, p. l62f.
2. STi, p. 239.
3. "RDI", p. 133-
4. STii, p. 98.
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to these confines that the conqueror of finitude must be
subjected."'" One aspect of Jesus as the Christ, then, is
His character as a brute fact. Jesus of Nazareth becomes
2
the Christ because He is believed to be so. Through the
reception of His followers, He receives this appointment. "If
Jesus had not impressed himself as the Christ on his disciples
and through them upon all following generations, the man who is
called Jesus of Nazareth would...be remembered as a historically
and religiously important person."^ The fact of Christhood
must also be tempered by its reception. Jesus becomes the
Christ because He is received as such by the disciples and
4 5
followers. Thus a reciprocal relation arises. It is the
power of God to give and it is the freedom of man to receive.^
When the giving and receiving form a unity, God and man are
conjoined symbolically.
The Incarnation has happened and has been received. But
now Tillich goes on to explicate the meaning of it for man to¬
day in relation to the ontological and societal predicament.
Existence is conditioned by finitude and temporality. The
transition from essence to existence has the quality of a leap
which does not permit one to derive the occurrence from
necessity. Rather it exemplifies a contingent happening for
1. J.C. Livingston, "Tillich's Christology and Historical
Research," Rel. in Life, Vol. 35, p. 700.
2. "RDI", p. 144.
3. STii, p. 99.
4. STii, p. 99.
5. McKelway, pp. 157 and 158.
6. BRSUR, p. 29-
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which there is no apparent reason. But nonetheless man does
exist. And what is more, existing has the quality of a
creative falling. Tillich explains that human existence
reflects the possibility and potentiality to realize some
degree of essentiality. But such actualization is always
tinted by the nature of the transition itself. Actualization
and realization remain contingent and determined by the
characterization of finitude which is one of the marks of
existence. However, this mark does not circumvent the being
of man in his actual state. He participates in and retains
the awareness of the really real from which and upon which he
stands. He is never completely nor fully extricated from
this ground. In the actualized state of becoming, he lives
out of the source of creative fallen-ness. But in existence,
man is possessed with the dimension of freedom which also
provides the dynamic for movement. Freedom remains finite
in that it is encompassed by the reciprocal polarity of
destiny.^" Destiny describes the limits and boundaries in
which freedom operates. In part then, destiny contains the
given of existence as a partial conditioner upon freedom. All
in all, man may exercise his freedom to actualize, in a finite
way, what it is he really is. Participating in the contingent,
he also questions and seeks after the dimension of being from
which he feels separated. However, God communicates symboli¬
cally. At this juncture, man enters into dialogue with the
divine. Through symbolic reference and participation, he
begins to know the "power and meaning" of that to which the
1. STi, p. 182f.
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symbol points. Finite experiences are opened to the infinite.
Man comes "to know" symbolically the interpenetration of the
infinite into the finite as well as the really real. In this
manner, he also receives content and form for the "ought"
which positions and motivates him in the direction he should
move. Man strives and becomes by communicating and receiving
content and meaning from beyond. Collectively, man also
experiences a societal necessity which directs his attention
beyond the present situation. Tillich calls this a time of
religious crisis and cultural disintegration. It is a time
where the present is emerging from the shackles of finite
confinement and pressing beyond itself to the infinite. The
recovery from the loss of God in the 19th century characterizes
itself as a painful process that elicits a feeling of meaning-
lessness and anxiety. Tillich diagnoses this ailment as due
to man and as a result of the self-assertiveness and -sufficiency
he displays. But these are societal attitudes which are corre¬
lated to the individual. Tillich looks beyond this ontolo-
gical split to the infinite and he looks beyond the societal
dilemma to the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ. In
Him, man perceives a sign-post of the really real. In Him,
man comes to a symbolic awareness of himself within the con¬
fines of existence. Tillich does not mean to assert that
the infinite has become incarnate in space and time, for this
would be a superstition."'" The Incarnation directs attention
to the relation of the finite to the infinite in that essential
1. "RDI", p. 134.
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God-manhood has come into existence."'" To come to grips
with the Incarnation, it is imperative to reflect upon its
2
soteriological significance. Indeed, it must be remembered
that fulfilment is related to the infinite. Under the feature
of finitude, the Incarnation reveals essential God-manhood
z
without disruption and antagonism with existence. It re¬
veals Jesus as the Christ as over and against essence and
existence.
It is New Being over against essence, because it has
actual reality; it is a fact, while essential being
as such is merely potential and not actual. The
description of the gap between essence and existence
must not suggest that essential being has existed at
some time in the past or somewhere in the world, since
it is potential and not actual. 4
Jesus as the New Being is more than essence because as symboli¬
zing essential God-manhood He stands within existence. But
He is also more than existence since He is the New Being.
5
Jesus as the New Being brings essence into existence. In a
way, His symbolic being as the Christ bridges the gap between
these two by standing over and against the two while partici¬
pating in both. As the New Being, He appears to represent
a "system of symbols which gives the individual the courage
to accept himself in spite of his awareness that he is unac¬
ceptable. ...Tillich has already pointed out that "essential
man or essential being" has not existed in space and time.
Therefore to speak of the Incarnation as the infinite becoming
1. "RDI", p. 138.
2. "RDI", p. 139; (vide, STii, p. 130).
3- "RDI", p. 141.
4. "RDI", p. 142.
5. NB, pp. 15-24.
6. STii, p. 173-
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incarnate is superstition. The presence of essential God-
manhood in existence points beyond the actualization of
essence. More to the point, one is dealing with God-manhood
as it involves existence symbolically."'" It does not itself
become actual in a person's ontological structure. It
participates in existence only symbolically.
To essential man belongs the unity of his finiteness
with his infinity, and it is precisely this unity
which I call Godmanhood, because it is an expression
of the dialectical interdependence of finiteness and
infinity. Man is the only being who possesses a
genuine finiteness because he is the only being who
possesses a potential infinity; for finiteness has
meaning only in correlation with infinity and vice
versa. 2
The event of the Incarnation does not disrupt Tillich's
infinite abyss. Essentiality is never really an actuality
at any point within space and time. The Incarnation
symbolizes the reality and the essentiality of the unity
between man's finite and infinite qualifications. It repre¬
sents the dimension of interdependence between the two. And
this interdependence finds appreciation and significance in
man alone; for he is the only participant in existence who
shares both in finiteness and infinity. But more, the
Incarnation becomes indispensable because man's multi-dimensional
involvement produces meaning only as the finite and the
infinite are viewed as correlatives. As the Christ who is
the New Being, Jesus symbolizes this interdependence to man.
The Incarnation of Him who incorporates God-manhood into
existence "indicates that divine self-objectification and
1. Kegley and Bretall, p. 242f.
2. "RDI", p. 143.
279
essential manhood belong together, because man is essentially
the divine image, and anthropomorphism contains an indestruct¬
ible element of truth.""'" The gap produced by the transition
from essence to existence appears to be overcome in Him. The
New Being functions as a symbolic bridge both utilizing a
finite reality and participating in something more than the
finite. In this manner, He interrelates finite man with the
2
ground of being. The Incarnation symbolizes a point of
z
unity within life. At a point in space and time, the
cleavage between essence and existence is bridged. This point
is the identification of Jesus of Nazareth with the Christ.
The Christ as the "New Being...represents the essential unity
between finiteness and infinity.... It represents the essential
unity between individuality and universality.... It represents
4
the essential unity between contingency and creativity." The
5
picture of the Christ functions to show man what he can be.
Participating in His symbolized reality, one finds assurance
of His truth.^ The category of sharing relates man to the
Christ. "And it can be shown that...it was this picture which
7
created both the church and the Christian...."' Thus the
picture possesses "power and meaning" which can transform and
create changes and situations for the individual and for
Q
history. And what is more, the biblical picture leads one to
1. "RDI", p. 143.
2. McKelway, p. 171f.
3. "RDI", p. 144.
4. "RDI", p. 144.
5. STii, p. 93.
6. STii, p. 114.
7. STii, p. 115.
8. STii, pp. 114-5; (vide, "RDI", p. 146).
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the point of the eschatological.1 Jesus as the Christ
correlates finiteness with infinity and therefore produces
meaning for him who shares in this symbol of correlation.
2
He saves man by healing his existential wounds. He provides
the possibility for salvation which means "reuniting that which
is estranged, giving a centre to what is split, overcoming the
split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself."
By possessing this salvific power, Jesus as the Christ
directs attention to the end for which man and creation were
/1
intended. The New Being demonstrates to man what he is
really "has appeared in existence" and in appearing gives
not only man but also history meaning by serving as a "command
5
and expectation". Tillich affirms that the New Being has
come in the reality of Jesus as the Christ.^ Man and history
are given meaning because the Incarnation produces it in that
7
it correlates the finite and the infinite. For Tillich,
Jesus as the Christ answers man's ontological quest for
Q
meaning. And further, He answers the societal dilemma
brought about by the loss of God. He provides a symbol
which communicates "power and meaning" and "command and
expectation" capable of healing the split between man and his
9
world.
1. "RDI", p. 147.
2. STii, p. 166.
3- STii, p. 166.
4. STii, p. 167-
5. "RDI", p. 147.
6. J.N. Williams, "The Christology of Paul Tillich," Encounter,
Vol.'21, p. 429-
7. SF, pp. 173-186.
8. O'Meara and Weisser, p. 227f.
9. NB, pp. 34-45.
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It is of interest to note that Tillich is not concerned
with Jesus Christ as an historical entity per se but with
Jesus Christ as He comes through the Bible. Tillich deals
2
with His picture. This is where the Christian faith finds
"5
its foundation, its root-fact. For Tillich, faith cannot
rest upon the unsure ground surrounding historical criticism.^
5
"Faith cannot rest on such unsure ground." Man is sure of
faith's foundation by participating in the creative power of
the Christ.^ This power is inherent in the biblical picture.^
Christ is the centre of history since He makes a universal and
Q
absolute claim to meaning. Again absolutism cannot be
o
achieved on the basis of historical criticism. Rather
Tillich accepts the picture of Christ that is found in the
Bible to be invulnerable to criticism while yet portraying the
victory over estrangement. It becomes the real event for
faith."'""'" This emphasis appears to lead Tillich into a
position of abandoning the historical quality of the picture
itself, for indeed Tillich suggests that "there is no point
in attempting to go beyond it, and to ask for a photographic
12
picture in addition to the religious picture...." The
1. Kegley and Bretall, p. 230f. (see Appendix B, p. Ihoft)
2. McKelway, p. 159 •
3. STii, p. 114.
4. DF, p. 89.
5. STii, p. 113-
6. Kegley and Bretall, p. 244.
7. STii, p. 115.
8. IH, p. 251.
9. B. Cameron, "The Historical Problem in Paul Tillich's
Theology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 18, p. 266.
10.T.M. Dicken, "The Biblical Picture of Jesus as the Christ
in Tillich's Theology," J. Rel. Thought, Vol. 25, No.1,p.31.
11. Ibid.. p. 38f-
12. "RDI", p. 145.
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historical quality of the narrative falls into ambivalence
as its religious function is offered as an answer to man's
existential questions. The New Being is actual but one
cannot absolutely know in whom it occurred."'" Nonetheless,
faith's response continues to assure His certainty. However,
it does appear from Tillich's discussion of the Incarnation
that Jesus as the Christ does not become a literal but a
symbolic representation of Godmanhood and therefore the
2
Christ becomes less of a man and more of a symbol. Tillich
is very precise in stating that the New Being should not
suggest that essential man or essential being has become actual.
Thus one is apparently left with a symbol and with an inter¬
pretation which seems to move Tillich out of the realm of
•5
historical criticism and the relativities incumbent with it.
4
The Christ as a symbol loses its concrete historicality.
But nonetheless Tillich affirms that unless existence is over¬
come concretely it is not overcome at all. It would seem
that if the biblical picture arises from an actual life,
then its interpretation is also conditioned by the historical
claims. Tillich cannot sever the biblical picture from its
historical moorings without transforming Christianity from a
historical to a non-historical religion.^ What appears to
1. STii, p. 114.
2. M.F. Sulzbach, "Christology in Contemporary Protestantism,"
Rel. in Life, Vol. 23, p. 213.
3. R.C. Johnson, "Jesus of History and Christian Faith,"
Theology Today, Vol. 10, p. 175.
4. O'Meara and Weisser, p. 190.
5. Livingston, p. 704.
6. J.Y. Fenton, "Faith and Facts," J. Rel. Thought, Vol. 45,
p. 112f.
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develop from Ms attempt to insulate the foundation of faith
from criticism is a variant reading of the dictum developed
by Lessing. Tillich appears to be inferring that the
absolute claims of faith cannot be dependent upon the unsure
grounds of external details. Indeed it may be the case that
he prefers to deal with two realms of truth — those of
history and those of faith, the objective, empirical and the
subjective, personal."'" This leads one commentator to assert
that
Tillich has drawn an illicit deduction from a truism.
The truism is that historical statements are by
definition contingent and probable, but this does not
imply that historical knowledge can never be described
as certain knowledge — unless, that is, Tillich equates^
certainty and truth with the necessary truths of logic.
Doubtless, Tillich does draw a sharp distinction between the
historical Jesus and the biblical picture. He relates the
thesis presented during 1911 when he raised and attempted to
answer what the faith could say if the non-existence of the
historical Jesus were to be demonstrated.-^ Indeed, Tillich
affirms, "The foundation of Christian belief is not the
historical Jesus, but the biblical picture of Christ. The
criterion of human thought and action is not the constantly
changing and artificial product of historical research, but
the picture of Christ...."^ In this passage, Tillich appears
to make it quite clear that the historicity of Jesus of
5
Nazareth has no direct effect upon the foundation of faith.
Rather faith appears to be grounded in a picture which is it¬
self a constituent of history without having direct ties to
1. J.H. Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p. 86.
2. Livingston, p. 700.
3. IH, p. 33-
4. IH, p. 34.
5. Cameron, p. 272.
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the historical context which gave it birth. The relation of
Jesus of Nazareth to the Christ is not a completely clear
matter in Tillich. He does point out that the picture
becomes united with the reality of the New Being. "In an
ecstatic experience the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth
became indissolubly united with the reality of the New Being.
He is present wherever the New Being is present."1 Here one
seems to discover that the union is effected in "an ecstatic
experience". But what is the nature of it? Further, it
is the "concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth" that one is
2
dealing with and the person of the resurrected Christ. The
concrete picture achieves importance apparently because Jesus
was able to leave an indelible impression on His disciples
through the power of His being. At this point, one may be
justified in querying Tillich. Troeltsch had pursued a
more radical approach to the faith. This made great strides
in eradicating the implicit transcendentalism which he saw
lingering in the Liberalism from Ritschl to Harnack. These
men heralded the personality of Christ. This historical
fact possessed the power to impress itself upon the believer.
Along with His historicity, an added quality — His self-
evidencing power — seemed to accompany His historical
appropriation. Troeltsch's stand on the complete historicity
of faith seemed to counter-act this hidden dimension. But the
question now arises, "Does Tillich's 'ecstatic experience' re¬
introduce this hidden dimension through the back-door?" Indeed,
1. STii, p. 157-
2. Dicken, p. 36.
3. STii, p. 157.
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it may not be "too problematic to suggest that Tillich may have
done just this. No doubt, Jesus of Nazareth had been put
to death. However, it appears to be essential that the New
Being conquers the transitoriness of existence."1" Conse¬
quently the "concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth" becomes
associated with the salvific determination of the New Being.
On the basis of this, He and the New Being become synonymous
through the experience of the disciples. This effects
Tillich's understanding of the resurrection which has nothing
to do with a physical event but which is characterized as a
2
"spiritual presence". In part, it is the symbol of the
resurrection which Tillich utilizes to confer upon Jesus the
distinction of being the New Being. It is a symbol grounded
in the fact of the disciples' "ecstatic experience" and in the
interpreted reception by them of the unity between Jesus and
4
the New Being. "They called this experienced event the
'Resurrection of the Christ', and it was a combination of
«5
event and symbol," Surely the concrete picture "finds its
basis in an actual person", but the nature of the origin and
development of "the reality of the New Being"must also be
queried. One needs to know where and how the disciples came
into the possession of this "reality" which they amalgamated
1. STii, p. 157.
2. STii, p. 157.
3- McKelway, p. I69f.
4. J.W.D. Smith, "The Resurrection of Christ: Myth or History?"
Expository Times, Vol. 72, p. 373-
5. STii, p. 154.
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with the concrete picture of the man from Nazareth."'" It
seems to he the case that Tillich has huilt his theology
of the New Being upon a reality which exists in history but
whose history is beyond question and possibly even
a/historical. The gap between the picture of Jesus and
that of the Christ appears to be as infinite as the one
Tillich has proposed between essence and existence. Thus
one may ask Tillich the same question put to Barth by Harnack:
"If the person of Jesus Christ stands at the centre of the
gospel, how else can the basis for reliable and communal
knowledge of this person be gained but through critical-
historical study so that an imagined Christ is not put in
place of the real one?"^ Whether one speaks of the person
or the picture of Christ, the possibility of historical
claims and grounded-ness cannot be denied. If Tillich is
not to create "an imagined Christ", he must allow His biblical
picture to be itself a product of objective, empirical history
and thus open to investigation. Otherwise, Tillich may be
dealing with two separate realms of truth — those of history
and those of faith. And on this basis he is required to
expound on the interpenetration of the one with the other.
But the opinion appears to emerge that Tillich's biblical
picture is and consequently is necessary. Therefore, it is
1. H. Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith, p. 427f.
2. McKelway, pp. 177-180.
3- Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. I6lf.
4. H.M. Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, p. 31•
5. Fenton, "Faith and Facts," p. 113f«
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exempted from the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change which
Sjziren Kierkegaard described as the mark of all existing
things. Tillich seems to grasp after something that resists
movement and contingency. For him, historical inquiry is
not required, for the picture apparently forms the root-fact
of faith behind which it is impossible to go. Nonetheless,
the question must remain, "Is Tillich's picture of Christ an
imagined one put in the place of the real one?" "Do the
pictures of Jesus and the Christ form the ground level of
faith?" "And even if this is the case, can the pictures of
Jesus and the Christ form an undisturbed continuum?" "Or
does not the same abyss really exist between necessary and
accidental truths, even if presented in picture form?" The
infinite abyss that separates the finite from the infinite
does not allow Tillich to speak literally of Jesus as the
Incarnate One. Just as for Bultmann so also for Tillich, the
ontological gap between essence and existence does not permit
one to speak of a literal bridging of the abyss. One is
permitted to speak only symbolically, for it is superstition
to hold that God has really become man. Therefore, God as
Being-Itself does not directly impinge upon the created order.
The divine comes in the "power and meaning" of the symbol
which presents the ultimate. For Bultmann, the Word of God
Jesus preached bridged the gulf between the finite and the
infinite. In this Word, man comes to a new self-understanding.
But in all of this, God does not directly penetrate man.
Similarly for Tillich, the biblical picture represents the
concrete actualization of the infinite in the finite. However,
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it is pointed out that this does not suggest that essential
being has actually existed. Rather, the New Being symbolizes
the interdependent relation between the finite and the infinite
in man. Again, the ontological gap is not broken, for
essence and existence continue to remain unequivocably separ¬
ated. But by participation in the "power and meaning" of the
symbol, one shares in that to which the symbol points. There¬
fore inquiry can have no particular bearing on the picture of
the Christ since the picture itself appears to form the bed¬
rock of faith. Tillich's theology of the New Being appears
to succumb to the bifurcation between the finite and the
infinite, and as a result God remains infinitely separated
from creation. Historical objectivity and .facticity do
not really produce a foundation upon which one is able to
establish meaning and intelligibility. The historical is
the contingent and the probable. But the historical also
contains subjectivity and the personal. Man and his affir¬
mations appear to provide another dimension to history which
makes the picture of Christ real and actual. In a manner
reminiscent of Harnack's distinction between facts and facts,
Tillich apparently holds the beliefs and affirmations of man
to be another class of historical facticity. Jesus as the
Christ is real and factual because He answers a real and
factual need within the life-struggles of man. The Christ
represents the way man has discovered and affirmed to be the
resolution to his existential copings and questionings. Even
if His objective facticity proves to be non-existent, His
subjective reality remains alive and intact in the confession
of the man who believes that He is truly the Christ, the New
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Being. One must wonder if Jesus of Nazareth had not received
this distinction, would man have need to find another? The
notion of essential Godmanhood remains indifferent to the
external details and contingencies of history. Again in this
regard, Tillich echoes the position of Liberalism which turned
its attention from the controversy of external details to the
certainty of personality. What appears to be essential is
the absolute and universal claim of the New Being to heal the
existential split in man and his world. The symbol remains
more certain than the external fact that Jesus of Nazareth is
Himself this New Being. Man's awareness of the "ought" and
of the what he should be receives "command and expectation" as
well as "power and meaning" in this symbol. Man finds
courage to accept himself in participation with it. Therefore,
man in conjunction with the biblical picture of the Christ
achieves the courage of self-affirmation."'" Christology
ceases to be a matter of ontological speculation regarding
His two natures since essentiality is never actualized in
space and time. Rather Christology leads one in another
2
direction. It directs one to an interpretation of history.
History, the here and now of man's interactions, becomes the
outgrowth of a Christology which helps man "to know" what he
"ought" to be and which enables him to change and to transform
his life-situations. In substance then, Christology informs
man about himself in history.
1. NB, pp. 50-59.
2. IH, p. 242.
3. Tavard, pp. 163-174.
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THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
(IN THE SHADOW OF THE CHRIST)
To develop Christology means to describe the concrete
point at which something absolute appears in history
and provides it with meaning and purpose; and this
indeed is the central problem in the philosophy of
history. This problem can be obscured by leaving
that concrete point in history unnamed or rendering it
invisible....But the problem cannot be escaped, for
history becomes history only through its relation-^to
such a concrete point by which it gains meaning.
Tillich seems to be quite clear that Christology does not
involve one in a discussion about the two natures of Christ.
Rather, one is directed to the reality of history itself
which demands interpretation. This interpretation becomes
possible on the basis of a concrete point which is also
absolute. Indeed, the biblical picture of Jesus as the
2
Christ appears to satisfy this double demand for Tillich.
The Incarnation symbolizes the interdependence between the
finite and the infinite which is responsible for the production
of meaning. The biblical picture provides history with its
centre and with its absolute point for meaning and purpose.
This picture is not an abstract point. Rather it represents
in symbol and event a point of healing in space and time which
delivers the "command and expectation" of what man should be.
In relation to it, history becomes history because it is here
that meaning is to be found. Its conditioned and contingent
possibilities receive meaning and power and are open to the
otherwise hidden dimensions of the ultimate. In correlation
1. IH, p. 243-
2. Tillich et al., The Kingdom of God and History, pp.103-142.
3. Tavard, pp. 82-112.
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with the biblical picture, history partakes of the creating
and the transforming power implicit in this symbol. The
concrete and absolute point of Christ opens history to the
ultimate which is the ground and the source of all being.
Man responds as a man only in relation to the infinite which
is the source of his essence and therefore his "ought". He
becomes a man when he seeks after the "Wherefore?" of his
being. The quest elevates him above the merely existing
and aids him in asking what he should be. The demand finds
its content and realization in the biblical picture, for this
point of concrete existence shows God to man and what He
wants man to be. Existence therefore becomes an ethical
mode of becoming in the presence of the ultimate. Man in his
existing state is given the quality of finite freedom to move
toward essential goodness. In freedom he must decide for
or against God in confrontation with the meaning realized in
the biblical picture. And to the degree that man finds
fulfilment through the "power and meaning" of this picture,
so also do all dimensions of creation participate in his
actualization. "Qualitatively speaking, nothing happens in
man that does not have a bearing on the elements which consti¬
tute the universe.""'" Man in himself represents all levels
and realms of life. Moreover, in the present cultural
situation where man today is pushed toward the abyss of meaning-
lessness, historical existence is threatened in that the loss
2
of God has impaired communication with the ultimate. Tillich
1. STii, p. 121.
2. "YD", p. 18.
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points out that this is due to the weakening of the symbols
which societal man utilizes to communicate with the infinite."*"
The present dearth results from the nineteenth century's
attempt to be self-assertive and -sufficient. But this has
achieved a state of cultural disintegration and religious
crisis in that man is temporarily severed from the ground of
2
being. This in turn has resulted in a depletion of meaning
in the present epoch. For Tillich, meaningful historical
activity is to be found in action which receives meaning and
■3
power from the centre of history. To speak of meaningful
activity requires one to speak of Christology, for this is the
point in space and time where meaning and purpose are
expressed in a concrete and absolute existence. Christianity
makes the claim that in the personal existence of Jesus as
the Christ the fundamental meaninglessness of living has found
4
a centre of unconditioned meaning and fulfilment. He satis¬
fies and fulfills man's personal quest for significance by
5
His undisturbed relation to God. In Christ, the foundation
of ultimate meaning is laid down, and the event of salvation
takes place within the confines of history.^ This manifes¬
tation of ultimate meaning and therefore of salvation and
fulfilment occurs in a group of believers who herald Jesus as
7the Christ to future generations by a decision of faith.
1. IH, p. 238f.
2. NB, pp. 115-124.
3. Kegley and Bretall, p. 295-
4. IH, p. 259.
5. IH, pp. 259-260.
6. IH, p. 260.
7. IH, p. 260.
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"Only for faith, Christ is the centre of history, and only
through this centre is faith possible."^ Faith brings one
into participation with Him and with the power of existence
that expresses itself in meaning and salvation. Faith as
such is a religious act which "opens the depth of reality and
gives...intuition access to the character of the depth of
-z,
reality and enables us to express it in definite terms."
Faith provides an intuitive insight into the deeper dimension
of reality which is not always visible to the objective and
undiscerning eye. In faithful participation with Him, one
shares in and is grasped by that which both penetrates and
transcends the present reality encompassed in the symbol.^
The ultimate both "stands" in and beyond the present
experience and there "is the transcendent meaning implied in
5
history...." Faithful participation in the Christ is faith¬
ful sharing in the ultimate which is immanently though
symbolically transcendent to existence. Participation
involves the basis of meaning. Therefore Tillich asserts:
The old christological struggle has been transformed
into a struggle about a Christian or a half pagan
interpretation of history: whether the Kingdom of God
or a national kingdom is the centre of history and
principle of meaning for every historical activity, and
what the relationship should be between divinegand human
activity with respect to the Kingdom of God.
To engage in Christological discussion entails speaking about
the final meaning of history that is found in faith. One is
1. IH, p. 260.
2. IH, pp. 262-3-
3. IH, p. 268.
4. IH, p. 269.
5. IH, p. 270.
6. IH, p. 261, ftnt, #1.
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able to speak meaningfully about the relationship of divine
and human activity. But one must stand and participate in
the bounds of faith where the centre is believed to have made
itself manifest in space and time. To speak from the stand¬
point and the belief of faith allows one "to see" intuitively
the true nature of existence as estrangement from God."'"
Existence is estrangement and not reconciliation. Therefore,
man and his self-sufficiency "have no power to overcome
arbitrariness, that goddess and demon of history, because
history itself cannot overcome itself and its supporting
2
powers." Man must choose between the Kingdom of God which
signifies absolute meaning and a national kingdom which can
only express conditioned fulfilment. The man of faith "sees"
the choices clearly and discerns the real choice from the
bogus, for the choice made will colour one's view of history.
There are several characteristics which Tillich presents
as qualifying and characterizing the historical. In the
first place, it involves the union of the objective and the
subjective, of fact and interpretation. History recognizes
not only that something occurred but also that this something
is meaningful and relevant.^ In this way, events become
remembered events which signify that a decision has been made
5
at some point by the reception and acceptance of a happening.
1. Cell, pp. 367-8.
2. IH, pp. 260-1.
3. STiii, p. 302.
4. Kegley and Bretall, p. 303-
5. Kegley and Bretall, p. 303*
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Second, while not being the only factor, man and his purposes
become decisive in the historical."'" Tillich has already
pointed out in his ontological survey that man is the telos
of creation. In history, he pursues purposes and decisions
2
which in themselves express meaning. "Processes in which
z
no purpose is intended are not historical." Third, purposing
depends upon the finite freedom resulting from creative fallen-
ness. Freedom allows man to pursue goals and alternatives
which are not yet present. It permits the capacity for self-
transcendence that contains the possibility "to produce some-
4
thing qualitatively new." Within the limits of destiny, man
possesses the freedom to create something that has not existed
previously. He has the power to produce something quali¬
tatively new. Tillich asserts the "for our purpose it
suffices to describe freedom as the faculty of producing the
q
new and of realizing meaning." Not only does freedom
possess this potential, it also expresses itself by creating
meaning. The human product which results possesses meaning
and relevance. "In realizing its [freedom's] own meaning it
is within itself and beyond itself.... The new that is produced
6
by freedom is meaningful reality." It is not an event or a
1. STiii, p. 502.
2. L.T. Howe, "Is History a Theological Problem?", J. Rel.
Thought, Vol. 25, No. 5, p. 88.
5. STiii, p. 505.
4. STiii, p. 505-
5- IH, p. 252.
6. IH, p. 255-
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natural thing that is new, rather the new is meaning itself."1"
Man's purposeful pursuits transcend the given limits of
existence by resulting in the creation of the qualitatively
new meanings which are more than any fact or event or natural
thing. As an aside, it is interesting to note that Tillich
seems to be pursuing a similar approach to an understanding
of history as the one previously encountered in Dilthey and
Troeltsch. The similarity comes in Tillich's emphasis upon
the phenomenon of man and his conscious purposing. Events
and things filter through his psychical medium where they
become correlated to him and to his needs and pursuits. It
would appear that as things and events satisfy and fulfil
human .intentions, goals and purposes they become historical.
Indeed, Dilthey and Troeltsch took a similar view in their
approaches to man and his relation to the world. For them,
man's consciousness and awareness of events and things gave
them meaning and significance. For all three men, it seems
that the "more than" quality of history — the more than
events, things or facts — is man and his value-giving pursuits
and purposes. To return, as a fourth point, the new possesses
its meaning in a unique and novel way which sets it apart from
2
all other new-ness. By being unique, a historical creation
^5
is non-repeatable and non-recurring. But there are occasions
when the uniqueness becomes significant. Significance repre¬
sents "a human potentiality in a unique, incomparable way."^
1. IH, p. 253-
2. STiii, p.304.
3. "VD", p. 19-
4. STiii, p. 304.
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These potentialities of life attain historical status by
occurring within existence and finding representation as a
uniquely significant event."'" In this manner the uniquely
significant participates both within and beyond history.
Significance attaches to events as "they represent essential
human potentialities, they show these potentialities
actualized in a unique way, and they represent moments in the
2
development toward the aim of history...." On this basis
these events are universal, particular and teleological. With
these marks, Tillich sets the tone for his interpretation of
history. To engage in it is to encounter both fact and
interpretation. These are related to the phenomenon of man
as he pursues purposes and goals. His power of action
expresses itself in the dynamics of finite freedom which is
part of the given of creative falling. This power of action
can create both the 3iew and the meaningful. The product of
freedom possesses a unique quality since it is non-repeatable.
The new and the meaningful happen once and for all. But more
to the point, this uniqueness can also be of significance for
the entire life process. It can represent human potential¬
ities under the conditions of existence and thereby point to
the aim of history. Such a uniquely significant event con¬
fronts man in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ.
This picture represents the universal potentialities of life
inherent in all men. He portrays the particular and concrete
existence of one whose power of being has expressed itself as
1. STiii, p. 304.
2. STiii, p. 305-
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the reality of the New Being. And He directs man's
attention teleologically to the "ought" of essential nature
and therefore to the telos of creation. The biblical picture
represents the purposes and decisions of the disciples in the
creation of a new and meaningful event and reality which is
itself significantly unique."'"
Moreover, the free decision of the disciples also
reflects the communal quality of Jesus' life and the disciples'
faith. Man's finite existence actualizes itself in community
2
with person-to-person encounters. The previous decisions of
freely purposing men become the events of meaning today as one
re-affirms these past decisions now in the present.
Tillich sees "the" meaning of history to be that which
is portrayed in the Bible as the history of salvation,
which for him is a history of the decisions of a people
that certain events were and are the locus of their own
authenticity. To find meaning in history...we must be
able to affirm those same decisions. 3
The biblical picture finds affirmation in the Church which is
the community of faith. This is the place where Jesus is
proclaimed to be the Christ and the centre of history. "The
appearance of the Christ in an individual person presupposes
the community out of which he came and the community which
he creates."^ One receives the key to the interpretation of
history as one participates in this community where history is
5
said to have found its concrete and absolute centre. From
1. Thomas, p. 154f.
2. STiii, p. 308.
3- Howe, p. 84.
4. STii, p. 136.
5. Kegley and Bretall, p. 295.
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the vantage point of the community there arises the affirmation
of the biblical picture and the view that history is the
history of salvation."'" One lives this perspective through the
2
faculty of faith which affirms Him. In addition, as a man
shares in the religious symbol, he appreciates and experiences
the existence of the Christ. In this manner, the faithful
perceive history to be "constituted by the appearance of an un¬
conditioned meaning not as a demand but as existent, not as an
idea but as the temporal and paradoxical anticipation of the
4
ultimate perfection." Jesus as the Christ bestows a
teleological perspective upon the realm of man's existence.
He anticipates the "ultimate perfection" in the temporal realm.
He signifies what man can and "ought" to become. The signifi¬
cantly unique event of the Christ points to the meaning
contained within history though grounded beyond it. On the
basis of his Christology, Tillich suggests that an interpre¬
tation of history includes both a prophetic and a sacramental
element. In Christ, the ultimate has come in an anticipatory
way. "Those who participate in him participate .in the New
5
Being... only fragmentarily and by anticipation."-^ Though
participating on a limited basis in His power, one experiences
Him as the qualitative "finish" or "aim" of history even though
it continues quantitatively.^ The biblical picture points
to the aim that has come and to the end that is to come. The
1. IH, p. 256.
2. Thomas, p. I6lf.
3. IH, p. 262f.
4. IH, p. 262.
5. STii, p. 118.
6. STii, p. 120.
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faithful man stands between the first and second coming."^
He shares in an existence that is qualitatively ended but
quantitatively active. "So the Christian interpretation
of history stands between 'already' ['Christ, the centre of
history, has come'l and 'not yet' ['Christ, the end of history,
is coming'1; the explanation of this 'intermediate situation'
p
is the main problem of Christian theology today." The man of
faith "sees" his being-in-the-world as an "intermediate
situation" where existence participates in the "already" and
anticipates the "not yet". Historical existence vibrates
between these two dialectical points as man freely though
fragmentarily transforms and expresses the new in relation to
the ultimate meaning that has come and is coming. For his
part, the believer lives out of the qualitative end and
fulfilment of history and thus perceives that "the realization
of meaning could be understood as the essential content of
history...."^ Participating in the biblical picture and
freely creating the new, man realizes meaning within the
process of becoming and shares in it.
In a fashion apparently synonymous with Dilthey,
Tillich seems to be elevating the personal and human element
in his understanding of Christ and history. The fact of
Christ shares reciprocity with His reception. He is called
4
the New Being because man believes Him to fulfil this role.
Through personal conviction and faith, he "sees" Jesus as the
1. STii, p. 118f.
2. IH, p. 264.
3. IH, p. 254.
4. Keefe, p. 190.
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Christ. The human element in the equation of fact and
reception points to the pivotal position of man. He decides
and purposes the final outcome of faith's claim. On the
basis of this he finds himself armed with the necessary
handles for gripping the process of becoming and shapes it
into an intelligible and meaningful pattern. It would
appear to be the case that man finds fact (Jesus of Nazareth)
and value (the Christ) united and real at a particular point
in space and time. Man creates the new and the meaningful
because he is in relation to Him. Dilthey, of course,
perceived history as meaningful because it results from the
psychical processes of man. But Tillich like Troeltsch
adds the extra factor of the Christ who once and for all
conjoins fact and value. The mechanism of history still
receives meaning and purpose. Dilthey understood this as
resulting in different productions qualified and determined
by different values at different times. Tillich perceives
history to result in varied products at different points in
the time-continuum. But the over-riding and all-encompassing
source of value radiates from the Christ. No doubt, He is
a product of history in that He arises in the affirmations
of the disciples who were influenced by the brute facts of
the matter. In contradistinction to Dilthey, Tillich suggests
one point to be meaning-giving for all others instead of
several points giving meaning to several others. Tillich and
Dilthey do seem to agree that history results from the
influence and intervention of man. For both, man appears to
retain the initiative and centrality in the space-time
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continuum. For both, it would appear that history reflects
the "mind-affected" creations of man. But much unlike Dilthey,
Tillich sees the Christ as a basic and primary ingredient to
living. Dilthey concentrated upon immanent relations.
Indeed, as man becomes historically conscious and aware of
this immanentism he obtains liberation from dogmas and faiths.
In a word, man becomes free to experience the relativities of
existing. Tillich has an "about face" on the subject of
liberation. It appears to be the case that fulfilment is
only possible in intimate relation to the infinite. The
cultural and religious dearth of the present situation results
from man's loss of God. No doubt, Tillich wants to speak
symbolically about Him and about man's relation to Him. But
yet, he wants to identify this loss as being the root of evil
for man today. Consequently, Tillich directs attention away
from the immanentism that Dilthey proclaimed and heralds the
presence of the New Being as the centre of history. It
would appear that meaning and pattern are imputed in living
through the symbolic presence of God in Jesus as the Christ.
Thus while Tillich and Dilthey may see history as working out
man's humanity, collectively and individually, the former sees
its ultimate basis in the infinite and the latter looks no
further than the present.
To continue, even though the biblical picture of the
Christ functions teleologically pointing out the direction
of history and the "ought" of man, Tillich is immediate to
suggest that nothing within the confines of the historical has
any claim to the absolute and the ultimate."'" Existence in
1. PE, p. 42.
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the presence of the ultimate still continues to bear the
marks of transitoriness, fragmentation and contingency.
While man works for the realization of his essential state,
his attempts must always be conditioned by these features.
"The unconditioned appears as that which does not admit any
conditioned fulfilment of its commandments....""'" His
strivings and workings collectively and individually are al¬
ways qualified by the features of finitude. What is essential
is never actualized under the conditions of estrangement. The
Word of the Cross is to be heard, for it is a protest against
2
any and all claims of finite realities to be absolute. The
character of existence is estrangement and this places all
z
finite realities under the sentence of finitude.
Nonetheless, historical time is measured qualitatively
in that events are unique and free creations which are non-
4
repeatable. History progresses in a forward movement. Time
comes from and rises up to the eternal. "I would suggest a
curve which comes from above, moves down as well as ahead,
reaches the deepest point which is the nunc existential, the
'existential now', and returns in an analogous way to that
5
from which it came, going ahead as well as going up." In
this suggestion, Tillich seems to point to the presence of
the eternal in the temporal. This is the really real toward
which faith's symbols direct man. It impinges upon the
1. IH, p. 224.
2. IH, p. 234.
3- PE, p. 38.
4. Kegley and Bretall, p. 304.
5. STiii, p. 420.
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structures of history."'" Symbolically speaking, the
"existential now" receives its content from the eternal which
comes from above, shadows the present, and rises up again
2
to the eternal. The eternal goes ahead of the "existential
3
now" and points to the future which transcends the present.
The question about time or about history, which has a
definite direction and a meaningful end, therefore
coincides with the question about a concrete reality
in which the contradictions of meaning are regarded as
overcome, in which the possibility of final senseless¬
ness is removed. Therewith, however, the decision
about history has become^part of the decision of the
Christological question.
To speak meaningfully of time or of history requires one to
have committed himself on the Christological question. One
is required to decide, "Yes" or "No" about the biblical
picture. The decision also decides the question about time
5
and history. The believer experiences its meaningful inter¬
pretation by actively participating in the community where
the centre is affirmed.^ Time attains the quality of a leap
where freedom transcends the given and creates meaning in
7
the new. The capacity to create reveals the revolutionary
and transforming character of time in individual and collec-
8
tive life. History demonstrates its power of transcendence
by its leap to the qualitatively new. Time symbolizes the
1. PE, p. 73-
2. SF, pp. 34-37.
3. "VD", p. 20.
4. IH, p. 248.
5. McKelway, p. 237f.
6. "YD", p. 22.
7. IH, p. 273-
8. IH, p. 275.
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correlation "between the eternal and the finite as well as
represents the shadow of the eternal in the present. There¬
fore, every part of history participates "in the transcendent
meaning of History.""'" The ultimate stands out as fulfilment
and decision. "Fulfilment here means that the meaning of
2
history has overcome ambiguity and meaninglessness." Ful¬
filment finds its expression in the biblical picture which
opens history to meaning. "Decision means that the reali-
"5
zation of meaning in history is possible only by freedom."
Creative falling produces the ability to respond in the mode
of freedom which permits the responsibility of decision. As
a purposing creature, man finds it incumbent upon himself to
decide. In history, "[t]he ultimate is that which is ful-
4
filled, which is decided." This finds expression in decisions
which can produce the qualitatively new. Man freely purposes,
decides and establishes something new which has the dimension
of a leap. Through fulfilment and decision, the ultimate
remains equally near to and distant from all moments. As
well, fulfilment and decision express the content of the
ultimate.^ Belief allows one "to see" it as symbolically
present. "Everyone who recognizes a meaning of history,
recognizes salvation through history.... Fulfilment implies
salvation, consequently, decision is decision for or against
7
salvation." Religiously speaking, Tillich points to the
1. IH, p. 274.
2. IH, p. 278.
3. IH, p. 279-
4. IH, p. 280.
5. IH, p. 280.
6. IH, p. 282.
7. IH, p. 283.
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Kingdom of God as the expression of fulfilment expected."'"
The Kingdom of God symbolizes the completion of the historical
2
realm. As such, it has political, social, individual and
z
universal connotations. "It is a kingdom not only of men;
4
it involves the fulfilment of life under all dimensions."
In this symbol, the ultimate finds its most comprehensive
5
representation for salvation. It is both present and
active in history while directing attention to eternal completion
beyond the here and now.^ The Kingdom of God is the aim of
7
history. Therefore it encompasses all aspects of becoming
by symbolizing the content of the ultimate fulfilment for the
Q
entire historical spectrum. The symbolic picture of Jesus
as the Christ remains the centre of history infusing it with
meaning and demanding decision. As well, the biblical
picture directs attention to final salvation encompassed
and expressed in the symbol of the Kingdom of God.
By means of these two symbols, Tillich delineates
between the present and the future, between what is and what
can be. In this way, man is given rallying points which
possess cognitive as well as emotive "power and meaning".
Through the utilization of these symbols he is able to give
content and impetus to change and to transform the present
1. IH, p. 280.
2. STiii, p. 356f.
3. STiii, p. 356f.
4. STiii, p. 359.
5. McKelway, p. 235f.
6. "VD", p. 24.
7. "VD", p. 26.
8. Kegley and Bretall, p. 307.
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in the light of the eternal. The biblical picture of the
Christ symbolizes man's personal salvation and fulfilment
under the conditions of existence. Man realizes his
personal end by participation in the community where Jesus is
affirmed and believed to be the Christ. By the power of this
symbol he achieves revolutionary energy to alter the
situations in which he exists."^" This moves man "to see" the
salvation of all dimensions of life. On Tillich's presuppo¬
sitions, the fulfilment of one dimension also includes the
2
fulfilment of all others. Therefore, he proposes the
symbol of the Kingdom of God as encompassing the entire
spectrum of life. However, these symbols are never really
actualized within the historical realm. Rather they point
the direction man can and should travel in order to attempt
to actualize himself and creation. Thus these symbols be¬
come rallying points which provide the impetus and courage
to face the struggles of existing and "to see" them within the
meaningful context of salvation. Tillich's symbols arise
out of an old tradition where concepts no longer expressed
4
"the paradox of the ultimate and the depth of religion."
He sees the need and the necessity to revitalize the symbols
of Christianity "in order to make visible the concrete and
5
living meaning of religious symbols." He admits that his
method is unusual and that he does not employ empirical or
1. LPJ, pp. 107-124.
2. STiii, p. 359.
3- IH, p. 282f.
4. IH, p. 284.
5. IH, p. 284.
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psychological sciences to develop a position, but he feels
this necessary in order to confront the impasse of the present
with which theology has not dealt."'" Tillich's concern over
the present cultural and religious situation apparently has
given him the daring to attempt a new interpretation of
faith in order to approach existence with an "activistic inter-
2
pretation" that opens man to the dimension of the ultimate.
He is convinced that this is the only way out of the present
dearth which no longer experiences the infinite and is there¬
fore segregated from salvation. But the symbols of the Christ
and the Kingdom have been employed to move beyond the present
impasse to the ultimate confrontation. In the face-to-face
encounter with faith, man is required to decide whether the
Kingdom of God or a national kingdom shall infuse history
with meaning. These are the choices which Tillich presents.
It is now man's decision for or against faith, the Christ,
the Kingdom, ultimate meaning and salvation.
CONCLUSION
Paul Tillich has travelled quite a distance from his
initial existential analysis into the conditions of the human
situation. There he labelled existence as a state of estrange¬
ment from the order of essential goodness. The fact that man
exists demonstrates the fact that he is separated from what
he really is. On this basis, Tillich perceives a gap between
1. IH, p. 284; (see also discussion on "Protestantism" in
RS, pp. 191-219, and Chapter 15 in PE.)
2. IH, pp. 260-2; and ftnt. #1 on p. 262.
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what man i_s and what he should he. It is a gap which does
not allow for the essential to become objectively actual.
Indeed, essential goodness never actualizes itself under the
conditions of existence. The gap remains an infinite abyss.
In this way Tillich demonstrates a predilection similar to
Bultmann in that his methodological presuppositions do not
permit the transcendent to break the bounds of the external,
closed cause-and-effect world. The state of essence and the
state of existence remain separated. In a fashion similar to
Kierkegaard, Tillich also appears to view existence as a leap
which has all the marks of contingency. It cannot be seen
to be derived from essence. It remains unexplainable in
that it reveals no necessity. On this basis, Tillich can
join with Kierkegaard in disclaiming the great synthesis
achieved by the great system-builder, Hegel, who attempted
to conjoin and to reconcile essence and existence. For
Tillich as for Kierkegaard, the latter demonstrates a leap-
quality which both defies systematization and reveals its
contingent character. Now faced with an abyss, Tillich
proposes symbolics as a means of bridging the gap. It would
appear that symbols allow man to participate, to share and to
be involved in the transcendent realm. This is possible
because symbols themselves participate in the reality to which
they point. By experiencing their "power and meaning", man
also shares in the "power and meaning" of the ultimate. There¬
fore he can live in the finite without being totally excluded
from the infinite. In order to experience the ultimate, one
must share in the symbol which opens this dimension.
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Consequently Tillich turns his attention to Jesus as the
Christ. But he is careful to point out that one is here
dealing with the biblical picture of the Christ and not with
God become man. For Jesus as the Christ to be the Incarnate
Word, essential goodness would need to have realized itself
within and under the conditions of existence. Tillich
manoeuvres around this position by arguing that Jesus of
Nazareth and the reality of the New Being form the irreducible
composite of Jesus as the Christ. This occurs when the
disciples experience His resurrection as a spiritual presence.
This experience results in an ecstacy which indissolubly
unites His picture with that of the New Being. However,
Tillich does not really inform the reader from where this
latter reality has come. One possible explanation may be to
suggest that Tillich, like Liberalism, distinguishes between
external and personal facts. The root fact for faith is the
biblical picture. No doubt, this represents the personal
conviction and affirmation of the disciples who believed Jesus
to be the Christ. Working on the level of personal fact,
Tillich may speak of the infinite in time. It becomes an
intimate experience of the believer who has faith that the
biblical picture is certain and authentic. Indeed, one may
still inquire into the relation of the New Being to the
import of the biblical context. Tillich talks about the New
Being as essential Godmanhood under the conditions of existence.
By essential Godmanhood, he means the interdependence of the
finite and the infinite. The latter marks the realm of ful¬
filment. Tillich does not appear to suggest that the in-
breaking of God into the realm of the finite is an external fact.
311
Rather by apparently placing priority on the personal facts,
the New Being really points to man in his essential humanity
where existential man really lives. It appears that the
contingent person of Jesus of Nazareth is only ancillary to
the in-breaking of this realization and awareness that man
belongs to the infinite."'" One commentator tells us that
Tillich has severed the historical from faith and has attempted
2
to personify an idea. Indeed, this may appear to be the
impact of Tillich's manoeuvreing, for he tells us that the New
Being has become actual in existence and this is the case
even if he is not called by the name Jesus. Historical inquiry
can investigate Him but it certainly cannot undermine the
foundation of faith which remains the biblical picture. Again
it is possible to suggest that Tillich begins his discussion
with the external facts of the matter. However, it must be
remembered that even if one agrees that this forms the root
fact of faith, the biblical picture is still a product of
personal conviction and belief. If one allows Tillich to
begin the discussion in this manner, Tillich appears to be
somewhat justified in shifting the emphasis from external to
personal facticity. But one may still want Tillich to tell
us how he knows that the Christ of his theology is the Jesus
Christ of the Gospels and not possibly some undigested morsel
of beef. If the Christian is dealing solely with the picture
which is an expression of personal reception and interpretation,
1. H,R. MacDonald, "The Symbolic Theology of Paul Tillich,"
Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 17, pp. 414-429-
2. Sulzbach, pp. 211-213.
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His meaning becomes more important than the fact. Besides,
the meaning will also presumably include the fact at some
level.^
Thus "Jesus" is in Tillich's systematic thought merely
"the fact"...the sheer existence of which validates
the interpretation.... It is no longer the historical
manifestation but the "Biblical picture of the Christ"
which is the basis of all. Jesus plays no functional
part whatsoever in thepbelief of the believer or the
faith of the faithful.
Historical inquiry can investigate the figure of Jesus, but
this investigation can never dislodge the faith of the
disciples. It is this faith which believes Him to be the
Christ and places more importance upon Him than the historical
Jesus. This is not to say that Tillich denies His historicity
but rather he does not find it necessary to deal with this
problem at any great length. Thus Tillich is essentially
dealing with a meaning, an interpretation, a personal con¬
viction. These apparently hold precedence over fact.
One must conclude,,.that while fact and interpretation
should not be identified, the truth of interpretation
depends upon its factual basis....Through his complete
separation of fact as interpretive faith, Tillich un¬
deniably shifts the centre^of revelation from history
to a non-historical realm.
Tillich does appear to shift the discussion from interpreted
fact to interpretive faith. But he has also accomplished
something more. The non-historical characteristic of the
interpretive faith seems now to give the sure foundation
which he could not seem to find in the labours of historical
1. J.L. Adams, Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science
and Religion, p. 187f.
2. W.D. Johnson, "Tillich's Religious Symbolism," p. 175•
3. Cameron, p. 272.
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inquiry. The meaning, the significance and interpretation
of the picture towers above the uncertainty of the external,
historical facts. After all, these are always open to
controversy aid quibbling. No doubt, the historical Jesus is
important for Tillich. His importance rests upon His being a
fact which has been interpreted. The picture of Jesus of
Nazareth as an external fact becomes indissolubly allied with
the interpretation that this picture represents the New Being.
At this point, one might even assert that Tillich echoes the
past assertion of Herrmann who said that:
All Christian faith is thus really a confidence in an
event which has taken place in the Christian's own
life....Now the event whose occurrence in our life is
fraught with such importance, is the fact that the
portrait of Christ is brought before us by the New
Testament and expounded to by life in Christian fellow¬
ship....The proof of the historical reality of Jesus...
rests always on the significance which the story of
Jesus has gained for his life. (Herrmann, Communion
With God, pp. 176 and 7).
It would appear that faith for Tillich as for Herrmann becomes
a reaffirmation of the Christ's significance and meaning for
man in his encounter with a world seemingly deprived of
meaning and sense. Faith becomes a confidence which re¬
establishes the personal unity of the faithful's life. To
speak of Him requires one to stand within the context of the
community and to come face to face with "the portrait of
Christ" found in the New Testament. In communal participation,
one comes to affirm Him and thereby achieves an integrative
principle resting upon personal importance and faith. The
event of the picture incorporates both the external fact and
its intimate connections. Historical uncertainty dissipates
like the morning dew before the certainty inherent in the act
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of belief. In faith, Jesus as the Christ opens the
dimension of ultimate meaning and this permits the believer
to experience the power of God. With this synthesis of fact
and interpretation, Tillich begins to work with an entirely
new creation which is something qualitatively new."*" The
synthesis results in the interpretive faith of the disciples'
decision to represent Him as the Christ. At this point then,
one is dealing with a personal faith which has transcended
2
its ambiguous beginnings. History now appears to give way
to interpretation that is meaningful, certain and absolute.
The act of faith rests upon this latter presupposition. Again
one perceives undertones of Dilthey. The fact fades into un¬
importance as the significance arising from it comes into view.
It is man who purposes, decides and creates the qualitatively
new. Man qua man becomes the barrier against change and
relativities. Purposes and values are all "rooted in the
experience of individual human beings...." While the exper¬
iences change, man himself remains a constant factor which
permits the picture to flow from one generation to the next.
Man qua man remains constant and on-going. Dilthey tells us
that "meaning and significance arise only in man and his
history." And Tillich informs us that man, through the
power of his finite freedom, can produce the "qualitatively
new" which can also be uniquely significant for representing
all human potentialities. The unique event of Jesus happens
1. Kegley and Bretall, pp. 297-301.
2. K. Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 172.
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within "the experience of individual human beings". Through
an act of faith, man shares in the "meaning and significance"
of the portrait of Christ. It can only happen in man and it
can only be transmitted by him. He remains the common denomin¬
ator throughout the changes in history."'" Therefore, man
armed with an undemonstrable article of faith — the symbolic
possession of ultimate meaning — takes up the gauntlet and
engages in battle with the fragmentation and temporality of
life.2
Nonetheless it would appear that Tillich has not really
succeeded in presenting a point within and of history that is
absolute and certain. He begins with Jesus as a contingent
fact, but his attention soon shifts from this particularity
to the certainty of the interpreted fact. It would seem that
in a sense Tillich attempts to transcend history by the
infusion of something absolute but also non-historical — the
interpretation. The biblical picture presents itself as the
cornerstone of history. This is the point where history's
centre is seen to rest. Indeed, this is the centre not in
a quantitative but in a qualitative sense.^ The biblical
picture allows existence to become a Gestalt. The meaning-
lessness and senselessness constantly threatening the non-
believer subsides with faithful participation in His "power
1. Cell, pp. 339-46, 348, 353, 355, 372, and 373-
2. Compare: K. Hamilton, "Tillich's 'Method of Correlation',"
Can. J. Theo., Vol. 5, p. 94f.
3. Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 170.
4. Adams, pp. 36-41.
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and meaning". History finds concrete and absolute this
point which is also teleological. The Christ-symbol not
only signifies who and what man is but also what he can and
should be. Christ's absolute significance apparently de¬
rives from the union of fact and value. In Him, he receives
an "ought" which is absolute. The ambiguities are broken,
for He represents the final meaning both "inside" and "outside"
the confines of life."'" The aim of history is expressed in
the New Being who reveals what God wants man to be. The
Christ becomes a rallying point which seems to motivate man
to create the new and to change the present. But man is
also central in this endeavour. And in a fashion similar
to Liberalism, Tillich might also agree that:
Personal conviction of the Christian view of the world...
depends on faith in the Divine worth of Christ. For
His historical appearance denotes not only the
organizing centre of the world-whole...but also the
absolutely sufficient ground of knowledge by which we
make that view of the world our own.
(Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, pp. 592-3)
The Christ symbol functions as a sign-post both giving man
"knowledge" of his situation and directing him along the path
he must travel. Its power rests, in part, upon the personal
conviction of the believer, and, in part, upon faith's partici¬
pation in the "power and meaning" of the picture. The demand,
that man experiences, finds its content in the concept of
Justice. "The general content of the demand therefore is
that dignity equal to that of the 'I' be accorded the 'You',
1. N.F.S. Ferre, "Three Critical Issues in Tillich's
Philosophical Theology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 10,
pp. 236f.
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the dignity of the true origin of human essence.""'" Jesus
as the Christ reveals this "general content". He directs
man beyond the now to what "ought" to be. In terms of the
demand for Justice, the New Being symbolizes "fulfilment
p
within the unity of universal fulfilment." Christ becomes
the criterion of authenticity under the conditions of becoming.
In Him, man becomes "knowledgeable" about his destiny — he
discovers the way he must sojourn.
It would appear that Tillich, in part follows the lead
set by Kierkegaard around Lessing's ditch. Decision, resol¬
ution and action become the tools at man's disposal for forging
a way across the "ugly, broad ditch" which Lessing perceived.
The accidental truths of history remain accidental. But by
sheer human power and resolve an interpretive and personal
path around the "ditch" emerges. The symbols point out
what essentially belongs to him. They enable man to share in
infinite value and worth. In deciding for faith and its
symbols, the problem of objective historical distance is
transformed into the personal certainty and immediateness of
contemporaneity. Accidental historical facts seem to dis¬
appear in the brilliance of meaning and significance. History
provides the vehicle for value in the biblical picture. Man's
resolve to appropriate it apparently seems to negotiate the
distance between faith's Christ and history's approximateness.
In this leap, man is seen to be the pivotal point. His
decision erases the enigma between the uncertainty of. history
1. IH, p. 210.
2. LPJ, p. 65.
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and the meaningfulness of faith. History illustrates what
its facts cannot demonstrate. The effect of his decision
places him in contact with the infinite. It illustrates
Christ to be the final demonstration of meaning. But it is
important to remember that faith's decision opts for personal
value over external fact. For Tillich, both dimensions —
personal and external — are seen to be historical. It is
on the existential level that Christ stands as a concrete and
teleological point of reference and meaning. The coming-into-
existence-kind-of-change affects all historical realities save
Him. However, Dilthey's dictum must be heard again. "All
meaning, all value, all purpose, in the historical world, is
rooted in the experience of individual human beings...." The
picture is a meaning, value and purpose expressed in the
"ecstatic experience" of the disciples and the participative
experience of the community. Man's re-affirmation brings to
explicit awareness his essential belonging-ness to something
of infinitely more value than the present here and now. Man's
decision opens him to the presence of the eternal which is an
essential ingredient for living.
Tillich's opting to view the transcendent in personal
and existential terms appears to be a decision for meaning
over fact. "The key to Tillich's view of the transcendent
is that there is no transcendent realm, only transcendent
meaning.""'" The infinite as infinite is not an expression of
being as being but of being as value and meaning; the infinite
1. N.F.S. Ferre, "Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence,"
Rel. in Life, Vol. 35, No. 5, p- 665; vide, Tillich et al.,
The Kingdom of God and History, p. Il4f.
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qualifies existence. Therefore the symbols of the Christ
and the Kingdom function to qualify history and life by
making it human, meaningful and coherent. Existence achieves
meaning, coherency and humanization to the degree that man
actively participates in the "power and meaning" of the
Christian symbols. In participation, his existence becomes
aware of its essential foundation. Potentiality qualitati¬
vely differs from actuality, but yet man shares in potential¬
ity when he shares in the "power and meaning" of the New Being.
Subjectively, fact and value are conjoined symbolically in the
portrait of the Christ. But objectively and externally,
history does not appear to provide the quantitative evidence
required to bring about qualitative change. Subjectively,
Lessing's "ditch" appears closed. Objectively, it seems to
be as wide as ever. It would appear that Kierkegaard might
be justified in reminding Tillich that, "Everything that has
come into existence is eo ipso historical. For even if it
accepts no further historical predicate, it nevertheless
accepts one decisive historical predicate: it has come into
existence" (Philosophical Fragments, p. 93)• For the reality
of the New Being to remain a reality within history, it too
must be historical and contingent and consequently conditioned
by a coming-inte-existence-kind-of-change. For it to remain
aloof from this contingency, the New Being must be necessary
and completely resistant to change. "Everything which comes
into existence proves precisely by coming into existence that
it is not necessary, for the only thing which cannot come into
existence is the necessary, because the necessary is. (Ibid. ,p.91)•
1. Adams, pp. 46-49.
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The is-ness of the New Being suggests its reticence to change
and its quality to be necessary. "Nothing whatever exists
because it is necessary.... The actual is no more necessary
than the possible, for the necessary is absolutely different
from both.The New Being as absolute and necessary
objectively contradicts the realm of history which Liberalism,
Kierkegaard and even Tillich perceived as relative. What¬
ever exists is actual and therefore it cannot be necessary
for the necessary simply is. "But if the event of Jesus is,
as Tillich has claimed, both fact and reception, then the risk
2
of faith is not only existential but is also historical."
Faith's basis involves not only an interpretive faith but
also fact. It is this fact, at least, which seems to
establish faith in the changing tides of history. Tillich
has implicitly followed Lessing's dictum by not allowing the
historical to effect the truths of religion. But he has
apparently shifted the discussion to the realm of meaning.
This would seem to suggest that indeed history in external
-z,
terms can only be approximate. Therefore history and faith
remain objectively separated. Tillich's attempt to bridge
the gap moves his inquiry from the historical to the non-
historical.^" In a sense, Tillich, like Bultmann and Ritschl
and company, is not completely able to jump Lessing's "ugly,
1. SK, Philosophical Fragments, p. 92.
2. Livingston, p. 702.
3. Ibid., p. 700.
4. J.Y. Fenton, "Being-Itself and Religious Symbolism,"
J. of Re., Vol. 45, pp. 73-86. The author raises the
question if it is the case that phenomena are well-
founded "when they are absolutely founded?" He deals
with this question in relation to Tillich's solution
offered in terms of Being-Itself.
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broad ditch". The whole weight of eternity cannot be
suspended on the spider's thread of external, historical
details. The absolute truths which faith is assumed to
require and the probablistic truths of history remain
severed and unreconciled. The symbol of the New Being
stands as something non-historical within the particularity
of space and time. It does not really appear to afford a
way to a "radical and absolute solution" for "the system of
historical life". To be historical involves change and
precludes any thought or notion of the absolute and completely
certain. History remains the realm of the contingent and the
particular. Indeed, "History within itself cannot be
transcended...." Change remains the order of the day. In
the end, it would seem that Tillich like the Liberals before
him appears to offer a subjective and personal path around
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The strange new world of Karl Barth opens out and upward
into new vistas and insights which unfold new dimensions and
perspectives hitherto glossed or ignored. Barth comes for¬
ward as a strange new voice bringing into perceptibility an
alternative interpretation of the contents of faith. In the
preceding exposition on Bultmann and Tillich, one was con¬
fronted with explications of the faith which sought to clothe
its contents within the wrappings of immanence. Both Bultmann
and Tillich share a similar ontological presupposition and
"preunderstandings". Both theologians seek to come to grips
with the contents of faith from the starting-point of the
world in general and of man in particular. In essence, for
both men it can never be a question of discoursing about God
in Himself or about God acting in history. Such talk not
only offends but also contradicts their initial assumption
regarding the world in which they live. Bultmann quite
simply points out that one of his basic operating propositions
contends that God does not literally interact with the world
of space and time. Rather he is given to emphasize the Word
of God as it is transmitted to man by Jesus Christ. But this
same Jesus Christ is not understood as the Incarnate Word
who meets man as vere homo et vere Deus. On the contrary,
Jesus approaches man as a special moment in space and time.
It is a moment which has brought to awareness the compre¬
hension that the world is more than a closed nexxis of cause
and effect. Jesus illuminates the presence of a God who,
while not directly interacting with man, can nonetheless present
to him a feeling and a sense of freedom from an otherwise
closed world. Even though he is existentially free from the
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confines of this world, man still does not come to any
knowledge or encounter with God. He is released from bondage
by the Word of God which illumines his awareness of the world.
However this awareness bespeaks to man not an understanding of
God but of himself. Man in essence falls back upon the
immanence of this world. One might say that God becomes a
regulative principle of our awareness even though man is not
able to experience or to know God. A similar development
occurs within the thought of Paul Tillich. In his theology,
Tillich is quite precise when he points out that there is
never a time when essential goodness has become actualized.
Like Bultmann, Tillich operates with a world that remains
contained within itself. Tillich, like Bultmann, attempts to
describe and to explain the world religiously. In order to
do this he develops his symbolics which allow him to speak
about God. But it is important to point out that Tillich does
not acknowledge God's direct interaction with the world. This
becomes clear in his exposition of Jesus "as the Christ". Here
one is not dealing with the Incarnate Word but rather with the
picture of Jesus who becomes indissolubly united with the
picture of the Christ by means of an ecstatic experience.
Jesus becomes the Christ by an act of the disciples. Jesus
remains the Christ for man today as he re-affirms this act
of the disciples. This Jesus as the Christ comes to symbolize
the New Being of all men. The symbol signifies man's essential
goodness which has been lost to him in his existential state.
But the symbol of the New Being reminds man of his essential
goodness and of what he should be. Jesus concretizes this
symbol by being the occasion for its introduction into man's
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world. But the symbol itself hovers between the here and
the beyond. It functions as a signpost directing man's
movement and energy to what he should be. However, this
"should be" is never a component part of the existential
realm. The infinite, to which the symbol points, remains
man's threshold into the mystery of God. To speak of Him
one must speak symbolically. Indeed, the only non-symbolic
statement Tillich will grant in relation to the divine is to
assert that God is Being-Itself. Taking into consideration
the gap which irrevocably remains between the finite and the
infinite, one finds that he can only speak symbolically of
God's being since He does not really interact within the cause
and effect world. God does not give Himself to be known in
His action; even in Jesus who is called the Christ, God does
not directly interact. He remains immediately unknowable.
One must ask if it is not legitimate to say that Being-Itself
is God for Tillich. Certainly in his theology immanence
remains the order of the day. Tillich is not really able to
have the finite and the infinite interact in any other way
than symbolically. The insurmountable chasm continues
between these two realms. Man finds himself again thrown
back upon the world which exists according to the laws of
cause and effect.
Into a theological world which unceasingly attempts to
ford Lessing's "ugly broad ditch", Karl Barth presents his
theological portrait. Theology does an about-face with
Barth. The attempts to base the world upon itself and to
explain it by means of immanent causes and solutions have
fallen upon bad times. Barth recognizes the "ugly broad ditch"
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which so baffled Lessing and those who have followed after
him. However, Barth fails to accept the presuppositions
upon which the "ditch" has been dug. The validity of Lessing's
problem looms ominously over any theological exposition which
radically separates the finite and the infinite. Bultmann
attempted to hurdle this gap by means of the Word of God.
Tillich sought to erect a bridge with his symbols. But in the
end the accidental truths of history are not momentous enough
to storm the necessary and eternal truths of religion.
Immanence and transcendence continue unconnected, and,in the
end immanence falls back upon itself. But at this point
Barth attempts his explication of the faith. However, it is
not a this-worldly assault upon the gates of heaven. Rather
Barth takes another avenue of approach. He permits the trans¬
cendent God to reveal Himself where and when He so wills it.
In taking this approach Barth ignores Lessing's"ditch" as a
non-existent ontological reality. For him, it is a question
of the reality of God first in His being and act and then the
reality of the world. Barth refuses to allow any world-view
to pontificate over the truth and the reality of God's
presence. Rather he becomes the charter and map-maker of a
new exploration into the mystery of the eternal presence, in
space and time. Barth attempts to approach the biblical
witness without the usual assortment of ontological precon¬
ditions, presuppositions, and "pre-understandings" moulded by
a this-worldly attitude and governing and controlling what is
to be called real. On the contrary, these preceding notions
are seen to be controlled by God's self-revelation. He who
is the Truth controls the ratio of truth. God does not
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remain at man's disposal that he might domesticate Him.
Rather God freely gives Himself to man's cognition. He
creates and imparts the revelation of His truth. Jesus
Christ stands in history as God's personal self-revelation.
In Him, God freely enters into the space and time continuum
of man's creatureliness to share in man's life and to deter¬
mine man for Himself. Barth does not shrink away from
speaking of God as presenting Himself within the limits of
this world. And moreover, Barth speaks of God's interaction
in objective and literal terms which testify to the earthly
presence of the eternal in time. For Karl Barth, to speak
of Jesus Christ is to speak of God Himself. This is the
strange new world of Karl Barth. It is a world which expounds
the divine in real terms and in so doing denies the reality of
Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" which neither Bultmann nor Tillich
has successfully crossed. But here one comes up against a
different approach which acknowledges God's presence here in
the world. God gives Himself to be known and it becomes the
task of the theologian to inquire into what God has already
said in the person of Jesus Christ.
A. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
And so it stands: whatever exists apart from thee,
the Only One, can be conceived as not existing. Thou
alone of all living beings hast really true existence —
and therefore thou alone of all beings hast perfect
existence. For anything other than thee does not
possess this manner of existence and therefore possesses
but imperfect existence. 1
Jesus Christ comes to the Christian as the self-
1. A, p. 154.
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impartation of God Himself."1" God comes into the sphere of
space and time to communicate knowledge of Himself to man where
2
he lives. God steps into the realm of creation as creature
hut without ceasing to be the One He is. Barth attempts to
handle this revelation of God in Jesus Christ with absolute
seriousness. But in order to do so Barth must appropriate
a cognitive apparatus which will facilitate the exposition of
this revelation. Therefore he turns to the work of Anselm
in order to acquire an epistemological basis for bringing to
understanding the revelation of God. In Anselm, Barth admits
that he was "working with a vital key, if not the key" to which
•5
formed the base for a faithful understanding of the divine.
Indeed, the exercise of thought which Anselm's method trans¬
mitted to Barth was a process of reflection whereby
intelligere issues in probare.^ In discoursing about God,
one stands within the tradition of faith. Theology searches
for an understanding of its subject matter; it does not
attempt "to lead men to faith, nor to confirm them in the
15
faith, nor even to deliver their faith from doubt.Rather
theology searches for intelligere on the basis and foundation
of faith. One does not begin with ignorance but with a know¬
ledge that seeks and desires to become clearer.^ Therefore
to speak of faith is to speak of a summons to knowledge which
1. IVii, p. 101.
2. Ii, p. 155.
3. A, p. 11.
4. A, p. 14.
5. A, p. 17-
6. TFT, p. 184.
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is inherent in the nature of faith itself."1" God delivers
Himself to man in an intelligible and cognitive manner which
the ratio of man is capable of assimilating and of knowing.
The faithful man is in search of a clarification of what he
already believes to be true. To expound the reality of
God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ, the believer turns
2
toward and stands within the context of Christianity. It is
here that one comes to know God. "We know it [God's
existence] because it is how God has revealed himself and
•3
because we believe him as he has revealed himself." God
controls and determines human inquiry. He accomplishes this
control in the event of His revelation. Faith believes that
God does reveal Himself in Jesus Christ and that He gives
Himself to be known. Man's inquiry, then, does not need to
establish the reality and the presence of God a priori. Quite
to the contrary, the inquiry arises out of the fact of God's
act in itself. It is solely on the basis of God's initiative
that man receives knowledge which itself seeks to become
clearer. Therefore a definitive relationship between God
and man is already posited in faith before it seeks for a
clearer understanding of itself. "But this act of knowing
can be explained: we know it because on the basis of reve¬
lation and faith, standing before God, we know that we do not
stand as anyone being before any other being, but as a creature
before his Creator."^1" Revelation and faith become the
1. A, p. 18.
2. A, p. 16.
3. A, p. 152.
4. A, p. 152.
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determining factors in the quest for clearer knowledge. Man
comes to know a definite object which has given itself to be
known and which controls the mode of this process of thought.
God in Himself, God in the person of Jesus Christ, condescends
to communicate with man."'" God, the Creator, confronts man,
the creature, and bestows upon him knowledge. God and man
meet and communicate and have dialogue at the behest of the
divine. Man does not come by any ability inherent or innate
"5
within himself. Rather faith like revelation is dependent
upon the activity of God. "In as much as faith in God, and
therefore really faith in what is right, it is the proper
action of the will due to God, enjoined by God and bound with
4
saving 'experience'." God stands as the author and the
sustainer of man's belief. But man is not simply a passive
recipient of this divine initiative. His faith also resembles
God in that it is an action of the will. Man's faith which
searches for understanding expresses itself in the proper
action of the will. Proper action becomes a decision of the
r
will which freely chooses to give obedience owed to God. In
a sense, it may be legitimate to suggest that as an absolutely
freely effecting cause God allows man the option of freely
choosing Him. Man chooses to respond to Him and to acknowledge
His revelation.^ Man's choice is not inadvertent nor is it
1. Iii, pp. 132-133.
2. Hi, p. 188.
3- Iii, p. 135.
4. A, p. 22.
3. A, p. 19.
6. Ii, p. 233-
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accidental. His acknowledgement and response follow upon
the event of hearing which comes about through preaching."1"
Faith experiences the "Word of Christ" which confirms man's
2
experience of the divine. Human speech about Him possesses
7
the possibility of becoming His Word about Himself. This
Word can be "legitimately represented by particular human
4
words." But these "particular human words" are found within
the context of the Church. Man's words are not random dis¬
sertations or discourses. Rather they reflect a definite
content which arises from a particular point of reference.
This point of reference finds expression in the belief of the
Church — the Church Credo. The "subjective credo has an
objective Credo of the Church as its unimpeachable point of
reference...." Therefore one is not discussing how man in
general comes to know God, but how the Christian who already
believes moves from knowledge to clearer knowledge of his
faith.^ In order to discourse about God one does not begin
with something other than faith. He begins within faith it¬
self. "[F]aith is assent to what is preached as the Truth,
assent for the sake of Christ who is its real and ultimate
7
Author and himself the Truth, can proclaim only the Truth."
Q
What is preached summons the hearer to obedience. It is
1. A, p. 22.
2. A, p. 22.
3- Ii, p. 57.
4. A, p. 22.
5. A, p. 24.
6. Ii, p. 224.
7. A, p. 25-
8. Ii, p. 104.
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something which requires assent and acknowledgement from the
hearer."^" What is preached is seen and heard in its divine
2
essentiality. Jesus Christ is the truth of God made
7
flesh. As the truth, Jesus Christ proclaims what is true
about Himself and consequently what is true about God.^
God in Christ acts and reveals Himself within the context of
this world. "God...is certainly a reality within our world.
For our knowledge must be knowledge of a world-reality if it
5
is really going to be our knowledge." One of the
conditions for apprehending God in this world is that He be
present here where man lives. God accomplishes this require¬
ment in the person of Jesus Christ. He is the Word made
6
flesh. Man's act of cognition has the objective act of God
7
as its basis for reflection. God speaks and man listens.
Thus what is preached has its foundation in the act of God,
in this person who is Himself the Author of Truth. Faith
begins with this point of reference as it is transmitted to
8
man who stands within the tradition of faith. This
g
tradition bears witness now to God's act then. Faith assents
to the belief and testimony of the Church where what is
preached is heard as the truth. God remains in complete
1. Ii, p. 101.
2. li, p. 105-
3. Hi, p. 156.
4. IVii, p. 125.
5- Hi, p. 207.
6. Iii, p. 132f.
7. Iii, p. 165.
8. Ii, pp. 98-140.
9. G/A, pp. 3-4.
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control of revelation and of man's assent and acknowledgement
of it. God who is the object of faith's search for under¬
standing determines and limits the acquisition of truth. As
the object of knowledge, He reveals Himself within the context
of the Christian tradition. Here is the beginning point
where theology seeks for a clearer elucidation of its content.
The gap between man's assent to faith and his awareness of
the Truth forms the basis of theology's endeavour to move from
credere to intelligere.
Faithful man comes before God who is the summa veritatis
as well as the causa veritatis.^ God stands as the Creator.
Human existence, for Barth, takes place within the compre¬
hension of the eternal. There is no independent existence
2
as such. Man lives, moves, and has his being within the
nexus of a created reality that is dependent upon God Himself.
"And so it stands: whatever exists apart from thee, the Only
One, can be conceived as not existing." The reality of God
forms the umbrella over the reality of the created realm.
■5
"God is the prius of all cognition and of everything known....
He becomes the precedent of faith because God is its object.
And God is this object because He so wills to be. Therefore
the truth-quality of faith's understanding does not reside
in any quality of the Christian. Rather God the summa
veritatis is the causa veritatis. He possesses the basis of
faith's truth within Himself.^ Faith commences with the
1. A, p. 18.
2. Hi, pp. 165, 168, 169-
3. Hi, p. 197.
4. Ii, p. 223.
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certainty which God has already bestowed within His reve¬
lation. "And for the very reason that this thing, the Word
of God, is not a thing, but the living, personal, and free
God.""'" Jesus Christ as the Word of God become flesh assures
man that his statements about and his reflection upon this
2
object of faith resemble and correspond to the truth of God.
On the basis of faith, on the basis of the Word of God, and
on the basis God's revelation in Jesus Christ, man wills to
apprehend the object of his faith. God becomes the pre¬
supposition for faith's knowledge. "Thus the knowledge
that is sought cannot be anything but an extension and expli¬
cation of that acceptance of the Credo of the Church, which
faith itself already implied." The Christian's search for
understanding moves between his assent to faith and his
awareness of its truth. There can never be any question of
denying or doubting faith's foundation. On the contrary,
Credo determines the basis of intelligere. On this pre¬
supposition or "pre-understanding" man moves forward to
extend the limits of faith's initial basis. But it is an
extension and an expansion that is never ignorant of its
background and tradition. This extension of the Credo is
always positive and hopeful because it involves God's
grace.^ Therefore theology does not question and doubt
faith's basis but rather it proclaims the truth of the Credo
which is guaranteed by God.
1. Ii, p. 226.
2. TFT, p. 187.
3- A, pp. 26-7.
4. H/G, p. 59.
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However this proclamation cannot establish a conception
of God since only He can know Himself."'" In dealing with God,
theology and faith are confronted with an event. It is the
very nature of God to be contained within His act.
We are dealing with the being of God; but with regard
to the being of God, the word "event" or "act" is
final, and cannot be surpassed or compromised. To its
very deepest depths God's Godhead consists in the fact
that it is an event — not any event, not event in
general, but the event of Hispaction, in which we have
a share of God's revelation.
In Jesus Christ, God comes to man and delivers knowledge of His
being in His act of revelation. God does not confront one
as a static entity or as an eternal truth. God encounters
man in His act in Jesus Christ. 'God comes to meet man where
he resides. God shares man's time. His action in Jesus
Christ reveals His being. This action provides the basis
for knowledge. God's truth like His being shares in this
active characterization. "The definition that we must use
as a starting-point is that God's being is life." One is
here dealing with a dynamic entity whose truth is life itself
and whose life is truth itself. While man cannot know God
in Himself directly, the Christian confession of faith pro¬
vides a mediate basis of knowledge. "[r]evelation is
originally and immediately, what the Bible and Church pro-
4
clamation are derivatively and mediately, God's Word."
Thus knowledge of the eternal is never without a witness or
a testimony. His presence remains in the Credo of faith
1. Hi, p. 179.
2. Ili, p. 263.
3. Ili, p. 263.
4. Ii, p. 131.
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where God so wills to make Himself known. Man's knowledge
and his language are appropriated in His gracious act of
revelation. God as the causa veritatis gives to human
language and cognition participation in His summa veritatis.
In this act God does not affect and determine what is alien
and foreign to Himself. Rather He is the basis of all
created reality. In approaching man, God comes unto His
own. There is certainly no question of the divine performing
a ueTa/JacrLS els yeVcs . God interacts
with what has been created by Him. But in the event of God's
coming to appropriate the creature's language and cognition,
2
He comes to what is other than Himself.
By the Word and Spirit of God we are told that God
is and who He is, what He wills and does and will do,
and what this means for us. We have now to tell
ourselves what is told to us, and we have also to
tell it to others. 3
God informs man about Himself. In this communication the
realities of God and man remain distinct and intact. Yet He
communicates who He is and what He intends. It is for man
to reflect upon this conversation, for he now needs to come
to an understanding of what God's meaning means for him.
Faith experiences and encounters God's truth not as God knows
and comprehends the truth about Himself but as man in the
created realm comes to a creaturely appreciation of the
knowledge of God. In faith man, the creature, stands before
God, the Creator. His truth is not man's truth, although God
1. Hi, p. 228.
2. Ili, p. 228.
3. Ili, p. 211.
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creates the possibility of the human ratio corresponding to
and resembling the divine veritatis. On this basis, then,
theology is a creaturely pursuit of the Creator which has
been initiated and authorized by the will of God. In this
pursuit, faith speaks positively of God's activity in the
event of His revelation. But because God's very nature is
activity and event, human truth is subsequent, secondary,
dependent, and improper."'" Faith's search for understanding
can only acquire an imprecise knowledge which is in need of
constant correction. "It belongs to the nature of this
knowing that it consists only in 'approximations'. It can¬
not...be perfected. It stands in need of correction at
2
every point." His knowing in faith cannot hope to be any¬
thing more than an approximation of the certainty of faith.
It may be the case that Barth is acknowledging the trans¬
itional nature of life. Kierkegaard has already pointed
out that the movement and contingency of existence qualifies
the certainty and definiteness which the Reason seeks to
attain. Quite possibly, Barth is reflecting this same motif
in his acceptance of approximation as the limiting condition
of even faith knowledge. Consequently, man's language and
cognition of God must always transpire in the creaturely realm
which is other than God and which is in the constant state of
becoming. Therefore faith can only attain to a scientific
or probablistic certainty. This is to say, the Christian
must act as one who does not possess absolute certainty about
1. Hi, p. 228.
2. Ili, p. 202.
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his object, who will experiment with his conceptions, and
who is in need of correction from others."'" The knowledge
of faith becomes relative in that this intelligere is always
dependent upon and reflective of the activity of God who in
2
His being is freely willing life and activity. Faith's
coming to knowledge must reflect God's nature if it is to be
true knowledge and right action of the will. The under¬
standing after which faith seeks depends entirely upon its
object.
Since man's knowledge can only be mediate cognition and
since the object of faith is not just any creature or thing
but the Creator, the entire credibility and comprehensibility
of faith's undertaking depends solely and entirely upon the
incomparable and the incomprehensible — namely upon the fact
that God gives Himself to man's apprehension. "Everything
depends not only on the fact that God grants him grace to
think correctly about him, but also on the fact that God him¬
self comes within his system as the object of this thinking....
In God's decision to be the object of man's faith and thus of
his understanding, God takes the initiative to approach
creation and to appropriate what is His own. But this is
4
always God's decision because it is always God's act. Know¬
ledge, then, occurs as it is instituted by the decisive action
of God. It is His confrontation with man in the person of
1. A, p. 30.
2. A, p. 37-
3. A, p. 39-
4. Ii, p. 178.
5. IViii, p. 219.
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Jesus Christ that provides the focal point for Christian
experience. And this experience is never contemplated nor
grasped by pure intellectual capabilities. Christian know¬
ledge requires that one, in his totality, is grasped and
2
determined by the very object of thought. It is always God
who retains the initiative and it is He who grasps man in all
of his possibilities. As such he shares in this knowledge
by participation which is always presented to him.^ Partici¬
pation inaugurated and sanctified by divine action in Jesus
Christ becomes a mode of relation between God and man in the
realm of cognition.
And the presupposition of this participation is that the
ground of being of this One penetrates and transcends
of itself the limits of the sphere of what we can see
and interpret and know, that it discloses and declares
and attests and reveals itself in this sphere. 5
God offers Himself to human cognition. And this is effected
within the realm of man's world. God both penetrates and
transcends the limits of what is knowable. He interacts
and communicates with the creature in the place where he makes
his home. God "discloses and declares and attests and
reveals" Himself where man lives in order that His creation
may come to knowledge of the Creator. Participation is an
act of God in His self-revelation. It is His coming into the
limits of space and time. It is God's act in Jesus Christ.
1. IViii, pp. 267-274.
2. IViii, p. 220.
3. IViii, p. 220.
4. IViii, p. 220.
5. IVii, p. 39.
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On this basis of participation one "can see and interpret
and know" that God is with him because God acts where it is
possible for man to come to an understanding.
The essence of the knowledge of this One is that the
divine act of majesty in and by and from which the
man Jesus has His being should be reflected and
respected in the human seeing and interpreting which
is awakened and controlled by Him and therefore
corresponds to Him. 1
Again everything depends upon Him. Faith's search for
understanding can only repeat and reflect what the "divine
act of majesty" has effected in Christ. Human seeing and
interpreting reflect upon God's act in such a way that man is
both awakened and determined by Him in this experience.
Because God acts and because He participates within the
sphere of creation, man comes to knowledge. And this know¬
ledge receives its credibility and truth because God awakens
and controls it within him. He personally guarantees and
assures the certainty and the truthfulness of human cognition
and its correspondence to Him. "The veracity of the
revelation of God verifies itself by verily laying claim to
the thinking and speaking of man." Man's thinking and his
speaking are put into the service of God. In this way human
thought and speech receive their truth-quality in relation to
divine communication. Indeed, God becomes the first and the
last word that is spoken about Him by man. It would seem to
be that Barth may again be reflecting a Kierkegaardian motif.
It has been suggested (see Appendix A) that SK understood
1. IVii, p. 39.
2. Hi, p. 211.
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Jesus Christ as the Absolute Paradox. He is nonetheless
intelligible and comprehensible in His reality. In confron¬
tation with the Reason, SK contends that Christ appears as
the absurd and the incommensurable. In and of itself, the
Reason cannot understand Him, but through the passion of
faith man can overcome his rational doubts and limitations
and embrace the reality of the Eternal in time. In matters
of faith, the Reason is hard pressed to explain rationally
the content of faith. It does not seem to be the case that
SK is advocating the suspension of the Reason. Rather he
seems to be marking the point of its competence. Similarly,
Barth implicitly appears to be arguing for the same limitation
when attempts are made which strive to explain the faith
rationally. Faith presumably provides its own comprehen-
sibility which is beyond the competence of the Reason.
Faith and the understanding which accompanies it
are always reflecting upon the revelation and act of God in
Jesus Christ. This faith and the corresponding knowledge
share in the reality of Christ then and there, here and now.
The truth-quality of this original ratio becomes contempor¬
aneous in the present act of intelligere by the ratio fidei.
Then and there becomes here and now — a present reality.
Man is distinguished from the animals in that he shares in
the vestigium trinitatis. Man possesses this possibility
which comes to actualization within the reality of faith.
This vestigium trinitatis empowers man: (a) to remember God,
1. Ii, pp. 168-170.
2. A, p. 20.
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(b) to recognize Him, (c) to love Him."'" This potentiality
resides within the limits of faith. Barth is not arguing
for anything that may smack of a natural theology or a
natural capacity within man to come to God unaided. He is
rather contending that the knowledge of faith can become
contemporaneous on the conditions immanent in faith itself.
The vestigium trinitatis relies upon a "biblical-ecclesias-
2
tical-dogmatic presupposition". Knowledge of God is
attained on something which exists externally to man and which
must be given to him to understand. He can recognize,
remember, and love God always and only within the prospectus
of faith. Man "recollects the revelation of God on the basis
of the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition".
Here it is given to man to move to the ratio fidei where
Christ's reality becomes present.^1" Man's noetic ratio comes
into correspondence with the ontic ratio of the object of
5
faith. And this ontic ratio is identical with the summa
veritatis and the ratio veritatis of God.^ In the position
of faith, the noetic ratio of the believer is determined and
7
appropriated by the ontic ratio of the object. God who
is this object becomes known and contemporaneous with man's
Q
act of cognition as the ratio fidei moves to intelligere.
And moreover, this event of cognition also incorporates its
1. A, p. 20.
2. A, p. 58.
3- Ii, p. 136.
4. TFT, p. 192.
5. A, p. 45.
6. A, p. 45-
7. A, p. 46.
8. TFT, p. 189f.
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own veracity. God is contemporaneously the truth, the
content, and the object of faith in the event of cognition.
The ratio fidei becomes identical with the truth of God and
this identity lies hidden within the "biblical-ecclesiastical-
dogmatic presupposition" of faith.^ This identity comes to
emergence and into the ratio fidei always on the initiative
of God.
Fundamentally, the ratio either as ontic or noetic is
never higher than the truth but truth is itself the
master of all rationes...deciding for itself, now here,
now there, what is vera ratio: in so far as the ratio
of the object of faith and the use which man makes of
his capacity to think and judge conform to Truth...its
true rationality is determined and the intellectus
that is sought occurs. 2
Here again one meets the assertion that God who is the Author
of Truth is also its master. He affects the relationship
that results between the ontic and noetic rationalities.
When man's rationality conforms to the rationality of the
object of faith, the possibility is present for true ration-
ality to result and for knowledge to occur. When true
rationality obtains man can truly remember, recognize, and
love God as the Author, Guarantor, and subject of the Truth
and the object of his faith. God's act in Jesus Christ who
is the object of faith and God's self-revelation becomes
contemporaneous in this acquisition of genuine rationality
and intelligibility. The mediate knowledge transmitted by
bible-church-dogma provides the foundation for God's past act
in Jesus Christ becoming present. This act of revelation
1. R/T, pp. 182-7.
2. A, p. 47.
3. T/C, p. 45f.
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then and there becomes a renewed here and now in God's
decision to make the ratio fidei correspond to the ratio of
the object of faith. Two points of interest seem to emerge.
First, the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition"
of faith's knowledge may possibly reflect the influence of
Kahler (see Appendix B). He had vigorously proposed that the
biblical document presents the uniqueness of the biblical,
historic Christ. Within the context of the faith tradition
and given the faith of the believer, the Bible provides an
integral and irreducible component for the foundation and
preservation of faith. These various integrated and essential
ingredients represent the fundamental building-blocks. In his
own way, Barth appears to concur with Kahler on this initial
point of reference. On a second front, it is important to
point out that Barth's emphasis on the "here and now" in the
ratio fidei does not simply appear to suggest his opting for
an existential reading of faith's content. Barth's position
seems to be an alternative to the way proposed by Bultmann
and Tillich. These latter men appear to seize upon the
moment as the point of revelation and faith. For both men,
the emphasis seems to fall upon the decision for faith in
the now. The supra-temporality of God becomes real and alive
in the eschatological moment of decision. The past and the
future do not really seem to be of great significance for
RB and PT. What is important is the here and nnw which
manifests itself in commitment to and re-affirmation of the
faith and decision of the disciples and the Church to confess
Jesus as the Christ. Indeed, the Barth of the Romans had
also expounded a similar point."'' Barth speaks of the Moment
1. G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth, "Theology of Crisis?", p. 23ff«
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and of its standing beyond the temporal."'" Time gains
significance as man manifests his action in love. "[K]nowing
that the eternal 'Moment' does not, has not, and will not,
enter in, we should then become aware of the dignity and impor¬
tance of each single concrete temporal moment, and apprehend
2
its qualification and its ethical demand". God's "time" and
His eternity seem to stand above man's time and historicity,
Yet man lives in hope and consequently he waits and lives "as
though" he sees and knows what is invisible. This type of
exposition reflects the similarity of RB and PT. The moment,
the here and now, is recognized as eternal and qualified by
its ethical demand of love.^ And it was this similarity
which RB and PT grasped as representing Barth's standing with
5
them. However, Barth has pointed out that for all of his
"art and eloquence", he had missed the distinctive feature of
Rm. 13-llf: "the teleology which it ascribes to time as it
moves toward a real end".^ The supra-temporality of God as
well as His pre- and post-temporality must be recognized as
integral to a proper exposition of the reality of God.
Bultmann and Tillich appear to hold God's reality at a
distance beyond the real and the known. Barth accepts the
temporality of God as a past, present and future correlate
to the historicity of man. As a complementation to his
1. E/R, P- 497-
2. E/R, P. 501.
3. E/R, PP . 313-315.
4. Hi, P- 635-
5. Ili, P- 635.
6. Ili, P. 635.
7. Ili, P- 608ff.
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exposition of Rm. 13-llf, Barth views the End as more than
an existential qualification standing beyond each moment.
The End is real as is the supra-temporality of God. For
Barth, man lives in the constant presence of the real and
eternal God. It is no longer enough merely to challenge and
to repudiate all human attempts to approach God."'" And it is
not enough to cling to the moment with the intense and inward
anticipation of a revelation from Him. The moment no longer
swallows up both the past and the future. God's pre- and
post-temporality stand at the beginning and end of man's
journey through life. God's supra-temporality conditions
and qualifies man's present by leading him from the "no longer"
to the "not yet". In a word, Barth in contradistinction to
Bultmann and Tillich appears to combat the modern dislike of
the divine supra-temporality by taking seriously the reality
and presence of God "who is also pre-temporal and post-
temporal, bound to no time, and therefore the Lord of all
times."
From the epistemological foundation which Barth has
established, several points emerge. Essentially Barth is
writing a theology, an explanation of faith, from within the
confines of faith. Like Anselm, Barth does not hold up to
questioning the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presuppo¬
sition" of his thought. He begins with faith and therefore
with a particular object which is something new and unique and
2
which requires a new and different mode of apprehension. But
1. E/R, pp. 240-270.
2. IVii, p. 38.
3^8
this is not something that man can achieve by his own
ability and prowess. Because of the uniqueness and the in-
comparableness of this object, man is given to know about
God. He receives the ability to know by the grace of God
Himself. Man knows when he is able to recognize that in
Jesus Christ God is present."^" Here is the incomparably new
event within the context of the creatures' world. It is the
in-breaking of the infinite into the finite. This becomes
a necessary act since God has decided that man should know
Him. A limit to man's knowledge is inherent in the very
creatureliness of his being. Man can only come to know what
transpires and occurs within the limits of his reality. God
moves toward man by participating in his space and time. He
transcends and penetrates this sphere in the being and act of
Jesus Christ. In the objectiveness of this person God
accomplishes His self-revelation within the world. In order
to do this, God does not disturb what is alien and foreign to
Him. On the contrary, He moves into a closer and more
intimate relationship with what is essentially His own. All
things are seen as residing and existing within the province
of His activity and being. Nonetheless the distinctiveness
of both God and man remains. He is the prius of all cog¬
nition and the basis of all knowing. God lives as the
Author of Truth. Therefore His work in Jesus Christ is
really the truth of His own being. Jesus Christ delivers
the truth of God because He approaches and encounters man as
a reality within the perspective of the world. But the un¬
iqueness of this reality demands and requires God's
1. IVii, p. 38.
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intervention in the process of human reflection. Man simply
does not possess the tools to handle this incomprehensible
reality without assistance. Barth maintains that God as
the Author of Truth and as the Subject of truth in Jesus
Christ permits human cognition. God permits man to know
Him by recognizing Him in the event of Christ. The faith of
the Church repeats and reflects this revelation. But this
faith is only mediate knowledge and recollection of what is
immediate in revelation. Faith can never hold or encapsulate
God whose very nature is activity, event, and life. Thus God
imparts Himself through the vehicle of the faith of the Church.
God initiates and effects the cognition which occurs in man.
To explain this process of thought, Barth follows the lead
of Anselm. God in Jesus Christ speaks truthfully about Him¬
self because He is the truth. Cognition has as its object
the testimony of faith regarding the fact of revelation. The
Word of Christ can become identical with the words of those
who preach Him. God's Word can be represented by particular
human words and thoughts. Faith reflects upon these words
in the expectation that God's Word will become manifest in
them. This is accomplished as the ratio of the believer
corresponds to and resembles the ratio of the object of faith.
The essence of Christian knowledge is the repeating and
p
reflection upon God's act in Jesus Christ. But this
1. IVii, p. 58.
2. Q/G, pp. 113-121. In the®pages, Zahrnt attempts to do
battle with Barth over the application of his understanding
of faith and history upon the present day situation of man.
Because of the apparent divine decision before time to
create time and man, Zahrnt feels it necessary to challenge
the effects of this eternal decision upon the real world.
He contends that the historical can do no more than dis¬
appear into the eternity of God. This, of course, also
(Contd.
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repetition and reflection is always controlled and awakened
by the Truth who masters all rationes. Therefore human
words and thoughts about God are not simply propositions
which are debated and dismissed on the assumption that their
truth value lies inherently within the words themselves.
More to the point, the proposition of human speech acquires
its truth because God makes it true. He guarantees that
man's words correspond to His Word. From this, Barth will
contend that knowledge of God remains limited both to the
confines of faith and to the continuance of God's grace.
Knowledge of God reveals itself to be Christian knowledge
based upon "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presuppositions.
And again, these presuppositions are not reducible, but
Contd.) allows Zahrnt to maintain the non-historicity of
Barth's theology. On a second front, Zahrnt attacks
Barth's lack of concrete reference to man's existential
life. Indeed, this existential interpretation of faith
is primary for man. (For Zahrnt's historical and exis¬
tential viewpoint, see especially pages 205-207.) On
the first count, Zahrnt does not appear to appreciate the
vitality and dynamism with which Barth comes to an under¬
standing of God. God is not an eternal and unmoveable
First Cause but rather active and eventful in His being.
God's being and act seems to correspond to the event-
character of history itself. The conjunction of "timeless
event" in relation to God's activity hardly appears to be
consistent if "timeless" is taken to mean static and
stationary. This simply does not depict Barth's narration
of God. Rather God's decision is an event in eternity
which itself reflects an historical nature. Barth's
system does not appear to infringe on the freedom of man
nor on that of God. Turning to the second point, one of
the basic thrusts of Barth's exposition is to move beyond
a simple recounting of faith's benefits for man. To see
only this is to miss completely the vertical dimension of
God's in-breaking into history. An existential slant can
distort the ontological reference of faith's words which
Barth sees in God Himself. And further, existential
questions may receive faithful answers but can these
answers be assumed to be intended strictly for existential
purposes? Or does the text answer questions which are
not always related to man and his existence?
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themselves establish the foundation for faithful
1
enquiry.
B. A MOMENT TO PAUSE
Very distinct avenues of approach begin to emerge as
one considers Barth's epistemological structure in relation
to what has already been reviewed. Barth asks a very
pertinent ontological question which underlines the new
direction of development inherent in his thinking. "Could the
Christian message and the Christian faith be a subject for
debate while the validity of a general world view was pre-
2
supposed?" It would appear that Barth is reviewing Liberal
Protestant theology at a very basic and crucial point. From
an epistemological perspective, for instance, how can one
possibly contend for the ontic ratio in the object of faith if
in point of fact one is not really dealing with the truth of
God in Jesus Christ? How does one grapple with the
"biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presuppositions of the
faith if their truth is not contained in that to which they
refer but in that which they say in themselves? Without this
ontological referent as underlying the truth of faith's pre¬
suppositions, must not faith be viewed as anthropocentrism,
nominalism, symbolism, or myth? Indeed Barth admits that
Liberal Protestantism cannot be denied entirely^ because it
still speaks even today. It is essential to be clear that
1. A, p. 60f.
2. H/G, p. 23-
3. H/G, pp. 32-3-
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Liberal theology has alerted Barth to the danger of con¬
ditioning faith by implicitly assuming the truth of one
world-view. This is pointed out in his question. Barth
contends that Liberalism was too entrenched in fixing the
contemporary world as decisive and primary."^" By attentively
focusing upon the world, the prevalent ideas of the time be-
2
came normative. Essentially man began to take himself too
seriously. Christianity appeared as another historical
phenomenon which had to be related to the experiences of man.
However, 19th Century Liberalism never viewed Christianity as
anything more than historical.^ Indeed Barth was aware of
3
Overbeck's position of the non-historicality of Christianity.
This allowed him to view the historical as well as the non-
historical dimension of reality which opens outward beyond
man's perception to God.^ Because the 19th Century could not
view Christianity as something more than historical, theology
became enwrapped in the inner experiences of the Christian in
7
relation to the notion of God. And more, theology sought to
acquire this God by methods and means at its own disposal —
God's truth was seen as inherent within the experiences of
8
the believer. Man became the centre of importance as God's
Q
dealings with Him slipped into the background. The reality
1. H/G, p. 19.
2. H/G, p. 19.
3. H/G, p. 20.
4. H/G, p. 29.
5. T/C, p. 6lf.
6. R/T, pp. 134-8; D/M, pp. 100-4.
7. H/G, pp. 26-7.
8. T/C, Chapter 6.
9. H/G, p. 25.
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of God became estranged from the phenomenon of Christianity.
God was not seen as literally interacting with the space and
time world."'" The contemporary scene of man and his world
blotted out the immediate presence and living reality of the
divine because the picture of that world had been elevated
to the dignity of a world-view. On this basis Christianity
could be no more than something historical. Lessing's
"ugly, broad ditch" provided the gap between God and the
Christian. The static being of eternal truth could not be
established by the elusive and dynamic becoming of historical
data. Historical approximation and becoming is not
synonymous with the logical coherency and explicit necessity
of eternal truth. As SK has pointed out, the necessary is
and therefore it does not undergo the coming-into-existence-
kind-of-change which is consubstantial with the historical.
Rather the truth of faith's claims could be seen as logical,
propositional truth without explicit historical referents.
The ontological basis of faith's claims could thus be
extradited to the outer limits of human experience. But Barth
viewed a different world from most theologians when he looked
into the context of Scripture. He encountered something of
2
a new world created by God. A new beginning and a new
direction in theology seemed necessary because the Bible
3
testified to God's speaking to man. The Bible witnessed
to the activity of God which is cognisable by man.^ For Barth
1. R/T, pp. 177-181.
2. W/G, p. 40.
3- W/G, p. 44f.
4. w/G, p. 48f.
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this world does not represent the beginning and the end of
our wisdom and knowledge. "We would truly find release in
the...fact, that our human existence is neither self-
sufficient nor a law unto itself, that the visible world can
be neither without God nor with a powerless, invisible God
'in heaven' as its opposite."^" The present world does not
stand by its own initiative nor by its own wisdom. But God
Himself maintains creation by a presence that is neither
powerless nor fictitious. The world of man enjoys both a
horizontal relationship with other creatures as well as a
2
vertical relationship with God the Creator. Here then is
where Barth challenges and abandons a world-view that had an
assumed validity. He relinquishes the presupposition that the
world is self-sufficient and that its God must either be power¬
less or non-existent. Barth's approach appears to move him
around the dilemma of Lessing who was unable to establish the
eternal truths of religion by means of the accidental truths
of history. Lessing's "ugly; broad ditch" is no longer ob¬
structing Barth's theology. It can no longer be a question
of confining faith's truth to some eternal land where logical
necessity and coherent immovability establish the nature of
God. Barth transcribes this static immovability into an
"5
event-character conception of the divine. God is not only
eternal truth in Himself but He is also the truth involved in
event and act. S. Kierkegaard's understanding of history as
1. Xmas, p. 62.
2. IViii, p. 248.
3. Hi, p. 263; E/KB, p. 121.
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"becoming "begins to "be interpolated into Barth's conception
of the divine. God and man as distinct realities"'" eventuate
themselves in the act of becoming. God and man are thus
historical, each in its own distinct mode. Lessing's
obstacle takes up a position behind Barth because he has
seen it as something that is avoidable and not absolute.
Essentially, Barth gives credence to the biblical message that
God has acted and is active in the affairs of man. This
position manifests itself in Barth's epistemological framework
where he actively attempts to make intelligible this reality
of God. It is a theological stance which gives seriousness
to the ontological referent of faith's claims. Barth seems
to have learned from the predecessors of the 19th Century
Protestant Liberalism. He has discovered the alternative
route of taking God as well as man seriously within the
shared context of created reality. From this perspective
then, the reality of Jesus Christ provides the means of knowing
both God and man in the particular and personal existence of
the vere deus et vere homo.
C. THE REALITY OF JESUS CHRIST
It is precisely God's deity which...includes his
humanity....How do we come to know that?... It is a
Christological statement...in Him we encounter the
history, the dialogue, in which God and man meet to¬
gether and are together....Jesus Christ is in His
one Person, as true God, man's loyal partner, and
as true man, God's. 2
1. Illi, p. 46; Hi, p. 580.
2. H/G, p. 46.
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Barth's epistemological foundation has been laid to make
intelligible God's interaction with the world as it has come
to man in the testimony of the "biblical-ecclesiastical-
dogmatic" presuppositions of the faith. It has been established
that faith is capable of cognition and understanding. More¬
over, this process of thought functions upon the impetus and
initiative of its object. At this point the person of Jesus
Christ looms into the foreground of faith's encounter with
God. He approaches faith's quest for understanding as the
object of its cognition as well as the initiator of this
process. Jesus Christ encounters man as the reality of
God's deity and the fullness of man's humanity. He allows
man the possibility to come to know. He approaches as man's
partner in dialogue along the way of faith's search for a
fuller cognition of its object. In a word, the epistemologico-
ontological referent of the knowledge and being of faith's
reality drives one into immediate and certain encounter with
Jesus Christ. In this way, Barth's "biblical-ecclesiastical-
dogmatid' presupposition appears similar to the position of
Kahler. Kahler encountered the Christ through the mediation
of God, the faith tradition, and the confession of man. The
historic, biblical Christ stands revealed and hidden in the
complex of these determinations. Barth seems to progress
along a similar path. He is interested in the Jesus Christ
of faith as He is mediated through tradition, scripture,
confession and God's grace. As a result of His uniqueness,
one is driven to explore the reality of this person from
several vantage points. God certainly enables man to know
who Jesus Christ is. But man must always recount to himself
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what God means to say. Human knowledge can only attain to
scientific certainty. As such, his statements and conceptions
of God in Jesus Christ require constant correction and demand
continuous experimentation. God's truth can never be fully
grasped; it can only be approximated in faithful human
endeavour for understanding."'" This is the nature of faith's
knowledge and as such this imposes limitations and short¬
comings on any one formula or sign expressing the dynamic
actuality of God's being and act in Jesus Christ.
When one is propelled to inquire after the "Who?" of
Jesus Christ, one receives the answer: "He is the Word made
2
flesh." Jesus Christ stands before man in history as
■5
having been in the beginning with God. The Word announces
itself as a free and sovereign reality within the structure
4
of history, because the Word is always Subject. Therefore
one has not to do with any reality that arises from some
5
necessity inherent in the contingency of history. One must
make reference to an entirely new creation — something unique
that has not been before.^ Nonetheless, this Word becomes
flesh within the realm of space and time without ceasing to
7be free and sovereign in this very act. The Word becomes
Q
flesh; God enters the context of man's historical existence.
1. H/B, P- 184.
2. Iii, P. 132.
3. Iii, P- 133.
4. Iii, P- 134.
5.E/KB, PP . 141-3.
6. Iii, P- 134; IVii,
7. Iii, P- 136.
8. Iii, P- 147.
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That God enters the realm of space and time indicates that
He has become a man Himself.
If we ask what the Word became when in His incarnation,
without ceasing to be the Word, He nevertheless ceased
to be the only Word, and if we allow ourselves to say
that He became flesh, we must note that..."flesh" does
not imply a man, but human essence and existence, human
kind and nature, humanity humanitas, that which makes a
man man as opposed to God, angel or animal. 1
The Word not only became a man in the flesh who eats, sleeps,
talks, but also the Word became what is essential to man. The
Word appropriated and became "human essence and existence,
human kind and nature". In becoming man, the Word attached
itself to the possibilities and potentialities implicit in
■5
humanitas. And moreover, this act of God was accomplished
without His ever ceasing to be God. "Jesus Christ very God
and very man does not mean that in Jesus Christ God and man
were really side by side, but it means that Jesus Christ,
4
Himself true God, is also a true Man." The Word becoming
flesh, a man, does not result (l) in a God who appears to be
a man, (2) in a man who is thought to be a god, or (3) in
a third reality between God and man. The being and
activity of Jesus Christ adopts and assumes humanitas in such
a manner that it is always determined, preserved, and actual¬
ized by the reality of God.^ In this real and objective
person, God penetrates and transcends the limits of created
1. Iii, p. 149; compare IVii, p. 25-
2. E/KB, pp. 144-6.
3- Hi, p. 150.
4. Iii, p. 161.
5. Iii, p. 151-
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reality. He lives as a man equal to us in what we are as
men."1" By this act, God does not interfere with what is
p
strange to Him; He comes unto His own. On Barth's episte-
mological premises, it is essential that Jesus Christ comes
to man as a reality which is discernible within the context
of the human mode of apprehension. Man's faithful know¬
ledge of God requires its basis within the concrete objective
structures of experiential world-realities. If there is
really going to be human knowledge, it must be apprehended
as something that is possible and real here in space and time.
Jesus Christ comes into the world-historical situation as a
real man. He does not appear in docetic or ebionite wrapping
or as some third between-God-and-man reality. Jesus Christ
steps into the soil of history as a real, living, breathing
man. However, Jesus Christ presents Himself as determined
solely and exclusively by the activity and presence of God.
As a man, then, Jesus Christ enters the world of time
and space, flesh and blood. The commencement of His entry
is marked off by the event of incarnation — God becoming
a man.
God's revelation in its objective reality is the person
of Jesus Christ....[l]t becomes the object of our
knowledge; it finds a way of becoming the content of
our experience and our thought; it gives itself to be
apprehended by our contemplation and our categories. 4
The incarnation reveals itself to be an act of God's self-
1. Iii, p. 151.
2. Iii, p. 151.
3. Page J33.
4. Iii, p. 172.
360
revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. It is an
objective reality that contains the possibility of becoming
the object of human knowledge. This reality possesses the
revelation of God. Here the importance of the incarnation
comes to the fore. It is the beginning in time of God's
self-impartation to man. The incarnation marks the commence¬
ment of God objectively revealing Himself in the person of
Jesus Christ. Man's knowledge and faith requires the
apprehension of this mystery of revelation."'" By contrast,
Bultmann does not appear to be overly congenial to this position.
The importance of Jesus Christ is not to be found in His person
but in His message — the Word of God. It seems that Bultmann
is not concerned to deal seriously with the God incarnate.
Rather, he is content to elaborate and interpret the Church's
confession that Jesus is the Christ. In a word, Bultmann
seems to place more credence on confession than on the person
confessed. To explicate the person of this mystery, Barth
offers a discussion of the Virgin Birth. In this way, Barth
sees an avenue opening into discourse about this act of God.
"Born of the Virgin Mary" signifies that one has here to do
2
with a real son born to a real mother. One is not simply
discussing a mythological or symbolical figure who is seen to
represent something else. Here Barth is talking about a real
historical person. Therefore man becomes central in this
3act of revelation. He finds himself affected. By the
1. Iii, p. 184.
2. Iii, p. 185.
3- Iii, p. 186.
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Word's becoming flesh, God becomes man and thus undergoes the
limitations inherent in humanitas. In becoming a man, God
limits Himself to the structures of flesh retained within
the bounds of space and time. But to be "born of a virgin"
signifies even more to Barth. It indicates that humanitas in
2
and of itself Has come under God's judgement. In and of
itself, humanitas requires the intervention of God in order
to bring about the incarnation of the Word. But what does
this indicate in regards to man's nature?
[Man] has lost his pure creatureliness, and with it
the capacity for God, because as a creature and in
the totality of his creatureliness he became dis¬
obedient to his Creator.... It is with this disobedient
creature that God has to do in His revelation. 3
A new light enters into the discussion. Jesus Christ is not
simply an academic exercise by God to test the usefulness
of the lines of communication between Himself and man. One
discovers something more profound and basic. God interacts
with man in the Incarnate Word because the creature has lost
or relinquished his capacity for the Creator. Man has lost
contact with God. He possesses no facilities or capacities
for re-establishing the divine-human dialogue. In the face
of man's plight4 God acts in the event of His revelation to
attack this loss of capacity and to give back to man what
belongs to him in his creatureliness. God's act in Jesus
1. Iii, p. 187.
2. Iii, p. 188.
3. Iii, p. 188.
4. A, p. 38.
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Christ is the working out of this mystery for .man. "And
this mystery must consist in [man] receiving the capacity
for God which [he] does not possess.""'" Humanitas "becomes
the recipient of a lost capacity and ability. The incar¬
nation of God creates a new potentiality of divine-human
dialogue. In this mode of expression God reconciles the
disobedience of the creature. "The mystery of revelation and
reconciliation consists in the fact that in His freedom, mercy,
and omnipotence, God became man, and as such acts upon man.
2
By this action of God sin is excluded and nullified."
Revelation becomes the manner of reconciliation. Incarnation
as revelation reconciles man to God. It occurs at the behest
of divine, "freedom, mercy, and omnipotence". The result
manifests itself in God becoming man and bestowing the capacity
for communication. God appropriates and moulds humanitas
in order to give back to it the full expression of its
creatureliness. God imparts a capacity for Himself. There¬
fore to be "born of a virgin" indicates the incapacity of
man on his own behalf to provide a basis of communication and
dialogue with God. As such, this indication discloses the
negative dimension of God's act in Jesus Christ.
But there is more than the negative. The sign of the
Virgin Birth also possesses a positive quality which cannot
be properly lost sight of. Jesus Christ was conceived by
the Holy Spirit. Barth views this conception as providing
the ground and the content displayed in the event of the
1. Iii, p. 189.
2. Iii, p. 191.
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incarnation."'' To be conceived by the Holy Spirit demon¬
strates that truly one is dealing with something new and
p
unique which cannot be encompassed within what has gone before.
The act of conception reveals itself to be strictly an act of
God — it is a pure divine beginning. This creative activity
fulfilled in the incarnation of Jesus Christ expresses a
divine intention. It points out "that God Himself creates
a possibility, a power, a capacity, and assigns it to man,
4
where otherwise there would be sheer impossibility." God
acts in the Holy Spirit and in Jesus Christ to convey what is
otherwise impossible for man. God acts positively in the
self-impartation of this power, capacity, possibility, when
He appropriates and grasps the "human essence and existence,
human nature and kind". He pursues that with a positive
end in view. But more, this positive pursuit of man points
out the correlation involved in the event of man's recon-
5
ciliation and the existence of Jesus Christ. "For it is on
this ground that the same work, the same preparation of man
for God by God Himself, can happen to us also, in the form of
6
grace, the grace manifested in Jesus Christ...." A
connection comes into view between the existence of this real
man Jesus Christ and man himself. It is the interconnection
of human reconciliation and the existence of this real man.
On the basis of the existence of Jesus Christ, man is made
1. Iii, p. 196.
2. Iii, p. 198.
3. Hi, p. 197.
4. Iii, p. 199-
5. Iii, p. 200.
6. Iii, p. 200.
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available for God by His preparation."'" Humanitas receives
the preparation and the power to share in this revelation
of reconciliation. But this participation resides always
in the good-pleasure and grace of God manifested in Christ.
The positive dimension of the Virgin Birth directs
2
attention to the activity and event of God Himself. The
ontic rationality preserved by the formula "born of the
Virgin Mary" and "conceived by the Holy Spirit" possesses a
-z,
truth which relies on the act of God. It assumes a noetic
rationality as man is given to recognize and acknowledge the
event of God in this sign. "[B]ecause He is thus conceived
and born, He has to be recognized and acknowledged as the
4
One He is and in the mystery in which He is the One He is."
Because God comes to man as He does, human cognition can
only acknowledge this activity which remains a mystery in
the event of revelation. Because it is incomprehensible in
itself, one can only recognize that this is God who is
conceived and born. Ontic and noetic rationality merge
at the point where acknowledgement and recognition are made
possible by the grace of God who is master of all rationes.
In another vein, Tillich endeavours to affiliate the human
reality with essential meaning through the power of the
symbol. For him, Jesus as the Christ is the New Being who
points the way to man's overcoming the forces of estrangement.
As a symbolic importation of essential meaning, Jesus as the
1. N/H, p. 160.
2. Iii, p. 201.
3. H/B, pp. 100-2.
4. Iii, p. 202; compare IV, p. 208.
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Christ symbolizes man's essential goodness. In contra¬
distinction, Barth affirms that Jesus Christ is indeed the
real and living presence of God Himself. Man does not need
to speak symbolically since God has come to His own.
But what is Barth really attempting to say here? A
clue into his intention may perhaps prevail as one recon¬
siders the epistemological prologue. Quite definitely,
faith presents the possibility for rationality and therefore
for understanding. As well, in order to be a possibility it
must be an experiential world-reality. Jesus Christ fulfils
this condition. He enters the arena of history as a real
man of flesh and blood. Barth unequivocally maintains the
utter realness and full-ness of His humanity. But Barth
sees more to be involved than the simple historical apper¬
ception of a past historical entity. Here he embarks upon
an exposition of the meaning of the incarnation as it is
expressed in the sign of natus ex virgine and conceptus de
Spiritu sancto. A new dimension looms over the horizon
of the discussion. Barth is attempting to point to a "more
than" quality and characterization prevalent here."'" Yes,
Jesus Christ is a world-historical phenomenon. And yes,
He is "more than" this. The mystery of the incarnation, of
the Word become flesh, highlights this otherness, this
strangeness, this incomprehensibility. Because Christ is
"more than" a flesh and blood historical entity, and more
precisely because He is the activity of God Himself in the
1. H/B, p. 193-
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flesh, man's rationality is confronted with a strange, new,
incomprehensible, paradoxical, phenomenon.'1" There are no
analogies to point to and to find correlations with. Yet
here in man's midst something real and unique demands to be
heard and to be understood. But what is the point of entry
into the rationality of the person of Jesus Christ? Barth
maintains that the paradoxical can only be acknowledged and
recognized as God Himself by the grace of God. The whole
circumstance of His becoming in Jesus Christ appears a mystery.
By his own rational capacities, man stands dumb-founded before
this reality. Yet Barth does not want simply to write-off
this entity as unintelligible and therefore as unreal. It is
real and it is intelligible. Jesus Christ becomes these
things on the initiative of God. Here is where man can be¬
gin to apprehend the truth of what had previously seemed
2
incomprehensible. Man comes to know Him through the
invitation of God. The ratio of this object of faith is
available for human cognition, but the availability is always
determined by God. Why is this? Barth contends that this
one particular and real event in the historical world received
its definition, determination, and actualization from divine
prerogatives — conceptus de Spiritu sancto. It stands as
an absolutely new and unique beginning completely dependent
upon God. God acts in order to deliver something that man's
creatureliness has lost — a capacity for the divine. Through
His work in the person of Jesus Christ, man again may
1. T.F. Torrance, Space, Time, and Incarnation, p. ,52ff.
2. R/T, p. 141.
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participate in dialogue with God. His work is a preparation
of man for divine contact and interaction. Thus Jesus
Christ in the uniqueness of His person is seen to fulfil
"more than" an ancillary role in the self-revelation of God.
His importance looms overwhelming if one considers that to
know Him is to know God.
By way of an aside, one can begin to see a few parallel
developments here between Barth and SK. If one considers
that for SK history is marked exclusively as the realm of
becoming and change and that because of this fact Reason is
unable of itself to come to grips with the paradox of faith;
something a bit similar is seen in Barth. He too seems to
assume implicitly the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change
which SK so vividly portrayed. History is not a static
realm of necessary truths and logical connections. Rather
one has to do with flux and change and becoming. But what
is one to do in the face of the Christian claim that the
divine is in time? SK maintains the rationality of the
Paradox even though it appears incommensurable with the
integrity of knowledge gleaned by Reason. He upholds the
integrity of faith's object as well. Barth, for his part,
pursues a similar course. Jesus Christ comes to the
judgment seat of Reason as something incomprehensible, indeed
as paradoxical. However, Barth opts to maintain the intel¬
ligible integrity of the faith and its object. Certainly one
has to deal with what seems unintelligible and paradoxical.
However, God provides the basis and the ground for any and
all rationality that man requires in order to come to an
understanding. There is rationality and intelligibility to
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be had in faith. And what appears to be unreal and im¬
possible to the perview of Reason is nonetheless more real
and more true because God Himself sanctions the authenticity
of this event which occurs in space and time.
But to return, Barth maintains that the conceptus de
Spiritu saneto provides the ground and the content of this
mystery of revelation. One discovers that this has a
positive quality which impresses the presence of God upon man.
This capacity for the divine rightfully belongs to the very
nature of creatureliness. The full dimensions of this ground
and content of revelation blossom as one inquires more deeply
into the person of Christ. In meeting Him, man perceives
his existence as an open entity which stands in direct
relationship to God in Jesus Christ. "With Christ: never at
all apart from Him, never at all independent of Him, never
at all in and for itself. Man never exists in himself.
A new dimension of reality opens which has heretofore
remained closed by disobedience — lack of capacity for the
divine. Man apprehends that his existence as a man is not
simply a closed reality actualizing itself along a horizontal
plane. In encounter with Christ, a new level of existence
becomes manifest to the creature. "Man exists in Jesus
Christ and in Him alone; and he also finds God in Jesus Christ
2
and in Him alone." Man can no longer be viewed as the
independent bearer of his own existence. Rather, he is seen
in intimate relationship with Jesus Christ. The horizontal
1. Hi, p. 149-
2. Ili, p. 149.
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dimension of existence is penetrated and transcended by a
vertical element which in and of itself grasps the existence
of man where he is. In this person, man comes before the
knowability of God on his side."'" "He is God who is man.
This is Jesus Christ. In Him we do not stand outside but
inside; we participate.... In Him the fact that God is
knowable is true not only for God Himself,...but for man, for
2
us." The new vertical dimension to creaturely existence
is seen to possess content and form. The vertical does not
approach as a vague and meaningless openness or feeling.
Man stands in the presence of God Himself as he encounters the
person of Christ. He reveals Himself as the vertical element
which renders God knowable on this side of creation. It is
a revelation which requires a change in focus, a shift in
attention. To recall a point, it is possible to expand an
apparent point of similarity between Kierkegaard and Barth.
For SK, the Absolute Paradox confronts man in its total un-
likeness. Man with his Reason can only view the Paradox as
something absurd and incomprehensible. Nonetheless, the
Paradox persists in its claim to be decisive for every moment.
Its decisiveness depends upon God, the Eternal, in time.
The Reason cannot explain this actuality within the realm of
possibility. Yet the Paradox persists and demands its
recognition. In confrontation with this paradoxical incom¬
mensurability, the Reason can only yield, for the Paradox must
bestow its content and give itself to the understanding. On
1. Hi, p. 150.
2. Ili, p. 151.
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its own, the Reason cannot cope with the reality of God's
presence in a particular man. In His absolute freedom, God
has become a man in time. But because God is so essentially
unlike man, He remains the Absolute Paradox for man's rational
capabilities. In faith and in passionate commitment, man
can come to appreciate the Paradox even though he cannot
explain it. In the passion of faith, man attains new insights
and vistas into the dimension of existence. For Barth, some¬
thing similar appears to be happening. As the self-revelation
of God, Jesus Christ in His historic, biblical person confronts
man in His unlikeness to him. On his own, man cannot compre¬
hend His person. Nonetheless, His reality continues to con¬
front man and to challenge his self-contained position. In
Jesus Christ, God reveals His presence in space and time. Man
cannot explain this actuality, but he can come to an under¬
standing of Him within the context of faith given the "biblical-
ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition". In His otherness,
God becomes historic while remaining God. In faith occasioned
by God's free grace, man can freely come to a faithful under¬
standing of God and himself. In faith, a re-organization of
life-perspective and -attitude takes place. For Barth as for
SK, Jesus Christ is the truth of God. As a result, man finds
himself confronted by the truth. "What happens in the truth,
what is indeed the truth, is what happens before God, by God,
in our place. And it has happened before God, by God, in
our place that our enmity against His grace has been expiated
and abandoned."^" The content of the person of Christ becomes
1. Hi, p. 132.
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yet clearer. The truth happens by God and before God in our
place. This happening expresses God's act on man's behalf.
Jesus Christ as the happening of truth relieves man of his
enmity, his disobedience, before Him. He accomplishes that
act of e^iation on man's behalf before God by an act of God.
Jesus Christ fulfils what man cannot do. He performs an
act of expiation which produces a capacity in humanitas for
God.^" By means of this labouring, man no longer remains
outside of the eternal, but now he stands inside of Him. It
2becomes apparent that God is not against but for man. In
essence, God decides to be for man. However, this "God for
us" does not remain a distant fact that is unrelated to human
existence. Man has a share in the work and accomplishment of
Jesus Christ. In Him, he participates in the inside of God —
in His grace. "Thus everything that is to be said about our
participation in the person and work of Jesus Christ...can
properly consist in this: It lies in the nature of what
happens there in God, in eternal continuation of the recon¬
ciliation and revelation accomplished in time, that in full
reality it happens here also to and in us...." The work
and person of Jesus Christ do not become a quiet remnant
of past history that contains no relevance for the present.
The vertical dimension determining, penetrating, and trans¬
cending the reality of His existence will not permit then
and there to remain then and there. God acts in such a
1. Hi, p. 153; E/KB., pp. 126-9; Ili, p. 156.
2. Ili, p. 157.
3. Hi, p. 157.
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manner as to allow for the possibility of human cognition."'"
And this act possesses the potential of becoming here and
now of full contemporaneousness. In this way, God's there
and then becomes real here and now, because God so wills.
What becomes present and pertinent is the reconciliation and
revelation effected in the work and person of Jesus Christ.
Man can thus share in what happened in truth once and for all.
But this participation and sharing brings man's thought back
to the realization that his existence is not self-sufficient.
p
Man does not stand upon himself. He can no longer stand
outside of God, for he has now received the means of coming
inside into the graciousness of God. As another aside and
in terms of Lessing's problem, the reality of truth itself
1. See D.M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 3^-f. It is
interesting to note Baillie's reaction to Barth's early
writings on Christology. He apparently feels hostile to
Barth's suggestion that the historical Jesus per se
demonstrates no revelation of God. Baillie points out
that Barth restricts revelation to "the miracles, the
Resurrection, and the forty days." This restriction seems
to reveal Barth's scepticism about the historical. It
should be noted that Barth's position on the historical
Jesus seems to be intent on preserving the uniqueness of
Christ without destroying the objective reality. Barth
appears to maintain that the historical Jesus is a bi¬
furcation of His historic-suprahistoric reality. To
divide His person is to compromise and consequently to
miss His reality. Further, Barth does not limit the reve¬
latory activity of Christ to the elements Baillie mentions.
Revelation commences with the miracle of the Incarnation
and ends with the mystery of the resurrection/ascension.
In the total complex of His activity, the distinctiveness
and uniqueness of Christ remains beyond the explanation
of the Reason.
2. Hi, p. 159-
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has been transformed from the immanent to the transcendent.
God is the Author of Truth. As He acts to reveal Himself
in Jesus Christ, He imparts His truth in His being and act.
Thus in the being and activity of Christ there does not
exist any gap between static and becoming truths, since God's
very nature reveals itself to be action and event. The
immanent remains immanent and the transcendent remains trans¬
cendent; however the two dimensions of reality converge in
the person of Christ who brings man to God and God to man.
This person participates both in the becoming of history and
in the event-character of God's very nature. In this way
the static and necessary notions of eternal truths dissipate
before the activity of God Himself.
Barth has examined this world-historical reality as the
Word become flesh. To do this he has pursued the formula
natus ex virgine and conceptus de Spiritu sancto. Again
Jesus Christ has been reviewed as the vertical dimension of
man's existence while participating fully in the horizontal
plane. In this He has been perceived to be standing inside
the reality of God opening and readying man for mutual partici¬
pation in this inside. But now Karl Barth reviews Jesus
Christ from yet another perspective. One now begins to see
another reflection of the telos involved in the work and being
of this person. Something was done to man:
and the meaning for him of the divine word of atonement
and therefore of the grace of God, is that as God con¬
descends and humbles Himself to man and becomes man,
man himself is exalted,...being placed at His side, not
in identity, but in true fellowship with Him, and ^
becoming a new man in this exaltation and fellowship.
1. IVii, p. 6.
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Another characterization opens up. In Jesus Christ one still
has to do with the activity of God. This involves Him con¬
descending to be a man within the context of history. In
this condescension, God effects the exaltation of humanitas,
not by making him God, but by encountering him in true
fellowship. The result of this action is the creation of a
new man standing inside divine fellowship. God accomplishes
this result in Jesus Christ not simply as a man, but as the
man, true man."'" What He is as vere homo cannot be exhausted
by His likeness to man in general. The distinctiveness of
2
this true man resides in His determination by God. Because
He shares in man's humanitas, God does not leave this un¬
affected. Rather, man's existence and essence, human kind
and nature, are exalted. Exaltation "means the history of
the placing of the humanity common to Him and us on a higher
level, on which it becomes and is completely unlike ours even
4in its complete likeness...." Jesus Christ stands among
men in likeness and unlikeness to them. One is here dealing
with an unlikeness that exhibits a qualitative difference.
Humanitas is set into motion; man experiences a movement
5
from below to above. However, this motion always refers
to the exaltation of this true man — of Jesus Christ.^ Man
7in general does not receive improvement or change. Exaltation
1. IVii, P- 27.
2. E/KB, PP . 142-4.
3. IVii, P. COCM
4. IVii, P- 00CM
5. IVii, P- 29.
6. IVii, P- 29.
7. IVii, P. 28.
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of humanitas occurs in this one true man."'" The entrance of
His person into the world-historical situation is a unique
phenomenon. His life initiates an entirely new sequence
2
which remains dependent upon God. What transpires involves
the true God becoming true man not because of any necessity
impinging on Him, but rather because of His good-pleasure.
The act of incarnation must not be seen as having no relation
or relevance for man, however. God's becoming flesh
"signifies the promise of the basic alteration and determin-
4
ation of what we all are as men." The divine in-breaking
into the space and time sphere of creatureliness signals the
new, unique, the divine in history. Man does not find him¬
self alone. God confronts him and encounters him in the
5
event of Jesus Christ.
The human speaking and acting and suffering and trium¬
phing of this one man directly concerns us all, and
as His history is our history of salvation which
changes the whole human situation, just because God
Himself is its human subject in His Son, just because
God Himself came into this world in His Son, and as
one of us "a guest this world of ours He trod. " 6
The incarnation as history reveals another history which has
relevance for all men. The history of Jesus Christ in His
speaking, acting, suffering, triumphing, fulfils the history
7
of man's salvation. This man in His person effects a
change in the whole human situation and He succeeds in this
Q
because He is God Himself as a man among men. He is the
1. IVii, p. 176.
2. IVii, p. 37-
3. IVii, p. 41; IViii, p. 227-
4. IVii, p. 49-
5. E/KB, p. 145.
6. IVii, p. 51.
7. IViii, p. 216; IVi, pp. 197-200.
8. IViii, pp. 183-191-
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Subject of man's salvation history."'" As such, Jesus Christ
remains the author of salvation, the initiator of man's
dialogue with God, the guarantor of human capacity for the
2 3
divine. Salvation stands or falls with this person. It
is His history which accomplishes the dialogue between the
4
finite and the infinite. The divine and human essences
5
assure the vertical and horizontal realities of this event.
It is a history open outward to man and upward to God. With¬
in the reality of Jesus Christ one has to do with the humanity
of God in all of its real-ness and truth.^ God does not
change or alter humanitas in His downward movement in becoming
7
a man. He determines human essence by divine essence. But
man in general has a part in this work of God. He is not
excluded from participation. Man comes to know the history
O
of salvation as he recognizes the particularity of Christ.
His history is salvation history. Participation occurs as
one recognizes and acknowledges Him as the One He is. "To
recognize Him is to see and know Him...as the One who He,
Jesus of Nazareth, really is. It is not a matter of inter¬
preting an appearance but Himself, His existence, beside
which He has no other....It is a matter of interpreting Him
1. IVii, p. 60.
2. IVii, pp. 65-6; IViii, p. 215-
3. IViii, p. 212.
4. IVii, p. 69.
5. IVii, p. 71.
6. IVii, p. 72; N/H, pp. 158-9-
7. IVii, pp. 60-1, 84, 87, 88.
8. IVii, p. 89.
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as the One He is.""'" To interpret, know, see, and recog¬
nize Jesus of Nazareth as the One He is directs attention to
2
His humanity. One is not dealing with an appearance fabri¬
cation, or imagination, but with a real man — Jesus of
■3
Nazareth. There is no other "beside" or "behind" to this
4
man. As one inquires after Him, the discovery of His
existence leads to the recognition of His truth. This truth,
based on the good-pleasure of divine grace, displays the
determination of divine essence upon human essence and the
5
actualizing of obedience in the humanity of Christ. Humanitas
receives its truth in the measure of obedience manifested.
This is not a random obedience but a participation in the
inside of God. Obedience expresses true human freedom for
God who is for man.^ This is the creaturely quality which
was lost but has now been restored by the exaltation of
7
humanitas in Christ. As such, man now exists in self-contra-
Q
diction and ignorance. Jesus Christ demonstrates who and
what man is to be.^ Therefore Jesus Christ brings man the
truth and the genuineness about himself. "Our life is hidden
— not yet revealed — with Him.""'"^ He is the basis upon
1. IVii, p. 91.
2. IViii, p. 214.
3- IViii, p. 195.
4. D/M, p. 191; R/T, pp. 44-5-
5. IVii, p. 92.
6. IVii, p. 93-
7. IVi, p. 89.
8. IViii, p. 197-
9. IVii, p. 93-
10. IVii, p. 103-
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which human life must he established. There can be no
sharing in this obedience and no knowing of God which attempts
2
to side-step His humanity. The humanity reveals itself
3
solely in the person of Jesus Christ. Here is where one
4
must look. It is not a static point nor an eternal idea.
5
There remains nothing static about Him. The phenomenology
of this divine event is a history, happening within the
6
historical sphere. And moreover, even though God Himself
has acted in a definite time once and for all, Jesus Christ
7
lives today here and now as He did there aad then. The
existential dimension of participation in faith which
Bultmann and Tillich emphasize also has a place in Barth.
Man's present moment is qualified and determined by the supra-
temporality of God. But Barth views this supra-temporality
in real and present terms through God's self-revelation in
Jesus Christ. God's saving act contains this forward refer-
Q
ence which allows it the freedom to become contemporaneous.
But it becomes this only when God so wills. "He, then, is
9
the law controlling what we think and say." God limits and
controls man's apprehension of the truth"!"0 The being and
act of God in Jesus Christ forms the ground of cognition about
1. IVii, p. 117.
2. IVii, p. 101.
3. IVii, p. 105.
4. IViii, p. 216.
5. IVii, p. 106.
6. IVii, p. 106; IVi, p. 128.
7. IVii, p. 107; IViii, p. 223f.
8. IViii, p. 182.
9. IVii, p. 108.
10.IVii, p. 122.
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Him."'" The act of knowledge depends solely upon divine
2
initiative presented in the act of self-revelation. Be¬
cause Jesus Christ is event, man's knowledge must likewise
be event. The static truth of this One dissipates as man
confronts the dynamic reality which is not controlled by
human abilities and powers. The mystery of revelation
demands dynamic participation which can only be given by God.
The truth and the cognition of the history of Jesus Christ
and of the history of man's salvation remain concealed within
the dynamic reality of God.^1" It is His to give and to
5
control.
The elusiveness and the dynamism inherent in this his¬
tory of Christ is pointedly demonstrated in the mystery of
the resurrection. This event portrays the meaning and the
significance of this man.^ "The resurrection and ascension
7
of Jesus Christ are the event of His self-declaration."'
This self-revelation brings from concealment the "who" of
this person. It possesses the power to communicate and to
g
proclaim itself. The resurrection forms an integral com-
Q
ponent of the Christ-event. On the basis of it, Jesus
Christ then and there becomes here and now.
The eternal action of Jesus Christ grounded in His
resurrection is itself the true and direct bridge
from once to always, from Himself in His time to
1. IVii, pp. 122-3; IViii, pp. 267-8.
2. IVii, p. 123; IViii, p. 219•
3. IVii, p. 124.
4. IVii, pp. 125-130.
5. IViii, p. 231.
6. IVii, p. 132.
7. IVii, p. 133-
8. IVii, p. 134.
9. IVii, p. 134.
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us in our time. Because as crucified and dead He
is risen and lives, the fact of His death on the
cross can never be past, it can never cease to be
His action, the decision which God makes hie et nunc....
Again in speaking of the resurrection one does not come up
against a past fact which is simply past. The death and .
resurrection of this man remains part and parcel of a past
time that meets man as a completed event. But even so,
this event transcends the limits of this past time and pene-
2trates into present realities. The resurrection bridges
the historical distance from once to always. This bridging
effect reveals the full-ness and comprehensiveness of the
work and being of Jesus Christ. The resurrection forms the
turning point in the mystery of revelation. The Easter-
-Z)
story marks the before and after of this revelation. A
distinction arises at this point: "...the step from the .
relative concealment of the being of Jesus Christ to its
absolute manifestation: the historicity...in which His being
is revealed before no less than after, but after differently
4
than before." The Easter-narrative relates the degree of
concealment contained in the before and after of the resur¬
rection. One has to do with the same Jesus Christ. He
forms the point of continuity between these two points. The
distinction which arises and which places central importance
on this event is the absolute quality of revelation that is
made apparent. The resurrection signals the completion,
fulfilment, and fruition of the work of this person and
1. IVi, p. 315.
2. H/B, pp. 120-1.
3. IVii, p. 139-
4. IVii, p. 140.
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therefore of His revelation."'" As such this event is once
2
and for all and all-sufficient as a basis for knowledge.
The veracity of this event as a basis for cognition remains
inherently interrelated to the being and activity of Jesus
Christ. A clearer perspective may possibly be achieved if
one again considers the position of Kahler. The historic,
biblical Christ provides the root fact for faith. The
biblical narrative presents the recollection/confession com¬
plex which testifies to the reality of one who stands beyond
the grasp of factuality. The crucifixion/resurrection event
signifies the two-fold work of Christ. But the suprahistoric
dimension of His reality eludes historical research. Pre¬
supposing the recollection/confession complex, Kahler perceived
revelation and salvation. In a similar fashion, Barth portrays
the person of Jesus Christ. The crucifixion and resurrection
events mark the culmination of revelation and salvation. None¬
theless, the uniqueness and unlikeness of Christ elusively
denies man access to an explanation of His person. The supra-
historic dimension must be contended with, for it is the
work of God which preserves and initiates His life-giving and
life-determining self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. Conse¬
quently, an explanation by the Reason of His revelation is
not possible even though it can be understood in the context
of faith.
1. IVii, pp. 140-1.
2. IVii, p. 142.
3. IVii, p. 142.
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Here one is dealing with an event that transpires
within the world of space and time."'" As such it is a
concrete and real event imbedded within the fibre of history.
2
But its history does not involve it as a public event. How¬
ever, this in no way detracts from its realness. Again, the
resurrection points up the quality of self-manifestation
which (a) relies completely on the initiative of God and
(b) declares the risen Christ to be in essential continuity
with the pre-Easter person. Therefore, the resurrection
maintains itself as an event of revelation, because it is
intrinsically interconnected with the reality of Jesus Christ
4
who is Himself an event of revelation. Like Jesus Christ,
the resurrection possesses the quality of incomprehensibility
simply because it is inherently and innately a part of His
5
own incomprehensibility. But even so, the paradoxical
strangeness and uniqueness of this event must be comprehended.
"By its sacred incomprehensibility we mean its necessary and
essential distinctive newness and difference and strangeness
as the event of revelation of the hidden presence and action
1. IVii, p. 143.
2. IVii, p. 143; W/G, p. 90. The "non-historical"
dimension of the resurrection becomes clearer in the
discussion of "saga" and its relation to the "non-
historical" historical level of reality. The non-public
is seen in relation to the vertical in-breaking of God.
3. IVii, p. 144.
4. IVii, p. 146.
5. IVii, p. 146.
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of God in the flesh....""'" There can be no parallels or
p
analogies by which to capture the rationality of this event.
Rather the apprehension of the resurrection depends upon the
self-declaration and self-impartation of God Himself. It
possesses a miraculous character which defies naked human
comprehension. Its newness, strangeness, and difference
demands that Christ kindles the recognition and acknowledgement
"5
required on the part of man. Jesus Christ is and remains
the personal inroad into the human apprehension of the mystery
4
of revelation. It is not possible to get "behind" this
reality and the mystery by some sifting through historical
knowledge and recollection. Man is confronted with the
documents of faith which testify to the reality of Christ.
Historical knowledge cannot legitimately dissect these docu¬
ments and thus capture the truth of their statements.
It must be a consideration of what the texts say (and
do not say) in their attestation of this event, with¬
out measuring them by an imported picture of the world
and history, without reading them through these alien
spectacles, without prejudice as to what is possible
or impossible, good or less good, without prescribing
what they have to say and what they cannot say, with¬
out imposing questions which they themselves do not
ask, but entering into their own questions and remaining
open to their own replies which, if our thinking is to
be genuinely "historical", must have precedence over
our own attitude (which we naturally reserve). 5
The texts must be allowed to witness and to testify to their
ontological reference point.^ The texts of faith attest to
1. IVii, p. 146.
2. IVii, p. 147.
3. IVii, p. 148.
4. IVii, p. 149.
5. IVii, p. 150.
6. J.A. Wharton, "Karl Barth as Exegete and His Influence on
Biblical Interpretation", Union Seminary Theological
Review; Vol. 28, No. 1, 1972, pp. 6-9-
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the mystery of revelation in Jesus Christ. But this
attestation can only be distorted and retranslated when one
enters into dialogue with them on the basis of pre-conceived
notions and "pre-understandings". The texts must be allowed
the freedom to reply to the questions which they themselves
seek to ask and to answer."'" The inquirer must himself
remain open if his thinking is to be genuinely "historical".
His "pre-^understandings" must be held in abeyance in confron¬
tation with what purports to be the truth of God. If man
refuses to encounter the truth of faith on these terms, then
of necessity his quest after historical knowledge can only
2
lead away from the truth and from the knowledge of this event.
Even though Jesus Christ and His resurrection receive testimony
in the documents of the faith, this does not permit man to
handle and to control the truth within these records. The
truth is never dependent upon the documents in and of them¬
selves. Like Jesus Christ and His resurrection, they are
historical realities contained within space and time. None¬
theless their truth-character is self-transcending in that they
rely upon the self-giving of God Himself who is the object of
knowledge. The newness and difference of the divine presence
among men places Him inside and beyond the capabilities of
man's ability to learn and to know. And what is more, it is
man himself in his plight and disobedience who has lost his
power and possibility for God. Knowledge and truth there-
1. W/G, "The Strange New World in the Bible".
2. IVii, p. 150.
3. N/H, p. I6lf.
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fore rest solely upon the good-pleasure of His self-reve¬
lation. In contrast, it could be said that Bultmann and
Tillich both appear to establish the possibility for God on
man's faith in Him. By existential participation in the
belief of the Church, man may live as if God is real and
active in his life. Through faith, the believer embraces
the meaning and significance of God for his life. Pregnant
with possibilities, the present moment confronts man and
demands decision from him. Bultmann and Tillich both strongly
suggest that through the power of faith, man can find life in
death and he can move toward goodness while surrounded by the
demonic.
But there is yet another angle from which one may approach
the reality of revelation inherent in the resurrection. Barth
tackles this perspective from the problem of historical
distance — how can the past become present?"'" The impli¬
cations of this problem lead into a consideration of relevance,
recognition, and recollection. In a sense, the epistemolo-
gical presuppositions display another dimension of reality
as one takes a second look. This is what Barth does. How¬
ever, he does appear to stumble or to hesitate in reformu¬
lating his answer to the problem of relevance. Barth simply
again maintains: "The only answer which it seems we can give
is the profoundly ambiguous and unsettling one that it [the
resurrection] can do so only as we accept it from others,
from the tradition of the Church and ultimately from the
2
biblical witness...." Indeed Barth is correct to label his
1. IVi, p. 287-
2. IVi, p. 287-
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answer to the question as "profoundly ambiguous and un¬
settling." For he goes on to affirm that today it is
necessary to turn to the testimony of others, to ecclesiastical
tradition, and finally to the word of scripture. Acceptance
of the truth of these attestations and testimonies establish
the foundation upon which "'Jesus Christ for us' is valid
today." This alone must be the port of entry into any
discussion of relevance which takes seriously both the fact
of historical distance and the fact of Jesus Christ. With
this said, Barth again maintains the concrete reality of the
resurrection. It is an event in space and time. Therefore,
a connection can be established between the past and the
present."'" And this connection must be in the form of
recollection where historical, mediate knowledge and indirect
report, tradition, and proclamation form the second-hand basis
2
for knowing. Indeed, this may seem distressing, but yet
Barth maintains that one cannot simply halt here in a vacuum
of uncertainty. The problem of historical distance must
not provide an insurmountable obstacle for coming to grips
with what has certainly taken place. The ghost of Lessing's
chasm ought not to dissuade man from the pursuit of this
event.^ To hesitate indefinitely before the problem of
historical distance would be to avoid entirely the reality
of the divine relation. The problem is indeed a genuine one
1. IVi, p. 288.
2. IVi, p. 288.
3. IVi, p. 288.
4. IVi, pp. 287, 290.
5. IVi, p. 291.
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and ought to be considered, but it is not overwhelming. In
other words, this problem does not have the last word. Barth
discerns that more appears to be involved in man's hesitation
than Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch".
We need the consciousness of historical distance,
the neutralizing historical consideration, the
remembrance of the 1900 years, the thought of the
message and tradition and proclamation of others
which binds but also separates the there and here,
the question of authenticity and credibility, the
feeling of the uncertainty of the mediation, the
unsettlement which it involves for us, we need all
this because it seems to create a delay. 1
The consciousness of historical distance demonstrates a need
on the part of man. All this talk about 1900 years ago, the
question of credibility and authenticity, the excuse of un¬
certainty regarding transmission, all this creates a neutral¬
izing effect which does no more than delay serious consider¬
ation of a historical reality. Barth would seem to be pro¬
posing a psychological diversion pretending to ontological
status created by man to divert his attention in another
direction. The problem of historical distance seems to be
an escape mechanism to channel man's creative abilities in a
direction away from the truth. It is as if Lessing's"ditch"
acts as a displacement exercise. This seems to be something
of the intent on Barth's part.
The genuineness of Lessing's question cannot be dis¬
puted in that it springs from a very genuine need:
the need to hide ourselves...from Jesus Christ as He
makes Himself present and mediates Himself to us;...
the need to safeguard ourselves as far as this move¬
ment of flight allows against the directness in which
He does in fact confront us.... 2
1. IVi, p. 292.
2. IVi, p. 292.
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The delaying tactics involved with Lessing's question are
truly real and genuine. Barth does not deny this. Man's
need engages him in an almost subconscious flight and with¬
drawal from the direct immediateness and spontaneity of the
reality of Christ. Human reaction to this directness in¬
volves a genuine drawing back which seeks to avoid dealing
with the immediate reality. A similar flight occurs as man
steadies himself along the path of natural theology."'" Here
man is seen to engage in a domestication of the Gospel which
re-moulds it into the image of man's knowledge about himself.
The similarity involved here is the escape, withdrawal, and
flight from Jesus Christ who gives Himself immediately and
directly. This, however, does not impugn the genuineness of
man's withdrawal; it nonetheless demonstrates it to be un-
2
necessary. In each instance, Barth comes back to the
immediateness of the perception which makes counter-arguments
7
against these positions unnecessary as well. The real
solution to the problem of historical distance has been re-
4
solved in the resurrection itself. In His dying and rising
1. Hi, p. l63f; III? pp. 134-9.
2. Ili, p. 172; IVi, p. 293-
3. Ili, p. 171; IVi, p. 293-
4. IVi, pp. 293, 351f; compare G. 0'Collins, "Karl Barth on
Christ's Resurrection", Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 26, No. 1,
1973, pp. 85-98.
Fr. 0'Collins questions the heavy Barthian emphasis upon
the objective appearance of the risen Christ (pp. 90-2).
Indeed, he thinks that such an approach can be fatal if
it relies too heavily on objective data (92). However, it
would seem important at this point, by way of clarification,
to make two points. (l) Barth asserts that man can only
come to know what he can experience as a world-historical
phenomenon. The risen Christ is a knowable reality as a
continuation of God's revelation in the Incarnation. On
Barth's epistemology, the risen Christ cannot be simply an
inner experience or a spiritual appearance. To be known,
(Contd.
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again, man then and now has died and has been risen with
Him."'" The old man of flight and withdrawal has received
2
his final notice. In the death of Christ, man also finds
his end and his judgment for this flight from God.^ But
beyond this judgment, there lies the positive aspect which
controls and determines the judgment and death preceding
4
resurrection. The "beyond" in question, the positive aspect
inherent in the death of Christ, manifests itself in the event
of resurrection. As such it is a (a) new act of God,
(b) confirming the event of His death, (c) altering man's
situation, (d) happening to the same Jesus Christ, and
(e) occurring once and for all. Just as God created a new
sequence within the world through the event of the incarna¬
tion, (a) He is aLso responsible for the act of the
Contd.) He must be objective and real. And (2) for Barth
to fail to acknowledge the objective reality of the risen
Christ would possibly have placed something of a limi¬
tation upon the actuality of God's historical self-reve¬
lation. In addition, to know the risen Christ in any¬
thing but an objective manner would require the positing
of another epistemological system. Even in speaking of
the creation, Barth maintains the continuity of God's
self-revelation in its historicity in order to make it an
object for man's cognition. Therefore in dealing with
the resurrection Barth also deals with the objectiveness
of the risen Christ.
1. IVi, p. 295; ivi, p. 351f.
2. IVi, p. 294.
3. IVi, p. 296.
4. IVi, p. 297.
5. IVi, pp. 297-99.
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resurrection."'" The uniqueness and newness of this
occurrence places it beyond human possibility and effort.
Again, (b) the resurrection follows in sequence upon the
death of Jesus Christ. He was dead and buried and then He
2
was resurrected. In this way, there is no disruption of
the temporal order of events which receive their conditioning
by the space and time continuum. Jesus Christ, even in the
event of revelation, confines Himself to the limits of this
reality. More importantly (c) the resurrection points to
an alteration of man's very existence. As an alteration
based on the experiences of this man, it also is relevant
4
now. Christians attest to this fact as they recognize and
5
acknowledge Christ as alive. Nonetheless, the Christian
lives in expectation and anticipation in his act of recog¬
nition. The alteration effected by Him is "not yet".^ Man
lives between the times of the resurrection and the ascension
7
and His coming again. Faith in Him moves one into an
eschatological position where one anticipates the future of
the final and definitive and proper manifestation of the pro-
O
leptic alteration effected by Him. Something new, unique,
and different approaches and encounters man from outside of
1. IVi, p. 300.
2. IVi, p. 305•
3. IVi, pp. 310, 316.
4. IVi, pp. 313-5; IViii, pp. 239-251.
5. IVi, p. 317.
6. IVi, pp. 319-323.
7. IVi, pp. 324, 327; IViii, p. 262.
8. IVi, pp. 327-329.
391
himself and in this exchange man receives and participates
in history."1" This something from outside begins in the in¬
carnation and proleptically manifests itself in the resur-
2
rection — one is confronted with God among men. This
demonstrates (d) the resurrection to be an experience in space
"5
and time. Though it is unique and of a different historical
Zj.
sense, it is nonetheless an event which can be known. And
finally (e) the death and resurrection of Christ are once
and for all because of their temporal and historical
5
character. But the purpose of this event is to give man
time to stand before God and to hear His positive Word.^ The
death and resurrection mark the end and the beginning of man
7
in relation to God. Bultmann is not prepared to follow
Barth in his bold declarations regarding the resurrection.
Instead, he accentuates the meaning and significance of the
event for the believer. The resurrection marks the beginning
point of the Easter faith when the disciples came to realize
the existential implications of Christ's message. Bultmann's
lack of concern for the supra-temporality of God appears to
shift his point of concern toward man and the relevance of
faith's message for him.
From these perspectives, the person of Jesus Christ has
been presented not in His totality and fullness and complete
1. R/T, pp. 9-12.
2. Illii, pp. 623-625.
3. IVi, p. 333.
4. IVi, pp. 335-7.
5. IVi, p. 343f-
6. IVi, p. 353; compare IVi, p. 253^
7. Illii, pp. 637-8; IVi, p. 355f; and see W/G, "Biblical
Questions, Insights, and Vistas".
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clarity, but in approximation and anticipation which is
always in need of constant correction. However, several
things appear to be justified to say about this person on the
basis of Barth's exposition and faithful search for under¬
standing. One here has to do with an historical phenomenon
in the particularity of the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He
is a man among men. But there is something unique, new, and
strange about this man. His humanitas stands completely
determined, penetrated, and transcended by the reality of
God. While humanitas exhibits His essence, God determines
His existence. His human life and being receive exaltation
by the activity of God. Barth confirms that here one meets
true man and true God. A vertical and horizontal interrelat¬
ionship displays itself. God and man communicate in this
one person. As such, the incommensurable and paradoxical
mystery of revelation marked off between the times of in¬
carnation and ascension dwells among men. In this way Jesus
Christ comes to His creation and imparts Himself. But He
always does this within the limits and with respect for the
structures of space and time. Jesus Christ does not disrupt
history. On the contrary, He fulfils and accomplishes, now
proleptically and later absolutely, these limits and structures
of history. The first sign of this action becomes apparent
in the self-declaration of the resurrection. Here God acts
and reveals. Barth sees this action and revelation as the
working out of the divine plan of reconciliation, atonement,
and salvation which makes man ready for God by giving him a
capacity and power for the divine."'" This is done where man
1. O'Collins, "Karl Barth on Christs Resurrection," Scot. J.
Theo. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 94-8, 1973-
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lives and as he lives in the person of Christ. He is not
an abstraction, an appearance, or an eternal idea; He is
a flesh and blood man."'" This is important for Barth, since
man can only know what occurs as a part of his experience
within the world. But even though He appears as a world-
historical phenomenon, the truth, cognition, and apprehension
of His person always relies upon the good-pleasure of God.
Jesus Christ can be viewed simply as Jesus of Nazareth in
His horizontal dimension without reference to His vertical
determination. But this is to miss entirely His reality and
truth. Jesus Christ is the being and activity of God among
men. The absolute uniqueness and newness of this reality
does not correspond to anything past or present within the
structures of human existence. At this point, Barth's
thought describes a correspondence theory of knowledge which
relies upon "analogies", "similarities", and "correspondences"
between objects of cognition and the process of thought which
grasps the relationship involved and all of this in order to
explain the act of coming to knowledge. On this basis he
can assert that Jesus Christ as the One He is in Himself cannot
be known by man. This would be a consequence of the infinite
2
qualitative difference between human and divine. There can
be no knowledge or cognition where there exists no similarity
or analogy. What Barth appears to be saying is that man has
no inherent or innate relationship with God on which he can
1. 0'Collins, pp. 87-91.
2. R/T, p. 10; Hi, p. 189f; H/G, p. 52.
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establish his own knowledge and cognition of this object."'"
But a correspondence and a relationship does indeed occur
when and where God gives Himself to be known. He is the
master of all rationality and truth because He is the Author
of Truth. Therefore man's claim to stand before an insur¬
mountable gap where accidental truths of history can never
possibly establish the truths of faith falls before Barth's
1. The question of analogy is important in the theology of Barth
when one considers the vast amount of epistemology contained
within the structure of his thought. It is on the basis of
this ability to know that Barth is able to speak meaningfully
about the historical reality of God's revelation then and
there becoming present here and now. Since this "unpre¬
cedented event" possesses no analogy within our own structures
of knowing, the power to come to know must be given to man.
Barth has a discussion on the use of analogy in Hi, pp. 224-
243. In the context of this paper, analogy is seen to be
a dynamic relationship inaugurated by God. The possibility
for coming to know rests on His side when He allows for
man's thought to have a correspondence with His truth. At
this point, the position of Jung Young Lee's article, "Karl
Barth's use of analogy in His Church Dogmatics," (Scot. J.
Theo. Vol. 22, pp. 129-151) has been seen as guiding the
inquiry in this paper.
By way of amplification of the discussion on the topic,
the following readings are listed:
1) John Mclntyre. "Analogy," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 12,
pp. 1-20.
2) T.F. Torrance. "Karl Barth," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 22,
pp. 2-3.
3) J.G. Gibbs. "A Secondary Point of Reference in Barth's
Anthropology," Scot. J. TheO., Vol. 16, pp. 132-135*
4) B.M.G. Reardon. "Reason and Revelation: Is Barth Con¬
sistent?", Church Quarterly Review, Vol. 145, pp. 144-155-
5) H.G. Wells. "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Analogy," Can. J.
Theo., Vol. 15, pp. 203-213-
6) Hans. Urs von Balthasar. The Theology of Karl Barth. see
section "Analogy in Full Bloom", p. lOOff.
7) H. Martin Rumscheidt. Revelation and Theology. sections:
"Possibility of Knowledge of God," p. 143f; "How is Man
to Speak of the Reality of the Testimony?", p. I49f; and
"Dialectical Relation between Revelation and Man's
Speech," p. 155f-
8) Donald Evans. "Barth on Talk about God," Can. J. Theo.,
Vol. 16, pp. 175-192. .
9) G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth, pp. 181-195-
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epistemology. When dealing with Jesus Christ and thus
with God, man experiences the solution to all problems of
cognition and understanding because God controls and masters
and imparts what man sees and hears and thinks and says about
Him. When this happens a genuine and an authentic corres¬
pondence, analogy, and similarity arises which remains
approximate, determined, penetrated, and transcended by the
activity of God. This divine-human relationship must always
be initiated by God and must always be correlated because of
the very nature of the divine life. Correspondence, analogy,
similarity, relationship, must all reflect the dynamism and
actualism of God. For this reason also, Jesus Christ does
not remain past and old but penetrates and transcends the
present and the now. The incarnation marks the beginning of
God's act of revelation in Jesus Christ. And the resurrection
and ascension mark the historically proleptic conclusion and
divine continuation of this mystery of revelation which
becomes a once within the limits of space and time but an
always within the being and activity of God. Therefore Jesus
Christ, as God Himself, possesses the initiative to make the
mediate and indirect and second-hand attestations about Him
the medium for immediate, direct, and contemporary knowledge.
Certainly one deals with witnesses and proclamation, historical
distance and credibility of texts, when one takes hold of the
Credo of faith. But these "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic"
presuppositions do not contain the truth and reality of this
person in themselves. Their truth as a correspondence and
as a relationship to His truth are always dependent, controlled,
determined, conditioned, and authenticated by Him in His act
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of revelation in the testimony of the Holy Spirit.1 Man
recollects the Jesus Christ of then and there in faith's
tradition and "by God's act man here and now participates in
the reality and mystery of His truth and being. The Jesus
Christ man comes to know is the same person of the biblical
witness and the Church's faith.
What takes place in real Christian knowledge is
rather...that the whole man...is grasped by the
object which takes and retains the initiative in
relation to him....For its theme, basis, and
content, is the reconciliation between God and man
effected in Jesus Christ and also revealing itself
in Jesus Christ. As a human action it takes place
in participation in His action. 2
Here is the one and only basis for man's knowledge of God.
Jesus Christ is the theme and content of this cognition of
the divine activity of reconciliation. By participating in
His action, man shares in His act and this becomes contem¬
poraneous with and shared by man. Divine knowledge imparts
human correspondence and analogy which lead to this partici¬
pation in the divine reconciling activity. Here, then, the
resurrection bridges the historical gap between once and
always by a self-revelation of God's intent and purpose for
His creature. But it is an intent and purpose prefigured
and expressed in history though not yet absolutely manifested.
Consequently, the resurrection points to an eschatological
dimension of man's life where he exists between the resurrec-
3
tion and ascension and His coming again. In this way,
1. IVii, pp. 125-132; compare Iii, pp. 203-279-
2. IViii, p. 220.
3. D/M, p. 61.
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something is seen to lie beyond the event of the resurrection
and yet be dependent upon God. The time between the times
belongs to man in the presence of the eschatological dimension
of existence which points by way of Jesus Christ outwardly
and vertically to the presence of God.
D. THE TIME BETWEEN THE TIMES
The concept of history in its true sense...is intro¬
duced and achieved when something happens to a being
in a certain state, i.e., when something new and
other than its own nature befalls it. History...
does not occur when the being is involved in changes
or different modes of behaviour intrinsic to itself
but when something takes place upon and to the being
as it is. The history of a being begins, continues
and is completed when something other approaches it
and determines its being in the nature proper to it,
so that it is compelled and enabled to transcend it¬
self in response and in relation to this new factor.
The history of a being occurs when it is caught up
in this movement, change and relation, when its
circular movement is broken from without by a movement
towards it and the corresponding movement from it,
when it is transcended from without-, so that it must
and can transcend itself outwards.
Barth communicates the person of Christ as always determined
by the being and activity of God. He is God Himself within
the framework of history performing a once and for all act
of self-revelation. As a historical event and reality, He
respects the limits of space and time. God's self-impar-
tation respects the sequential nature of creation while
always maintaining His being and activity in continuity
through time. In this way Jesus Christ does not disrupt
time but is Himself a once and for all historical event.
Because of His determination by God, He stands in history as
1. Illii, p. 158; compare Tillich, The Interpretation of
History, pp. 203-210.
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a new and unique occurrence which has no foundation or
necessity in the past. His being and activity are totally
and absolutely different. In history God thus creates a
new series and sequence of events which confront and encounter
man. And because God acts and creates, the situation of
Jesus Christ alters man's situation in the world. He offers
the possibility of true history. History becomes real and
true when something happens which is new and other than him¬
self. It is not the case that man changes inherently within
himself by a process or movement of something in him. Man
encounters something which transcends the limits and possibili¬
ties of his being and existence. Something from outside of
man has an effect upon him. A new factor confronts and
determines him by compelling and enabling him to transcend
himself by responding to this sequence and series of events.
As this occurs, man engages in true history which breaks the
bounds of circular creaturely movement and permits him to
transcend himself in response and in correspondence to this
new factor. When man is so determined, his movement and
activity relate , respond, and correlate to the movement and
activity of what comes from the outside. In true history,
man becomes enmeshed and enwrapped in the movement of God in
Jesus Christ. He is the new factor, the something from out¬
side, who opens man outward to the reality of God. He breaks
man's circular creaturely movement and allows him to transcend
himself. Here one meets Jesus Christ as the initiator and
enabler of true historical existence."'" Jesus Christ meets
1. Illii, p. 159f.
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man within the framework of space and. time as the God
"become man without ceasing to be God. Indeed He is not
an appearance or a symbol. He is rather a real man like
all other men yet unlike all other men even in His likeness.
This, of course, differs in degree from the interpretation of
history presented by Tillich. While the basic contents of
the interpretation remain similar between the two men, it is
nonetheless apparent that Barth speaks of an objective factor
which breaks the circular movement of the creature while
Tillich speaks more in terms of a symbolic representation of
what the creature "ought" to be as symbolized in the New Being.
The basic distinction, then, rests in the implications under¬
lying the two different approaches to reaching an "under¬
standing" of the human situation. For Tillich, it is never
the case that the infinite is actualized or materialized with¬
in the structures of reality. The creative fallen-ness of
man indicates the gap that irrevocably remains between the
finite world and infinite meaning. The symbols function in
such a way that they "open" new vistas and windows to what
transcends but does not literally interact with time and space.
The medium of this interaction always remains at the disposal
of man's "seeing" the truth intrinsic in the symbol's
pointing. However, Barth approaches history with the impli¬
cation that there is a vertical dimension directly impinging
upon creation while maintaining its integrity. This, no
doubt, preserves the relativity and contingency of history
as well as the reality and objectivity of Jesus Christ. He
no longer confronts man as a symbol but as a real man. And
by His action a new series of events within the events of
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history are made possible. The objectiveness of this
person allays all need for referring to symbols and appearances.
One now has to deal historically with a person as He is
transmitted and made known through the documents of faith.
Even so, a coming to knowledge of this man who allows all
men to transcend their circular movement remains dependent —
one may say, contingent — upon the object of cognition. The
very nature of what is involved focuses attention from the
merely empirical phenomena to something just as immediate
but yet inscrutable for the empirical abilities of man. The
vertical dimension of reality remains real and active in the
human pursuit of knowledge. Here Barth and Tillich agree.
However, for Barth it is strictly within the province of the
vertical to give itself and thus to grasp man in this process
of giving. Indeed, even the framework of history relies
upon the creative and determinative powers of the divine.
Christ as well as space and time stand in direct and non-
empirical relation to God. In Barth's explanation of the
event of creation, this vertical dimension receives expli¬
cation. In his discussion, Barth displays the cognitive tools
available to man for making this realm real and intelligible
for human experience and cognition.
Jesus Christ approaches man from within the structures
of history. He reveals the reality of God. Barth maintains
that God is also responsible for the realm of history by His
act of creation.1 Here God sets the stage for the history
of salvation which comes about in the person of Christ. "The
1. Illi, p. 59-
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history of salvation is the history, the true history which
encloses all other history and to which in some way all
other history belongs to the extent that it reflects and
illustrates the history of salvation...."^ This becomes
the theme of all history. Salvation in time is the content
of creation, and this is what is meant when one discusses
history. All history belongs to this act of salvation. God
actualizes the possibility of reconciliation as He creates
2
the world and man. Creation and the history standing upon
z
it are the first works of God. Man comes to an appreciation
and understanding of this relation as he comes to view himself
4
and his historical being as concrete divine acts. Faith
attests to God's work of creation and Barth, for his part,
attempts to explain and to understand what this means in
terms of faithful knowledge. The biblical witness to this
act is straight-away affirmed as presenting the history of
5
creation. Barth does not want it to be interpreted as a
philosophy of existence which would entail another epistemolo-
gical approach.^ It is seen as an act in continuity with God's
7
self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Like this action, God
Q
works in particular events in a once and for all manner. By
1. Illi, P. 60.
2. Illi, PP . 43-6.
3. Illi, P- 60.
4. Illi, P- 61.
5. Illi, P- 63.
6. Illi, P- 6lf.
7. Illi, P. 64.
8. Illi, P- 65-
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His action in creation, He fashions a place where man can
participate with Him."'" He creates a place where man can
participate in history. God accomplishes this by the
2
historical act of creation which takes place within time.
The temporal element marks off the creaturely qualification
■5
of man as distinct from God. This element involves a one
way sequence of events which characterize both the creature
Z{.
and the act of creation. Time and creation come into their
own simultaneously. The temporal realm becomes the sphere
5
where God is able to communicate His eternity historically.
The time given in this way is always from God and always
dependent upon Him.^ The fact of man's time rests upon the
7
genuinely prior act of God's creating it. This temporal
element finds itself conditioned, qualified and determined
8
by the reality of Jesus Christ who is. As this One, He is
"now" even as He is "once" and "not yet". In Him, time is
o
constituted in its full contemporaneity. He sets the norm
and the standard for the valuation and meaning of real time."^
"Really to have time is to be in Him and with Him, in virtue
of our participation in His present, on the road from this
past into this future. " "" God Himself stands as the guarantor
1. Illi, p. 67.
2. Illi, p. 67-
3. Illi, p. 67.
4. Illi, p. 68.
5. Illi, p. 69.
6. Illi, p. 72.
7. Illi, p. 73-
8. Illi, p. 74.
9. Illi, p. 74.
10. Illi, p. 74.
•1—1I—1 Illi, p. 74.
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of this real time in that He makes time to be fulfilled in
this person."^" Time as a sequence characterizing the
existence of the creature does not form an independent series
of events distinct from the reality of Jesus Christ. Rather
in His act of salvation and reconciliation, He determines and
qualifies the meaning of time before time. "It was in
correspondence with this real time, and as the necessary and
2
adequate form of this event, that time was originally created."
With this said, Barth begins to bring into full view something
of the scope and comprehensiveness of God's act in Jesus
Christ. The reality of time and of creation correspond and
relate to this divine self-revelation. God's act of recon¬
ciliation determines and precedes His act of creation. The
temporal and sequential ordering of creation stand in direct
immediacy to Him. From the person of Christ, one attains
a vantage point which unlocks the qualitative significance
of all time. Thus to speak of Him requires man to
appreciate and to understand the comprehensiveness of faith's
object. The similarities with Tillich's existential inter¬
pretation of history cannot be overlooked. Barth and Tillich
appear to agree that the input of the Christian message into
the life of the believer provides the possibility for a
teleological perspective upon existence. Tillich suggests
that this perspective is keynoted in the symbol of the New
Being. As the believer re-affirms and participates within
1. Illi, p. 75-
2. Illi, p. 76.
3. Illi, p. 77.
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the uniquely significant decision of the disciples and the
faith tradition, he acquires the symbolic handles by which
to grasp and to perceive the potentialities and possibilities
latent in existence. It would seem to be the case that the
believer is given direction and guidance for living. In a
sense, the New Being functions as a touchstone by which life's
possibilities may be evaluated and Judged in terms of meaning
and significance. Jesus as the Christ represents the New
Being, but it is important to point out that the cohesiveness
and legitimacy of this association of Jesus and the Christ
appears to be a matter of faithful decision by man. In a word,
the recognition depends upon the affirmation and sustained
passion of the believer. Indeed, Tillich suggests that there
could be a time when "Jesus as the Christ is the centre" comes
to an end, and presumably this would involve a break in
continuity with the historical tradition surrounding Him."'"
He functions as the beginning, centre and end of the present
relation to Him, but this relation is understood in existential
and personal terms. Jesus as the Christ is the beginning,
centre and end of existential meaning and worth. Barth
appears to demonstrate a limited sympathy for this "Christ
for us" interpretation. Jesus Christ apparently signifies
the vertical interpenetration into man's horizontal continuum
of time. Jesus Christ infuses meaning and direction into
time by helping man to see and to know his dependence on God.
But yet, Barth seems to place the emphasis for this situation
upon God's grace rather than upon man's faith. In this way,
God's supra-temporality represents more than a concept of
1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, "History and the
Christ".
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eternal meaning and worth. God penetrates and transcends
existence with meaning as well as with His personal presence.
Consequently, Barth sees God's pre-temporality and post-
temporality as limiting points which entail more than the
category of meaning. For Barth, God really limits the
beginning, centre and end of man's existential and historical
becoming.
However, Barth does not limit his exposition to the
correspondence of creation to the act of reconciliation. In
the same manner used to explicate the historicity of the
Christ-event, Barth moves to exposit something of the historical
character of creation. He has found the key to this under¬
standing in the person of Christ when he sees Him as qualifying
the totality of existence. But creation like the resurrection
is not a public event. Nonetheless, Barth is seen to uphold
its historical-ness. In order to do this he turns his
attention to the vertical dimension of reality. He asserts
that creation cannot be interpreted in terms of a purely
perceptible and visibly objective event.^ What is required
here is consideration of the "non-historical" level of this
event. "For this reason it is a 'non-historical' history,
2
and it can be the subject only of a 'non-historical' history."
This does not make it any more or less real; it simply places
creation in a sequence of events which are not immediately
perceptible by man but are nonetheless of a similar historical
nature. What Barth appears to be maintaining is the equal
1. Illi, p. 78.
2. Illi, p. 78.
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status to cognitive reality of this "non-historical" dimension
of existence. He points out that, "...this is true of all
history to the extent that God's creation continues in it
and in all its movements, relationships and forms there is
an element in which it is immediate to God and immediately
posited by Him." Similar to his discussion on the
resurrection and indeed pertaining to it, Barth is insistent
to maintain the vertical slant with and in correlation to
the horizontal. For God's creation continues in all history
and it is therefore in immediate relationship to Him. God's
positing of the created realm establishes a relationship
2
between the finite and the infinite. Barth can confidently
confirm, "Not all history is 'historical'." There remains
this definite and real connection between God and history.
And in regards to creation in particular, this allows him to
treat this event strictly and solely in its "non-historical"
4
immediacy to God. Indeed, Barth's continuation of this
exposition leads him to conclude that history is really only
genuine and true in so far as the "historical" and "non-
5
historical" dimensions accompany each other. If man con¬
tinues to deny this latter level he engages in "a highly
unreal history...in the poor light of which the historical...
can only seem to be an ocean of tedious inconsequence and
therefore demonic chaosi'^ Barth, for one, will not be
1. Illi, p. 78.
2. Illi, p. 49-
3. Illi, p. 80.
4. Illi, p. 80.
5. Illi, p. 81.
6. Illi, p. 81.
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driven to this dichotomous approach to reality. The real
and the genuine must continue in their relationship to the
divine. What appears to be implied from this and above
statements is the imposition of purpose and meaning into
history by divine interaction. History stands as the arena
in which God executes the divine plan of reconciliation. This
is the intent and purpose for which it has been made the
medium. However, Barth must still provide some cognitive
tool for the apprehension of this "non-historical" dimension
which remains beyond the grasp of simple "historical"
objectivity. The "non-historical" element requires depiction
and narrative."'" To meet this requirement Barth turns to a
2
discussion on saga. Saga depicts and defines this vertical
dimension. This becomes his manner of speaking about "an
intuitive and poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of
history which is enacted once and for all within the confines
of time and space." Saga seeks to interpolate the immediacy
of God within the "confines" of history. This immediacy is
not objectively grasped by saga; it is seen intuitively,
insightfully, imaginatively. Moreover, saga does not present
itself in objectified prose; it utilizes poetic language
which narrates figuratively and therefore approximately. This
language does not appear to encapsulate its ontological
referent; it only highlights and illumines its presence.
Saga, then, is the human exposition of the immediacy of the
1. Illi, p. 80.
2. Illi, p. 81.
3- Illi, p. 80.
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divine within history. At times, the biblical witness is
forced to speak in this form because of the very nature of
its object, i.e., the resurrection. Historical and objecti-
fiable language cannot grasp this transcendent dimension
involved in the make-up of genuine history. "On the contrary,
we have to recognize that...the Bible is forced to speak also
in the form of saga precisely because its object and origin
are what they are, i.e., not just 'historical' but also
frankly 'non-historical'."^ Saga represents a necessary
means of communication. The object, which controls and
conditions the truth of the statements made about it, will
not permit itself to be simply grasped and managed by object-
ifiable and quantitative language. The reality of God
penetrates and transcends history. He cannot be managed and
quantified. This would ignore and destroy the dynamism
and actualism of God's being and activity and life. To speak
of God in the non-public aspect of His interaction, the
biblical witness employs something of a dynamic language
which at least approximates the object of its narration.
Biblical narrative speaks in terms of saga which is non-
objectifiable and non-quantitative. This is the path that
must be pursued when one depicts the event of creation. Here
p
one is engaged in pure saga. What is required at this most
basic of "non-historical" levels is the implementation of
"the divinatory and poetical saga." "Divination means the
1. Illi, p. 82.
2. Illi, p. 82.
3. Illi, p. 82.
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vision of the historical emergence which precedes
'historical' events and which can he guessed from that which
has emerged and in which 'historical' history takes place.""'"
This element of pure saga appears to involve an intuitive
imagining. In this case, it is a process which results in
a vision or mental conceptualization of the beginning of the
historical process. Moreover, it seems to be a deductive
process based upon experiential data and governed by this as
well. All in all, Barth seeks to describe an intuitive-
deductive process of thought by which one produces something
2
similar to a cognitive grasp of historical emergence. "And
poetry means the articulated form of this divinising vision
3
and therefore of the historical emergence seen in this way."
Poetry verbally expresses the intuition and insight of the
divinatory process. It speaks figuratively of that which is
not perceptible in an objective reality but is derived and
imagined on the basis of the given. As such, poetical
narrative speaks about something which remains beyond the
grasp of perception but within the eye of the mind. Barth
utilizes this divinatory and poetical saga to envision the
basic structures implicit in historical phenomena, to grasp
at the origin and roots of history, and to express figuratively
4
the hidden depth of genuine time in existing time. Therefore
divinatory and poetical saga performs an important role in the
apprehension of reality. The saga moves into relationship
1. Illi, p. 83.
2. Compare A. Einstein, The World As I See It, pp. 124-126.
3. Illi, p. 83.
4. Illi, p. 83.
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with divine immediacy which, hy its very nature, outstrips
man's objectifiable perception. Saga allows him to intuit
and to feel and to sense the divine presence not in
abstraction from but in relation to and dependence upon the
known quantities of the world. Saga, then, relies for its
partial verification upon its consistency and continuity and
agreement with other biblical witnesses."'" This conceptual
apparatus for perceiving the "non-historical" comes a bit
sharper into view when Barth contrasts it with myth. Barth
draws the distinction regarding myth that its object and
2
content are of a general nature. The particularity of saga
is transformed into the timeless, inclusive and narrow
imagining of reality peculiar to myth. It does not con¬
cretize its intuition nor does it seek to uncover the depth
of its insight. Rather myth's intuition pertains to a
timeless and abstract view of its eternal truth.^ This method,
of course, is immediately unsuited for the task of speaking
about God whose very nature is not a static truth but an
historical manifestation of His reality. But because of
its abstract nature of depiction, the distinctiveness of the
elements involved become blurred to the point of creating a
monism. And what is more it fails to achieve a depth beyond
man and his own world.^ This is again inappropriate to the
intercourse between man and God. In Barth's view, these two
1. Compare A. Einstein, The World As I See It, pp. 173-4.
2. Illi, p. 84.
3. Illi, p. 84.
4. Illi, p. 85.
5. Illi, p. 85.
6. Illi, p. 85.
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elements are distinct and particular in their own right.
Thus the timelessness, the predominance of man and his world,
and the lack of real depth, mark myth off as a non-historical
and abstract divinatory and poetical understanding."'" Barth
quickly contrasts saga as retaining the essential distinctive¬
ness of Creator and creature, as depicting the particularity
of the interaction, as grasping the hidden depth behind the
creature's existence, and as narrating exactly what it
2
intends to say. All of these dissimilarities lead Barth
to the conclusion that saga and myth are opposites. The
historical and particularized nature of the biblical witness
requires one to speak of saga. Barth maintains the
historicality of creation as well as God's active distinctive¬
ness from man. Further, he does not view the biblical
witness as a presentation of a timeless and eternal truth
related exclusively to man's understanding of himself. Here
Barth would find contention with Bultmann and his occupation
with myth. No doubt, Bultmann does present an understanding
of the biblical witness which seeks to get "behind" the myth-
character of this witness in order to bring from concealment
the true intention of the text. One must ask if Barth is
not supplying his reader with a means of interpreting the true
purpose of Bultmann's demythologizing task. Surely implicit
within Bultmann's project is the assumption that somewhere
in the biblical witness one can certainly etch out a hidden
1. Illi, p. 86.
2. Illi, p. 86.
3. Illi, p. 87.
412
truth or idea about reality that is relevant and pertinent
today. And behold, the Word of God as it is transmitted
through Jesus Christ seems to give one something to retain
amid the change and relativity of the world. Bultmann dis¬
mantles the particularity of the message of the witness in
order to make it pertinent now. He appears to abstract
some eternal and static truth out of the testimony of faith.
But Barth does not view this as the proper category for
understanding the manner of biblical speaking. Instead of
myth, one has to do with saga. This is the proper way to
inspect the conceptualization of this witness. One is not
dealing with a timelessness and an abstraction but with a
particular entity — God and man interacting while retaining
their distinctiveness and identity. Behind man at a more
basic dimension of reality stands the divine immediacy which
requires witness but which lies beyond the perceptible
grasp of man. Here one employs the divinatory and poetical
saga as the conceptual apparatus for forming cognitions of
this dimension and for preserving the integrity of God.
Therefore myth is regarded as totally inappropriate for the
depiction of this vertical level and for narrating the
historical interaction between the horizontal and the vertical.
Two interesting parallels between Barth and Kierkegaard seem
to be reflected here. First, Barth speaks of saga as
grasping and intuiting the "non-historical" history of creation.
What is revealing is Barth's persistence in avoiding any
suggestion that saga explains the creation in an objectifiable
manner. He appears to be intimating the position that the
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Reason's sphere of competence does not allow it to dissect
and to analyze in a detached and quantifiable manner the
content of this "non-historical" history. It would seem
that the Reason has achieved the limit of its capacity in
confrontation with God's activity. Similarly, Kierkegaard
appears to have drawn the limits of Reason in explaining the
Absolute Paradox. The latter is no less real because of this.
Barth and SK, in their own ways, may be seen to agree that the
activity of the Reason breaks down when it attempts to explain
the historic-supra,„.historic reality of the Eternal in time.
Second, Barth and SK appear to agree that a qualitative dis¬
tinction remains between God and man. For Barth, saga
assists in maintaining this distinction. Yet saga provides
a faithful inroad into the intelligibility of God's historic-
suprahistoric activity. In this way, Barth can possibly
appreciate Bultmann's interest in discerning the meaning and
significance of God's activity for man. However, Barth
augments this meaning and significance with the reality of
God's presence.
Barth now returns to the presentation of creation as
pure saga. It is now apparent that his exposition avoids
the claim of being an "historical" history which presents
only the public and perceptible facts of the matter. As
well, it is also clear that Barth is not speaking mytholo-
gically about timeless and abstract human phenomena. Creation
as pure saga seeks to explicate the "non-historical" dimension
of "historical" reality in its concreteness and particularity.
"The question always and everywhere, is that of the actuality
414
of the historical self-revelation of God. This has also a
'historical' aspect, and to that extent its witnesses must
observe and think and speak 'historically'.""'" Saga accompl¬
ishes this task by preserving the historical integrity of
God's actualism and dynamism in interrelationship with man
and his world. Because God presents Himself in this manner,
human cognition must assimilate itself to this object of
thought. God gives Himself historically; therefore man
must observe and think and speak historically as well. God
in His historical self-revelation determines, governs and
controls man's apperception and cognition of Him. It must
always be the case that man adjusts and attunes his thinking
and speaking and observing to the reality of God who is the
prius of all cognition. Thus, Barth wants more than per-
2
ception and comprehension. "Imagination, too, belongs no
less legitimately in its way to the human possibility of
knowing. A man without imagination is more of an invalid
than one who lacks a leg." Perception and comprehension
encompass man's knowing on the objective and empirical level
of being. But this is not the limit or the extent of what
"to know" circumscribes. Knowing also involves imagination,
insight, and intuition. This type of knowing does not
appear to be mere speculation, given Barth's previous state¬
ments. Imagination is always governed by the given phenomena
of empirical reality. And in the case of faith, imagination
1. Illi, p. 90.
2. III4-, p. 91.
3. Illi, p. 91.
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is governed by other biblical witnesses which condition and
qualify any imaginative intuition. Man requires this
avenue to cognition if he is to participate in the truth
statements of faith. For again, the "non-historical"
dimension of divine immediacy lies beyond the quantifiable
comprehension of man. Imagination, insight, intuition, provide
the inroad into this level of reality. And more, imagination
provides a common denominator among men. It is a shared
phenomenon allowing for communicability and commonality of
intuited insights of the divine immediacy. "In principle
each of us can be open to the actualities of pre- and post-
history; each of us can produce saga and prophecy or at
least perceive them when they come from others."1 Man does
not exist without the inherent cognitive apparatus necessary
for divine perception. But it is an apparatus that is
always initiated and controlled by the divine object. What
one encounters in the creation narrative in particular and
the biblical witness in general is human attestations and
2
human mediation of the divine self-witness. God provides
the content, credibility, determination, and the limitation
of this human medium. He maintains and conditions the truth-
quality of man's statements by giving both their content and
their veracity. What comes to the fore in this process of
imaginative cognition is the object of faith attested in
human, poetic language. This is the limit and the deter¬
mination of the biblical witness in general and of the creation
1. Illi, p. 91.
2. Illi, p. 93*
3- Illi, p. 93-
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in particular — God in His historical self-revelation.1
What begins to emerge from all of this is a very strange
new world. Barth takes with utter seriousness the historicality
of the biblical witness in its testimony to the activity of
God. The subject matter of this testimony governs the
giving and the comprehensibility of the message. Barth has
made this point clear with his insistence upon the actuality
of the revelation of God. This becomes the guiding light in
any human effort to move toward understanding. Man is not
left unaided and alone in this endeavour. The vestigium
trinitatis — the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic pre¬
supposition" of faith — and the human power of imagination
provide the basic tools for faith's quest for understanding.
This testimony and ability at human disposal provide the
bridge which God determines, controls, and initiates. What
opens into view is the "non-historical" reality of God's
immediacy before the "historical" realities of objective
history. God remains actual and present within its context.
He makes Himself known by allowing human cognition an insight¬
ful and intuitive inroad into the divine "non-historical"
and historical reporting of the divine historicity in Jesus
Christ. Man experiences God in the actuality of the
historical self-revelation, and to express and to depict this
depth-dimension man employs both divinatory and poetical saga
as well as historical testimony. By means of the saga, man
comes to know the non-historical reality of God in a conceptual
though non-objectifiable manner. God determines the vision
1. Illi, p. 94.
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and the poetic expression of man but yet He always appears
to remain other than man's imaginative picture of Him.
The truth-quality of saga is always between the truth of
who God is in Himself and what man experiences this truth
to be. Theology works in this gap between Truth-Itself
and man's assent to it."'" In other words man does not directly
speak about the reality of God. This respects both the
infinite qualitative difference between God and man and
the integrity and intelligibility of man's faithful
cognition of the object of faith. As seen from the
perspective of salvation, history becomes the place where
and the material which God employs for the working out of
His plan of reconciliation. History appears in a broad
spectrum which affirms the actuality of man and God. There
is a purpose in all of this and this purpose dissolves the
apparent and demonic chaos which would otherwise be assumed.
God creates time out of His good-pleasure and He fulfils it
in the person of Jesus Christ. Here one encounters the
genuineness of real time in its full contemporaneity. Jesus
Christ who is "now" meets man as "once" and "always". He
provides the unique clue for coming to an understanding of
God in history. In the person of Jesus Christ, God
approaches man and comes into His own. History is real in
so far as it stands in relation with and in correspondence to
2
the reality of God. He is the dimension of completeness
which stands behind everyday existence and which provides the
1. A, p. 25; R/T, p. 182.
2. Illii, p. 46.
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depth and roots of creation. God is true existence in
Himself and everything outside of Him can be conceived as
not existing."'" The actualism and the dynamism of God
establish the once and for all-ness of history which even
God Himself respects in the person of Christ. There exists,
then, this vertical dimension which is once and always active
in the horizontal and sequential continuity of "historical"
history.
RECAPITULATION
Barth seeks to protect the historical dimension of the
dynamism and actualism of God. He seeks to preserve the
historical integrity of God's act in Jesus Christ. In order
to achieve this end, Barth conceives history as a two-dimen¬
sional sphere. A type of complementarity transpires here in
that God creates the historical for the purpose of man's
reconciliation while man requires the medium of the historical
in order to come to know the reality of God. The two
dimensions intersect each other at the point of Jesus Christ
who is the God become man. And more, Barth presents the
saga as a means of penetrating the "non-historical" historical
dimension of divine immediacy. Saga provides the tool of
moving into this level of being which remains beyond the
perceiving and comprehending of man. Imagination and poetry
delimit the content of saga which itself attempts to preserve
the historical individuality of God's actions in space and
time — actions which stay beyond the empirical grasp. But
1. H/B, p. 135.
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this entire schema resides upon the more inclusive conception
of history as the reality where God fulfils His eternal plan
of reconciliation. From an epistemological standpoint,
Barth provides the conceptual apparatus for conveying
cognitive data. And from an ontological perspective, the
inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of God's being and
activity direct Barth into conceiving the whole of the
historical sphere as the place of God's action. However, the
eternal decision of God does not destroy the human freedom
of man. He still possesses the genuine option of retreating
from Him, i.e., Lessing's problem. God's act in Jesus
Christ proleptically fulfils what God has decided from
eternity. But yet man lives between the time of the
resurrection and ascension and His coming again. The purpose
and intent of history is determined and conditioned by God,
but man can use this time between the times to come to God
or to turn away."'" No doubt, the correlation of human and
divine freedom within the sphere of history must remain open
2 3
for discussion. But as Barth has pointed out to Harnack,
"I explicitly deny the possibility of positing anything
relative as absolute, somehow and somewhere, be it in history
or in ourselves...."^ This is consistent with his position
throughout, that as one approaches the object of faith one
is only allowed to speak with scientific certainty. What
1. IVi, p. 323-
2. H/B, pp. 123-4, p. 194f.
3. For a fine treatment of the Barth-Harnack correspondence
(1923), see H. Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology.
4. R/T, p. 48.
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man between the times can and will say about God is always
approximate and relative. God's being and activity move
on toward the future. God's movement requires man to move
in his thought and in his faith. Man's faith in search of
understanding needs constant correction and support. This
quality marks off man's relationship to God. It is a re¬
lationship involved in a movement between the times. As such,
it takes place in history where God and man meet in the
person of Jesus Christ whose "once" becomes "always" in the
Christian act of understanding.
I thank thee, good Lord, I thank thee, that what
I at first believed because of thy gift, I now
know because of thine illumining in such a way
that even if I did not want to believe thine
Existence, yet I could not but know it. 1
The conclusion of Barth's exposition of God in history
brings him back again, full circle, to the point of his
beginning. Faithful man's search for understanding involves
him in the circulus veritatis Dei where he repeats what God
2
has effected and made known. For Barth, God is the
beginning and the end of faith's knowledge. In every aspect
and in every dimension of this quest, man is confronted,
encountered, determined, and conditioned by Him. He is the
ontological reference of truth and He is the way to and the
content of this truth. Therefore, at the end of the day
man can only say, "I thank thee, good Lord, I thank thee."
Gratitude and thanksgiving mark a positive quality of
theology which brings to clearer knowledge God's "Yes" to man.
1. A, p. 170.
2. Hi, p. 250.
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POSTSCRIPT
I. A GLANCE BACK
The thought of Kierkegaard has been pointed out earlier
as a reaction to 19th Century Protestant immanentism. SK
attempted to affirm the relativity, contingency and temporality
of history as the sphere in which man comes to faith. He
dampens any notion of faith being related to an eternal
apprehension. Indeed, Reason cannot successfully cope with
the dynamic possibility of faith within the historical
continuum. Reason collides headlong into the unknown reality
of faith. Here the Reason, which must be viewed in its
objective and empirical garb, encounters God. This encounter
is mediated within the confines and limits of time and space
where contingency and temporality are the order of the day.
Nonetheless, Reason experiences something real that will not
be dissolved and controlled by Reason's analyses or circum¬
spections. Because in history one can only deal with the
unnecessary and with the contingent, Reason can never demon¬
strate and prove this unknown reality with which it collides.
Approximations can only result. But this is simply not good
enough. Faith admits to mediating in time the experience
of the eternal in the God-man Jesus Christ. To Reason in the
full bloom of objectivity and empiricism sprinkled with a
notion of immanentism, this declaration of faith can be no
more than an absurdity. However, the persistence of the
claim continues and Reason's attempts to demonstrate the
complete absurdity of faith's content cannot resolve the
matter. SK develops the classification made by Lessing
regarding reason's eternal truth and history's accidental truth
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to an extreme. Indeed, history has no element of static-
ness and rest. The very historical nature of all reality,
if it is to be truly historical, demands a coming-into-
existence-kind-of-change. History, then, involves becoming.
Most surely on these grounds, Reason can hope for no more
than approximation. Nonetheless, faith continues to make
the claim that the eternal is in time in the person of Jesus
Christ. He is the Absolute Paradox which faith relies upon
and Reason cannot dissolve. Here again the incommensurab¬
ility between historical truth and eternal action manifests
itself most distinctly. The Absolute Paradox approaches
Reason as totally incomprehensible and absurd. Yet SK
maintains the integrity and intelligibility inherent in this
Paradox. In other words, to accept the Paradox involves one
in an integrative re-organization of the logical structure of
being."'" The Paradox provides another approach and dimension
to integrative and coherent living which Reason in itself
cannot obtain. SK refers to the downfall of Reason as its
paradoxical passion links Reason and Paradox together in
understanding during this moment of passion. Paradox is
assimilated into the human structure of "knowing" and being
by the activity of the leap of faith which resolves to make
inward and subjective the objective uncertainty and absurdity
of the eternal in time. The leap of faith grasps in the
moment of passion and subjectivity what Reason can only view
as incommensurable. This leads SK to make the claim that,
"Faith is not a form of knowledge; for all knowledge is
1. A. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further
Light," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 13, pp. 33-4.
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either a knowledge of the Eternal, excluding the temporal
and historical as indifferent, or it is pure historical
knowledge. No knowledge can have for its object the
absurdity that the Eternal is historical.1,1 SK appears to
be influenced to no mean degree by the distinctions of Lessing.
Indeed, it almost seems to be the case that SK works within
the limits set by Lessing. This observation relies upon
SK's claim that "Faith is not a form of knowledge." To have
knowledge is to know either the Eternal in and of itself or
the historical in and of itself. These are the two approaches
open to the realm of knowledge. But faith makes something
of a synthetical claim by offering the eternal in time.
Knowledge cannot be attained from the temporalization of
eternity since this lies beyond the spectrum of the grasp of
knowledge. Reason appears to be able to contemplate
eternal ideas in their static and logical interconnectedness.
As well, Reason can consider the approximations of accidental
historical truths. But the necessity of eternity revealed
in the contingency of history provides a unique and un¬
believable situation. This situation can only be categorized
by the machinations of Reason as incommensurable. SK there¬
fore maintains the non-knowledge condition of faith. However,
faith does have a consistency and coherence of its own even
though no form of knowledge as defined above results. "But
the disciple is in Faith so related to the Teacher as to be
2
eternally concerned with his historical existence." For SK,
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 76.
2. Ibid., p. 76.
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faith establishes something of a heuristic grasp of the
individual act of becoming in history. One involved in
this heuristic coherency has laid aside the attempt to
demonstrate what always remains beyond Reason's ability to
demonstrate. Faith involves one in the concern for and
resolution of historical living. It is an act and movement
of becoming conditioned and qualified by the Teacher, the
eternal in time, Jesus Christ. The strict historicality
of the dimension of existing removes the full blossoming of
faith from the objective into the inward and subjective
passionateness of the believer. This does not appear to
negate nor to dismiss the historical reality of Jesus Christ.
What appears to be happening is the very definite change of
direction and switching of emphasis. The rationality and
integrity of faith finds its establishment upon an inward
and subjective basis. Faith functions as a mode of passionate
inwardness in the face of an objective uncertainty. Thus
faith appears to be encapsulated within the inner experiences
of the believer. This appears to follow upon the heels of
SK's stringent emphasis upon the contingency and becoming
of realities within time and space. Faith remains coherent
and consistent but it is not knowledge as defined by SK.
SK, then, offers a way of reacting to 19th Century Liberal
Protestantism from within the accepted limits and structures
set by Lessing. The believer is able to affirm within him¬
self what Reason cannot establish from historical data. Man
in faith comes "to know" God in Jesus Christ by a subjective
act of will. Indeed one must inquire if SK has not in effect
created another anthropocentric system."'" This is the question
1. K. Barth, "A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille,"
(trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt), Can. J. Theo., Vol. 11, p. 6.
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Barth asks. One may ask differently, "Is it possible to
react constructively against Lessing without being freed
from the limitations of his problem?" SK develops this
limitation to a maximum point as he views all of history
and the knowledge deriving from it as involved in becoming.
Faith offers more stability within time because it deals
with an eternal reality in history. Faith ultimately
grasps this reality by an act of passionate inwardness making
faith's truth immanently and directly subjective. One must
begin to question the objectivity of faith, its realness in
space and time, if it must withdraw into the inner recesses
of the passionate soul.
Barth thinks not. In his own way, SK affirmed the
historical reality of Christianity. Reason does meet and
engage the incommensurable Paradox within history. But
finally faith resolves to appropriate this historical en¬
counter inwardly, thus removing it from the contingency and
temporality of time. History maintains its radical state
of becoming and faith achieves the truth and certainty of
the eternal. However the bifurcation of existence lingers
as history continues objectively and faith moves underground
into the indirect experience of subjectivity. From the
perspective of Barth's exposition on faith, this continuous
dichotomous situation fails to do justice to the reality and
actuality of God's self-revelation. Barth's little but
important book on Anselm appears to engage the ontological
problem epistemologically. This writer is not convinced
that Barth is so much painting a picture of the woiid as he
is informing his reader about the inherent possibility for
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knowledge that does exist in faith. No doubt, a metaphysical
construction may arise by way of implication; however this
does not appear to be the primary thrust or interest. Man
in the midst of faith can know God. Certainly there would
be some line of agreement between SK and Barth on the state¬
ment that "Faith is not a form of knowledge." It is not a
form of knowledge to be gleaned by the processes of Reason.
However the reality and actuality of God in time is open to
cognition on the basis of Credo and the working of God himself.
In this way, history retains the radical nature of becoming
which SK perceived. It is a constant realm of coming-into-
existence-kind-of-changes. But Barth wants to place a much
weightier and heavier emphasis upon the objectiveness of
Jesus Christ. He does not appear to be satisfied with this
person being absorbed into the subjectivity of man. Jesus
Christ possesses an objective reality distinct from and
knowable by the man of faith. Indeed the historicity of
Christ seems to be taken in utter seriousness. Yet for
Barth as for SK, Reason cannot decipher the incomprehensibi¬
lity of this "unprecedented event". However Barth does not
simply view the problem from this side of reality as does SK.
He rather assumes that the possibility of knowledge resides
with God. Therefore if one asks "How do we/I come to know
this person?" Barth does not respond that knowledge of
Jesus Christ as the One He is is impossible or not really
knowledge at all. Rather one must approach the Credo of
faith and be given to know Christ as the One He is by the
good-pleasure of God. In this way the solution to "how can
accidental truths of history be seen as the eternal truths of
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reason?" is given by God Himself in Jesus Christ who is the
same one that Reason can never know unaided. Lessing's
problem is thus transposed from the realm of epistemology
to that of psychology. His problem does not agree with the
actual reality of the subject matter. God is known and is
knowable in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ encounters
man as an historical reality and as the object of faith who
is knowable. Reality, by implication from Barth's epistemolo-
gical framework, includes both a vertical and a horizontal
dimension. God does not remain exiled beyond the limits set
by Lessing's problem. SK dealt with God as He was experienced
inwardly in man. This vertical dimension remains prominent:
(l) history is strictly the realm of becoming; (2) "Faith is
not a form of knowledge"; (3) Faith's leap appropriates the
historical and objective uncertainty subjectively within man.
However the viewing of God from the perspective of becoming
similar to history places God and history on similar dynamic
and movement-oriented levels. Barth preserves the actuality
of God's historical self-revelation as well as the contingency
and becoming which characterize history. Dynamism and
activity qualify the interrelation and interaction between
God and man in history. The bifurcation between eternal and
historical truth becomes antiquated in the dynamics of the
relationship. Nothing static and abstract remains of God
who must be interpreted as eventful. Therefore Barth's
exposition of the faith seeks to displace and dissolve as
unreal and illusionary Lessing's problem. By doing this on
epistemological grounds beginning from God and going to man,
Barth seeks to invert the man/God relationship which SK moved
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to a deeper level of human subjectivity. With Barth,
Lessing's limits and strictures are removed from the realm of
theological consideration and from faith's search for under¬
standing.
II. A GLANCE TO EITHER SIDE
a) Bultmann: "Faith is not a form of Knowledge"
It has been pointed out that SK had labelled faith as
not being a form knowledge: (l) because it does not deal
strictly with the Eternal exclusive of the historical and
(2) because it does not deal strictly with the historical
exclusive of the Eternal, but (3) faith deals with the
Eternal in time. It has been suggested that SK works within
the bounds of Lessing's problem while accentuating the meaning
of accidental to be an all-inclusive classification of the
historical. And further, SK transposes the realm of faith
from the objective arena of becoming into the subjective sphere
of man's inwardness and passion. In doing this he does not
degrade the historical, but rather he arranges the limits of
the historical in such a manner as to display the futility
of Reason's attempt to grasp what can only be incommensurable.
Therefore the battle for the certainty and applicability of
faith goes into the subjective inwardness of man's being
where the rationality of objective Reason exhausts itself and
the coherency of faith intercedes. One may ponder the
alternative presented by Bultmann.
Taking Bultmann within the context of his exposition of
history, one approaches something resembling the subjectivity
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of SK. It would almost appear that faith is not really
a form of knowledge. But what tends toward this assumption?
Bultmann has a purpose in mind as he dialogues with the Jesus
Christ of Christian faith. Dialogue is an important exegetical
tool in that it retrieves something of the commonality inherent
between then and there and here and now. Bultmann's conver¬
sation with Jesus Christ discovers an existential awareness
that contains relevance and importance now. In a world
that seems alien and appears hostile to man, there can hardly
be any security or readily available material for man to
construct a foundation upon which to build his life. History
for Bultmann can only objectively be perceived as contingent
and temporary. This is hardly a conducive atmosphere for
man to achieve stability. What Bultmann appears to be saying
is that the world is in a state of constant flux and of becoming.
With this view, history itself cannot be a sure basis for human
security. Rather man must look into the becomings and past
becomings of history for some possible means to alleviate the
tension and anxiety produced by the constancy of change and
flux. In the preaching of the Word of God as instituted by
Jesus Christ and heard today, a new self-understanding can be
found. The Word delivered by Jesus Christ attacks the false
foundations of security man would find in history. As well,
the Word demonstrates the insecurity and the vulnerability
of man in the face of history. But in this demonstration,
the Word also delivers a new self-awareness. It would
appear that Bultmann maintains that man receives something
of a heuristic principle which produces an ontic change
within the inner man. The anxiety and fear arising from the
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insecurity of history dissipates as one discovers a new
source of hope in the power of God. This power is not
perceived, however, and man can only act as if God were in
control. Though the world rages on, man acts as if meaning
and value are inherent in reality. The self-awareness con¬
tained in the Word becomes a present reality. The then and
there becomes here and now in the subjective inwardness of
man where the constant becoming of history subsides and
dissipates. The "now" becomes important not because of any
objective and empirical knowledge delivered by Jesus in the
Word. The "now" is important because man possesses a self-
awareness which allows him to proceed in the world as if the
ontic change had really been ontological. Thus it does not
appear that the man in faith is dealing with knowledge as SK
defined it but rather he goes forward on the basis of a self-
assured awareness. No direct relation between SK and Bultmann
is suggested here, rather the possibility of a co-incidence
and similarity.
On the basis of Bultmann's approach to the relationship
between faith as subjective inwardness and history as objective
becoming, his cosmological "pre-understanding" remains intact.
Jesus Christ does not communicate knowledge about the eternal
or about history but about a way of standing in history. It
is a way of standing based inwardly upon man's subjectiveness.
Again in counter-reference to this Bultmannian position,
Barth affirms that there is no gls ye/os
between the world and God."'" God does not need to jump an
1. Illi, p. 60.
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"ugly, broad ditch" to approach His creation. Bui tularin's
myth is replaced by Barth's saga. Timelessness and
abstraction are replaced by the historicity and particularity
of Jesus Christ. Barth does not assert this on the basis
of any cosmological grounds — "How does one know this?"
His epistemology seems to permit God the initiative of
acting, and then the initiative of bringing this act to
cognition. In this way, Barth.1 s approach does not
circumscribe God's activity and man's apprehension of Him.
What Barth discovers from the openness of his approach is the
openness of history to the actuality of God. Again, faith
does not need to retreat into the inner depths of man's being
because faith can perceive the hidden depth in history as the
vertical dimension of God. The becoming of history contains
the becoming of God in history which can be no private act
on man's part but is open to public scrutiny on the initiative
of God. In Barth, faith's content moves out-of-doors and
allows for the possibility of knowledge about the eternal in
time.
b) Tillich: "The Symbols of faith form the basis for
historical action".
SK had taken the content of faith into the inner
recesses of human subjectivity. The objective data of history
concerning the content of faith are not irrelevant and dis¬
missed. Rather Reason is not able to move behind the data
to comprehend the reality. The issue of faith's content
must be decided on other than objective grounds. It must
be determined by man's subjectivity which appropriates the
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truth of faith for the realignment and reconstitution of the
believer's existence. On the groundwork laid by this truth,
man receives an example by which he may express his existence.
The subjective appropriation of faith's truth finally moves
outward again in the concrete expression of a life-style
forged out of the content of this truth.
Action and life-style are also important ingredients in
the thought of Tillich. Concentrating upon his understanding
of history, the centrality of the Christ comes into view. For
Tillich, Christ establishes the concrete point of reference
for man's qualitative appreciation of history. The biblical
picture of Jesus as the Christ similates the New Being of man
within the structure of space and time. This is not to
argue that Tillich's gap between essentiality and existential
existence has been closed. The New Being expressed symboli¬
cally in Jesus as the Christ points to the direction man must
travel and the path he must tread in order for him to
assimilate the symbol of the Christ. For this symbol demon¬
strates the interdependence between the finite and the
infinite. Man's essential reality lies beyond his existential
being; however the Christ-symbol points out the qualitative
possibilities available in history when one conditions his
existence in the light of the infinite. The dimension of
the infinite provides the ideal toward which man "ought" to
strive. Tillich maintains that fulfilment lies in the
infinite, in the "Wherefore" of man. The symbol of the Christ
provides the window into the infinite dimensions of man's
existence. Christ participates within the concrete while
pointing out beyond Himself to the infinite. The symbol of
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the Christ allows man "to see" the way he must go since the
symbol allows man "to know"heuristically the true dimensions
of existential reality. In this way Christ and the Kingdom
of God function as rallying points and battle cries for man's
action, concern and determination. The content of historical
activity which is meaningful and relevant and pertinent to
the essentiality of man in his "Wherefore" derives from the
religious symbols. Man appropriates these symbols subject¬
ively and thus reorganizes his existence around the Gestalt
which they impart. Faith imparts itself in the form of the
symbol which transmits to the believer an internal awareness,
perception, "knowledge" of the course to be pursued. Again
faith's content does not appear to be knowledge as SK defined
it, rather it seems to be a heuristic perception as Bultmann
concluded. However Tillich appears to attach the societal
and communal relevancy to this perception which brings it
outside of man and into the context of historical action and
activity. Indeed the symbolic content of faith appears also
to be consistent with Tillich's assertion that essentiality
has never really existed in created reality. Therefore man
can only "know" in symbolic and figurative terms the content
of faith. And on the basis of the necessity for Tillich's
symbolics, one must also wonder if he is not indeed operating
within the limits of the problem set by Lessing and defined
by SK. The secret to historical action appears to be in
ontic, subjective transformation whereby man, the believer,
is given the eyes "to see" reality as it "ought" to be.
Meaning penetrates history from beyond via man. He is the
instrumentality of change and value. Man affected by the
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infinite dimension shining through the symbol conditions
and shapes the created realm. Man performs this task by re¬
affirming the disciples' decision regarding Jesus of Nazareth.
It was the decision to identify him as the Christ. The real¬
ity of the Christ-symbol thus becomes loosely affixed to the
concreteness of history. But in the final analysis the con-
creteness of history becomes secondary and functional to the
purposes of the symbol. At this point, one must reconsider
the vitality of Lessing's problem.
However, Barth lifts the content of faith out of the sub¬
jectivity of man and sees it rooted within the structures of
becoming and history. History is meaningful not because of
man's subjectivity but because of God's objectivity in Jesus
Christ. The reality of His person is not dependent upon some
ecstatic experience of the disciples. His reality like all
reality is determined by God. Jesus Christ does not need
to hide within the safety of man's subjectivity. God has
revealed who He is in the context of history. In the turbulence,
contingency, temporality and becoming of history, man can come
to know the eternal in time. He is an objective reality and
as such a world-historical phenomenon. There is no need for
symbols to bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite
because this gap is an illusion. God Himself acts within
history. History is meaningful because (l) God created it
and (2) it is the place where He encounters man. "How does
one know this?" On the basis of faith's Credo and by the
testimony of the God Himself. That man knows God by His act
influences what man knows about the reality of the creation.
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The objective and horizontal dimension of history stands
in relationship to the qualitative and vertical dimension
of God. Man no longer needs to explain God; God explains
Himself, man and creation.
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CONCLUSION: LESSING'S END?
The vestiges of the past have been found in the present.
In particular, the figure of Lessing can be seen to cast a
rather long shadow. In many respects, his endeavours have
become a constituent component of present theological enter¬
prise. For Lessing, "accidental truths of history can never
become the proof of necessary truths of reason." His
definition of the propositions has created the "ugly, broad
ditch" over which he was unable to leap. In faith's terms,
his problem involved the relationship between the ground and
content of faith — "How is the historicity of Jesus Christ
connected to His message?" To Lessing, the problem did not
appear overly burdensome or terribly significant. Fortunately,
he was already across the pitfall. However, those who were
to follow were nonetheless confronted with the "ditch" from the
other side. The ground and content of faith apparently
required an engineering feat in order again to connect the two.
The theologian lives in the realm of the accidental yet he
began looking for a way to make available the necessary truth
of faith. The bridging process concentrated upon the Christo-
logical question and the interpretation of His person. The
answer to this question also entailed a decision about the
characterization of history. In the main, Lessing had
separated history and faith by inserting a logical wedge between
faith's ground and content. Later men approached this
situation with the hope of alleviating and ameliorating the
resulting tendency either to objectify Christ and thus idealize
faith, or to subjectify Him and thus relativize His message.
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Again, history .remains the realm of the contingent and faith
continues as the sphere of the necessary and eternal. Yet
from Ritschl onwards, theology has sought to interpret and
to understand these two dimensions. Experientially, the inter¬
connection seems unquestioned and sound. Epistemologically,
theology appears hard pressed to explain the basis of the inter¬
relation. To a large extent, the Liberals proposed a possible
way of resolving the problem. On the one hand, history is con¬
tingent and objective in its natural determination. Consequently,
the external and material details about Christ are a matter of
controversy and uncertainty. On the other hand, history is also
seen to include the personal dimension of man. This entails
the values and purposes he lives and pursues. From this
perspective, Christ is a sure and certain reality in that man
apparently may empathize and experience His "inner life" as a
present, personal reality. In this way, the Liberals seem to
manage to tolerate the disjunction. Yet, they also appear to
relieve some of the pressure by drawing out the consequences
of their distinction between external and personal facts. The
former category retains the accidental qualification while the
latter possesses some undemonstrable, sure and certain basis
for faith. Christ's personality provides the personal
experience which both confirms His authenticity and protects
His contemporaneity. The objective, historical world appears
undisturbed by His presence, but yet man receives the gifts
of value and purpose for life. Unfortunately, Troeltsch
soon revealed that even this optimistic solution was really a
delaying tactic. Jesus Christ is part of the objective,
historical world, and therefore He also shares the uncertainty
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and probability of this realm. There can be no undemon-
strable quality inherent in His "inner life". The Liberal
attempt to bridge Lessing's "ditch" began to collapse.
Troeltsch did not see a sure and certain basis for faith in
history. Rather, he thought it more expeditious to speak
of Him as satisfying a social-psychological need. This
replaces His undemonstrable power with something a bit more
substantial and open to investigation. Apparently, Troeltsch
did not assume that history can really transcend itself. His
fidelity to the accidental character of history appears to
re-admit the problem of finding another bridge. Christ's
"inner life" did not really seem to be able to bear the whole
weight of eternity. SK would presumably agree with
Troeltsch's depiction of history as transitional and with the
inability of facts to establish Christ's reality once and for
all. It appears to be his insight which radicalizes
Lessing's terms. He argued for the contingency of all
historical reality including the truth of faith. Everything
that is, is historical. The objective, empirical world is
no longer neutral to man's well-being. On the contrary, God
has become incarnate in space and time. The Absolute Paradox,
Jesus Christ, lives and dwells in this same transitional
sphere where man also lives and dwells. He confronts Reason
in His total unlikeness and thus aids Reason in breaking out
of its finite shell and in re-organizing life in terms of a
finite/infinite correlation. The truth of God appears to
become free and dynamic. SK does not seem to formulate it as
a necessary truth which is constant and immoveable. The
necessary in these terms cannot be historical, since the
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necessary simply is. But SK continued to co-ordinate the
realization of God's truth in the Absolute Paradox with the
subjectivity of the believer. Faith becomes a personal
affirmation and conviction. God's reality as well as
Christ's becomes indissolubly co-temporaneous with the sub¬
jectivity of man. In a fashion similar to the Liberals,
SK's position involves the risk of relativism for history and
for faith. Indeed, relativism becomes extremely perilous
for SK since he accentuates the transitional nature of life
and seeks to take it with the subjectivity of the believer.
Bultmann and Tillich appear to retain elements of this same
subjectivity. However, they give it an existential content.
In a manner similar to the Liberals, Bultmann and Tillich
reiterate that the objective, empirical world is dull and un¬
feeling. And moreover, it is also fraught with the accidental
and contingent. It would seem to follow that the external
facts of Christ's reality are again not a matter of primary
concern for faith. Bultmann and Tillich do not seem eager
to re-open the "Life of Jesus" approach. They rather refer
to His picture or portrait as the root fact. The historical-
critical inquiry is not permitted to move behind the texts in
order to discover a "so-called" historical Jesus. He is in
unity and oneness with the Christ in the biblical narrative
as well as in the preached word. Jesus is the Christ in that
the disciples and later followers affirm this relationship in
their living and believing. The human aspect imputes
historical concreteness and realness to Him. He becomes in¬
extricably bound to the reality of man. The objective,
historical world plods along, yet man affirms and believes
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Christ in existential, historical terms. In this way,
Bultmann and Tillich apparently opt for the existential
experience of Christ which begins with the initial yielding
of His empirical facticity. Yet they go on to elaborate His
importance and significance for life. At least, the initial
admission seems to permit a secondary factual basis which
is, of course, greatly amplified in personal terms of meaning.
For Bultmann, meaning is understood in personal, individual
terms of authenticity. For Tillich, it is perceived in
individual and social terms of fulfilment. The objective,
historical world receives the taming hand of man. Through
faith, God's reality is affirmed, but both men speak of Him
as if He is present. God cannot be demonstrated in reality,
but His personal effects can be understood as illustrations
of His presence. Bultmann and Tillich both appear to offer
a personal and subjective solution to Lessing's problem. They
attempt to establish a subjective bridge over a logical
"ditch" which seems also to have an objective side. They both
seem to think that it is quite sufficient to contend that
either the "Dass" of His living and dying or the portrait of
Jesus of Nazareth will do. One must ask if the tenuousness
of their answer can adequately sustain the reality of God, the
contingency of history, and the faith of man. Ultimately,
neither man appears to succeed in really re-defining Lessing's
terms. Faith's content remains necessary and simply is. But
its ground remains uncertain and probable. No explanatory
foundation appears to be forthcoming which adequately gives
any credence to God's reality as distinct from man. It
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seems to be KB's epistemological break-through which grants
the conceptual possibility for understanding God as separate
from man. SK had emphasized the human side of the relation
without apparently establishing the epistemological tools
for adequately speaking of God. For KB, His reality becomes
an important concern. As one understands His relation to the
world, one can also grasp the reality of Christ in the world.
KB presents God as the central reality upon which all other
realities are dependent. He is an absolutely freely
effecting cause. In these terms, the world cannot be under¬
stood apart from Him. His life is lived in conjunction with
historical reality. The transcendent and the immanent are
interrelated in complementary though polar dynamics. God's
actualism correlates with that of the world. His reality is
separate from though in correlation with that of man. But
KB does not want to move in the direction of an intellectuali-
zation of faith which merely augments the faculty of Reason.
Faith is real and sovereign. The reality of Jesus Christ
marks the point of contact at which God and man meet in their
unlikeness. This occurs in the medium of history which is
not hostile or alien to His presence. God remains real and
distinct as does man in this encounter. However, through His
grace and man's faith, a communication commences which
protects both man and God. The objective person of Christ
and the subjective faith of man moderate and correlate at the
moment when God so wills to reveal Himself and man receives
the will for faith. God's eternity reveals itself to be
actual and real from Christ's actualism in history. Jesus
Christ is the Godman. His position remains protected by faith,
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church tradition, God's will and preaching. He cannot be
manipulated through the exercise of Reason. Nor can He be
subjectivized since He is distinct and independent of man.
In this way, Berth accepts Lessing's proposition about history
as modified through SK. But consequently, he rejects
Lessing's definition of faith as necessary. It appears
that for KB the necessary is and this opposes the vitality
of history. Therefore the necessary is not historical. But
faith seeks to understand how God is just this. To place
Jesus Christ in the actualism of history also implies that His
truth is actual and thus transitional. Indeed, His truth is
alive and present in each moment of faith and grace. In this
way, KB does not bridge Lessing's "ditch", rather he provides
an interpretation which suggests the artificiality of the
problem. Lessing's proposition of accidental and necessary
truths seems to have created an epistemological gap. On his
definitions, the content and ground of faith appear to be
separated. In this manner, the disjunction continues to
manifest itself on a logical level. In many ways, KB's
understanding seems to be proposing a definitional counter¬
argument using Lessing's terms. The subjectivity of the
believer and the objectivity of God seem to be placed in
polar equilibrium. Man cannot be convinced of faith through
rational arguments. As well, God cannot be defined in
necessary, static terms, since He freely wills His presence
in Christ. The absolutely freely effecting cause (God) and
the freely effecting cause (man) seem to coalesce and to
communicate in the co-temporaneous moment of grace and faith.
However, KB does not really appear to be suggesting a
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cosmological answer to Lessing's problem. Rather,he seems
to approach it with a similar interpretive intent. If this
is really the case, is the definitional reformulation of
Lessing's terms sufficient? It may well be that KB's answer
also requires a reformulation of the climate of opinion which
made Lessing's problem possible. This would presumably entail
a cosmological as well as an epistemological re-evaluation of
reality.
Another dimension of Lessing's problem is the increased
importance of man in matters of faith. His ascendency seems
to be closely correlated with the rise of Reason. As a
rational creature, he functions as Reason's medium for under¬
standing. This involves judgment and interpretation. Again,
man appropriates the power of arbitrating the content and
meaning of faith. Lessing's definitions coupled with
Reason's anti-metaphysical bias appears to have severed the
alleged tie between the ground and content of faith. But
since man is a rational creature, he can presumably also
understand what faith's content really is. In a sense, a
presumptuousness on the part of man seems to develop which is
carried through by the Liberals. They interpret faith in
terms of value and purpose while conceding that man is a
valuing and purposing creature. Consequently, he retains
the right of disposition over faith's content. One can only
know God through the effects He produces in the believers.
His reality is beyond empirical observation and conception.
Nonetheless, man feels His presence and he interprets the
meaning which it has. For SK, faith's content is not a
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necessary, static entity. His severe emphasis upon the
transitional nature of history precludes any type of
necessity. Faith becomes a human organ which makes the
Absolute Paradox a present function of life. God is
apparently present in history but faith is the only means of
feeling and experiencing it. On one hand, SK does not seem
to share the anti-metaphysical attitude of the Liberals.
However, he does show a preference for delegating to man the
appropriation of God. Human subjectivity disposes of faith's
claim and content. Faith is not a form of knowledge, rather
it appears to be a relationship to Christ which assists the
believer in better understanding his historical existence.
This relationship is mediated through subjectivity. Bultmann
and Tillich do not appear to be far removed from this position.
For Bultmann, faith seems to result from human volition which
chooses and decides to live for God. In confrontation with a
choice, man must decide either for life or death. The
resolution seems to result in an attitude or life-style which
directs existence in one direction or the other. Again, one
does not speak of God as present in any other terms than man
lives as if this is the case. It is man who decides and
interprets. For Tillich, the believer stands in faith by
accepting and affirming the decision of the disciples. Their
faith indissolubly united the portrait of Jesus with the
reality of the New Being. This is the decision which man
makes then and now. Faith becomes a way of "seeing" and
"knowing" His presence in life. The responsibility for
deciding falls to man. It was his initial faith which
recognized Jesus as the Christ and it is his continued belief
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which maintains His recognition. Again, God's separate
reality cannot really help. His presence is felt through
the mediation of symbols, but these depend upon man's faith
and his resolve. Created goodness has never been actual
and real in estranged reality. In KB, the presumptuousness
of man seems to be tempered and conditioned by the reality
of God. Faith is no longer interpreted as merely a feeling,
a personal attitude, a life-style or an ideal. It becomes a
form of knowledge which seeks to understand the reality of God.
Faith-knowledge seems to be possible in that He is now given
distinct and real status in KB's theology. God gives content
to faith and provides the condition for its reception. Since
His reality is no longer an effect or experience but something
of independent substance, man cannot control and dominate the
disposition of faith. God remains sovereign in this respect;
man receives what He desires to reveal. As knowledge, faith
presupposes something to be known. And KB's emphasis upon
God's reality in Jesus Christ appears to make Him the object
of knowing. It is never a naked knowledge, rather He is
mediated through the tradition of faith, church, scripture and
preaching. Man's knowing involves God's desiring to be known.
And this transpires in confrontation with Jesus Christ. In
this way, the human side of the God/man equation stands in
polar tension with God's absolute freedom. Man's presumptuous¬
ness dissipates before His presence. In KB's terms, God is
He of whom no greater can be thought.
One other theme comes to light. Lessing's propositions
appear to imply the need for a stable and unchangeable point
of reference in the contingency of life. Only necessary
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truths seem to provide the sure and certain basis. Lessing's
definition of the accidental appears to have enjoyed wide¬
spread acceptance. In Liberal thought, history's accidental
determination received negative connotations which emphasized
the dullness and neutrality of the world. The objective,
material realm represented the sphere of possibility and
probability. Its external facts are always open to
quibbling and controversy. A more permanent and constant
basis is required for personal well-being. Probability will
not suffice. Consequently, the certainty of Christ's 'inner-
life" provided this foundation. Faith appears to contain
something constant and lasting in the value and purpose which
He displays. This dimension allows a point of reference
which man can cling to in confrontation with the world. SK
continues with Lessing's definition of history. Indeed, he
takes this characterization to qualify each and every aspect
of life. Nonetheless, SK views history as positive because
God has revealed Himself there in the Absolute Paradox. While
faith is not a form of knowledge, the suggestion seems to be
that it does assist one in understanding existence. The
Teacher delivers the Truth which is fundamental for life. The
transitional sphere is complemented by His Truth which signals
the presence of God. Man's life requires direction and
purpose, and Jesus Christ is the source of satisfaction. He
represents the infinite in the finite. In faith, man appro¬
priates His Truth in every moment. This same theme recurs
in Eultmann and Tillich. Bultmann understands faith's
position in existential terms. But the choices he perceives
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are limited to an either/or — either life or death; either
God or the world. Man is a creature living in the state of
possibility. Indeed, his very nature includes action and
choice. He is always before a decision. Life is obtained
when he opts for God and His power. In this resolve he lives
in His presence which is free from the possibilities of the
past and the world. God makes authentic life possible by
freeing man from the past determinations and decisions. In
faith, man somehow partakes of God's unfettered possibility.
In freedom of this sort, he achieves his historicity. Conse¬
quently, he seems to receive a heuristic perception which
allows him to understand the world's relativity and therefore
its complete inability to be the basis for real life. In this
way, faith provides Jesus Christ as the sure and certain Word
of God who creates the permanent situation for authentic life.
In the Word, man stands before faith's either/or. Tillich
seems to offer a variation of Bultmann's existential inter¬
pretation. For him, man's historicity also involves his
becoming which expresses itself in decisions and actions.
Historical life does not appear to possess the possibility
for fulfilment in itself. The estranged reality of life
seems alien to his real nature. Yet authentic historicity
is permitted. For Tillich, faith provides the option for
fulfilment. Through participation in the Christ-symbol, man
receives direction and content for living out of the really
real. By affirming and living the Christ-symbol, he may
share in the meaning of Being-Itself. Indeed, the Christ-
symbol opens him to the reality of the infinite which would
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otherwise be hidden. Again, KB does not really alter man's
need for the infinite dimension. As very God and very man,
Jesus Christ is the source for understanding man's own
nature as well as God's grace. In faith he perceives
that the horizontal reality of life is vertically intersected
by the distinct reality of God. In the moment of faithful
understanding, man realizes his dependence upon Him. The
fullness of existence appears to be achieved in conjunction
with His presence. Indeed, God's nearness is actual and
alive in the life of man in its own right. History is the
place where He has revealed Himself and this is the place
where He is also known. God's actualism and history's
actualism are correlated in the person of Jesus Christ.
With these strands and tendencies displayed, it may
be seen that Lessing's problem has been the platform for
several variant though correlated responses. What apparently
began as a simple statement about history and faith soon
became an agonizing question for theology. Not only was the
concreteness and reality of Jesus Christ jeopardized, but
also the application and relevance of faith seemed to come
into disrepute. Theology maintained His centrality in any
disposition of faith's content and thus sought to answer
Lessing in Christological terms. Yet Lessing has been seen
to cast a shadow which is still present in contemporary dis¬
cussions. As one possible answer, theology attempted to
divide history into the objective, historical and the
existential, historical. With this done, it endeavoured to
place Christ in the latter context and to speak of Him in
terms of significance and meaning. This option seems to be
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viable until (a) the personality of Christ was revealed to
be an undemonstrable article of faith and (b) the "Dass"
or portrait of Jesus Christ as the New Being is seen in its
tenuous factual grounding. When this is done, the relativity
of the interpretation seems to become apparent. As a second
approach, KB has endeavoured to connect history and faith in
the person of Jesus Christ who is both objective, and
existential, historical. God and man become distinct
realities. The absolutely freely effecting cause and the
freely effecting cause stand in correlation to each other. In
a sense, KB turns the tables on Lessing by re-defining his
terms. In this way, he apparently offers a quite different
answer to the problem. The final disposition of Lessing's
question and the adequacy or inadequacy of the several systems
has been considered. Therefore, it seems possible to
suggest that KB's alternative better handles the problem
raised. In the main, a vast amount of difficulty arises from
assuming faith's content to be necessary in Lessing's sense.
This has apparently been assumed to mean something constant
and unchangeable, even immoveable and static. SK seems to
imply this of the necessary when he argues that it cannot be
historical. The necessary simply i_s and does not participate
in the transitional movement of life. The distinction by
both Lessing and SK seems to be handled in logical and
definitional terms. KB re-translates the necessary to mean
the actualism of God in history. God's eternity absorbs the
movement and historicity of becoming in His own terms. In
Jesus Christ, He shows His complicity in human historicity.
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It has not really helped to separate history into the
impersonal and the personal. This only beclouds and con¬
fuses the issue. The day of reckoning still comes when
the theologian will have to show the relation between the
reality of faith and history. Bultmann attempts to overcome
the obstacle by speaking of the Word of God. This is the
constant element though it is repeated in proclamation. But
from where does this Word come? After all, he assumes
history to be the realm of the accidental. Tillich does not
appear to fare any better. He proposes a union between the
New Being and Jesus of Nazareth. The disciples accomplish
this in their faith. But from where does the New Being come?
Both Bultmann and Tillich seem to assume (a) that history is
changeable and (b) that it cannot transcend itself. The Word
of God and the New Being do not really seem to accommodate
the problem. Consequently they do not seem to be able to
sustain the whole weight of eternity. Lessing's problem was
definitional in a very large measure. And KB attacks it in
these terms. All of theology's symbols, myths, Words, New
Beings and values do not really appear to bridge the logical
problem of the "ditch" without a fundamental re-understanding
of what is involved. It appears to be the insight of KB that
the problem is hopelessly impossible without this reformulation.
Consequently, the necessary content of faith comes into line
with the accidental ground. Both are transitional and alive
in complementary modes of historicity. But as it was
suggested above, it may be that KB's answer also requires the
complementation of a cosmological reformulation of the climate
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of opinion which bred Lessing's problem. If this is the case,
Lessing may provide the impetus for far more paper and print











* Compiled by Alastair McKinnon, E.J. Briel, Leiden,
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The purpose of this exercise is to sift through various
entries in The Kierkegaard Indices, Volume II, in order to
glean some textual indication of Kierkegaard's use and under¬
standing of paradox. Alastair McKinnon has strongly suggested
that paradox is not intended to mean something irrational or
absurd. On the contrary, he contends that Kierkegaard's
usage implies something comprehensible and intelligible in
its own right. The selections are taken from Philosophical
Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Indeed,
these two works account for about two-thirds of the term's
listing in The Kierkegaard Indices, Volume II. By restricting
attention to these references, the term paradox appears to be
used in a comprehensive and intelligible manner. Kierkegaard
compares paradox with Reason, and he indicates that the latter
can never explain the former. The paradox refers to the
eternal in time. In Christian terms, Kierkegaard tells us
that God, the Eternal, has become a particular man. As an
imagination, Reason can understand this. But when faith
presents the imagination as an actuality, Reason replies that
this is absurd. Reason is able to speculate about God and
an individual man, but Kierkegaard emphasizes that what is
paradoxical is also real. This dimension of realness is the
stumbling-block for Reason. In itself, the paradox is.not
paradoxical. It is paradox as such only in conjunction with
an existing individual. The suggestion seems to be that man
by nature lives in the world through his power of Reason. It
does not appear that Kierkegaard is impugning its place in life,
rather he appears to be accentuating a limitation of its
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ability. In religious terms, this particular limitation
has to do with the paradox — with God in time. In con¬
frontation with this fact, Reason can only find it absurd and
unreasonable. But according to Kierkegaard, the Reason
effects its own undoing in this encounter. Reason yields and
the paradox bestows. It does not appear that Reason is
annihilated. Rather, the supremacy of the Paradox is
acknowledged. In the encounter, the paradox takes prece¬
dence over Reason and confers its own rationality and intelli¬
gibility. It is not explainable in Reason's terms, but yet
the paradox does not convey gibberish. The paradox re¬
aligns the functioning of Reason in the light of God in time.
The Reason never understands this in the sense that the
paradox is explained. The paradox remains paradox as long
as man exists. While Reason cannot apprehend it, faith is
the vehicle which passionately affirms the paradox's actuality
in and pertinence for life. In faith, existence appears to
acquire a complementation which augments and amplifies
Reason's grasp of reality. In faith, the believer is placed
in the extremity of existence which vouchsafes his whole life
in time. In faith, the paradox evidently offers a new
organizing principle which relates the existing individual to
the eternal. This organization appears to represent an
heuristic frame of reference. More to the point, it seems
that in Kierkegaard's terms the absolute distinction between
God and man places the paradox outside of Reason's competence.
This does not presuppose the paradox to be irrational, but
rather it suggests that it offers a meta-rational basis of
integration. In Its own right and in its own sphere of
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influence, the paradox interrelates the existence of the
believer with the eternal while superceding the competence
of Reason to explain it. From these observations and inter¬
pretations, it would seem to be the case that the paradox
operates in a different continuum of meaning than the Reason.
Consequently, this does not nullify or jeopardize its
integrative and organizational ability, but it does suggest a
dearth of comparison between the Reason and the paradox as
Kierkegaard employs them.
Philosophical Fragments: (see page 750-752)
Page/Line
46/12-13 However, one should not think slightingly of the
paradoxical; for the paradox is the source of the
thinker's passion, and the thinker without a
paradox is like a lover without feeling: a paltry
mediocrity.
46/19 The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt
to discover something that thought cannot think.
48/24 The lover is so completely transformed by the
paradox of love that he scarcely recognizes himself;
59/1 Thus our Paradox is rendered still more appalling,
or the same Paradox has the double aspect which
proclaims it as the Absolute Paradox; negatively
by revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin;
positively by proposing to do away with the
absolute unlikeness in absolute likeness.
59/17 But this is what the Paradox also desires, and thus
they [Paradox and Reason] are at bottom linked in
understanding; but this understanding is present
only in the moment of passion.
61/1 If the Paradox and the Reason come together in a
mutual understanding of their unlikeness their
encounter will be happy....
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Page/Line
63/3 But precisely because offense is thus passive,
the discovery, if it be allowable thus to speak,
does not derive from the Reason, but from the
Paradox; for as the Truth is index sui et falsi,
the Paradox is this also, and the offended conscious¬
ness does not understand itself but is understood
by the Paradox.
63/10-12 But if the Paradox is index and judex sui et falsi,
the offended consciousness can be taken as an
indirect proof of the validity of the Paradox;
offense is the mistaken reckoning, the invalid
consequence, with which the Paradox repels and
thrusts aside.
63/15 The offended individual does not speak from his
own resources, but borrows those of the Paradox;
63/27 Offense was not discovered by the Reason...for
then Reason must also have been able to discover
the Paradox.
64/1 No, offense comes into existence with the Paradox;
65/6 hut since the Paradox has made the Reason absurd,
the regard of the Reason is no reliable criterion.
65/13 The Reason says that the Paradox is the Paradox,
quia absurdum.
65/15 The offended consciousness holds aloof from the
Paradox and keeps to the probable, since the
Paradox is the most improbable of all things.
65/23 since the Paradox is the Miracle.'
66/4 When Reason takes pity on the Paradox, and wishes
to help it to an explanation, the Paradox does not
indeed acquiesce....
66/9 When Reason says that it cannot get the Paradox
into its head, it was not the Reason that made this
discovery but the Paradox....
66/15 All that the offended consciousness has to say
about the Paradox it has learned from the Paradox....
67/29 But here the difference consists in the fact that
the Reason yielded itself while the Paradox
bestowed itself....
68/11 If God had not come himself, all the relations would
have remained on the Socratic level; we would not




72/9 and it has also been shown that the Moment is the
Paradox....
73/3 when the Reason sets itself aside and the Paradox
bestows itself.
74/2 if only the moment remains, as point of departure
for the Eternal, the Paradox will be there.
76/13 But the Paradox unites the contradictories, and is
the historical made eternal, and the Eternal made
historical.
76/14 Everyone who understands the Paradox differently
may keep the honor of having explained it, which
honor he won by not being content to understand it.
81/16 Faith is itself a miracle, and all that holds true
of the Paradox also holds true of Faith.
120/13 It is and remains the Paradox, and cannot be
assimilated by any speculation.
123/9 But consequences founded on a paradox are humanly
speaking built over a yawning chasm, and their
total content, which can be transmitted to the
individual only with the express understanding
that they rest upon a paradox, are. not to be
appropriated as a settled state, for their entire
value trembles in the balance.
Concluding Unscientific Postscripts: (see page 752-755)
88/4 The paradoxical character of Christianity consists
in its constant use of time and the historical in
relation to the eternal.
95/21 thought wills the discovery of the paradoxical
95/26 The last thing that human thinking can will to do,
is to will to transcend itself in the paradoxical.
95/27 And Christianity is precisely the paradoxical.
96/22 All Christianity is rooted in the paradoxical.
162/6-11 but in becoming aware of the paradox and holding the
paradox fast every moment, fearing most of all an
explanation which would take away the paradox,
because the paradox is not a transitory form of
relation of the religious in the stricter sense to
the existing subject, but is essentially conditioned
by the fact that a man is in existence, so that the
explanation which takes away the paradox fantasti¬
cally transforms at the same time the exister into a




177/38 corresponding to passion in the subject the
truth becomes a paradox; and the fact that the
truth becomes a paradox is rooted precisely in its
having a relationship to an existing subject.
180/37 this truth must therefore be a paradox for him as long
as he exists.
183/26 But the eternal essential truth is by no means in
itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by
virtue of its relationship to an existing
individual.
186/20 The paradox emerges when the eternal truth and
existence are placed in juxtaposition with one
another....
187/17 How does the paradox come into existence? By
putting the eternal essential truth into juxta¬
position with existence.
187/20 The eternal truth has come into being in time:
this is the paradox.
188/1 But since the paradox is not in the first instance
itself paradoxical (but only in its relationship
to the existing individual)....
194/7 "But viewed eternally and from the divine stand¬
point. .. there is no paradox...."
194/37 That God existed in human form, has been born,
grown up, and so forth, is surely the paradox
sensu strictissimo, the absolute paradox.
195/3 but the absolute paradox, just because it is
absolute, can be relevant only to the absolute
difference that distinguishes man from God....
195/22 for in connection with the absolute paradox the
only understanding possible is that it cannot be
understood.
197/16 To explain the paradox: is that tantamount to
reducing the term paradox to a rhetorical
expression...?
203/8 and only when it becomes understood that there is
no paradox or that the paradox is only paradoxical
to a certain degree, only then is all lost.
206/31 And so it is here; the existing individual has
by means of the paradox itself come to be placed
















And this is indeed granted to the highly unspecu-
lative understanding between passion and the
paradox, since the whole of life in time is
vouchsafed, and the change comes first in eternity.
Faith has in fact two tasks; to take care in every
moment to discover the improbable, the paradox; and
then to hold it fast with the passion of inwardness.
The significance attached to time is in general
decisive for every standpoint up to that of the
paradox, which paradoxically accentuates time.
The misunderstanding is invariably due to the
false notion that the incomprehensibility of the
paradox must be related in some way to the
difference between more or less understanding....
The paradox is related essentially to man as man.
In his misunderstanding he will understand
Christianity as a possibility and forget that what
is possible in the fantasy-medium of possibility...
must in the medium of reality become absolute
paradox.
the difficulty, the paradox, is that it is real.
But within the sphere of faith the moment can never
arrive when he understands the paradox (in a direct
sense);
In the fantasy-medium of possibility God can
perfectly well for the imagination be fused with
a man, but that this should occur in reality with
an individual man, this precisely is the paradox.
The paradox consists principally in the fact that
God, the Eternal, came into existence in time as a
particular man.
and the absolute paradox is recognizable by the
fact that every analogy is a fallacy.
The absolute paradox will maintain itself well
enough, for in relation to the absolute, more
intellect gets no farther than less intellect;
The formula [ about faith] fits only the believer,
no one else...but simply and solely the believer
who is related to the absolute paradox.
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ovcrnaturlig (Forts.)
I.lift til, til puste hemic op i ovcrnaturlig Storrclsc, at lade hende SV| 47 34 59 34 61 30
joe i tlcnnc nxstcn ovcrnaturligc Tilstand ikkc griber en Virkelighed, SV2 30 23 220 27 198 31
slierk, ovcrnaturlig st;erk, dot er qvindelig sv;ig i lndbildningcns SV2 69 30 266 18 237 17
Overgangen fra at vie re i ovcrnaturlig Slorrclsc ved del Ondes Magt SV2 159 27 372 16 324 23
cr i Fortvivlclscns Nod, har altid ovcrnaturligc Krefler, og dcrfor SV2 189 19 408 9 353 20
og hvorlcdcs han blcv ovcrnaturlig, ikkc soni den Rcligieuse blivcr SV2 248 26 478 18 411 29
soger at bringc dct Rcligicusc frcm i dels ovcrnaturligc Storrelsc, AE1 56 12 52 26 60 15
og viscr ham i ovcrnaturlig Slorrcl.sc for den undrende lagttagcr: AEI 116 3 125 3 125 8
Ligclighcd, og bans ovcrnaturligc Spxndstighcd Sclvbchcrskclsc, A El 209 8 236 8 223 39
da reiser Frimodigheden sig mcd ovcrnaturligc Krxftcr, LE 303 15 477 3 150 2
Dragt, i hvilkcn el ovcrnaturligt Vatscn har skjult sig. Naar ncmlig KG 90 12 105 27 72 43
Hcmmclighcd, i ovcrnaturlig Storrclsc iforc den Kloglens, KG 219 24 259 3 183 17
Pantheisme (Pantlicismcn)
Athcismc, Panthcisme. cfr. 3,86 om Frankrigs rcligicusc Tilstand: TP 50 38 91 37
og til en vis Grad, hvad Hegel kaidcr Phantasiens Panthcismc1. BI 146 3 204 28 132 38
nodvendig ladcr sig dcducere af Panthcismcn, saa folgcr dcraf B1 195 35 263 33 188 35
Panthcisnicn kan komnic lilsyne paa to Maadcr, cntcn idct Bi 319 20 413 33 327 32
Kjcdsommclighcd cr den dicmoniskc Panthcismc, Blivcr EE1 267 27 302 24 286 1
I Panthcisnicn liggcr i Almindclighed Bcslcmmclscn af Fyldc, EF.l 268 29 303 33 287 6
at Synden cr en Position, at dct cr Panthcisme og Rationalismc, og SD 149 20 234 30 228 10
IJdcn denne Catcgorie liar Piintheismcn ubctingct scirct. SFV 166 19 652 II 136 30
vie re Christus; og Panthcismcn cr ct akustisk Bedrag, dcr forvcxlcr sr-v 166 37 652 30 137 23
Paradox (Paradoxc, Paradoxct, Paradoxcts)
dcr ikkc gaacr af Vcicn for den tilsynclaacndc Paradox § 6: BI 81 6 127 27 60 8
fra den Forskandsning, han liavdc indlagct bag sit drislige Paradox. BI 158 18 219 19 147 12
frygtcde man dog ikkc for del Paradox, at dct Mindstc EEI 52 32 42 2 51 22
saa trostcr jcg mig igjen sorn saa oftc mcd Paradoxct, at man ogsaa EE1 64 27 56 29 64 39
Bedrag cr ncmlig for Kjxrlighcdcn ct absolut Paradox, og dcri liggcr EEI 166 2 180 24 177 18
eller del Sympatbctiskc, saa cr Paradoxct hicvet, dct cr, Individet EEI 166 11 180 34 177 28
over Rcflcxioncn, dct larnkcr vcl ikkc Paradoxet i den Forstand, at EEI 166 12 180 36 177 30
hegge Momentcr i sig, og dcttc bringcr den i Forhold til Paradoxct. EEI 166 28 181 18 178 8
1 dc to beskrevne Tilftcldc cr Paradoxct vcl ogsaa for Kjtcrligheden, EEI 166 28 181 18 178 8
denne ikkc, i sidstc Tilficldc cr Paradoxct for Kjtcrligheden. EEI 166 30 181 20 178 10
Paradoxct cr utarnkcligt, og dog vil Kjxrlighcdcn ttenke EEI 166 30 181 20 178 10
clskct ham, og del cr saalcdcs inlet Paradox, og forsaavidt den maaskee EEI 168 24 183 30 180 12
Paradoxct cr allcrcdc for hendes Sjxl, men saaltcnge hun EEI 181 9 199 8 194 3
naar hun kommer til sig sclv, da gjeldcr dct om at tainke Paradoxct. EEI 183 13 201 27 196 17
mcllcm den Maadc. paa hvilkcn dc, liver isatr, komme til Paradoxet. EEI 183 20 201 35 196 26
dcr tvingcr hende at stirrc paa dcltc Paradox, om hun kan EEI 184 12 202 34 197 21
dct Tilftcldigc, og dcltc cr dct uhvrc Paradox, at dct Tilfteldige er EEI 216 8 240 17 232 6
hvilkct cr ct Paradox for den sccniskc Prestation og EEI 257 10 290 9 277 8
Del syncs ct Paradox og cr dct ogsaa for Folclsen, EEI 274 36 311 18 294 11
faacr i ethvert Moment Oic paa hiint uhyrc Paradox, dcr cr Indholdct FB 32 20 95 17 44 7
faldcr jcg ned, da del, dcr bvdes mig, cr et Paradox. FB 32 31 95 28 44 18
forste Bcvxgclsc; man vil sugc Levc-Viisdom ud af Paradoxct. FB 36 7 99 28 48 14
den cr ikkc lljcrtcts umiddclbarc Drift, men Tilvxrclsens Paradox. FB 44 36 110 8 58 9
end min cvigc Bevidsthed bore dcr Tro, thi dcttc cr dct Paradoxc. FB 45 35 111 13 59 II
men dcr horcr ct Paradox og ydmygt Mod til nu at gribc IB 46 16 11 1 34 59 33
cllcr lad os la-re at forftcrdcs ved den uhyrc Paradox, dcr er hans FB 49 29 115 33 63 24
for at see, livilkct uhyrc Paradox Trocn cr. et Paradox, FB 50 17 116 27 64 16
hvilket uhyrc Paradox Trocn cr, ct Paradox, der forniaacr at FB 50 17 116 27 64 16
en hcllig og gudvclbchagclig Handling, ct Paradox, dcr giver Abraham FB 50 18 116 28 64 17
Trocn cr ncmlig dcttc Paradox, at den Enkcltc cr hoicre FB 52 4 118 13 65 28
Trocn cr nctop dcttc Paradox, at den Enkelle som den Enkcltc FB 52 32 119 9 66 22
dct cr og blivcr i al Evighed ct Paradox, ulilgxngciigl for FB 52 39 119 17 66 30
Og dog er Trocn dcttc Paradox cllcr ogsaa (dctlc cr dc FB 53 1 119 18 66 31
At dcttc Paradox for den Enkcltc let kan (orvcxlcs mcd FB 53 6 119 23 66 37
noglc Kjcndctcgn, at man kundc adskillc Paradoxct fra en Anfarglelsc. FB 53 12 119 30 67 5
hvis Liv ikkc blot cr del mcst Paradoxc, dcr ladcr sig IB 53 22 120 6 67 17
Dcttc Paradox ladcr sig ikkc medicrc; thi saasnart han begyndcr FB 53 25 120 9 67 20
dct Guddommeligc og dcrfor ladcr dct Paradoxc dcri sig mcdierc i dct FB 56 20 123 26 70 36
Dcttc cr dct Paradox, ved hvilkct han blivcr paa Spidscn, FB 58 2 125 20 72 28
ikkc kan gjorc tydeligt for nogen Anden, thi Paradoxct cr, at han som FB 58 3 125 21 72 30
Hans Bcrettigclsc er igjen dct Paradoxc; thi dcrsom han FB 58 5 125 23 72 32
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Paradox (Forts.)
thi da konimcr man slct ikkc til Paradoxct, at den Enkcltc FB 58 11 125 30 72 39
i vor Tid liorer ct Svar i Rctning af Paradoxct, da lydcr dct gjcrne FB 58 15 125 34 73 5
i Bcvidsthcd af, at han cr ct Paradox, dcr ikkc kan gjore sig FB 58 17 126 1 73 ' 7
Angstcn, Noden, Paradoxct vil man ikkc vide Nogct af. FB 59 14 127 4 74 11
1 ilie hcrctligct. Man udcladcr Noden, Angstcn, Paradoxct. Min Tankc FB 60 22 128 19 75 26
og denne Tid den cr Angstens, Nodens og Paradoxcts. FB 60 30 128 27 75 35
ved at vitrc fritagnc for Noden og Qvalcn og Paradoxct, men blcvc dct FB 61 7 129 10 76 15
i dct (orja'tlvde Land. Man glcmmcr Angcslcn, Noden, Paradoxct. Var FB 61 19 129 22 76 2K
Minnt en Mordcr, cilcr vi staac ved dct Paradox, dcr cr hoicrc end FB 61 29 129 33 77 1
end del Alincnc. Dcllc cr Paradoxel, son) ikke ladcr sig mcdicrc. Dct I'D 61 33 130 3 77 5
Trocn dcrimod cr dcltc Paradox, at Indcrlighcdcn cr hoicrc FB 64 6 132 14 79 8
Troens Paradox cr dcttc, at dcr cr en Indcrlighcd, dcr FB 64 15 132 24 79 18
Troens Paradox cr da dctlc, at den Enkclte cr hoicrc FB 64 37 133 12 80 3
Paradoxct kan ogsaa udtrykkes saalcdcs, at dcr cr en absolut Pligt FB 65 2 133 16 80 7
Dcttc Paradox ladcr sig ikkc mcdicrc; thi dct bcror nctop FB 65 15 133 30 80 23
I 1'orUcllingcn 0111 Abraham findc vi ct saadant Paradox. FB 65 30 134 11 81 5
Troens Paradox liar labt del Mcllcmliggcndc a; dct Almcne. FB 66 1 134 21 81 17
Trocn cr dcttc Paradox, og den Enkcltc kan aldcles FB 66 7 134 27 81 25
Riddcr derved, at han tagcr Paradoxct paa sig, cllcr han blivcr FB 66 13 134 33 82 2
Bctragtcr jcg dcrimod Opgaven som el Paradox, saa forstaacr jcg FB 68 17 137 14 84 18
jog forstaacr den saalcdcs. som man kan forstaac ct Paradox. FB 68 18 137 15 84 19
Men dcttc cr Noden og Angstcn i Paradoxct, at han, FB 68 29 137 27 84 31
og saa snart den Enkcltc cr kommcn ind i Paradoxct, kommer han ikkc FB 69 2 138 5 85 5
Kirkens Idee; han konimcr ikkc ud af Paradoxct, men maa entcn findc FB 69 3 138 6 85 6
os saa lidt ntcrntcrc ovcrvcic Noden og Angesten i Troens Paradox. FB 69 36 139 4 86 5
han ikkc heme hos nogct Mcnneskc; thi saa cr han udenfor Paradoxet. FB 71 37 141 18 88 16
lod dcr sig dog ud af Paradoxct construcre noglc Kjcndetcgn, FB 73 5 142 30 89 32
paa at springe af fra Paradoxcts (range Vci og blivc en tragisk Kelt FB 73 8 143 2 89 35
Troens Riddcr dcriniod han cr Paradoxct, han cr den Enkcltc, FB 73 14 143 8 90 3
cr dcr en saadan, da cr den dct beskrevne Paradox, at den Enkcllc som FB 74 16 144 17 91 10
Skjulthed, saa slaac vi ved Paradoxct, dcr ikkc ladcr sig medicrc. FB 75 13 145 13 91 32
at den icsthctiskc Skjulthcd og Paradoxct vise sig i dcrcs absolute FB 78 3 148 24 94 31
da stodcr jcg bestandig an paa Paradoxct, det guddommcligc og FB 80 28 151 29 97 24
Fordi dct dog var muligt, at den kundc kastc el Lys over Paradoxct. FB 84 24 156 25 102 11
Forhold til ham, saa ere vi ved Paradoxct, dersom dct cllcrs cr til FB 85 13 157 14 102 35
cr Analogicn, Modstykkct til hiint Paradox, om hvilkct vi talc. FB 88 27 161 16 106 33
teeter da Agnetc. Imidlcrtid maa linn lye til Paradoxct. Naar ncmlig FB 89 23 162 25 108 2
allercdc i Reining af dct dtcmoniskc Paradox hoicrc end dct Almcnc, FB 90 2 163 3 108 10
island til at kunnc gjore del Almcnc, og nu Paradoxet gjentager sig. FB 90 18 163 20 108 28
thi Havmanden kommer nclop ved Paradoxal til at villc rcaliscrc FB 90 20 163 23 108 31
Saadannc Naturcr ere fra Grunden af i Paradoxct, og dc ere FB 96 3 170 5 115 13
fortabes i dct dtcmoniskc Paradox cllcr frelscs i dct guddommclige. FB 96 5 170 7 115 16
til del Almcnc, og bragt i Forhold til Paradoxct, hvad cntcn han i FB 96 35 171 5 116 II
man ikkc Sligt. Skal han tic, saa maa han ind i Paradoxet. — Endnu FB 97 43 172 35 117 40
1 saa Fald cr han i Paradoxel, men i saa Fald cr hans Tvivl FB 100 28 175 24 120 32
en Analogi. maattc dct vtvrc Syndens Paradox, men dettc liggcr igjen FB 101 17 176 19 121 27
Nu staac vi da ved Paradoxct. Entcn kan den Enkcltc FB 102 3 177 12 122 17
alter syncs her, at Paradoxct cr dct Lctlcste og Nemmcste af Alt. FB 102 7 177 16 122 22
om den end ikkc kan ttenkes i Almindelighcd; thi saa htcves Paradoxet. FB 102 11 177 20 122 27
Noden og Angstcn i Paradoxcl laae. som ovenfor udviklct, FB 106 17 182 12 127 15
med mindrc man vil have ham ud igjen af Paradoxet, saalcdes. FB 106 19 182 14 127 18
vildc han ved en saadan Talc faldc ud af Paradoxct. og hvis han FB 106 29 182 25 127 28
og forsaavidt jcg kan forstaac Paradoxct, kan jcg ogsaa FB 106 34 182 30 127 34
men kun forstaac ham saalcdcs, som man forstaacr Paradoxct. FB 107 35 184 3 129 5
Entcn cr der da ct Paradox til, at den Enkcltc som den Enkcltc FB 108 12 184 21 129 25
Phtcdrus § 229 E). Dcttc syncs ct Paradox. Dog skal man ikkc t.xnke PS 38 9 230 18 46 11
Dog skal man ikkc ttenke ildc om Paradoxel; thi Paradoxel cr PS 38 10 230 19 46 12
ikkc itcnkc ildc om Paradoxct; thi Paradoxct cr Tankens Lidenskab, og PS 38 10 230 19 46 12
og den Ttenker, som cr uden Paradoxct, han cr ligesom den Elsker PS 38 11 230 20 46 13
Dcttc cr da Ttenkningens hoicstc Paradox, at villc opdagc PS 38 16 230 25 46 19
egen Undcrgang. Saalcdcs er dct jo mcd Hlskovcns Paradox. Mennesket PS 39 25 232 13 48 16
da vaagncr Selvkjtcrlighcdcns Paradox som Kjtcrlighcd til PS 39 26 232 14 48 17
nu den Elskcndc ved dcttc Kjtcrlighcdcns Paradox blivcr forandrct, PS 40 -)L 232 20 48 24
virkcr hiint Forstandens anede Paradox igjen tilbagc paa Mcnncskct PS 40 6 232 25 48 29
fattc dcttc? Her syncs vi at staac ved ct Paradox. Blot for PS 46 16 240 11 58 5
Saa blivcr da Paradoxct endnu forfatrdcligcrc, cllcr dct sammc Paradox PS 46 37 240 33 59 1
endnu forfterdcligcrc, cllcr dct sammc Paradox har den Dobbclthcd, ved PS 46 37 240 33 59 1
Ladcr nu ct saadant Paradox sig txnkc? Vi villc ikkc forhastc PS 47 3 241 3 59 7
Forstandens Undcrgang cr dct jo ogsaa Paradoxct vil, og saaledcs ere PS 47 11 241 12 59 17
Saalcdcs ogsaa mcd Paradoxcts Forhold til Forstanden, PS 47 26 241 28 60 3
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Dcrsom Paradoxct og Forstandcn stodc sammcn i den ficllcds PS 48 1 242 1 61 1
og stirrer n.cstcn som en Bctlcr paa Paradoxct, forstcncndc i sin PS 48 26 243 2 62 10
vil talc saalcdcs, ikkc Forstandcn, men Paradoxct; tlii som Sandheden PS 49 15 243 19 63 1
stn el falsi, saa er Paradoxct dct ogsaa, og Forargclscn forslaacr PS 49 16 243 20 63 2
forslaacr ikkc sip sclv1. men cr forstaact af Paradoxct. Medens PS 49 17 243 21 63 3
fra dens nuulsaltc Kant, saa cr dct dog Paradoxct, som gjcnlyder i den, PS 49 19 243 23 63 5
Men cr Paradoxct index og judex sui el falsi, saa kan Forargclscn PS 49 20 244 1 63 6
lictragtcs som en indirecte Prove paa Paradoxcts Rigtighed; PS 49 22 244 4 63 9
cr rlcn Usandhedens Conscqvents, mcd hvilkcn Paradoxct stodcr fra sig. PS 49 23 244 5 63 10
talcr ikkc af sit Hgct. Iran talcr af Paradoxcts, ligesom Den, dcr PS 49 25 244 7 63 12
desto mere viser del sig, hvor meget Forargelscn skyldcr Paradoxct. PS 49 28 244 10 63 15
Forstand udviklcr, opdager liverken Paradoxct cllcr Forargclsen. PS 49 37 243 33 63 29
thi saa mnattc Forstandcn ogsaa have kunnet opfindc Paradoxet; nei, PS 50 2 244 12 63 18
nci, med Paradoxct Oliver Forargclscn til; Oliver den PS 50 2 244 12 63 18
Statucrcs Oichlikkct, da cr Paradoxct dcr; thi i sin PS 50 6 244 17 63 25
thi i sin nicest abbrevierede Form kan man kaldc Paradoxct Gieblikket: PS 50 7 244 18 63 27
da den jo cr I'orargclse paa Paradoxct, og Paradoxct alter PS 50 17 244 29 64 12
jo cr Forargclsc paa Paradoxet, og Paradoxct alter er Oicblikkct. PS 50 17 244 29 64 12
at Oicblikkct cr Daarskaben, Paradoxct cr Daarskaben; hvilket er PS 50 26 245 4 64 28
hvilkct cr Paradoxcts Fordring paa at Forstandcn cr PS 50 26 245 4 64 28
men da Paradoxet bar gjort Forstandcn til dct Absurdc, PS 50 29 245 7 65 1
Forargclscn blivcr da udenfor Paradoxct, og GrUnden cr, PS 50 32 245 10 65 6
ikkc opdagct dct, da dct tvertimod cr Paradoxct, som opdagede det, PS 50 34 245 12 65 9
Forslandcn sigcr, at Paradoxct cr dct Absurdc, men dctte PS 50 35 245 14 65 11
kun en Vrrcngcn cftcr, thi Paradoxet cr jo Paradoxct, quia absurdum. PS 50 36 245 15 65 13
kun en Vrtcngcn cfter, thi Paradoxct er jo Paradoxct, quia absurdum. PS 50 36 245 15 65 13
Forargclscn hliver udenfor Paradoxct og beholder Sandsynlighcdcn, PS 50 37 245 16 65 15
og beholder Sandsynlighcdcn, medens Paradoxct cr det Usandsynligstc. PS 50 38 245 17 65 16
dct. men den snakker kun Paradoxet eftcr Munden, hvor undcrligt PS 50 39 245 18 65 18
dct end syncs; thi Paradoxct sigcr sclv; Komcdicr og Romancr PS 51 1 245 19 65 19
Forargclscn blivcr udenfor Paradoxet, hvad Under, da Paradoxet PS 51 3 245 21 65 22
blivcr udenfor Paradoxct, hvad Under, da Paradoxct cr Underet? PS 51 4 245 22 65 23
tvertimod del var Paradoxct dcr anvistc Forslandcn Pladsen PS 51 5 245 23 65 24
sig ag sin Hcrlighcd i Sammcnligning mcd Paradoxct, dcr cr det PS 51 11 245 30 65 32
ikkc opfundel dcttc, men Paradoxct cr sclv Opfindcrcn, der overladcr PS 51 12 245 31 66 1
vil forbarmc sig over Paradoxct og hjiclpc dct til Forklaringen, PS 51 14 245 33 66 4
hjxlpc dct til Forklaringcn, saa finder Paradoxet sig vcl ikkc deri, PS 51 15 245 34 66 5
Naar Forstandcn ikkc kan faac Paradoxet i sit Moved, PS 51 18 246 2 66 ■ 9
Forstandcn ikkc opfundel Dette, men Paradoxct sclv, dcr var paradox PS 51 19 246 4 66 10
Alt hvad den sigcr om Paradoxct, har den Ixrt af dctlc, PS 51 23 246 8 66 15
allc dc Yttringcr, Du kegger Paradoxct i Munden, tilhorc slct PS 51 28 246 13 66 21
— ,.Hvorlcdes skuile dc tilhorc mig. da dc jo tilhorc Paradoxet. PS 51 29 246 14 66 23
men nclop dc, som holdt fast ved Paradoxct, og dog talc de som PS 52 7 246 32 67 13
at Paradoxct saalcdcs ligesom lager Forargelscn Brodct PS 52 10 247 2 67 17
Forstandcn opgav sig sclv, og at Paradoxct hengav sig sclv (halb zog PS 52 19 247 13 67 29
blcv Alt socratisk, vi fik ikkc Oichlikkct og gik glip af Paradoxct. PS 53 9 247 26 68 II
og \ list, at Oichlikkct cr Paradoxet, og at vi uden dcttc PS 55 3X 250 33 72 9
kommcr nu den I.icrcndc i l orslaaelsc mcd dcttc Paradox, thi vi sigc PS 56 13 251 13 72 27
thi vi sigc ikke at ban skal forstaac Paradoxct, men kun [orstaac. PS 56 14 251 14 72 28
ban skal forstaac Paradoxct, men kun forstaac, at dcttc cr Paradoxct? PS 56 15 251 16 72 30
dct skecr naar Forstandcn og Paradoxct stodc lykkcligen sammcn i PS 56 16 251 17 72 31
Forstanden skaffcr sig selv til Side og Paradoxct giver sig sclv hen; PS 56 17 251 18 72 32
dcr cr cntlcdigct, ci heller ved Paradoxet, dcr giver sig hen. PS 56 19 251 20 73 3
maa da vcl vtcrc hiin omtaltc Bctingelsc, som Paradoxet giver med. PS 56 23 251 24 73 8
os ikkc glemme dcttc, at dcrsom Paradoxct ikkc giver Bctingelscn mcd, PS 56 24 251 25 73 9
som Udgangspunkt for del Fvigc, cr Paradoxct tilslcdc. PS 57 4 252 11 74 *>
Trocn, livis Gjcnsland cr Paradoxct, men Paradoxct forencr nctop PS 58 26 254 7 76 12
Gjenstand cr Paradoxct, men Paradoxct forencr nctop Modsigclscn, cr PS 58 27 254 8 76 13
Fnhver dcr forstaacr Paradoxct andcrledcs bcholdc den PS 58 28 254 9 76 14
Modsigclsc cr attcr Troens Gjenstand, og cr Paradoxct, Oieblikkcl. PS 59 13 254 35 77 11
ikkc til men fra, ikkc lien Til Paradoxct. men Tilbagc fra Paradoxct, PS 60 39 256 35 80 25
Men saa cr Trocn jo ligc saa paradox som Paradoxct? Ganskc rigtigt; PS 61 29 258 4 81 12
hvorledcs skuldc den cllcrs i Paradoxct have sin Gjenstand og PS 61 30 258 5 81 13
og Alt hvad dcr gjcldcr 0111 Paradoxct gjcldcr ogsaa om Trocn. PS 61 32 258 7 81 16
Til Paradoxct. men Tilbagc fra Paradoxct, tilbagc forbi Socrates og PS 61 34 257 JO 80 ;"26.:
indslaacr, at han ikkc gaacr til Paradoxcts Forficrdclsc, men springer PS 65 33 262 31 87 22"
Faktum kom ind i Verden som dct absolute Paradox, saa hjxlpcr alt PS 86 1 287 1 119 1
blivcr i al tvighed Conscqvcntscr af ct Paradox, og altsaa definitivt PS 86 2 287 2 119 3
definilivt nctop ligesaa usandsynligt som Paradoxct, mcd mindre man PS 86 3 287 3 119 4
fik tilbagcvirkcndc Kraft til al omskabc Paradoxct, hvilket vildc va:rc PS 86 5 1 287 6 119 6
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del er 0|». Oliver l*;ir;iil<>xct op hitler sip ikke lilspeculcrc. PS K7 8 2X8 9 120 13
Men <'oiisei|veiiisei. iler ere liyppetlc pan el Paradox, dc ere jo, PS UK 39 290 15 123 9
den Overccnskonisl. al del er i Krafl af el Paradox, cr jo ikke at PS X9 3 290 18 123 12
linn vil vcl endop ansee Kaadct for el Paradox, op vicre sky SVI 19 17 26 8 31 23
(.'hriMcndommens Paradox lippcr i. at den hestandip brugcr Tidcn A El 82 18 83 31 88 4
med el Paradox, sanil 11111 al l orskjcllcn inellem den samtidipc AE1 83 37 84 30 89 35
In risk super nd over sip selv, cr den villcndc opdapc del Paradoxc. AEI 89 22 92 17 95 21
Iicnkninp kail ville er al ville ud over sip sclv i del Paradoxc. A El 89 27 92 23 95 26
del Paradoxe. Op C'liristendomnicn er nctop del Paradoxc. — Mendelsohn AEI X9 28 92 24 95 27
i Paradoxct, man antage iiu dctlc (a: va;rc en Trocndc), AEI 90 22 93 25 96 22
cller man forkaslc del (nelop fordi del er Paradoxct) AEI 90 24 93 27 96 24
tilvcic. men i at blivc opnucrksom paa Paradoxct, og i hvert Oieblik AEI 152 2 167 25 162 6
i bvcrl Oicblik al fastlioldc Paradoxct, netop bcfryglende allcrmccst AEI 152 2 167 25 162 6
cn Forklaring, dcr log Paradoxct bort, fordi Paradoxct ikke AEI 152 3 167 26 162 7
bort, fordi Paradoxet ikkc cr cn Iransitorisk Form af det i slramgcste AEI 152 4 167 27 162 8
sua at den F'orklaring, tier taper Paradoxct bort, lillige phantastisk AEI 152 7 167 31 162 11
til Lidcnskab svarcr Sandhcdcn som ct Paradox, og del at AEI 166 1 184 18 177 38
og del at Sandlicden blivcr Paradoxct, cr nctop begrundet AEI 166 1 184 18 177 38
blivcr til Gjcnpjcld ikke nogct Paradox, men del erkjendende Subjekt AEI 166 5 184 23 178 3
op dcrfor maa blivc ham ct Paradox, saalxnge han cxisterer, AEI 168 35 187 35 180 37
saa er Sandheden objektivl hestemmet Paradoxet; og dct at AEI 171 1 190 19 183 21
op tiel al objeklivl Sandhcdcn cr Paradoxet, viscr nclop, AEI 171
1
2 190 20 CC 22
Paradoxcl er den objektive Uvishcd, dcr cr Udtrykkel AEI 171 5 190 23 183 26
sect tilficldig, dens Gratl op Omfnng ligcgyldig), er Paradoxct. AEI 171 10 190 28 183 31
cr den evipe vicscntlige Santlbcd selv ingenlunde Paradoxct, men cr dct AEI 171 11 190 29 183 32
specnlalivl og evict sect er dcr inlet Paradox, men Vanskclighcden cr, AEI 172 21 192 15 185 24*
Santllicden som Paradox bliver cn Analogic til Paradoxct sensu AEI 172 32 192 27 185 34
sum Paradox bluer en Analogic til Paradoxct sensu cniinncntiori. AEI 172 32 192 27 185 34
,til Hinder for al lale 0111 Paradoxct mcd Hensyn til Socrates og Tro, AF.l 172 39 192 34 185 40
Del soeraliskc Paradox laa i, at den cvigc Sandhcd forholdt AEI 173 25 193 21 186 8
I'arailoxct fremkommer naar den evige Sandhed og dct al cxisterc sattlcs AEI 173 35 193 31 186 20
dct al cxislcre micrkcs, blivcr Paradoxct tydeligcre og tydeligcre. AEI 173 37 193 33 186 23
Santllicd forlioldl sip til den Exislcrcnde, blev Paradoxct til. AEI 174 26 194 31 187 15
lad os antagc, al den cvige vicscntlige Sandlicd sclv cr Paradoxct. AEI 174 28 194 33 187 17
Sandlicd .sclv er Paradoxel. Hvorlcdes fremkommer Paradoxct? Vcd at AEI 174 28 194 33 187 17
sictte dct sanimcn i Sandhcdcn sclv, saa blivcr Sandhcdcn et Paradox. AEI 174 31 195 a 187 20
cr blcvcn til i Tidcn. Dctte er Paradoxct. Dlcv Subjcktct i AEI 174 31 195 a 187 20
evigc Sandhcd forholder sig til en Existcrendc, blivcr den Paradoxet. AEI 175 7 195 17 187 37
Paradoxet stoder i den objektive Uvishcd og Uvidcnhcdcn AEI 175 7 195 17 187 37
Men da Paradoxct ikke i sig sclv cr Paradoxet, stodcr AEI 175 8 195 18 187 38
Men da Paradoxct ikke i sig sclv er Paradoxct, stodcr dct ikke AEI 175 9 195 19 187 39
Naar Paradoxct sclv cr Paradoxct, stodcr dct fra i Kraft AEI 175 13 195 24 188 5
Naar Paradoxct selv cr Paradoxct, stoder dct fra i Kraft AEI 175 13 195 24 188 5
da mcd Sandliedcn imod sig som Paradoxct, i Syndcns Angcst AEI 175 19 195 30 188 12
cr dcr inlet Paradox — saa skal jeg ikkc kunne afgjorc, AEI 177 25 198 16 190 29
jcg i Smulcriie blot experimcntercde Paradoxets Tankcbestemmelse frem, AEI 177 39 198 31 191 7
al lade Paradoxals Nodvcndighcd blive tydclig, hvilket. AEI 178 1 198 32 191 8
allid er nogct Andct end speculativt at hicvc Paradoxct. AEI 178 3 198 34 191 10
den liar forkyndl sip som Paradoxct, og fordrel Trocns AEI 178 6 199 a 191 13
til al gaae Ohjcktivitctens Vei, bar forkyndl sig at vtcrc Paradoxet. AEI 178 34 199 33 192 4
Christcndommen Paradoxcl, Exislentscn Afgjorclsens Tid. AEI 179 "> 2(8) 5 192 11
guddommcligt, Ihcoccnlrisk sect cr dcr inlet Paradox. AEI 179 10 200 14 192 20
var Inderlighcdcn, tip derfor Paradoxct for al slode ohjcktivt fra, AEI 179 37 201 9 193 12
theoccntrisk seel cr der inlet Paradox, den sandc Speculation blivcr AEI 180 29 202 7 194 7
bliver derfor ikke slaacnde vcd Paradoxel, den gaaer vidcrc AEI 180 30 202 8 194 8
dcr ccngang for alIc er Paradoxet og paa clhvcrt I'unkt paradox, AEI 181 9 202 28 194 27
o.s.v., er vcl Paradoxet sensu strictissimo, dct absolute Paradox. AEI 181 19 203 4 194 37
cr vcl Paradoxet sensu strictissimo, dct absolute Paradox. A E.I 181 20 203 5 194 39
Men sum dct absolute Paradox kail dct ikkc forholde sig AEI 181 20 203 5 194 39
Dct relative Paradox forholder sig til den relative Eorskjel mcllcm AEI 181 21 203 6 195 1
mindre klogtipe llovcdcr, men del absolute Paradox, nctop fordi det cr AEI 181 23 203 8 195 3
gjor l orstaaclscn af Paradoxct commcnsurabel for Eorskjcllcn mcllcm AEI 181 34 203 20 195 14
at det jcg har forstaaet ikkc cr del absolute Paradox, men ct rclativt, AEI 181 39 203 26 195 19
tlii det absolute Paradox kan dcr kun forstaaes om, at AEI 181 39 203 26 195 19
dct er nctop dct, som Paradoxct siper, der blot stodcr AEI 182 3 203 29 195 aa
..Spckulationcn dcrimod anlagcr vcl Paradoxct, men blivcr ikke AEI 182 14 204 6 195 35
man vcl nok nodt til at blivc staaendc vcd Paradoxct, naar dcttc netop AEI 182 20 204 13 196 3
Korklaringcn af Paradoxct lydcliggjor hvad Paradoxct AEI 1X2 30 204 23 196 14
af Paradoxct tydcliggjor hvad Paradoxcl cr, og tager Dunkclhcdcn AEI 182 31 204 24 196 15
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Port op tydcliggjor, at iter inlet Paradox cr; men dctte Sidstc Alii 1X2 32 204 25 196 16
men dcttc Sidste cr jo inpen Porklarinp af Paradoxct, men vcl en All 1X2 33 204 27 196 17
af Paradoxel. men vcl en l-'orklarinp af. at dor inlet Paradox or. Alii 1X2 34 204 28 196 18
Men dcrsoni Paradoxct fremkommer ved at del livigc op et existerende A El 1X2 34 204 28 196 18
taper da Forklaringcn. som den taper Paradoxct bort, ogsaa del A El 1X2 36 204 30 196 21
Altsaa den porklarinp af dct absolute Paradox, at dcr inlet A El 183 1 204 34 196 25
at dcr inlet Paradox cr uden saadan til en vis Grad, AEI 1X3 2 204 35 196 26
porklaringen cr. at Paradoxct kun er saadan til en vis Grad, og AEI 183 4 205 2 196 29
Op naar saa P.n talcr om dct absolute Paradox, dcr er Jodcr AEI 183 9 205 8 196 34
sclv erkl.erer sip at varrc Paradoxet, saa cr Spcculationens Forklaring AEI 183 23 205 23 197 12
At forklare Paradoxct cr dct at gjorc dct Udlryk Paradox AEI 183 27 205 28 197 16
cr del at gjorc dct Udlryk Paradox til el rhclorisk Udtryk, AEI 183 27 205 28 197 16
I saa Paid blivcr jo dog summa summarum, at dcr inlet Paradox er. AEI 183 30 205 31 197 20
ham at jee sipcr dctle, som kundc jcg ogsaa lucvc Paradoxct. ingenlunde. AEI 183 32 205 33 197 22
rncd mindrc Ophatvclsen mere angik Professorcn end Paradoxct, saa han, AEI 183 35 206 2 197 25
Itan, istedenfor at breve Paradoxct, sclv blev en bctrcnkclig phantastik AEI 183 35 206 2 197 25
Del at lorklare Paradoxet vildc da vrerc dybcre op dybcrc AEI 183 38 206 5 197 29
da v.erc dybcrc op dybcrc at fattc, hvad et Paradox cr, og at Paradoxct A F.I 1X3 39 206 6 197 30
og dyberc at fattc. hvad et Paradox cr, op at Paradoxet cr Paradoxct. AEI 1X3 39 206 6 197 30
og dshcrc at fatle, hvad et Paradox er, og at Paradoxet cr Paradoxct. AEI 184 1 206 7 197 31
sret Paradoxct saalcdcs var Grrcndscn for cn Pxistcrcndc Porhold AEI 1X4 4 206 10 197 34
saa vil Paradoxct heller ikkc vrcrc til at forklarc ved Andct, AEI 184 6 206 12 197 36
udlrykkcr selv del absolute Paradox (thi Speculationen cr ikkc bange AEI 184 8 206 14 197 39
Profcssorer og Privat-Doccntcr, da vac den ct Paradox for A1 Ic; i AEI 184 14 206 21 198 6
er Prival-Doccnt, altsaa er den kun et Paradox for Ni af Ti. AEI 184 16 206 23 198 8
saa vil Christcndommcn have ophort at vicrc ct Paradox. AEI 184 19 206 26 198 11
— Den der derimod vil paatape sig at forklarc Paradoxct, han vil da. AEI 1X4 20 206 27 198 13'
nctop samlc sig paa at vise, at det maa vicrc ct Paradox. AEI 1X4 21 206 28 198. 14
naar dct Afgjorcndc, naar Paradoxct ncdsxttcs til ct rclativt Moment, AEI 186 5 208 24 200 3
saa vil dctte sipc, at dcr cr intct Paradox, ingen Afgjorclsc, thi AEI 186 6 208 25 200 4
thi Paradoxct og dct Afgjorcndc cr nctop ved dcrcs Gjenstridighed AEI 186 6 208 25 200 4
For dem cr den Paradoxct, men Spckulanten veed at htcve Paradoxet. AEI 186 20 209 6 200 20
For dem cr den Paradoxct, men Spckulantcn vecd at hxve Paradoxet. AEI 186 21 209 7 200 21
Lad os tagc Syndsforladelscns Paradox. Svndsforladclscn AEI 187 11 210 3 201 15
ligc imod sig maa saa Trocns inderlighcd gribe Paradoxet; og nctop at AEI 187 25 210 18 201 31
Forlvivlclscs Vending blot for at optlagc Paradoxcts Vanskelighcd, AEI 187 36 210 29 201 41
Decl tilbage til ved den at forklare Paradoxct — men dcrfor kan der AEI 187 37 210 30 202 30
en troende Mcnighcd kan ncmlig kun Paradoxet forkyndes af en Troende, AEI 188 8 211 9 202 9
altsaa Synds-Forladclscn cr ct Paradox (almindclig Spending), AEI 188 10 211 11 202 12
Spckulationcn blivcr ikkc staaendc ved Paradoxct, den forklarcr det AEI 188 13 211 14 202 15
Sail nu Synds-I orladclscns Paradox havde sin Grund AEI 188 25 211 27 202 29
dctte Forklaringcn, at del er og blivcr ct Paradox, og da forst Alt AEI 189 3 212 7 203 8
naar Nogcn fatter, at det intet Paradox cr, ellcr kun til AEI 189 4 212 8 203 10
Dcrsom Spckulantcn forklarcr Paradoxct saalcdcs, at AEI 189 24 212 30 203 32
at Paradoxel altsaa ikkc cr den cvige varscntligc Sandheds vrcscntlige AEI 189 25 212 32 203 33
naar den Fcnfoldigc troer Paradoxet, og Spckulanten veed Alii 190 2 213 14 204 12
Vise lilligc veed af, at dct maa vierc el Paradox, dct Paradox, han Alii 190 5 213 17 204 15
at del maa vicrc ct Paradox, dct Paradox, han sclv trocr. Alii 190 5 213 17 204 15
den Vise vecd ikkc noget Andct om Paradoxet. men han veed AI.il 190 7 213 19 204 17
Andct oni Paradoxct. men han veed af, at han veed dct ran Paradoxct. AEI 190 7 213 19 204 17
cenfoldigc Vise vil da fordyhc sig i at fatlc Paradoxct som Paradox, Alii 190 8 213 20 204 18
vil da fordyhc sig i at fatlc Paradoxct som Paradox, og ikkc indladc AEI 190 8 213 20 204 18
og ikke indladc sig paa at forklare Paradoxet ved at forstaac, AEI 190 9 213 21 204 19
Christcndomnicn cr Paradoxel, Paradox og Lidcnskab passe ganske AEI 192 1 1 216 2 206 25
cr Paradoxct. Paradox og Lidcnskab passe ganskc for hinanden. AEI 192 11 216 2 206 25
og Paradoxct ganskc for den i Fxistcntscns Yderstc Bcstcdtc. A El 192 12 216 4 206 26
der saalcdcs passe for hinanden som Paradox og Lidcnskab, AEI 192 14 216 6 206 28
her. at den Existercndc ved Paradoxel sclv er bcstedl i F.xistcnlscns AEI 192 17 216 9 206 31
Forstaaclsc mcllem Lidcnskab og Paradoxet, thi helc Tidcn AEI 192 22 216 15 206 36
en ccnfoldig Viis, der soger at fattc Paradoxel, vil bcstricbc sig for AEI 192 27 216 20 207 2
sclv om dcr i Paradoxel var cn lillc Rest af guddommclig Vilkaar, AEI 192 29 216 23 207 4
og i ethvert Oicbhk opdagc Usandsynligheden. Paradoxct, for da med AEI 194 26 218 30 209 3
at dct Usandsynligc, dct Paradoxc cr Nnget, som Trocn AEI 194 28 218 32 209 5
sig sclvvirksom til del Usandsynligc og dct Paradoxc, sclvvirksom i at AEI 194 38 219 8 209 15
thi dct Usandsynligc og dct Paradoxc cr ikkc til at naac A Fi 1 195 3 219 12 209 19
ikkc dc dohbelt rcflcktcrcde rcligicuse Catcgoricr i Paradoxct. Alii 214 28 242 28 27) 28
Tro, Paradoxct og andct saadant, dcr vxscntligen forholdcr AEI 225 21 255 32 240 27
hlivcr dog Afgjorclscn ikkc sat i ct Paradox, og den metaphysiske AEI 226 27 257 11 241 33
den cvige Sandhcd som Paradoxct ved at vicrc hlevct til AEI 227 2 258 a 242 1
kun tienke cn cvig Salighcd, del Paradoxe liggcr dcrfor, fuldt saavel AEI 1 227 28 257 34 242 33
Paradox ' '
Paradox (Ports.)
I Paradoxet cr del ontvcndl, dcr cr Aanden tilskvndcndc,
lltimorrii nicdtti|:cr da ikkc den lidende Side af Paradoxet, og ikke den
cr den nntodne Humors Forfalskning :if Ptiradoxct som Incitamcnl for
Sag bIi\ cr del mod Paradoxct, Christendommens uforandrede Vilkaar,
Nei, del christcligc Paradox cr ikke saadan Dit og Dat, nogct
for elhvcrt Standpunkt lige til Paradoxct, der paradox accentucrer
cr at villc troc, og udtrykkcr det paradoxc Forhold til det Paradoxe.
syncs dog nxstcndccls lidt for Meget af dct Paradoxc.
Men Itvad cr dct Modsattc af Mediation? Dct er dct absolute Paradox,
paradoxc Accentuation af Pxistcnts, paa Paradoxct, paa Bruddet mcd
end den skjultc Indcrlighcd, forholder den sig dog til Paradoxet.
Dctte cr Paradoxct (livorom hcnviscs til dct Foregaaendc
mcd mindrc den Existcrcndc sclv cr Paradoxct, ved hvilkcn Bcstcmmclse
. 1. Synds-Bevidstheden cr det Paradoxe, og ved den ganske conscqvcnt
ved den ganskc conscqvcnt igjen Det dct Paradoxe, at den Existerende
Christelige, kail dct gjelde og om Paradoxct, at dct at lidc uskyldigt
Kjendct paa Christendommen er Paradoxct, dct absolute Paradox.
Kjendet paa Chrislcndommcn er Paradoxet, dct absolute Paradox,
en snakaldct christclig Speculation haiver Paradoxet, og gjor denne
thi i Forhold til del Evigc er en Nyhed rigtignok ct Paradox,
linicrc, men ogsaa kun i Kraft af Paradoxct, og for at blive opmatrksom
og for at blivc opmtcrksoni paa Paradoxct maa man have den Bcstcmmclsc
tagct sig Christus og Christendommen og dct Paradoxc og det Absurdc,
A hoicrc end B, thi saa cr Paradoxct, dct Absurdc o.s.v.,
heller ikkc cengang vierc den Troendc del Paradoxc og saa undcrhaanden,
kan ikkc blivc stnaendc ved ikkc at forstaac Paradoxct, fordi dct er
Dct Paradoxc liggcr i, at dctte tilsyneladcndc xsthctiskc Forhold,
At dcttc ikkc ladcr sig Itenke, cr jo nctop det Paradoxc.
'Men fastholdcs Paradoxct ikkc saalcdcs, saa er Rcligicusitctcn
trods Christendommens Paastand, at del Paradoxc, den talcr om,
forskjclligl altsaa fra ct rclativt Paradox, dcr hSchstcns vanskeligt
hvad der kan og skal og vil vicrc dct absolute Paradox, dct Absurdc,
i Forhold til det vatscntligcn Paradoxe at see Forsogene paa
da dct absolute Paradox netop frabeder sig al Forklaring;
eller parallclliscrcr Paradoxcts Uforstaaclighcd mcd Andct o.s.v.
hvorfor den blivcr Paradoxct saa licngc der cxistcrcs,
men i Forhold til dct absolute Paradox cr denne Skimtcn og Misscn
i Ave ved at forkyndc, at Paradoxct ikkc kan og ikkc skal forstaaes,
at Paradoxcts Uforstaaelighed skuldc forholdc sig til Differentsen
Paradoxet forholder sig vtcscntligcn til det at vxre Mcnncskc,
at vtcrc naglct til dct Paradox at have begrundet sin cvige Salighcd
fordi vi i Forhold lii Paradoxct og det Absurde ere allc
til fra den at bestemme Paradoxct (Christendommens Nyhed cr
omvendt tilbagckaldc Paradoxct ved lljtrlp af Analogicn,
Anvcndelse dcrfor er Analogicns Tilbagekaldclsc, ikkc Paradoxcts.
i Virkclighcdcns Medium maa blive det absolute Paradox.
Virkclighedcn cr del lloicstc, dct Paradox; thi Chrislcndommen som
ikkc vanskclig at forstaae, Vanskclighcdcn og Paradoxct cr, at dct cr
Den dcr forstaacr Paradoxct (i Bctvdning af at forstaac
Lidenskab grcb som det absolute Paradox (ikke som det relative,
meget godt vcdblivc at bcvarc sit Forhold til dct absolut Paradoxe.
at ban forstaacr dct Paradox (i ligefrem Betydning):
dcr forstaacr Paradoxet, vil misforstaaende glemme, at Christendommen
at Christendommen cr dct absolute Paradox (ligesom dens Nyhed den
til Virkclighcd, og nclop dcttc cr det Paradoxc, ikke det Fremmede,
Den der forstaacr Paradoxct vil glemme at han ved at forstaac
men i Virkcligheden mcd dct cnkcltc Mcnncskc cr nclop Paradoxet.
Men Paradoxct, dcr fordrcr Trocn mod F'orstand, udviscr strax
Forargclsc der lider, cllcr den dcr spotter Paradoxct som Daarskab.
Poinlct jo nclop cr, at dct cr Syndercn dcr soger hen til Paradoxct?
Disciplcnc en Smule fra sig ved lljtclp af ct Paradox: ja det cr
cr ved Paradiixcts I jernhed at sikkrc sig mod al Nicrgaacnhed.
Del Paradox liggcr i at gjorc el Barn til Paradigmti;
at dclte cr Paradoxct i Modstctning til at v.xrc kommcn i llcrlighcd.
Paradoxct liggcr hovcdsagcligcn i, at Gud, den Fvige, cr blcvcn til
saa kan dct ikke blivc opmicrksomt paa dct absolute Paradox, men har en
barnagtigc Orthodoxic denne Fornedrclse som Paradoxct: saa viscr den
saa viscr den co ipso, at den ikkc cr opmtcrksom paa Paradoxct.
Dct Paradoxc cr, at Christus cr kommcn til Verden for at lidc.
vidcrc en Landstorm af Analogicr Paradoxcts uindtageligc Befxstning.
Dan. Dan. Eng.
T. 3. udg. 2. udg.
5. /. s. /. P- /.
A El 227 41 258 34 242 45
AF.l 244 34 279 4 259 17
A El 245 8 279 17 259 31
AE1 246 17 280 33 261 1
AE1 246 34 281 16 261 18
AE1 251 3 286 18 265 23.
AE2 28 35 312 3 288 2
AE2 65 33 356 19 329 13
AE2 75 19 367 31 338 32.
AE2 204 37 522 31 473 37
AE2 204 40 522 34 473 39
AE2 205 18 523 8 474 16
AE2 206 36 525 1 475 34
AE2 206 37 524 33 475 37
AE2 206 38 524 34 475 38
AE2 207 9 525 10 476 7
AE2 211 20 530 15 480 21
AE2 211 20 530 15 480 21
AE2 211 21 530 16 480 22
AE2 211 40 530 35 480 41
AE2 223 37 545 32 492 37
AE2 223 38 545 33 492 38
AE2 226 12 548 7 495 4
AF.2 227 20 549 21 496 11
AE2 227 31 550 6 496 22
AE2 227 35 549 30 496 37
AE2 229 28 552 15 498 14
AE2 230 7 552 23 498 22
AE2 230 8 552 24 498 23
AE2 230 11 552 27 498 25
AE2 230 12 552 28 498 26
AE2 230 22 553 3 498 36-
AE2 230 27 553 8 499 1
AE2 231 a 553 18 499 11
AE2 231 6 553 22 499 15
AE2 231 20 554 3 499 30
AE2 231 37 554 21 500 9
AE2 232 24 555 13 500 36
AE2 234 9 557 11 502 20
AE2 234 12 557 14 502 23
AE2 244 27 569 9 512 25
AE2 246 2 570 27 513 35
AE2 246 20 571 11 514 12
AE2 246 aa 571 13 514 14
AE2 246 24 571 15 514 15
AE2 246 30 571 22 514 21
AE2 246 33 571 25 514 24
AE2 246 35 571 27 514 25
AE2 247 II 571 42 514 38
AE2 247 14 572 3 514 40
AE2 247 21 572 11 515 1
AE2 247 22 572 12 515 2
AE2 247 29 572 19 515 8
AE2 247 30 572 20 515 9
AE2 247 33 572 24 515 12
AE2 247 36 572 27 515 14
A E2 248 1 572 31 515 18
AE2 251 6 576 13 518 22
AE2 251 9 576 16 518 25
AE2 256 26 582 33 524 11
A F2 258 14 585 2 526 2
AF2 258 17 585 6 526 5
AF2 258 24 585 13 526 13
A 1:2 260 15 587 14 528 1
AE2 260 16 .887 15 528 2
AE2 260 24 587 23 528 9
AE2 260 30 587 30 528 15
AE2 260 31 587 31 528 16
AE2 261 20 588 26 529 6
AE2 261 22 588 28 529 8
/>:> /
Dan. Dan. Eng.
T. 3. udg. 2. jdg.
s. /. s. 1. P- /.
Paradox (Forts.)
oi' del absolute Paradox er jo kjendcligt paa, at ethvert Analogon AF.2 261 32 589 3 529 18
(den mvthiskc Commcnsurabilitct), ikkc Paradoxel, hvcm Ingen kundc AE2 262 37 590 15 530 22
Dot Paradoxc Upper nctop i, al Dot gjcldcr som dct hoicrc AFT! 268 40 597 35 535 42
Del absolute Paradox skal nok hxvdc sip sclv, thi i Forhold AE2 269 23 598 17 536 36
Dcttc Hvorledcs kail kun passe til Pet, til dct absolute Paradox. AE2 272 33 602 13 540 7 .
op alcnc paa den Troendc, dcr forhoidcr sig til dct absolute Paradox. AE2 273 7 602 23 540 16
dot cmincntcstc Hoveds prundigst gjcnncmtamktc Mcning er et Paradox. LA 97 10 115 5 79 26
hvorimod dct Paradoxc og Troen danncr en qvalitativ Sphscrc TSA 52 32 113 6 141 29
brinpc, brugcr Udtrykkct „Paradox", bruges dctte dog kun i uvisentlig TSA 53 7 113 21 142 19
uvxxcntlig Forstand om dct transitoriskc Paradox, om Anticipalioncn, TSA 53 9 113 23 142 22
men jo mere ban kommcr til sig sclv, jo mere forsvindcr dot Paradoxe. TSA 53 12 113 27 143 4
forud for sin Tid og dcrfor staac som ct Paradox, men tilsidst vil TSA 53 13 113 28 143 6
Sl.cgten dog saalcdes assintilcrc sig det ccngang Paradoxe, saa dct ikkc TSA 53 14 113 29 143 7
Iran kan have at forkyndc, cr dct vxscntligc Paradoxc. TSA 53 33 114 14 144 4
tlii del vxscnllipc Paradox cr nctop Protestcn mod Immancntscn. TSA 54 2 114 22 144 16
Hclragtninp vil vistnok syncs mange ct Paradox, en Ovcrdrivclsc, SD 81 17 153 18 155 17
den er heller ikke ct Paradox, tvtcrlimod en conscqvcnl SD 81 23 153 24 155 23
Criterium: det Absurdc, Paradoxct, Forargclscns Muliglicd. SD 136 24 219 24 214 7
Christendommcn derimod fxstcr Endc ved Hjxip af Paradoxct. SD 145 37 230 26 224 17
Og del forstaacr sip, Paradoxel, Trocn, Dopmel, dissc SD 149 4 234 12 227 27
— dog ikke som kundc det begribes, men som ct Paradox, dcr maa trocs. SD 150 13 235 32 229 10
— op Menncskc maa vicrc befarstet som den cr det i Paradoxct og Troen, SD 151 20 237 12 230 28
en ganskc anden Porstand Forargclscns Mulighed, dct Paradoxc i sig. SD 151 36 237 30 231 7
Det Paradoxc cr ncmlig Conseqventsen i Forhold til Larren SD 151 37 237 31 231 9
maa trocs, da det jo er dct Paradoxc, som intct Menncskc kan begribe) SD 157 5 244 16 237 6
vcl ;it marrkc betrypget i Paradoxct og Forargclscns Mulighed) SD 167 16 256 19 248 20
hvilkcn principiclt forhoidcr sig til Paradoxct (Christus) SD 178 6 269 12 260 6
den vedbiiver saa at stirrc paa dct cnc og sammc Punkt, paa Paradoxet. SD 179 22 271 8 261 35
, N'egtcn af Christus som Paradoxct liggcr naturligviis igjen N'egten SD 179 38 271 25 262 14
kan ..vide" 0111 ..Christus"; han cr Paradoxct, Troens Gjenstand, kun IC 36 6 42 20 28 11
Han cr Paradoxct, som Hisloricn aldrig kan fordoie cllcr omsxtte IC 40 25 47 32 33 15
Kraft ud af Christendommen; Paradoxet afspxndtcs, man blcv Christen IC 45 2 53 1 38 8
historisk Person, da han som Paradoxct er en hoist uhistorisk Person. IC 70 29 84 6 67 30
Gud-Mcnncskct cr Paradoxct, absolut Paradoxct; dcrfor IC 86 28 104 7 85 2
Gud-Mcnncsket er Paradoxct, absolut Paradoxet; derfor cr dct ganskc IC 86 28 104 7 85 2
men dcclamcrcnde latggcr Alt, sclv Paradoxct, ud i ct IC 105 16 125 25 106 13
uadskillclig fra og vtcscnlligcre end Lxren, er et Paradox, saa cr al IC 121 26 145 5 123 25
fra dct Christclige Forargelscn, Paradoxet o.s.v., anbringcr istedct: 0 177 3 201 9 162 34
Paradoxer
skjondt man cllcrs hadedc Paradoxcr. frygtede man dog EE1 52 32 42 2 51 22
har Dristighed nok til at ovcrbyde Dig i Paradoxcr, naar den narsten EE2 107 15 122 28 113 32
Forstand Dristighed til at ovcrbvdc Dig i Paradoxcr; thi den har EE2 107 17 122 30 113 34
hvilkct vii sigc, at dcr kun cr relative Paradoxer, den cr — ikkc AE1 183 3 205 1 196 27
Vcl har ncmlig Humor ogsaa med Paradoxcr at gjore, men knibcr AE2 204 40 522 34 473 39
Pengc
som endnu tinker paa Naomi og samlcr Pengc for cngang at hjxlpe hendc, LP 55 38 98 7
Fadcrcn i ikke at lilbagcbctalc dc laante Penge, saa udviklcr han BI 180 7 245 23 171 23
han ikkc har bckymret sig om at sarnie Penge. ikkc om Huusholdningcn, BI 210 24 281 29 205 21
Indgriben gjordc gait, ved ikkc at tage Penge for sin Undcrviisning. BI 215 19 288 9 211 1
Bravour omtalcr, at han ikkc tog Penge for sin Undcrviisning BI 215 21 28S 11 211 3
i omvendt Forstand blcv incommensurabcl for Penge og Penges Varrd. BI 215 24 288 15 211 6
han ladcr ham ikkc blot modlagc Penge, men endogsaa Mcelsackke BI 215 38 288 33 211 37
Fortjenstligt, at han ikkc tog Penge for sin Undcrvismng, ikke BI 216 11 289 3 211 27
at al sand Underviisning cr incommcnsurabel for Penge, og vel cr BI 216 14 289 6 211 30
at det i op for sig cr urigtigt at tagc Penge for sin Undcrviisning. BI 216 18 289 11 211 35
fordi. dcrsom han havde Penge, det inlet Tab var for BI 222 12 296 11 218 25
fordi, da overhovedet Penge ingen Rcalitcl havde for ham, Straffen BI 222 16 296 15 218 30
cntcn han udrcdcdc mange cllcr faa Penge, dct vil sigc, BI 222 18 296 17 218 32
han kan udrede, da Penge ncmlig ingen Vicrdi har for ham. BI 224 14 298 31 221 1
Dc varc allevcgnc, som man sigcr, ligcsom gale Pengc. BI 229 8 304 9 226 9
Intcrcssc var, n.xst cfter den at tjene Penge, at faac Indflydclsc paa BI 230 21 305 18 227 5
Ni.st Uafh.xngighed clskcdc hun Penge umaadcligt, som BI 303 31 394 35 310 7
sine Gunslbcviisningcr ikkc allid tog Ilensyn til Penge, han syncs for BI 304 18 395 28 310 35




THE SO-CALLED HISTORICAL JESUS
AND THE HISTORIC,
BIBLICAL CHRIST*
* Translated by Carl E. Braaten, Fortress Press,
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The thought of Martin Kahler provides an interesting
additive to the transition that evolves in the Liberal
distinction between external and personal facts. The
Liberals appear to have bifurcated the person of Christ into
the external details of His physical presence and into the
personal fact of His "inner life". The emphasis upon the
personal dimension of faith's content was assumed to provide
the sure and certain basis for faith's relevance. The
reality of His "inner life" was apparently associated with
meaning and value. In the biblical narrative, one can discern
the irresistible power and force of His personality. Amid
the contingency and probability surrounding the details of His
person, one can personally experience the immediate reality of
His intimate, subjective life. Consequently, a shift in
emphasis appears to have taken place. The Liberals do not
seem keen to insist upon the factual aspect of His person
other than to say that He was a real man. The incertitude of
historical knowledge was evidently too unsure a foundation on
which to establish faith. However, the Liberals did
utilize historical research in order to retrieve Christ's
personality. But the application of the method stopped at
the point of this discovery. Its undemonstrable power
provides the bedrock for the content of faith. His personality
is the authenticating factor which insures the relevance of
the message. Needless to say, the Liberal answer to Lessing's
problem was short-lived. Kahler seems to offer a variant to
the Liberal position. For him, it is no longer legitimate
to bifurcate Jesus Christ into the historical and faithful
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components. One of the reasons for this position shows it¬
self in Kahler's attitude toward the "Life of Jesus" method.
"How many authors of the 'Lives' blithely compose epics and
dramas without being aware that this is what they are doing!
And because this is done in prose...people think that this is
merely a presentation of the historic, biblical picture of
Christ. Far from it!" (57) This method seeks to dissect
the narrative in the hope of bringing from concealment the
Jesus Christ behind the faith-claims. To accomplish this
task, the "Life of Jesus" scholar manipulates the text in
order to gain the data which he deems pertinent. But Kahler
complains that in the end the Jesus that is constructed is
nothing more than a replica of the scholar's imaginings. To
succeed in his task, the scholar fails to realize the peculiar
nature and special reference of the biblical material. One
is not simply dealing with an historical document from which
it is possible to glean facts and details. Historical research
may assist faith in the explication of its message. But in
the "Life of Jesus" approach, this research has turned against
faith and no longer safeguards and interprets the "solid core
of the content of faith". For Kahler, this "solid core" is
the biblical Christ. He is the great power which sustains
the vitality of Christianity. It is just too simple a
matter to dispose of faith by treating it as nothing more
than history. But Kahler persists in maintaining that the
biblical material mediates something uniquely significant for
the present. Christ's contemporaries evidently perceived
something unique in His person. Scripture allows the present
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to have contact with Him. Indeed, the scriptures are not
mere objective reports of historical investigators who were
simply chronicling the events of His life. Rather, KShler
sees them as testimonies and confessions by people who
believed in Christ. Consequently every detail of the
biblical recollection displays its religious significance.
The narrative presents Him as giving the assurance and
impression that the way to the Father is through Him. The
Christ the scriptures present in their totality is not a
legend but a real human life. Kahler admits that this
material is not enough to write a "Life of Jesus", but it is
quite sufficient for the faith. The scripture provides "the
knowledge of faith concerning the person of the Saviour".
What is most decisive is the crucifixion and resurrection.
This is the two-fold end of His work.
That work is accessible to each of us: in the church
as it marches through the centuries, in the confessing
word and confessing deed of our fellow Christians, and
in the living faith which Christ himself has evoked
from us. The passionately held dogma about the
Saviour vouches for the reliability of the picture
transmitted to us by the biblical proclamation of
Jesus as the Christ. (95)
As a result, the biblical picture and proclamation both
recollect and confess the historic, biblical Christ. In
communication with the text, man apparently experiences these
recollections and confessions for himself. But more is also
involved, "in presupposition and intention the recollections
always witness to something which lies beyond mere historical
factuality — something which we call revelation or salvation "
(126). Kahler appears to - be striking a very new tone. He does
not want the text to be viewed as simple history. But
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he does want to maintain that it is not a legend, but that
it is dealing with a real person. This person is not
exhausted in a complete remembering of His historical
factuality. Christ's person is known in its historic-supra-
historic effect. Historical research evidently cannot pursue
the latter dimension. Yet Kahler is not keen to deride this
aspect. It may be that he is implying the limitation of
competence for the historical, objective method. However, he
does seem to mediate the multi-dimensional make-up of Christ
(l) by allowing scripture to be seen as a recollection of a
real life, (2) by complementing the recollection with the
confessional, and (3) by presupposing a revelational and
salvific reality which is the basis for (l) and (2). This
latter reality stands beyond mere historical factuality. The
fact of scripture finds its grounding in the recollection/
confession of Christ's contemporaries. This complex pre¬
supposes someone to be remembered and believed. But the
nature and significance of the recollection/confession always
witnesses to a reality beyond present limits of comprehension.
The suprahistoric dimension of Christ places Him beyond
historical research. As a result, Kahler affirms that "the
biblical documents would have a reliability which lies
completely beyond proof..." (126). In this respect, scripture
is not a naked historical record. Rather, it is the occasion
for faith and salvation. It contains the Word of God which
effectively preserves and mediates the reality of the historic,
biblical Christ. Ultimately, the vitality and the preser¬
vation of this entire structure depends upon the work of God.
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The Bible is not the Word, but it is the means for its
transmission. In communication with Scripture, the hearer
may understand the Word as living and revealing "the life-
giving and life-determining self-disclosure of the living
God which comes through human speech..." (140). Thus the
Bible is the normative document which transmits the
recollection/confession complex into the present. This is the
place where man encounters Jesus Christ as an historic,
biblical reality. The Jesus of history and the Christ of
faith coalesce and conjoin for Kahler in the Jesus Christ
portrayed in the whole Bible. For him, there can be no
differentiation between the "historic" and the "biblical"
Christ. The sure and certain basis of faith's ground rests
within the recollection, confession, proclamation, and presence
of the living Christ mediated through scripture.
Kahler's understanding of Jesus Christ effects an
interesting possibility in conjunction with the Liberal
position. The Liberals spoke of His significance and value
for man. They also suggested that His importance becomes
contemporaneous through the immediate impression which His
"inner life" makes. Kahler also speaks about the signifi¬
cance of Christ and of His impression upon the believers.
But Kahler does not deal with His personality or "inner life".
He is interested in portraying a whole person in His full
meaning and import as mediated through scripture. The
Liberals appear to be quite content to open the biblical
material to the dissecting talents of historical research.
Indeed, Harnack sought to trace the development of dogma in
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historical terms and thus release the message of faith
from the grip of historical accretions. Consequently,
Harnack seems to typify the Liberal bifurcation of Jesus
Christ into historical and faithful components. As well, it
is essential to remember that the Liberal position possessed
a strong undercurrent of anti-metaphysical presumption.
Historical method represented a congenial approach to a docu¬
ment which Liberal theology understood in very historical
terms. Jesus Christ and His faith were indeed constituents
in the world process and thus were specimens to be analyzed.
In contradistinction, Kahler did not agree that the biblical
narrative is simply an historical document susceptible to
historical inquiry. Kahler appears to proffer a "Closed
Door" policy to any research and investigation which desires
to interrogate and question the "solid core" of faith. It
may be suggested that he interpreted reality in terms
different than the Liberals. His position on the Christ may
possibly imply that the biblical picture represents a point
of interpenetration between the historic and suprahistoric.
In other words, it may be that Kahler understood the Christ
to be more than value and significance and effect in His
suprahistoric dimension. As a consequence, Kahler may have
presupposed an implicit cosmology which ran counter to the
Liberal climate of opinion. (This latter suggestion seems
to be doubted by Bultmann and Tillich, who both appear to
interpret Christ's suprahistoric effect in terms of meaning
and authenticity.) But for his own part, Kahler is not willing
to permit the biblical narrative to be treated as history per se.
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The Liberals suspend inquiry at the point of Christ's "inner
life". Kahler suspends inquiry with the narrative itself.
It is here that Jesus Christ is encountered. His uniqueness
evidently flows over into the Bible which partakes of His
inexplicable quality. The recollection/confession complex
represents the medium for encountering Him. The Bible is a
witness and testimony to the reality of His historic-supra-
historic person. The uniqueness of Christ stands beyond
mere historical factuality. But Kahler does not want to give
the impression that the text simply deals in legends. The
decisiveness of His crucifixion and resurrection seem to
signify the primary level of facticity. However, this
facticity does not appear to be open to scientific research.
The intention of His work in dying and rising manifests itself
as the moment of salvation and revelation culminating in the
faith of man. Kahler contends that the confessions of
Christ's contemporaries suggest the historic reality behind
and beyond them. But his refusal to treat the confession as
a mere product of history also seems to suggest that the
reality is beyond the limits of factual determination. None¬
theless, Christ remains a living and real person even though
His uniqueness defies analogy as well as naked historical
scrutiny. As a result, research may assist faith in
defining its content, but it cannot turn against faith and
employ its method to perview what stands beyond historical
accounting. As an alternative to the Liberal "inner life",
Kahler suggests the historic, biblical Christ. He is met
in the Bible which represents the Word of God. The life-
giving and -determining self-disclosure of God in Christ
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preserves and initiates the faith. As well, it is the work
of God which preserves and permits the Bible to function as
His Word. In this way, Kahler seems to be offering an
alternative to the Liberal's position. In his own way, he
may be implicitly refuting the anti-metaphysical bias they
possess. If not, he is at least proposing another way of
viewing Christ in the anti-metaphysical tradition. Kahler
does not appear willing to relinquish His uniqueness. Christ
continues to impress man with His significance, but historical
research no longer strips away at the facts. Rather, the whole
biblical picture represents the historic person.
Yet it does seem that Kahler may be interpreted to draw
a distinction between the external facts of physical obser¬
vation and their religious significance. What seems to have
taken place is (l) the factuality now recedes to the twilight
zone of historical discovery — revelational and salvific
qualities lie beyond objective retrieving — and (2) this
twilight reality produces a confessional superstructure which
(a) presupposes and intends a suprahistoric reality and
(b) witnesses to its present importance. This shift relies
upon the work of God as well as the tradition of faith, the
confessing and living of the Christian, and the continued
proclamation of the Word. In a sense, the clarification of
His uniqueness can be attained through the interpretation
attached to His suprahistoric dimension. Now if one follows
Bultmann's "pre-understandings", the work of God becomes
something quite tenuous and beyond experience. One can
live as if God is active, but this will depend upon the
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interpretation accorded to the as if. In this way,
Kahler's under-girding of the historic, biblical Christ by
the work of God can be interpreted away. The uniqueness of
Christ apparently depends upon the continuing presence of God.
Kahler suggests this when he qualifies the reception and
confession by God's initiative. But Bultmann appears to
approach Kahler's Christ with a strong anti-metaphysical pre¬
sumption. He can speak of God only indirectly and tenuously.
God is known through His effects and even then He remains
mysterious and hidden. This interpretation which reflects
the Liberal position apparently has side-effects upon God's
underwriting the historic, biblical Christ. The supra-
historic dimension appears to become as indirect and tenuous
and as mysterious and hidden as is God Himself. Indeed, the
uncertainty here may well result in a suspension of judgment
about the suprahistoric. Bultmann's "pre-understanding"
does seem to suggest this. And part of the gist of this
interpretation may result from Kahler's use of the word
effect in speaking of Christ's work, The Liberals understood
this term in their complex of meaning. And possibly had
KShler amplified the uniqueness of Christ by proposing a
conceptual understanding of it, his use of effects and
impressions may not have accrued the Liberal connotations.
Indeed, it does seem that Bultmann, in part, is effecting
this type of transition. Nonetheless, he can accept KShler's
position which places the objective reality of Christ beyond
historical method. In this way, the text is still treated
as a confessional document. Confession would seem to pre-
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suppose Jesus' recognition as the Christ. The theologian
would not have to deal with what lies behind this recognition
since it functions as the root fact of faith. Its importance
is its religious significance and not its historical detail.
The theologian can dispense with the historic person and
proceed to the weightier business of understanding His historic
meaning. In this interpretation, one does not resort to
transcendent verification and authentication. The "pre-
understandings" dispose of this. Meaning is now understood
in human, personal and subjective categories. As a result,
one can treat the biblical recollection/confession in anthropo¬
logical terms. Consequently, Kahler's historic, biblical
Christ can be seen as the root fact which demands illumination
in present categories. One is permitted to speak of the Word
of God, of His life-giving self-disclosure, and of His work,
but Bultmann is quick to interject that these terms must be
interpreted for the present context and climate of opinion.
In the end, interpretation may well out-balance the reality
interpreted. And as a consequence, the objective foundation
becomes separated from and superceded by its existential meaning.
Briefly as an alternative to Bultmann, one can view
Kahler through Barth. In his terms, substance and reality
are accorded to God and His work. The historic, biblical
Christ remains real and distinct from man's confession of Him.
As a complementary additive to Kahler, one can follow Barth
and attribute to God in Christ absolute freedom as opposed to
human finite freedom. In this way, faith in the historic,
biblical Christ remains protected in confession and proclamation.
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But He also exercises influence and power upon man.
In Barth's terms, God's existence presupposes man and
his faith. Instead of faith and its confession falling to
human disposition, God mediates and initiates its possibility-
through His objective self-disclosure in Jesus Christ and
through His active personal presence in the Spirit. In the
end, man and God appear to remain real and distinct though
correlated and interconnected in the historic, biblical
Christ. Therefore, Barth's interpretation of the reality
of God in Christ allows the undergirding of Christ to be
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